With the collapse of mainstream literary fiction as a commercially viable genre in 2036 and its subsequent replacement with Algorithmic Sentimentalism, so-called ‘human literature’ became an entirely state and corporate funded activity. Freed from market considerations, writers could concentrate on accumulating the ingroup prestige required to secure so-called ‘non-reciprocal’ sponsors. In the wake of the new sciences, this precipitated an explosion of ‘genres,’ some self-consciously consolatory, others bent on exploring life in the wake of the so-called ‘Semantic Apocalypse,’ the scientific discrediting of meaning and morality that remains the most troubling consequence of the ongoing (and potentially never-ending) Information Enlightenment.
Amar Stevens, in his seminal Muse: The Exorcism of the Human, famously declared this the age of ‘Post-semanticism,’ where, as he puts it, “writers write with the knowledge that they write nothing” (7). He maps post-semantic literature according to its ‘meaning stance,’ the attitude it takes to the experience of meaning both in the text and the greater world, dividing it into four rough categories: 1) Nostalgic Prosemanticism, which he describes as “a paean to a world that never was” (38); 2) Revisionary Prosemanticism, which attempts “to forge new meaning, via forms of quasi-Nietzschean affirmation, out of the sciences of the soul” (122); 3) Melancholy Antisemanticism, which “embraces the death of meaning as an irredeemable loss” (243); and 4) Neonihilism, which he sees as “the gleeful production of novel semantic illusions via the findings of cognitive neuroscience” (381).
Stevens ends Muse with his famous declaration of the ‘death of literature’:
“For the sum of human history, storytelling, or ‘literature,’ has framed our identity, ordered our lives, and graced our pursuits with the veneer of transcendence. It seemed to be the baseline, the very ‘sea-level’ of what it meant to be human. But now that science has drained the black waters, we can see we have been stranded on lonely peaks all along, and that the wholesome family of meaning was little more than an assemblage of unrelated strangers. We were as ignorant of literature as you are ignorant of the monstrous complexities concealed by these words. Until now, all literature was confabulation, lies that we believed. Until now, we could enthral one another in good conscience. At last we can see there was never any such thing as ‘literature,’ realize that it was of a piece with the trick of perspective we once called the soul” (498)
Algorithmic Sentimentalism: Freely disseminated computer-generated fiction based on the neuronarrative feedback work of Dr. Hilary Kohl, designed to maximize the possibilities of product placement while engendering the ‘mean peak narrative response,’ or story-telling pleasure. Following the work of neurolinguist Pavol Berman, whose ‘Whole Syntax Theory’ is credited with transforming linguistics into a properly natural science, Kohl developed the imaging techniques that allowed her to isolate what she called Subexperiential Narrative Grammar (SNG), and so, like Berman before her, provided narratology with its scientific basis. “Once we were able to isolate the relevant activation architecture, the grammar and its permutations became clear as a road map,” she explained in a 2035 OWN interview. “Then it was simply a matter of imaging people while they read the story-telling greats, and deriving the algorithms needed to generate new heart-touching and gut-wrenching novels.
In 2033, she founded the publishing startup, Muse, releasing algorithmically produced novels for free and generating revenue through the sale of corporate product placements. Initial skepticism was swept away in 2034, when Imp, the story of a small boy surviving the tribulations of ‘social sanctioning’ in a Haitian public school, won the Pulitzer, the National Book Award, and was short-listed for the Man Booker. In 2040, Muse purchased Bertelsmann to become the largest publisher in the world.
In a recent Salon interview, Kohl claimed to have developed what she called Submorphic Adaptation Algorithms that could “eventually replace all literature, even the so-called avante garde fringe.” In a rebuttal piece that appeared in the New York Times, she outraged academics by claiming “Shakespeare only seems deep because we can’t see past the skin of what is really going on, and what has been all along.”
Mundane Fantasy (aka, the ‘mundane fantastic’ or ‘nostalgic realism’ in academic circles): According to Stevens, the primary nostalgic prosemantic genre, the “vestigial remnant of what was once the monumental edifice of mainstream literary fiction” (39).
Technorealism: According to Stevens, the primary revisionary pro-semantic genre, where the traditional narrative form remains as “something to be gamed and/or problematized” (Muse, 45) in the context of “imploding social realities” (46).
Neuroexperimentalism: Movement founded by Gregor Shin, which uses data-mining to isolate so-called ‘orthogonalities,’ a form of lexical and sentential ‘combinetrics’ that generate utterly novel semantic effects.
Impersonalism: A major literary school (commonly referred to as ‘It Lit’) centred around the work of Michel Grant (who famously claims to be the illegitimate son of the late Michel Houellebecq, even though DNA evidence has proved otherwise), which has divided into a least two distinct movements, Hard Impersonalism, where no intentional concepts are used whatsoever, and Soft Impersonalism, where only the so-called ‘Intentionalities of the Self’ are eschewed.
New Absurdism: A growing, melancholy anti-semantic movement inspired by the writing of Tuck Gingrich, noted for what Stevens calls, “its hysterical anti-realism.” Mira Gladwell calls it the ‘meta-meta’ - or ‘meta-squared’ - for the way it continually takes itself as its object of reference. In “One for One for One,” a small position piece published in The New Yorker, the famously reclusive Gingrich seems to argue (the text is notoriously opaque) that “meta-inclusionary satire” constitutes a form of communication that algorithmic generation can never properly duplicate. To date, neither Muse nor Penguin-Narratel have managed to disprove his claim. A related genre called Anthroplasticism has recently found an enthusiastic audience in literary science departments across eastern China and, ironically enough, the southern USA.
Extinctionism: The so-called ‘cryptic school’ thought by many to be algorithmic artifacts, both because of the volume and anonymity of texts available. However, Sheila Siddique, the acclaimed author of Without, has recently claimed connection to the school, stating that the anonymity of authorship is crucial to the authenticity of the genre, which eschews all notions of agency.
I’m surprised to find that any human readers actually enjoyed “the story of a small boy surviving the tribulations of ‘social sanctioning’ in a Haitian public school.” But perhaps in 2034 literary awards are distributed according to the same algorithms that write the books.
I feel the same about many contemporary winners!
By total coincidence, Ed Kellar sent me this link just as I was posting: http://www.fastcompany.com/node/1731055/print
I hated Avatar blahblahblahblah it was garbage… I knew it would be bad from previews… blahblahblah
but I did PAY $10 to see it.
Game over man, game over!
Now there’s a future to instill a bit of the shudders…
“Neuroexperimentalism: Movement founded by Gregor Shin, which uses data-mining to isolate so-called ‘orthogonalities,’ a form of lexical and sentential ‘combinetrics’ that generate utterly novel semantic effects.”
This made me think of
http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/15597
There’s something about the hysterical conceits of pre SA technorealism that I find charming. Yeah yeah Bermandites probably have a word for that “something”. I don’t give a fuck. And if you like post SA nostalgic technorealism in the same way and not as hammy satire, then I don’t know what’s wrong with you.
Anyway, my point is the last time I read a computational stylistics tailored narrative I spent all of four days falling in love before I deleted it. It’s always “so good it’s bad,” if you know what I mean. Getting your buttons pushed that fast and that often starts feeling like ODing on yourself after a while. If SAA can overcome the current programs’ tendency to overdo short term optimization so much, I might give the brain wizards another shot, but until then I’m sticking with my touch pad and my classics.
Got a link to that computational stylistics tailored narrative, Frank?
Only to the archives of the bad old days where computational stylistics could do little more than read.
Perfect love in a pill takes less effort anyway. You can even feel effort if you really wanted to.
A webcomic for Bakker:
http://www.smbc-comics.com/comics/20111213.gif
Is that last one this singularity I keep hearing about?
That’s perfect. Nice find.
While I understand the validity of the observation, I still believe this scenario is a chimera.
The difference of my position is that I don’t think this is going to happen anytime soon, and that we only have the illusion of that threshold being just around the corner.
Even if I admit that the pyramid with two sides, materialism and soul, is looking quite a bit lopsided.
i am starting to think that these entries on BBT and the algorithmic sentimentalism are in some way an extended performative homage to and critique of “tlon, uqbar, orbis tertius.”
in retrospect, one can see it building to this.
Neuroscience beginning to penetrate the humanities? http://www.medievalists.net/2011/12/14/using-cognitive-science-to-think-about-the-twelfth-century-revisiting-the-individual-through-latin-texts/
(This is the kind of thing I get in my facebook feed. Total nerd.)
Maybe we really *should* all be out in the streets wearing sandwich-boards! “The end is nigh!”
Algorithmic sentimentalism sounds pretty good!
Is it scary that this sounds like a Wikipedia article for the year you name, 2036? Your line, “the so-called ‘Semantic Apocalypse,’ the scientific discrediting of meaning and morality that remains the most troubling consequence of the ongoing (and potentially never-ending) Information Enlightenment” really spoke to me.
Similar to a quote I read once: “The irony of the Information Age is that is has given new respectability to the uninformed opinion.”
As a former TV news reporter — this quote has stayed with me for a long time. And serves as a reminder to why I’ll never return. Yet, despite what I choose to do for a living, the Information Enlightenment you speak of rages on…
Then one begins seeing things …
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2011/12/14/you-are-a-machine/
I’m not sure that’s really a great example. But I’m sure they wont stop until they make people do things even after the magnets are pulled away and that will be an example. I kinda hypothesize such scientists are under a religious kind of thrall themselves, namely that “I can discover anything and everythings just fine”. Like a little child in them that just thinks it’s all play and everythings kept safe no matter the play. Despite TNT, nukes, etc.
Reading the medieval link and the neurocinema link made me associate another blog I was reading with the frames going on here. I think it’s fascinating how much science (and especially neuroscience) can change one’s perspective. There’s an interesting debate going on in the paleo community between journalist Gary Taubes and Researcher Stephen Guyenet. Taubes argues that fat tissue is highly regulated like other bodily tissues and the brain maintains homeostasis (as it does for all other bodily tissues) and that obesity is caused by a disruption in the regulation of fat tissue. Guyenet argues that fat tissue is unlike all other bodily tissues and is regulated indirectly, that the brain doesn’t act on the tissue itself, it instead regulates a vague desire to eat more or less of more and less tasty foods and that an obese body over accumulates fat as a side effect of your brain sending defective signals to eat more. Yup, the scientist is arguing that the relevant tissue is irrelevant and the journalist is arguing that what happens in the relevant tissue is key.
Note how incredibly flattering Guyenet’s theory is to Guyenet’s profession, the entire theory artfully affirms the profession and position. Guyenet studies the brain and is thus primed to believe that the key is all in the brain. Note how his theory ultimately boils down to a moral value judgement out of a Frankenstein movie, there are abnormal brains (obese people) and normal brains (skinny people such as Guyenet) and the key is fixing the abnormality in the brain, it’s basically phrenology with more research funding.
TaubesA: “Changes in the hormonal and enzymatic regulation of fat metabolism—in the regulation of fat storage and oxidation—drive changes in adiposity; and changes in adiposity drive compensatory changes in intake and expenditure… the body is doing its own thing, more or less independent of the brain’s input, “positive energy balance” — calories in greater than calories out — is a compensatory effect of the growth; it’s not a cause. The brain does what it always does, which is reacting and modulating homeostasis in response to environmental signals. But it’s a secondary organ in this sense.”
