BBT Creep: The Inherence Heuristic

by rsbakker

Exciting stuff! For years now the research has been creeping toward my grim semantic worst-case scenario–but “The inherence heuristic” is getting close, very close, especially the way it explicitly turns on the importance of heuristic neglect. The pieces have been there for quite some time; now researchers are beginning to put them together.

One way of looking at blind brain theory’s charge against intentionalism is that so-called intentional phenomena are pretty clear cut examples of inherence heuristics as discussed in this article, ways to handle