Guyenet “the brain is regulating the fat mass not by regulating fat accumulation directly, but by making us eat more and maybe expend less”
Why wouldn’t fat tissue be directly regulated when all the other tissues of the body are directly regulated? the more you look at the science, the more absurdly primeval the conventional knowledge of obesity looks.
Also it is fascinating to see the journalist using clear science and objectivity and the scientist hiding behind obfuscatory words and moralistic value judgments.
http://garytaubes.com/2011/11/catching-up-on-lost-time-%E2%80%93-the-ancestral-health-symposium-food-reward-palatability-insulin-signaling-and-carbohydrates%E2%80%A6-part-iia/
Is Taubes saying the mechanisms behind obesity more resembles the body releasing growth factors in response to physical injury than, say, how emotions can provoke unusual gastrointestinal responses? Maybe my comparison examples are flawed, but I don’t see how the first explanation is so matter of factly more sensible than the second.
Does this reaffirm or refute your views?
Completely off topic
Today I read Roger Ebert’s most recent blog post, http://blogs.suntimes.com/ebert/2011/12/getting_out_of_the_way.html
I enjoyed this post because it starts out talking about a 12 year musical prodigy and then goes to talk a little bit about math and chess as being two other areas where child prodigies can be found.
“It is said that child prodigies are most often found in three areas: Music, mathematics and chess. What these areas have in common is that they all involve abstract relationships. You need no life experience to master them. No emotions, indeed, except those generated in the act of exercising your abilities. No maturity. You don’t have to have been anywhere, or to have done anything.”
How is it that, say, a 3 year old child can start playing a musical instrument that they have never picked up before or write a piece of music?
I remember seeing something on TV (National Geographic channel or Discovery Science, can’t remember which one) where they interviewed a gentelman, Scott Flansburg, who is a “human calculator”. The results of an fMRI done while he was peforming mental calculations showed, per wikipedia (‘cos I couldn’t remember the details) “his brain activity in the Brodmann area 44 region of the frontal cortex was absent. Instead he showed activity somewhat above area 44 losser and closer to the motor cortex.”
you don’t say…
http://chronicle.com/article/The-Research-Bust/129930/
(of course, i suspect that the distribution of science citations is not dissimilar in many respects…)
also, i was struck between the similarity of this essay and Achamian’s relationship to Mimara’s slavery:
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/a-muscular-empathy/249984/
in fact, there were some surprising thematic overlaps in that piece and PON/TAE.
I didn’t understand a word of this post. Not a f’n word.
As I understood it:
It’s basically science fiction. Scott is writing a “retrospective” from the point of view of someone that is chronicling the change in the structure of literature after the Semantic Apocalypse.
The Semantic Apocalypse is one of Scott’s pet theories regarding what the future of media, literature, entertainment and “meaning” (in the broadest sense) looks like.
Basically, he thinks that neuroscience is going to undermine the shit out of everything we hold dear and that corporations are going to use its tools to manipulate our emotions in ways so powerful they’ll make all prior literature seem crappy and trite by comparison. In response, authors start doing all sorts of other strange things. Somewhere along the line, humanity goes insane and becomes the Inchoroi.
Awesome response, Jorge. And I look forward to the descent into ruin.
This is brilliant. I might end up having to crack the old algos books and learn some comp-ling. I’ll check back in if I can find anything of interest.
A paper published in Cell last week describes how using an inhibitor to a protein called PKR can increase memory in mice. They are pushing it as a potential Alzheimer’s treatment but the media is calling it a ‘memory pill’.
Media take:
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/sideshow/super-memory-pill-possibly-alzheimer-cure-could-around-162010613.html
Article abstract:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22153080
Bit off topic of me, but the other day I was thinking about what might be called social organisers. It’s the sort of thing that meerkats and other social animals might be described as using, where they react to where they should be and what they should be doing, in terms of the social structure. These sorts of cues come from the other animals in the social group (like alpha males or alpha females) as to what to do.
Okay, so what happens when this social structure, that kinda doesn’t exist but does (as much as stopping at traffic lights doesn’t exist…but does)…what happens if it folds over onto the viewer itself for what to do? Instead of consulting an external source on what actions to do, it consults the same creature that was otherwise supposed to be observing external sources for this info. And suddenly the creature is its own source of morality? Seemingly. Suddenly the external, existant structure (hey, that alpha is gunna bite you if you go near it’s food, that’s real!) becomes what is on the inside? It might explain voices from god, knowing what’s best for others (hello Vox!) and stuff like that. Just take a structure which really operates from scanning for external cues but shift where it scans to the individual who scans. Not too big a jump since its set to look at other individuals like it already. Now, in the hurly burly of a single mind, every cue to do something is a bit like a bull in a china shop, setting off other thoughts (which are being scanned since were scanning the scanner) else which is a cue, which itself sets off thoughts…and so on. Or am I behind again and this is that watcher and watched stuff?
Sounds a lot like Julian Jaynes notion of ‘bicameral consciousness’ Cal! The ancients had a fare better sense of the Unconscious than we do, I think. They just thought the other voices lived outside their skulls.
Scott, this obviously made me think of your efforts at tearing down genre walls:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/20/george-rr-martin-fantasy
“Fantasy is a silly genre.”
Someone needs to mail this guy a scarf.
But he’s right, isn’t he, in part? The sillyness is actually a crucial element. It’s just that it’s not the only element (unless it’s a pure entertainment piece – although he seems to take them as pure entertainment and it’s curious, what is a piece that isn’t pure entertainment when it’s taken to be so? Does it become a third thing? Have I stretched my brackets for too long?)
“But I had a deep and abiding distrust of any fiction in which the writer could simply invent something to move the plot along: it seemed the antithesis of rigour (I never got on with magical realism for similar reasons).”
Wow. Did he also never read Dante’s Inferno? The Vedas or Eddas? The general dismissal of magical realism as “silly” is a bit…let’s go with weird.
I read this back when you posted it, greg. Funny stuff. Funny how quickly and how easily the lines are redrawn to suit convenience. It just goes to show how fickle and empty they are in the first place. If Santa says he likes a red shiny nose, then all the reindeer fall in line!
Not directly in topic. I just noticed this quote:
“…the forms of a person’s thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language….And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness.”
–Benjamin Whorf
I wonder how it reconciles with the theories here. Even taking out the ideas on consciousness and free will, we could imagine the human being as a machine, but its action still originate at some point and affect something else. They have a direction, in the sense of “something” producing a cascading of effects.
So I continue to believe that, even mechanically, language is “doing” something and is not merely passively suffered.
What are the laws then?
In Bakker’s theory it’s like “consciousness” is an impotent homunculus living in the brain but without practical power. We just “see”.
But where does language stand?
haha,
I ended up with a nut theory.
I was thinking about this idea of language “happening” somewhere else not consciously. Figuratively I imagined things working like a computer screen. The “screen” would be “consciousness”. We witness things (as language) that the screen displays, but it’s obvious that the screen is a misconception and things happen because there’s a computer somewhere else. The screen is conscious, but only “watches” passively.
Now I thought that it’s not even the computer doing things, but a human being that uses it.
So, in reverse, I was wondering the possibility of multiple consciousnesses. Is this theoretically possible?
In the same way you don’t perceive anyone else within you (if you aren’t completely nut) there may be “someone else” that is conscious but that perceives another occluded reality, thinking it a “whole”.
So I was wondering how Bakker theory would work if it admitted the possibility of more than one concurrent consciousness, each “unaware” of the other.
I mean, if consciousness is a “process”, what prevents this process of existing more than once within the same system?
…I am legion?
This notion of multiple consciousnesses has been bouncing in my bean for about ten years now. Could there be a dozen other me’s, each living completely different lives, throwing confabulated rationalizations at the same set of behaviours? The parsimony of evolution argues against it, but it’s interesting, nonetheless.
I don’t like to sleep on the bus because I’m afraid of what I might say while asleep. That, and drooling in public.
You’re making what I call the ‘Goldilocks assumption,’ abe. Information passes through consciousness from sources unknown to destinations unknown: you literally are privy to virtually nothing of what’s going on in your brain at this moment: consciousness is a radically low res cartoon. Now we know, as a matter of empirical fact, that your brain (and its 38 000 trillion operations per second) is doing all the work. What we don’t know is whether your conscious access to what amounts to a flake of that information is efficacious. It probably is, given evolution’s distaste for waste. The real question is whether it’s doing the work you think it’s doing for the reasons you think - and more and more this is looking like wishful thinking.
I’m not sure I get that structure, Abalieno. For awhile I thought you were going to describe one I’d thought of – of there being a kind of user interface. But where’s the user? Well, what’s pressed against the user interface is…another user interface. Otherwise I’m not sure how a screen watches?
On language, I’d think Whorf is trying to describe a prison, but is really making a homely house. If everyone on planet spoke the same language, I might buy it. But clearly each language has been invented. How can we be entirely something when that something was not yet invented at some point? So to me he’s trying to describe language as hemming us in and as the entirely, but given how quaint and poetic language is, it seems more like describing a homely house. It’s like words are shaped trestles and the runner beans climbing them insist that the shapes they form when climbing the trestles are the shapes they really are.
Trestles are important, but I don’t think they are truth.
Finally for a grim example (and what a day for it!), I’m not sure at all about the supposed passiveness of conciousness. The dark bit of my example being were the only species who knowingly suicides. No, bees and similar don’t count, they don’t know they are going to lose the guts of them when they sting. Indeed I’ve heard accounts of clean up crews after a suicide that the blood is everywhere, because the person starts running around. I’d hypothesize that as blood pressure drops, the upper hemispheres get their supply of blood dropped and the more primal parts of the brain suddenly realise the grevous injury that has occured and go…ape shit. I’d say if that primal part were in control, it would never have gone that far to begin with. Not that I’m discounting an ability of the primal part to exert overide at any given time. Personally I think of it like the relationship between horse and rider. But then I thought that’s too close to horsemen of the semantic apocalypse…hehe.
Anyway, what did the selective text reading Santa say when he read a second apocalypse book? “Ho! Ho! Ho!”.
In group in joke humour for the win!
Currently enjoying drifting in the purely science fiction speculative and, even if we may suck as theoretical machines, I almost admire the extent some people can stretch it.
See:
Thus Line, as pleromatic representation of the Void totality of consciousness-absolute, can’t “fit” into the region-of-being set aside for the intrinsically valid and permitted function of the point-limit (now isolated-out as an indefinitely extensible Continent of drifting “contour-space”, the prototype of matter-substance). The consciousness-matter of the ideotype reflected by the filtrate purposiveness of Line toward the interruptive Point, becomes reflected off the resistance-limit of the point functioning as impenetrable basis of nature-matter. Such reflection polarizes the volitional Line, in effect spreading a Curtain of crystal-faceted Light across the coordinative junctures specified by the anticipatory ideotype as the resultant mirror-modeling of the indeterminate point in the overflow presence of encompassing or “surrounding” Line.
…don’t you agree? Consider it goes on like that for about 5000 pages.
I once read a page of text a computer program had randomly generated with a bunch of multi sylable words. And damn, if it didn’t seem to be saying something!
I think it’s the opposite side of the coin to what some authors insist about readers, that they don’t get it all and don’t think about it all. But it can potentially be that there isn’t anything to get, despite an apparent abundance of things to get.
So what catergory does the sample fall under? Neuroexperimentalism?
Conspiracy theories
http://asoiaf.westeros.org/index.php/topic/60302-better-than-the-illuminatus-trilogy/
Happy holidays to everyone who checks this page as compulsively as I do.
Semantic Apocalypse rears it’s (ugly?) head again. And on my 37th birthday, no less.
Well, I have to say it’s not that apocalyptic after all.
We’re machines dreaming we had a soul? How can a machine dream? And who would expect the soul being any more substantial than a dream? Should I quote Prospero?
It’s like saying software didn’t exist because it can’t function without hardware. Well, I wouldn’t be writing this without a software, nor you (hopefully) reading it.
It’s also like saying there is no difference between a human and a rock because both are a bunch of atoms. To such arguments Aristotle replied: “Why don’t you walk off a cliff, then?” (I kid you not.)
And even if such nihilism is irrefutable, it doesn’t mean it’s true. It would be like refusing to move an inch because you can’t refute Xenon’s paradox.
If it still looks apocalyptic,I suggest classic Buddhism (not the modern Tibetan mahayana,the original, Sri Lankan theravada). They thought very much along those lines. Refuting not only the self but any kind of being.They saw only elements. You may not like theirway out, but, hell, it is a way out.
“It’s like saying software didn’t exist because it can’t function without hardware. Well, I wouldn’t be writing this without a software, nor you (hopefully) reading it.”
Explain this a little more. I don’t get it. What am I missing?
The code can exist outside of the hardware. For example, I could sit down with pencil and paper and write out the code for a program. But without the hardware to compile, is it really software?
Did the logos exist before men found it?
Does a story exist in a book when your not reading it?
Is the code written in pencil on a napkin more or less than before it was written? More or less than before it was conceived?
Theravada Buddhism is kind of like post-structuralism: it embraces the possibility of attenuated or nonexistent selves, without accepting that all intentionality is likewise attenuated or nonexistent.
Otherwise, cognitive neuroscience is in the process of discovering how machines can dream. With every month, we become less and less something ‘special,’ something ‘set apart,’ and more another mechanism. That’s the trend… and I simply know of no way to argue against it.
If anyone manages to prove machines can dream, that will make things in general about a thousand times more interesting. It won’t make us any less special, but it will make everything else much more special. And like I said, who would expect a soul being any more substantial than a dream. Honestly, I don’t see anything apocalyptic in that. In fact, I find it invigorating. Imagine the possibilities…
The problem being, of course, that they’re no longer our possibilities. If only because it reveals meaning as a sham.
Let’s just hope that Minsky’s right and they decide to keep us as pets!
Dear Mr Bakker,
I have finally managed to complete the first two novels of your second trilogy, a feat of which I find myself quite proud. I can think of no phrase more apt to describe your later novels than words of your own construction, truly it was ‘the slog of slogs’.
I often found myself yearning for a personal stash of Quirri to carry me through the font of mediocrity and shallow philosophy that you deigned to regurgitate over 500 pages.I could readdress my prior arguments (Which you so conveniently neglected to acknowledge in that joke of a reply which consisted of nothing more than crass insults) however my strongest issue in these books was the way you allowed your rampant misogyny to consume the novels.
Your treatment of Esmenet and Mimara, in addition to revealing your own feelings of helplessness, sexual inadequacy and yearning for love and attention, was also dripping with clichés and stunk of a poor effort to write appealing strong female characters. A feeble attempt to gain mainstream recognition and boost your stature? Way to sell out Mr Bakker.
I also found myself stunned by the sheer level of unoriginality permeating your books. There is a point where shout-outs become idea theft, Dick. Calling a troll a Bashrag doesn’t stop it being a troll, it just conjures image of a PMS soaked tampon, which I suppose is appropriate, as that is how I would describe the ‘Judging Eye’ to any party interested. Your many, many sequences dedicated to contemplating how man’s work paled in comparison to the legacy of the Nonmen is an apt metaphor for you attempting to pay homage to Tolkien, a pale, fleeting shadow floundering after a beautiful and timeless structure.
However, none of these failings compare to your greatest literary sin. Your wanton waste of characters is the final nail in Kellhus’s Gary Stu coffin. Just as Kellhus has an inability to recognise a humans worth beyond their use upon his path, so too do you fail to recognise characters as anything more than a device to advance the ‘story’ of your work. I don’t know what you’re final message is going to be Mr Bakker (Though I am certain I will have heard it many times in my short life) but I am certain that it did not merit the deaths of Maithanet, Inralis and especially the removal of Cnaiur Urs Skiotha, seriously, you remove your only mildly compelling character? Perhaps you wished to correct your, I mean Kellhus’s, mistake of leaving him alive.
So, it is time to summarize this rant. I admire your insight, removing any POV’s from Kellhus, making your thoughts on the novel and the events at hand less blatant. However, this sadly appears to be the only way in which your writing has evolved from your prior trilogy. Reading your books I could only think of Cleric. A Nonman who speaks only in incoherent fragments, never having an apparent point except to himself, preaching to entities who only find him compelling due to conditioning and a lack of any other mental stimuli. I eagerly anticipate your next novel Mr Bakker, it is so rare to find such mediocrity wrapped in layers of egotism and pretension quite so deep.
-Your Loyal fan, Josh.
Thanks Josh. Nothing makes me feel better than making another reader feel more intelligent than they are. The very fact that you’ve been inspired to prove this to me and the greater world, demonstrates, I think, the way even the worst literature can move readers to make a flag of their intellectual insecurity – to be proud of who they are. I would recommend a reread, however: the true pleasure of my work is that they contain something called ‘subtexts,’ angles and observations that are not so easily picked up by readers such as yourself. But if you are really bent on proving yourself, there’s plenty of stuff here on the blog for you to pretend to understand. Plenty more flags to be waved! In the meantime you have my admiration: As much as I strive for mediocrity and pretension, I have never got the knack of being quite so obvious as yourself. You, sir, are the true marvel.
What is a “PMS soaked tampon”?
Presumably a dry one.
Mr. Lamaro you truly are the troll of trolls. A tip of the hat good sir!
Aye, he keeps it up. He’s mastered the charm of a road accident – you know you want to be a better human being, but there’s the delicious tinkle of broken glass and snarl of impacted steel and your rubber necking before you know it.
It saddens me that we probably won’t get another review from him until the next book is released. This guy’s a gold mine.
True, RIP! I was just thinking if he could just do this from a character perspective in Earwa, it’d make a great piece for the fanfiction section!
Its the witty way he uses Bakkers own works against themselves as metaphor and comparison that makes it for me. Genius!
Yesterday I was reading again Von Foerster’s book and there were certain fascinating parts.
The problem I have with Bakker’s theory is that I cannot fully grasp it in its entirety, and so it’s like every time I focus on an aspect I lose everything else. So forgive me if I’m repeating stuff
The first idea is that, in Constructivism theory, there’s no “confirmation” of reality. No certainty of it. What you do instead is “correlate” your sense experiences. “I see the pencil and I hold the pencil”. So “my sensation of touch, in correlation with my visual sensation, generates an experience”.
This simply to say again that we only construct a world we perceive, but we can’t say how much or how faithful is our model. Or not at all.
Quote from Physicist Sir Arthur Eddington:
Consider how our supposed acquaintance with a lump of matter is attained. Some influence from it plays on the extremity of a nerve, starting a series of physical and chemical changes which are propagated along the nerve to a brain cell; there a mystery happens, and an image or sensation arises in the mind which cannot purport to resemble the stimulus that excites it. Everything known about the material world must be inferred from these stimuli transmitted. . . It is an astonishing feat of deciphering that we should have been able to infer an orderly scheme of natural knowledge from such indirect communication.
Or maybe an astonishing pretense.
The interesting aspect is that the book addressed the problem of science as we discussed it. Why believe in science? Because it works. That’s one of the postulates that sustains Bakker’s theory.
Constructivists say:
1- Knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge, IS USEFUL IF it allows us to predict, i.e., to bring about or avoid a certain phenomena.
2- When knowledge no longer serves the purpose it becomes questionable and eventually devalued.
And it all sounds like an act, a choice that is made like a political opinion to me. As if we don’t believe in what is true, but in what is “convenient”. Maybe science has the same place of every other self-serving delusion? Well, as long the delusion doesn’t come crashing down on you.
But then it goes also to explain some experiments about how perception develops after we’re born.
“Newborns do not have object constancy, the capacity to distinguish stable objects. They cannot compute equivalence, a logical operation that must be performed to perceive an object which changes its structure or position in space as the same object.”
“Developmental studies of children, conducted by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, show that we learn to perceive object constancy. It takes about 18 months.”
“Sensorimotor intelligence organizes reality by constructing broad categories of action which are the schemes of the pertinent object, space, time, causality…”
It then says that if you show rows of coins to a five year old, with all rows having the same number of coins but with one row more widely spaced, and so longer, the kid will say that the longer row contains more coin.
But if you then repeat this experiment with a kid at seven he would say the question is stupid, as it is very obvious that all rows have the same number of coins.
“The older child takes a self-evident, or a priori, what only a few years ago he did not know existed. Once a concept is constructed, it is immediately externalized so that it appears to the subject as a perceptually given property of the object and independent of the subject’s own mental activity. The tendency of mental activities to become automatized and for their results to be perceived as external to the subject is what leads to the conviction that there is a reality independent of thought.”
Toward science this is the defying stance of Constructivism:
“The technological advances show “one” of many possible ways to bring about a result or make a prediction. A proven scientific theory is a successful means for reaching a goal.
It merely means we know one viable way to a goal that we have chosen under specific circumstances in our experiential world.”
“A key fits if it opens the lock. It describes the capacity of the key, not of the lock.”
“Scientists rely heavily on mathematics, a system constructed to generate necessary answers to its questions. Necessary answers generate certainty.”
Although here I’m lost because it’s where Constructivism goes metaphysical:
“Radical constructivism maintains that operations by means of which we assemble our experiential world can be explored, and that an awareness of this operating can help us do it differently and, perhaps, better.”
“We can invent keys that unlock our problems, but these inventions only tell us about the key, not about the lock. Although certainty is lost, choice increases.”
But to me ALL this only flows very naturally and coherently into Bakker’s theory. That’s maybe the scary part.
The key (science) really only tells more about us than the world. We strain to see, but we can only see our own reflection. Our science only explores and describes the limited horizon that we are, but nothing of what’s outside.
And this seems telling if one considers that:
“only living organisms qualify as observers”
“Scientists obeyed to this rule of separation because, under certain circumstances, when the observer included himself in his description (observations) it led to paradox, like the paradox one finds in the statement: I am a liar.”
And THIS specific pattern of paradox and recursion IS the very thing that “Gödel, Escher, Bach” describes as the ORIGIN of conscience.
So it’s as if EVERYTHING simply leads back to this kind of loopy paradox that defines both reality (within the blind box) and ourselves (the loop of conscience, and the limited horizon).
Happy New Year.
How does it define reality and ourselves? Isn’t it more being adrift in a storm of data? Not all of which has any actual correlate with things that stay the same (ie, reality)?
Hi Abe – happy New Year! I have a million messages backed up so I can only make a couple of remarks. I know nothing about Von Foerster, but there is nothing constructivist about my approach in the typical philosophical meaning of the term. It’s all just information: it’s the way information is lost on the journey from the environment to the conscious portions of the brain that convinces so many thinkers to mistake ‘experience’ as something ontologically distinct (and derivative). The Blind Brain Theory is just an account of that ‘way.’
I’m not trying to adhere to a canon, nor I even know the canon.
The difference I was pointing out is about the “alternatives” that Constructivism suggests. But other parts of Constructivism, while not perfectly canon, can still adapt to your theory. Take this from the wikipedia for example:
Constructivism criticizes objectivism, which embraces the belief that a human can come to know external reality (the reality that exists beyond one’s own mind). Constructivism holds the opposite view, that the only reality we can know is that which is represented by human thought.
This still seems valid if seen from the perspective of your theory.
You also say that we can’t know what’s outside, and so have a true grasp of external reality. And, by consequence, what we CAN know is simply what’s within the limited horizon.
The difference, if I understand it, is that you deny the “separation” between consciousness and external reality. They are whole, and our consciousness is a tip of the same iceberg that sits outside our control and that we somewhat watch/suffer passively.
Now, about your theory I had the idea of the homunculus (again I’m using terms not accordingly to canon). The homunculus is a living being within the talamocortical system or however you want to call it. So it watches the information that arrives there and thinks about it. That’s our consciousness. A cog trapped in a machine that seems to be aware.
That’s why it all becomes circular. If the information horizon represents the boundary we cannot trespass (but that is still connected and dependent on an external reality) then the model can still be seen in reverse: that we observe and describe merely what’s within that cavern. The more we struggle to get a grasp of what’s outside the more we return to describe the way we work internally, and see externally the shapes that we have internally. We only know what we know, meaning that we simply pin allegories of ourselves on the data we get.
Again the point where I don’t totally embrace your theory is about cause/effect. The idea that perceived reality is a sliver of the external one, and so that we are beginning to manipulate ourselves based on the data (cracking the hardware), works if we intend it with cause and effect. But if you say that consciousness is an “effect” whose cause happens in the rest of the brain that we don’t control, then it’s like we witness a movie of ourselves. Meaning also that we aren’t cracking anything since matters are out of our own hands anyway.
I’d say that the rest of the brain isn’t any smarter and applies its filters mechanically, passes information and then waits for consciousness to decide about it. But I find hard to believe that the hierarchy is reversed (that consciousness is merely “output”).
Is it really necessary in the theory that consciousness is passive? Because I think the whole model works well and explains everything even without that aspect. I’d say it works better.
It’s not that it’s passive; it’s that it’s likely operative in ways that don’t have much to do with ‘you.’ It’s just a waystation, clearing house, that we fundamentally misperceive. The now is an illusion. Your peripheral vision, everything outside your focus, is an illusion in fact. Selfhood is an illusion… The list goes on and on. Think about it. 38 petaflops versus your working memory. The Blind Brain Theory simply relativizes consciousness to the rest of the brain the way astronomy has relativized us to the universe. Something whose self-importance is simply a function of an impoverished and parochial perspective.
“This still seems valid if seen from the perspective of your theory.”
Not at all actually. What we perceive is information FROM the world on the BBT account, not representations OF. There’s no ontological division between what’s in our heads versus what’s in the world. It’s all just information. The machinery of the brain is world enabling, not ego imprisoning. All we have is a keyhole, but it remains a keyhole – and not a movie screen – nonetheless.
I just don’t know what COGNITIVE alternative we have to cause and effect at this level of description.
We only know what we know, meaning that we simply pin allegories of ourselves on the data we get.
With that line I meant to explain what you describe here:
http://rsbakker.wordpress.com/speculative-musings/mathematics-and-the-russian-doll-structure-of-like-the-whole-universe/
So then, what are ‘recapitulations’? Just an alternative possessing an alternative implicature, one that seems to shed a different kind of low resolution light. Another cartoon. Why should the universe possess a Russian Doll structure, one that allows the microscopic to recapitulate the cosmic? I have no idea.
My tentative answer is that “we pin allegories of ourselves on the data we get”.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mise_en_abyme
Why so? I suspect the answer is in Gödel, Escher, Bach, since the book is specifically about “recapitulations”.
Otherwise we can be satisfied saying that we see things that way because it’s that way that we work and only that way that we can “measure” things. We only see “us”, since we have no other tool than that. What’s your “measure”? It’s the occluded horizon that occludes everything else.
I guess your “singularity” is the possibility to pass ourselves a new set of tools (though I suspect that building tools blindly isn’t going to work so well).
It’s not that it’s passive; it’s that it’s likely operative in ways that don’t have much to do with ‘you.’
If you nitpick this I understand less and less.
I’m talking from the point of view of what I intend and seem to control: consciousness. I seem to have my thoughts and make my choices.
But if this decision-making happens elsewhere THEN I say my consciousness is passive. Because I’m seeing things from the closed perspective, after the fact.
Let’s say that the brain is an iceberg and that consciousness is the tip of the iceberg above thee level of water. What’s hidden below is the bulk of the process, and what’s above only moves around because of undercurrents it doesn’t see. So someone who sits on the top of the iceberg only gets to see this “output” as it is already processed “elsewhere”. Maybe he thinks of ruling the world, but he’s only an ant on top of a thing he doesn’t understand.
This was the part where think we agree and that I understand you (but you nitpick and so I don’t know if I got it right).
The part I disagree, or can’t make plausible, is the part where you rearrange hierarchy:
The now is an illusion. Your peripheral vision, everything outside your focus, is an illusion in fact. Selfhood is an illusion… The list goes on and on. Think about it. 38 petaflops versus your working memory. The Blind Brain Theory simply relativizes consciousness
I agree on the part of illusion and misconceptions, but I do not see as the motivation justifying what happens in the rest of the brain. I see more “peripheral vision” and the “now” as abstractions. The same way I see the process of “culling” information as an automatization. The way we operate and are built surely isn’t an act of “will”, and the brain obviously operates the body functions without the constant “intrusion” of consciousness.
But all this is coherent with the more straightforward idea of hierarchy: what enters consciousness, or upper level, is the most important stuff that is “filtered” from the noise. It’s like a spam filter for the e-mail. So that our limited thought can at least deal with important stuff instead of waste time regulating stuff that is better automatized.
Isn’t that pretty much the classical model?
The question I ask you is: isn’t the merit and significance of your theory untouched even if we stick to that hierarchy? What makes you believe that this hierarchy is also a misconception?
Because all the faults and limits of the brain of consciousness are entirely preserved even if we keep that hierarchy.
The other “proof” is from the book you pointed out like “You’re not so smart”. It deals with stuff happening at the fringe of consciousness, so the stuff that goes on without us noticing it. But this book is not titled “You’re SMARTER than you thought”. It shows you the LIMITS of your brain, with the idea that if you “think about thinking” you can somewhat encapsulate those shortcomings and adjust them.
The book essentially says that consciousness has limited control, but that this control is vital, since the rest of the brain is even LESS competent. So it tells you how to increase competence in that part that has control. It teaches you how to be a better “commander” of a process that is more complex and error-prone than you think.
So:
38 petaflops versus your working memory.
Fine. But those 38 petaflops don’t make us any smarter. Someone who looks at me doesn’t see me doing stuff smarter just because my brain knows better what to do than my limited consciousness.
This “blind brain” isn’t this magic wonder of possibilities since it’s STILL not so much more than an ape. “Consciousness” merely lets us sit on the shoulder of this ape and at times give it a tip about where to head to.
WHAT is of this whole thing that you see as false or proven wrong? Why are you against this possibility?
The consciousness we actually have, most likely. The consciousness we think we have, probably not. I understand that you think what you experience has to be special to you, but the fact is, YOU HAVE NO IDEA WHAT YOUR BRAIN IS DOING. Even the most sophisticated neuroscientist living has only the foggiest grasp of what’s going on. All the structural features we can hang our hat on make your optimistic picture look more and more dubious. Do YOU tell the information in your brain what to do? No.
You FEEL like you will this and that, choose peanut butter over jam, but that feeling is simply another brain product, something that lesions can wipe out. It can be subtracted. There’s people who think they will nothing, and others convinced they will everything. How about the consciousness of these people? Does it ‘sit on their shoulder tipping its head one way or the other’?
The tunnel goes this deep and deeper.
I wrote more on my blog about this, but it’s essentially more wood for the same fire:
It’s a Yale course discussing one of Pynchon’s novel and the whole first part describes in broad strokes literature and how it dealt with the perception of reality.
Wonderful to watch in hindsight.
Damn, I forgot to say that the reason I posted that link, beside that it’s really part of the discussion, is that she gets REALLY close to pronounce this phrase:
The Language that Comes Before
There’s a long tradition of granting ontological autonomy to language in literary circles. If your area of expertise is textual interpretation, then it pays to turn both the world and heaven into texts. The man with the hammer, as the saying goes.
YOU HAVE NO IDEA WHAT YOUR BRAIN IS DOING
Well, it still doesn’t counter much. Take an airplane as an example. You are the pilot in the cabin, with controls and gauges all around you. You don’t know /how/ all these instruments deliver information to you, nor you know precisely what each of the instruments is saying at one time. But depending on where you aim the attention you can get information on this and that, as need arises.
In the case of a human being the way it’s all structured is not planned by an engineer as in the airplane, but by nature and the course of evolution. So the brain certainly works in obscure ways, and we don’t have control in the mechanics of it, because we haven’t built the thing before hopping on board.
There’s people who think they will nothing, and others convinced they will everything.
As there can be a pilot who may be more confident than another. In the end they are all up there in the air at the whims of weather and chance. One may think it’s ALL about his expertise, and another may be more fatalist.
In this case, “consciousness” can’t rewire the way we work, but it has a degree of control to move awareness on different things. In that experiment where it is shown that one doesn’t notice that a picture changes color, once you rewatch it, knowing the trick, you DO notice that the color changes. This because your “awareness” has now been selectively activated on that differentiated state. The body and instinct did not think it was relevant data, and decided to not pass it to “consciousness”. But once consciousness has been activated on it, it DOES notice, showing a degree of control, to “override” the norm. Over-ride, describing well what I intend as hierarchy.
You know, chain of command, like when the higher ups notice some screw up and tighten the control. You obviously don’t know what happens everywhere in the whole chain of command, only hope it will keep its organization and doing its job. But if things get screwed up you have /some/ leverage to fix them. Or, if things get really ugly, all the alarms fire and it ends in utter confusion, the whole thing panics and your “commander” can’t really do anything about it.
So, again, all misconceptions, simplifications and myths that the consciousness resorts to in order to optimize its work are still all there. All its shortcomings and stupidity still there. But this (seems to me) is described by your theory as well by one where the “chain of command” isn’t entirely screwed up. Same for your descriptions of literature, philosophy, mathematics and so on. All you said is preserved even without messing with hierarchy.
On top of the fact that your theory opens one more problem about how much energy is wasted in solipsistic activity that has zero relevancy, that can only be justified if “consciousness” is meaningful and not just garbage data.
And so who’s in the pilot’s head? Another pilot? The analogy doesn’t hold.
There’s lots of evolutionary garbage in our systems. That said, being massively deceived about consciousness isn’t saying much, garbage-wise, given that the information we’re talking about is so incredibly small compared to the overall processing load of the brain. Some say less than a millionth. It really could be a ‘garbage side effect’ without in any way impeaching the efficiency of the brain. ‘Spandrels,’ as they are called, abound in evolution.
Brain processing is hierarchical (in some looping, reentrant sense), and the information that conscious experience accesses has a crucial role to play. But you’re simply assuming that what you think you experience has to capture some kernel or essence of what’s going on, and I’m saying that it likely doesn’t. You can’t trust you intuition: that’s simply an empirical fact. Willing is almost certainly something that simply accompanies your actions, so your feeling of control is out the window. So what are you basing your counterargument on?
Not at all actually. What we perceive is information FROM the world on the BBT account, not representations OF. There’s no ontological division between what’s in our heads versus what’s in the world. It’s all just information. The machinery of the brain is world enabling, not ego imprisoning. All we have is a keyhole, but it remains a keyhole – and not a movie screen – nonetheless.
Uhm, you are very wrong here. You’ve likely made a mistake explaining.
It’s not just undifferentiated information. There’s always the example of getting hit on the eye and seeing a light. You see a light because it hits the eye, not because you were hit by a light.
The keyhole is not a keyhole, it’s a membrane. Otherwise the keyhole would provide undifferentiated information from what’s outside. But instead it only provides feedback that is shaped by the device that receives it, then interpreted and so on.
So that specific, limited quote is right: the only reality we can know is that which is represented by human thought.
The part that I acknowledge is that it is not a “movie screen” either, because that would make it arbitrary, whereas the information is manipulated, but not arbitrary. So it’s neither a true hole, nor a movie screen. It is a “construction” or virtualisation that the mind creates emerging from interpreted information.
You know, Matrix or your own book, you could as well be attached to a VR device and you wouldn’t know it.
Nope. You’re simply buying into the traditional paradigm, and haven’t been able to think you way out. Representationalism is something that seems so natural once you embrace the idea that ‘everything you experience’ is actually ‘in your head’ – seems natural. And it’s also the thing that seems to make consciousness so devilishly difficult to explain.
The only reality we know is the reality we find ourselves immersed in, one that circulates from our environment and to our brain and back into our environment. One of the big illusions generated by the kind of representationalism you seem to be espousing is the notion that consciousness lies on the very top of the information pyramid, that its the ‘CEO,’ rather than simply another specialized informatic waystation. You are not some kind of ‘finishing line,’ as Dennett would say, but simply another informatic watering-hole, and a profoundly skewed one at that. Far from a pilot, you’re either a facilitator of otherwise unconscious informatic transactions, or you are some kind of marginal side-effect of high-level information integration. The more we learn, the more this seems to be the case.
It only feels otherwise because, as impoverished and as parochial as your access is, it literally comprises everything for you. It’s another example of another self-aggrandizing trick of perspective.
And so who’s in the pilot’s head? Another pilot? The analogy doesn’t hold.
Well, it fits with the “Mise en Abyme” idea. The infinite spiral/tunnel.
the information we’re talking about is so incredibly small compared to the overall processing load of the brain.
I don’t understand if you think the brain is working something mysterious or if it is doing exactly what we see, only it is doing it without “consciousness” intervention or priority. Consciousness is marginal but overall the work of the brain is the bulk of what we see it doing (the “what” is the same, it’s the “how” that we misperceive).
(By the way, this “spandrel” is quite significant, and if really a spandrel then nature is going to fix it with a very high priority. It’s just a too big thing to go on unchecked)
Do we agree that the whole of the brain is still pretty dumb and makes plenty of mistakes?
Far from a pilot, you’re either a facilitator of otherwise unconscious informatic transactions, or you are some kind of marginal side-effect of high-level information integration. The more we learn, the more this seems to be the case.
Examples? Because I think the various other ones you gave on neuroscience and everything seem to go in the other direction: to consider consciousness as the finest product of evolution, even if still greatly limited and filled with misconceptions.
You base your theory on some scientific experimentation and so that it can explain better certain things. But I only see a number of problems it rises instead of those that it is supposed to solve.
As if your theory goes to an extreme that Occam’s razor would cut.
Or, to put simply, consciousness as CEO is less a leap (Occam’s razor) than consciousness being a spandrel.
Dan Wegner’s “The Illusion of Conscious Will” is a great place to start, since ‘control’ seems to be what’s primarily hanging you up. Otherwise there’s plenty of research out there on processing lags and consciousness, how, for instance, consciousness is the last to be informed of what the body does while playing sports. Tor Norretrander’s “The User Illusion” is somewhat dated, but relevant, given that the research trends seem to bear out his interpretation of the data.
Given that evolution is random I’m not sure what ‘highest achievement’ means in evolutionary terms. Otherwise you’re simply begging the question: just because consciousness is BIG for you doesn’t mean anything at all.
And in point of fact, parsimony (or Occam’s razor) is clearly on my side here. First off, consciousness as spandral is actually far more economical in that it allows us to dispense with all kinds of problematic concepts. It only seems otherwise because you are defending the traditionalist view – it just seems simple because it seems ‘obvious.’ I don’t need explanations for apparent miracles like control, or the panoply of intentional concepts (like representation) that strike us as ‘intuitively true.’
The thing that bums me out the most about the blind brain theory is its parsimony.
I also hit a block:
You seem to say that the brain thinks, but us, as consciousness, misperceive that thinking as our own doing and will. But, saying so, you mean that the brain still does its works. “Choice” still happens, but it happens for the most part outside of consciousness, and we get to see only a sliver of it that we misperceive as the whole. Overall, we misperceive the “who” does the thinking, but thinking and choosing still happen, done elsewhere.
But let’s say I “force” myself to sit down and study math for an hour. What the fuck is my brain doing? It’s studying math. It’s not like it BELIEVES studying math but it’s really doing something mysterious in the background. IT IS STUDYING MATH. For an hour.
I misperceive this all. Because my consciousness isn’t really in control, and it’s not “consciousness” that did the “forcing”. It only saw it happen. But MY BRAIN IS STUDYING MATH.
Essentially: you’re saying that my consciousness misperceives everything, but in the end nothing practically changes. Because the brain is still making its calls, thinking, choosing. Whether or not our description of “us” doing all this in consciousness is accurate is not so relevant, as the brain is still doing more or less what we described.
If “the studying of math” doesn’t truly happen in consciousness, but in the rest of the brain, then you theory moves things around, but leaves them essentially the same. The brain thinks, chooses. If instead “the studying of math” is a “conscious” thing, as math is something specifically done in consciousness, then consciousness HAS a hierarchy. Because it can force the body to sit down and do something for hours that is a “spandrel” as a whole.
Actually, everything changes. What you mean by choice is informed by your experience of choice: what the brain does looks nothing like what you experience. In short, it means you have this entire vocabulary of the mental that you inherited from your culture that is likely out-and-out mistaken. No transformation of our understanding of human nature has even come close to scratching the surface of what we’re talking about here.
The fact that the brain will keep on doing what it does regardless simply demonstrates how irrelevant our ‘self-understanding’ was all along.
what the brain does looks nothing like what you experience
Is the brain studying math or not?
Maybe it’s doing it in a way we misperceive, but is it studying math? Or what is it doing during that hour? It is indeed burning energy on something.
What seems at stake is “who” decided to study math. But whoever triggered that action, still triggered it and occupied the brain with it.
Otherwise you’re simply begging the question: just because consciousness is BIG for you doesn’t mean anything at all.
It’s not a matter of big or small, it’s a matter of power. I can make (or perceive I can make) my body do stuff. I can compromise the doings on my body in pretty significant ways. So the “thought” seems to make a difference.
consciousness is the last to be informed of what the body does while playing sports.
Well, fits with the idea of automation. I decide to go running, then the chain of command deals with the actual performance of running. And I can also override it, because I can decide how to run, where to go, how fast, how slow…
Maybe you’re right on the parsimony things, but it seems merely to move questions around.
You keep appealing to intuition, Abe – the very thing that can no longer be trusted. I’m not arguing that you don’t feel like consciousness is ‘doing’ these things. You’re simply begging the question.
You keep appealing to intuition, Abe – the very thing that can no longer be trusted.
Well, I don’t know what to say.
It sounds a bit too like the religious paradox: if you don’t have faith you can’t see the truth.
Until you advance some actual evidence, you are making a quasi-religious claim.
I have no evidence or proof, but I raise questions that go unanswered.
Who’s studying math? Is math being studied?
I took math merely because it’s the kind of theoretical work that you attribute to consciousness, the specific thing that can’t be trusted. So I’m merely saying that the brain can be occupied, and for a long time, with theoretical activity that you deem as irrelevant (I guess this could be easily measured through experimentation, measuring the brain activity of someone who spends an hour studying. And if you say that the brain activity isn’t necessarily used on that, then I ask you on what the fuck is the brain doing all that time and why energy is consumed. on what? magic?).
By this observation I infer that consciousness comes on top of the hierarchy, or it wouldn’t have so much control on the brain to make it waste so much effort in something theoretical, and essentially vain.
The more brutal example is that I could kill myself. Consciousness has that kind of evident control.
The separation can be between “consciousness” as the thing that “feels”, or consciousness as something misperceived (or mis-located) but that still happens in the brain, partly working in ways that are opaque to us. But control is somewhere in there.
The only way out of this, sticking to your theory, is that even the theoretical speculation happens entirely outside consciousness. But going that way it’s like you re-bottle the whole frame, and end up with something essentially the same. Since consciousness is not that thing that “feels”, but it is essentially working the same way (it’s filtering data, making choices, thinking theoretically etc…).
You’re beginning to recycle previous moves now.
The question I’ve been debating is, ‘What role does consciousness as it appears play in brain function.’ Mathematics is actually one of my favourite examples simply because it seems to epitomize conscious rationality, while at the same time utterly relies on ‘mathematical intuition.’ It’s almost entirely unconscious – as Maxwell always insisted. The brain generates our dim awareness of its mathematical activity, just as it generates (post hoc) our occult empirically false sense ‘coming before.’
Using math in an entirely different, metaphoric sense, what I’m saying is that science is showing us a consciousness that looks something like this:
…1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+(2+2=4)+1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9+…
where we are duped into thinking that 2+2=4 is all there is because that’s the only information we can access. 2+2=4, in the metaphor, is the mental, the intentional, something that has to seem whole and indubitable and self-sufficient because its all we got experientially.
Does a volcano ‘decide’ to erupt? Does a species ‘hope’ to evolve? Does a thermostat ‘believe’ that the house is too cold? These intentional concepts – all the vocabulary of the mental – are just that: intentional, mental. Applying them to the unconscious machinery of the brain makes no sense (unless using it as shorthand, the way biologists use ‘design,’ for instance). The brain ‘decides’ nothing, though it generates any number of outputs. There’s no ‘control’ outside of path dependency. 2+2=4 is a fragment of a neural ‘equation’ that is too vast for us to even imagine. The equation (the greater brain) requires it, certainly, but in ways that consciousness (the recursive brain) cannot fathom. Thus, the Blind Brain Theory.
You’re beginning to recycle previous moves now.
Because I don’t consider this a tactical battle that I want to win. It’s only my desire to understand and think how it all can affect me. So I repeat patterns when I still have doubts about them.
The question I’ve been debating is, ‘What role does consciousness as it appears play in brain function.’
But I’m not. Because my interest isn’t in simply making or agreeing with a neat theory, but understand what it means and its consequences for myself and in general.
In fact my position at this point is that, even if we “relocate” consciousness, the vague description we give of it continues to be approximate, but also working.
Who does the thinking (and choosing, and making)? You say that it’s not consciousness, the way we feel it. That “feeling” is fabricated and false. You can’t trust it. Consciousness not only does not decides, but it also gets to see a small part of the thought process. And even consciousness’ belief of having a priority is also bound to the “feel” of being in control. Both illusions generated by the very essence that makes consciousness emerge.
This seems to be what you’re saying.
Now I’m looking at it from a slightly different perspective. Take that paragraph as the truth. We misperceive “consciousness” and what it does. But it seems to me that we don’t completely mis-describe thought on a general level.
Normally we think that “consciousness” is where things happen. In your theory instead we “move” the center (or responsibility) of thought “away” from consciousness an in an undefined, undifferentiated, holistic placeholder that we call “brain”. Do we agree till here?
So what you are “doing” with this theory is to create a division in the brain. You circumscribe, wall “consciousness” to a physical part of the brain and say that this part is the one responsible of the “feeling” of self. And this is the part that comprises all conscious perception, feeding as consequence a number of illusions and self-deceits, generated by an occluded horizon.
But to a random guy on the road to who you ask, who’s doing the thinking? He’ll say: my brain. He doesn’t make those specific distinction between conscious, unconscious and parts of the brain. And in the end he’s mostly correct. The brain does it. It’s complex, so we can abstract and generalize it. The guy on the road does this generalization.
So this relocation of “responsibility of thought and choice”, away from consciousness and to the “brain”, is like moving it to a dark, unknown place (but not magical or spiritual, just unsampled). Essentially, you are injecting uncertainty in the model. Still agree till this point?
Now what I tried to do with the whole thing of the “studying math” example was simply trying to reconcile the shadowy thought. Not try to pinpoint the thought process, but at least to wrap the bulk of it.
I agree that the “math doing” we perceive in consciousness is likely a sliver of the thought process involved to make math “emerge” into consciousness the way we see it. But the point I wanted to underline is: when we study math the brain IS spending the bulk of its energy on theoretical thinking, whose “top” eventually surfaces into consciousness in the way we rationalize math. Ok?
Meaning that “who’s studying math?” has an answer: the brain. It is doing it in obscure ways, but it is doing it. We don’t understand completely why we do this and that, but the brain IS working so we do exactly the “this and that” we eventually see it doing. What the brain does and what we see it doing is the same. We misperceive “how”, we get to see a fraction of the “what”, but at the very end the effect of the thought process is what the body does, and we see all of it.
Consequence is: there is not a complete separation between how we describe things, and how they behave (in practice). The same way I can describe a car moving down a road, even if I don’t have the competence to understand and describe the way the car works internally. What I know of the car is enough to be able to drive it. My perception of the car is a virtualisation and approximation of it.
Essentially I could make another example about the consequence of your theory: it’s like we are trapped in a car driven by a madman. We don’t get to drive it, but we are “aware”, so watching in horror all that happens, the risks and so on. Eventually we’re gonna crash badly because the madman is not a good pilot, but we also couldn’t do much about it because we wouldn’t be better pilots, and anyway we don’t get to influence the madman in any way. We only get to witness in horror.
I guess it’s like being knocked off before surgery. It’s an act of mercy. The “brain” maybe goes through all of it, but “consciousness” gets to turn its eyes away.
An act of mercy.
I guess the “spandrel” of consciousness is the evidence of Nature’s CRUELTY?
THAT way, Singularity is the very possibility to go against the cruelty of god and take our destiny in our own hands (whatever it means).
Do you understand the difference between intentional (psychological) and functional (causal) concepts?
By the way, following that line of thoughts one could say that consciousness is a “spandrel” close to the etymology of the term.
Not a casual dead end, or leftover byproduct. But a kind of “bridge”, or support, so that we can move from a previous state to another. A kind of necessary transition. One only wonders if the next “stage” is about erasing consciousness or widening it. Could be either way.
It kind of opens religious interpretations but it does not CONFLICT with the theory.
The only bad part is that we’re personally kind of stuck in a shitty period for humanity overall
Do you understand the difference between intentional (psychological) and functional (causal) concepts?
What part of what I wrote you are arguing with?
This is really frustrating.
In that last long comment I wrote I really hoped of nailing down your point of view.
I have not used “choice” or “intentional” as intending “free will”. It’s as if I code an AI from a wargame that *decides* to attack from the North instead that from the South. It’s still a routine but it gets to “choose”, even if following fixed patters devoid of magic or mysticism.
Brain = really complex machine.
Even on that level you say that consciousness does nothing relevant, as the bulk of the program runs somewhere else. The data that enters consciousness isn’t as relevant as consciousness believes. That’s why even from this mechanical perspective I see your theory as “repositioning” the center where the program actually runs.
The “responsibility” of thought is something that ALSO applies to a machine or a computer. It’s not my videocard that runs the logic of a program, on my computer. If my videocard developed “consciousness” maybe it would believe of doing all the work by itself, since the output mostly passes from there, right?
2+2=4 is a fragment of a neural ‘equation’ that is too vast for us to even imagine. The equation (the greater brain) requires it, certainly, but in ways that consciousness (the recursive brain) cannot fathom.
Cannot fathom? This is the stuff that makes no sense to me.
The brain’s purpose is running the body the best it can. We can’t precisely track the patterns of thought, especially outside consciousness, but what it “does” is running the body same as a computer is running itself.
I can’t see the “existence” of an non plausible long equation, if not “emerging” into 2+2=4. Intending that the impossibly long equation is required to obtain a simple output. As a shadowy complicated thought may be involved in the action of moving an arm. But the ultimate purpose was that: moving the arm.
In the end what the brain DOES is moving the arm, regulating bodily functions, running things. It does the thing we know it does, in ways that remain obscure (or otherwise we could build perfect cyborgs).
It just dawned on me that I was assuming a distinction that you maybe weren’t quite clear on – thus the question. BBT argues that intentionality (and all the concepts that fall out of it) are likely illusory, and yet in our exchanges you continually refer to them. AI wargames do not decide or choose at all. These are just intentional shorthands that suffice to explain what’s going on in a cartoonish way. To use this language in a discussion of intentionality, as you have been, is just to invite confusion.
So, just for instance: “I can’t see the “existence” of an non plausible long equation, if not “emerging” into 2+2=4. Intending that the impossibly long equation is required to obtain a simple output. As a shadowy complicated thought may be involved in the action of moving an arm. But the ultimate purpose was that: moving the arm” is loaded with intentional concepts – like most everything you’ve been writing. The pattern we’ve fallen into is for me to say, “No, there’s no such as ‘purpose’ or ‘intending’ – you’re simply begging the question.” To which you cook up another context to inject intentional concepts into. This just makes me think our problem is definitional: that you don’t understand the basic distinctions underwriting BBT.
The radicality of BBT lies in the functional relegation of consciousness and the wholesale delegitimation of intentional discourse – which is to say, the discourse of life.
Well, shouldn’t have my last comment clarified the situation?
I ask you the effort to reread my last few comments in the perspective of: Brain = really complex machine.
I describe intentionality the way a computer AI could run a robot accordingly to a very complex program. But still a predetermined program. So no “free will” or intentionality as we normally intend it. Let’s clear the space from that prejudice.
I need to know if from this specific context what I wrote above accurately describes and rephrases your theory, or if I made more important errors.
Because I need that for the next step I was coming to: that the activity of “consciousness” is neither alien nor so tiny to the point that it can’t “fathom” what is going on in the greater brain. But to go to that step I need you to validate what I wrote before. Otherwise I think I’ve understood absolutely nothing of your theory.
The next step is about showing that “consciousness” is coordinated with the greater brain, and with all its approximations and shortcuts it STILL grasps the bulk of the activity of the greater brain (or otherwise you need to explain that the brain is involved in pragmatic activity in the fourth dimension or something like that, I’m intending physical, pragmatic output here).
There’s no huge gap between them, if not in the number of information. But it’s a gap of quantity, and not of essential quality (in order to run the body in the daily life).
It would have, except that you continued using the same intentional terms after I told you they are not applicable in any sense (I’ve actually told you this several times). If you want to grasp BBT you have to leave intentional concepts behind, because this is what BBT is: a theory that explains away intentionality.
But if you are ‘just trying to understand,’ Abe, then why do your replies primarily consist of comments like,
To me, this says you don’t agree with the consequences of BBT, not that you don’t understand.
So let’s start from scratch. I have a fair sense of what you don’t agree with: What is it, precisely, you don’t understand?
So let’s start from scratch. I have a fair sense of what you don’t agree with: What is it, precisely, you don’t understand?
I don’t agree with the part I don’t understand
Starting from the bottom of my line of thoughts, and a kind of tabula rasa of the theoretical point we’re at: human beings and living beings in general have a “purpose”, not in the idea of a god or final destination, but a purpose in the way science defines it.
This purpose is surviving and reproducing within a relatively hostile environment. A lot of BBT relies of genetics and evolution to explain itself. I’m doing no more. Human beings are the result of evolution. I don’t need to give it a direction like an arrow, but evolution selects survival.
This is all stuff everyone knows, and it IS the stuff I can’t reconcile with your idea. Essentially, I understand the BBT, but I can’t apply it in any context.
The conflict I see is the way I encapsulate the brain, without going into it to understand its mechanics: the brain is what “operates” the body. Same as the brain in another animal. Or a program/hardware in a robot.
What are the basic functions of a human being? Eating, breathing, keep the processes that make it stay alive, reproduction and so on.
SO “what is the brain doing” MUST have a definite, unchallengeable answer: the brain runs the body. All its activity is done for that end. Running the body.
This is the context I offer you and that I want you to explain to me. In layman terms. Within “consciousness” I may misperceive everything about will and about feel. But I also observe my body and other bodies going in the environment. This means to me that while “the brain” is very obscure and far from the idea I had of it, my observation of the “output” is still as reliable as it always was.
Human being, brain, functions that keep it alive.
So everything that the brain does eventually coalesces into pragmatic, practical output. It’s not ESTRANGED from the physical world. It is 100% about this physical world and nothing else.
Or are you telling me that metaphysics has a place in your ideas (not BBT, your ideas as a whole)?
If we believe ONLY in the physical world then we believe in the fact that ALL the brain does is strictly running the body to keep it alive. All its complex “thoughts” and obscure processes are strictly about *observable* activities.
(otherwise, if you tell me that something the brain does is not eventually observable, then we are back into metaphysics)
Not to quibble but there is no scientific definition of ‘purpose.’
Regarding evolution, do I really need to make that argument over again? Evolution produces workable solutions to problems of survival, not perfect ones.
The brain generates behavioural outputs on the basis of sensory inputs – this was never in question. And as I have said at least a couple of times now, the brain is continous with its environment. What else would it be? But how you get from this to: “This means to me that while “the brain” is very obscure and far from the idea I had of it, my observation of the “output” is still as reliable as it always was,” escapes me. What we ‘observe’ is action, not output. We observe selves or agents possessing beliefs and desires pursuing goals in ways that are right or wrong, and for which they can be held responsible, either morally or epistemically. Insofar as every italicized, intentional concept in the preceding amounts to a missapprehension according to BBT, then your ‘observation’ is anything but ‘reliable.’
The argument you seem to be making is that the illusions don’t matter if the result is the same. But the results are not the same. Not at all. Think of it in terms analogous to ideology, a system of belief and ignorance that fool us into serving others under the guise of serving God, country, or our ‘individuality.’
All this metaphysics stuff is new. Let’s bracket it until we get the above cleared up.
You don’t quite get the distinction between intentional and functional concepts, do you? It just seems to me that you wouldn’t be working this same point the way you have been if you did.
The argument you seem to be making is that the illusions don’t matter if the result is the same.
You say that consciousness cannot fathom what the brain does. This is absurd to me. I ask myself what the brain could possibly do that I can’t fathom.
As long there’s a physical reality the brain merely functions (does) accordingly to the physical reality. That we measure.
I mean. “Consciousness” has no idea and can’t have an idea of the brain. But it’s by knowing the physical environment that it gets to know the brain. Not directly, but through that other stage. Consciousness -> environment -> brain
Otherwise I ask you what the fuck is this shadowy, unfathomable thought. Do I have a third arm of invisible light that I don’t see? Do I send messages to the aliens? Is there something the brain does whose output is outside physical reality?
If not, then all the brain does is a very complicate process that ends up with “lift the arm”. Or action as you say. We don’t know the process, but we do know how it ended up. The same as we ended up with 2+2=4 as the final result of the long equation.
Insofar as every italicized, intentional concept in the preceding amounts to a missapprehension according to BBT, then your ‘observation’ is anything but ‘reliable.’
For observation I obviously intend an observation I can do NOW. Corrected by the theory, and so limited by those walls.
Then these questions should be easy for you to answer:
How does the brain do mathematics?
How does the brain hit a baseball out of the park?
As I said, the same way we encapsulate the complexities of computer’s workings.
Doing complex calculations we can’t backtrack, or perfectly pinpoint. So the “shadowy” thoughts is the process that ends up with “hit a baseball out of the park”.
You mean ‘approximate’?
Actually, in the baseball example, it turns out consciousness (thought) comes after whatever it is our brain does. This very well might be the case in the mathematics example, though we don’t know. But in both cases we don’t ‘approximate’ what’s done, so much as simply observe (and take credit for) the output. Computers are pretty much magic black boxes to vast majority of users.
Same with our brain.
And the next step I was on is about “choice”. Not in the “free will” sense, but in strictly pragmatic sense of action.
Say I’m going to decide whether to study math or history in the next hour. So, in consciousness, I *feel* like going through motivations about doing one or the other, finally deciding for one of them.
Even if consciousness actually gets this deal “after” it’s already over and misperceives itself being the one responsible, what remains is the fact that I (I, intended as the whole brain) thought about “deciding whether to study math or history”, then verifiable by seeing what I’ll *do* in the next hour.
That’s why I made a fuss about dividing the “what” from the “how”. And that’s why I said that we (consciousness) still know about the “what”, in layman terms.
That’s why, again in layman terms, I said the deal is about “relocating” choice from consciousness to the greater brain. But then, consciousness being coordinated with the rest, it is still able to “encapsulate” (wrap-up, get the gist of) in approximation what the brain is up to. It does not understand the intricacy and type of analysis, or all the factors that play a role, but it does understand what ultimately the analysis does. As the game of GO, it’s way too complex to go through every possibility, but you can get some sense in a kind of holistic way.
Essentially I’m saying that the self-description of consciousness is tricked by perspective and misperception, but it’s not overall wrong on a higher level: that is what the brain as a whole is up to (inferred by observing what it does).
Opening up the possibility for self analysis, and so the possibility even for this theory for existing in consciousness and for being possibly true.
What I did was simply extending the computer example with which I agree: even if you consider a computer a magical black box because you aren’t an engineer, you STILL can use that computer by knowing enough to operate it. And this operation is what the computer is overall doing, what it was made for.
The same for the brain, you don’t know how the brain actually operates. But, by observing actions in the physical world, you understand what the brain is ultimately up to.
Final step: this seems of going against the idea of the spandrel: self-observation may be possible as CONSEQUENCE of externalization. Meaning that if “consciousness” was truly the center of thought, as we now believe the upper brain is, then it wouldn’t be able to self-observe. But if consciousness is instead perceptually SPLIT/REMOVED from the true center of thought, then it would gain this ability of “astral travelling” itself, if you follow this fancy turn of phrase. It gets to exit itself and observe itself as a duplicate. Which is why in the end we describe “consciousness” as a thing that feels in itself stuff that is entirely produce outside of it. Why this duplication was naturally selected?
Why not a spandrel? Because in this case consciousness would pass the upper brain relevant data that the upper brain can then use to self-correct. Meaning: all decision and thought still happen entirely within upper brain and outside of consciousness. But consciousness is the device that produces INVALUABLE data that the upper brain couldn’t obtain in any other way. And that would also explain why what enters consciousness is barely a sliver of the whole thing. Why conscious perception is so limited in respect of information it has access to? Because what the upper brain requires is that specific, specialized data that consciousness elaborates. No more, no less. The rest of the work the brain can do by itself.
I understand you don’t want to give consciousness the label of “CEO”, or a privileged hierarchy. So let me correct: consciousness is only a very specialized, but invaluable and indispensable, device that produces a very special kind of information that the upper brain requires in order to self-correct.
This looks as an “alternate” theory to me, that respects all the points of the BBT, while at the same time ending up a bit more optimistic. I guess you should at least CONSIDER that there isn’t just your cynical possibility, and this, imho, is both optimistic AND respecting the restrictions and laws of BBT.
You’re still getting tripped up on intentionality – and so missing the dismal radicality of BBT. So, just for instance, there is nothing ‘pragmatic’ about it either. It’s just the brain functioning – period. Use implies agency, and the brain possesses none. This is also what’s wrong with the way you push your computer analogy (turning it into a version of your previous pilot analogy). Consciousness does not use the brain.
You catch yourself by swearing off the CEO label, but again, you spend so much time on these descriptions I can’t help but be confused – and to think, again, that you’re not clear on the crucial distinctions.
Everything in the brain is a ‘very specialized, invaluable and indispensable device’ that produces information – and ‘correction.’ Thalamocortical information integration, which seems to correlate with consciousness, doubtless plays a crucial role. But consciousness as we experience it simply DOES NOT EXIST according to the BBT.
Let’s dispense with the pretence of just ‘trying to understand.’ Your argument has been consistant all the way through: you believe that consciousness as you experience it has to be ‘special somehow.’ Although BBT does not rule out that possibility, it suggests that we should be prepared to be dissappointed.
Why? Because the information available to consciousness is simply an abysmally small slice of astronomically large informatic transactions. The information itself is crucial (insofar as all neural information is), but how does this make consciousness as you experience it anything other than a passenger? A beggar who delivers a million dollars from one billionaire to another is a beggar all the same.
I think this time it’s more you not understanding me instead of me not understanding you, probably because of the way I phrase my examples. But I think the ideas do not conflict with your theory and are able at least to coexist in plausibility:
Consciousness does not use the brain.
I never said this. But I implied the opposite, that the brain uses consciousness as a device.
This is surely wrong in formulation, but it should be correct in the sense I mean it:
Use implies agency, and the brain possesses none.
The brain also “uses” an arm in order to bring food to the mouth, and stuff like that. It’s still at that level of “machine running in the environment”. You can program a robot so that it uses its features for certain tasks. So this abstraction of “use” always work. It is not intentional, but all in the original program.
It’s a slippery slope, but one that continues to be plausible and worth following to see where it leads.
Let’s dispense with the pretence of just ‘trying to understand.’ Your argument has been consistent all the way through: you believe that consciousness as you experience it has to be ‘special somehow.’
Specialized. And you said as much:
Everything in the brain is a ‘very specialized, invaluable and indispensable device’ that produces information – and ‘correction.’ Thalamocortical information integration, which seems to correlate with consciousness, doubtless plays a crucial role.
That’s “enough” of what I need for the rest.
Although BBT does not rule out that possibility, it suggests that we should be prepared to be dissappointed.
I absolutely agree with this. In fact I don’t believe in a way opposite to the one you depict. But I do think that the whole perspective opens a kind of dualism itself. Both could be “true”. Absolutely prepare to be disappointed because things are likely like that. But also do not completely forget that it’s not the ONLY scenario.
Why? Because the information available to consciousness is simply an abysmally small slice of astronomically large informatic transactions.
Also here I agree. Consciousness has almost no “muscle” to do or understand much. (here I deliberately switch language to something you deny) But weak doesn’t mean powerless.
Till this point I tried to describe a possibility (“abysmally small slice of astronomically large informatic transactions”, is required for making work what I’m saying). Now I’ll show the true leap of faith I was making.
- What if consciousness can pass adulterate data? What if consciousness CAN’T decide what the upper brain will do with the data consciousness passes to it, but COULD decide *what* to pass?
That is the kind of forcing I was doing on the idea of “intention”. If consciousness is a specialized device, then it has a specialized task. But being this task the domain of action of this device, then I can say that the device has power on this task. Say the “brain” is a huge, dark machine, from which everything else depends. The brain does the thinking and produces action. But in order to do this, it partly relies on data that comes from a specialized device called “consciousness” (not our own FEELING of it, just the specialized device and what it does truly). But by ALTERING the data it passes, consciousness can CONDITION the way thee brain works. Because what the brain does is a process that depends on data that comes to it.
This respects the fact that “consciousness” isn’t doing the “thinking” that runs the body. It explains that most decisions/action arrive to it after they’ve been made. Everything still happens in the brain, because it’s the upper brain that is responsible for all physical action. The upper brain is the CEO, consciousness merely a specialized small office.
But there IS a revolution from below. Because consciousness controls NOTHING BUT strictly the data that itself elaborates. That small fraction of data that enters consciousness and that is about self-observation. Consciousness doesn’t know what the brain will do with the data, and probably can’t even predict what the brain will do. That’s why as conscious being we are so flawed. Consciousness has very limited power and awareness. But it still gets to do its task, this task produces significant consequences on the upper brain, and by passing data consciousness can condition the upper brain.
You see, it’s absolutely true that consciousness has no idea of what is going on in the upper brain. You forgot to consider the other consequence: that the upper brain has no idea of what goes on in consciousness. They are somewhat specialized and independent, blind to each other. But it is in the realm of consciousness that data is produced that can condition the brain (also the opposite: the brain can have lesions that deeply affect consciousness by altering the data that arrives to it in the first place).
What is “wrong” in the *perception* of consciousness? The whole deal of “feeling”. The self and so on. Why so? Because that duplication is what allows self-reflection. The illusion that is consciousness is what gives consciousness its specific quality and specialized task.
Ending up in the kind of dualism I said above:
1- OPTIMISTIC: consciousness can control to a degree the brain by altering data. The scenario is one where we could hope that, singularity or whatever, evolution brings us to expand the keyhole, expand consciousness and its awareness, so that it can better “survey” what the brain does through self-correction.
2- CYNICAL: consciousness is a spandrel, so essentially worthless. By this description it is a mere act of cruelty (cruelty of the casual world, Nature’s a Bitch). The scenario is one where we could “hope” that consciousness is eradicated from the brain. As an act of mercy. (excusing all the anthropomorphisms, you can rephrase even without “feelings”).
So both of there are “possible”. It’s even likely that the second is closer to truth, but the first can’t be crossed yet.
Your insistence on translating BBT into intentional vocabulary continues to mystify me. If ‘decide’ and so on, is not what you ‘really mean,’ then why use it at all? Especially after I’ve pointed out (numerous times now) the potential for misunderstanding?
That said, I do think I have a better sense of what you’re struggling with. The dualism you’re sensing is actually theoretical. BBT is a theory about the appearance of consciousness, about why things ‘look’ the way they do. In other words, we literally do not have the consciousness we think we have. The consciousness we actually have is a specialized form of neural information integration that does all kinds of work. The consciousness we think we have is pretty much an illusion, a systematic missapprehension – and this is what BBT explains.
As such, it would almost certainly count as a ‘spandrel,’ a side effect of the kinds of constraints faced by the information integration that does all the work.
Does that make more sense?
I followed a chain of links leading to this site, did you know it?
http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/LessWrong_Wiki
I’m putting some quotes on my blog but I wanted to draw your attention on this in particular:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/r0/thou_art_physics/
http://lesswrong.com/lw/on/reductionism/
I still have to go through in detail to understand it, but the article seems to go against a certain basis of your ideas, so I’d like your perspective added to it:
Every now and then, another neuroscience press release appears, claiming that, because researchers used an fMRI to spot the brain doing something-or-other during a decision process, it’s not you who chooses, it’s your brain.
But what made me think is a kind of approach, on the site overall:
The way a belief feels from inside, is that you seem to be looking straight at reality. When it actually seems that you’re looking at a belief, as such, you are really experiencing a belief about belief.
So when your mind simultaneously believes explicit descriptions of many different levels, and believes explicit rules for transiting between levels, as part of an efficient combined model, it feels like you are seeing a system that is made of different level descriptions and their rules for interaction.
But this is just the brain trying to be efficiently compress an object that it cannot remotely begin to model on a fundamental level. The airplane is too large. Even a hydrogen atom would be too large. Quark-to-quark interactions are insanely intractable. You can’t handle the truth.
Yet it seems to me that the overall purpose of a site like this one is about solving the problems of “thinking” by thinking HARDER.
It gives me the image of a cat chasing its own tail and deciding it’s all a problem of speed.
I’d like your opinion on that first quote and on their definition of “reductionism”.
My take on reductionism is peculiar. I’m agnostic on as much as I can get away with on any given topic, so when it comes to metaphysical commitments, I think the best thing to do is to avoid them as far as you can. Once you start thinking in terms of ‘information from’ rather than ‘representations of’ then all these questions of reduction and levels of description are replaced with questions of what kind of informatic circuits can you place yourself in. The game is radically changed. When people talk ‘reduction,’ they are generally talking about the translation of information from a more problematic circuit to a less problematic one, where problematic can mean any number of different things. But this cartoon is one that requires a more mature neuroscience to fill in/flesh out, the big problem being that consciousness only glimpses a sliver of what is actually going on.
Great discussions over there, btw. It was watching a couple of guys creeping toward the Blind Brain Theory on LessWrong that convinced me the time had come to publish the damn thing.
Your insistence on translating BBT into intentional vocabulary continues to mystify me.
Because for me they are two things. First I try to get the facts of your theory right and stick to the formality. Then I step out and try to interpret it.
I’m not “struggling with a dualism”, I first tried to explain my ideas formally so that they work without any dualism, then admitted that dualism as a possibility. What I care is that the formality of the structure still works. Then I play with whatever leverage is left.
we literally do not have the consciousness we think we have
Yes, I got this a while ago
As such, it would almost certainly count as a ‘spandrel,’ a side effect of the kinds of constraints faced by the information integration that does all the work.
Does that make more sense?
Nope, because you don’t address my point. Consciousness, or its “feel”, from my perspective is required for self observation. Self observation is a specialized function that the brain uses, consciousness is a side effect bound to it.
But this doesn’t make it directly a spandrel. It is required for the function to work. Meaning that if you excise consciousness you also excise self observation since they don’t actually are two separate things.
About that site I thought that their idea of Reductionism well represented the way you describe it too:
Reductionism is not a positive belief, but rather, a disbelief that the higher levels of simplified multilevel models are out there in the territory.
So it’s not about reduction to a low level science, but to a fabric of the world that is “unachieved” by the human brain and that the whole science is only making cartoons of.
As to say that the world works following reductionism, but we just can’t measure it and have to resort to compromises (levels) that aren’t really there.
It’s funny how these memes just pop up and start replicating. I can’t turn around without bumping into the map vs. territory analogy it seems. The ‘informatic circuit’ model of cognition I gave you actually allows you to sidestep all the impacted debates regarding what’s ‘really real’ (at the cost of normativity!) and simply talk about how information in your brain plugs into larger environmental circuits. Check out my cryptic little Russian Doll piece for an example of how it might be conceived.
So it is qualia you’re pining for afterall! On BBT the ‘feel’ is a missapprehension. It’s dependent upon information integration (actual consciousness), but it’s all mistaken – which is to say, it’s thoroughly infected with false beliefs. Since most people assume a line between perception and cognition this is a strange and difficult thing to believe, but pretty much everything in your visual field is a perfect example of it: your brain simply assumes all the ‘fringe detail’ you think you see.
What any information – ‘mistaken’ or not – actually does, according to BBT, is a matter for neuroscience to decide. All it says is that you can’t assert the efficacy of any informatic modality on the basis of introspection. We simply see too little to say what you’re trying to say.
It’s a qualia because you see it linguistically. The “feel” is a misapprehension. Ok. It is mistaken. Ok.
But, at the same time, you don’t substitute what it actually does with something better. Because you say:
What any information – ‘mistaken’ or not – actually does, according to BBT, is a matter for neuroscience to decide.
You don’t/can’t go there. I did, with a leap of faith.
I’d continue arguing that a “mistake” /could/ not be how you intend it. Meaning that you think perception and feel are false, while I’d argue that they are “misrepresented” and imperfect.
Ultimately I agree with you:
We simply see too little to say what you’re trying to say.
But we don’t see enough to erase the perspective I suggested. I’m not /saying/ anything, in the sense that I don’t /believe/ in what I said, it’s just one possibility.
So essentially we’re back at guessing theories without currently a way to confirm or rule out completely. Your skepticism is based on solid reasoning and application of what happened before, so I understand why you’d never “agree” on something like that.
Yet this kind of dualism continues to survive at the margins, and I’d bet it will for a long time.
As I said above I’m not trying to prove or disprove anything, I just wanted to know if my line of thoughts was horribly flawed at some point, but it seems mostly “fine”, even if still essentially a big gamble.
But it’s a gamble that to work doesn’t break any rule, and that’s specifically what I was trying to figure out: if my reasoning was at least theoretically fine with the rest of theories of consciousness you offered.
I essentially wanted to know if we “see enough” or had enough data to disprove what I said.
It’ll flourish at the centre, where it always had. These kinds of ‘deflationary’ views of consciousness are just too counterintuitive to be anything more than culturally peripheral – I think.
Abalieno, imagine I’m some mad scientist who’s attached a device to your arm that, when I push a button, sends an electric current through your arm muscles that causes a certain movement. Is the action voluntary? Clearly not. Now imagine this device not only sends an electric current into your arm, but also implants a memory that you voluntarily chose to move your arm. Is the action voluntary now? You as the unfortunate victim of my device would believe so, but considering what I’ve done to you, the answer is still no. It’s a bit harder to imagine how such a device would work, but as Scott already mentioned, certain stroke victims believe they’re willing everything around them into happening. And since a stroke is merely a physical change to the brain, it’s conceivable that someone can build a device that will induce such a change whenever a button is pushed.
But what if you’ve had this device inside your head since birth, and its operation was imperceptible to you in every way? What if the “mad scientist” pushing the button to make you move your arms is a module of your own unconscious, and the “when” of the button being pushed was determined in purely causal terms? What if the “button push leads to arm movement” mechanic was the same, but the “feeling of volition” was merely an ex post facto memory attached by the unconscious to certain (voluntary) actions but not other (involuntary or reflexive) actions? As far as you can remember you’ve always felt, intuitively, undeniably, that you can consciously cause your arm to move. Your arm moves now, you think back and decide “yes, I willed myself to do that.” But did you? Have you ever?
Nope, it’s not the will I was contesting. If someone makes me move the arm then he also is the one willing it. As I’ve said, it’s a matter of moving the position, but not changing the merit.
So if the “will” is not in conscience but somewhere else in the brain, doesn’t change much, as virtualizations/generalizations go. Say consciousness is merely a talking device, saying: I decide to do x. Maybe it’s not the talking device itself to decide so, but the brain, in general did.
What I was contesting is the fact that what consciousness witnesses (if it doesn’t also will it) has authority on the body/brain. Theoretical activity, willed or not, can monopolize a body.
Your brain encounters situation n and performs action x. A part of x is the conscious memory that you did this of your own free will. That’s mistaken. Alright, but what’s happening in the parts of the brain you can’t perceive? Is your unconscious a “man behind the curtain,” an invisible locus of free will that when faced with n, decides “x or y? Let’s go with x.” Or does the function of your unconscious more resemble logic gates, that would perform “if n then x” with no semblance of choice at all? From the conscious perspective the end results are similar, a false memory of conscious choice, but that’s an entirely different problem than figuring out whether or not there actually is a man behind the curtain.
I meant “reality” in the limited sense. We have no way to reach external reality in any way. I don’t even bother to use “reality” as factual, external data.
So “reality” is merely the description of the walls of the cavern. I was just saying that science ends up only describing ourselves (consciousness beondaries), like watching your reflection in a mirror.
Mmm, I don’t know how science (ie people using methods) can describe anything, or you can look at a reflection, if you have no way to reach external reality.
Are you saying science only looks where we look, so really were just seeing the way were inclined to look?
It depends – I think nature tends to shake up where we look. But whilst situated in a society swarming with human artifice (ie, nature is hedged out), yeah, everywhere you look is everywhere you look. And no more.
I don’t understand how what I wrote can be seen as non-linear.
If you can’t see “external” reality then it means that the glass you’re seeing through is opaque. Science is definitely charting something, but in thinking of looking through the glass it is just looking at the reflected image on that glass.
The glass stops being see-through and becomes a mirror that only reflects what’s on this side. Whatever’s “really” past the mirror is unknown, and as Bakker says, unfathomable.
I thought I was partly agreeing, Ab? Where science is aimed is a product of psychology. So scientific discoveries, where in particular they are, are a roadmap of human psychology. A mirror.
But I was also saying that nature/the wilderness disrupts human psychology, so sometimes looking in places it otherwise wouldn’t. Which reminds me of my own aphorismthingie: The wilderness, both terror and womb. Both womb and terror.
Eh, allow me some self indulgence! Even if it’s past december now!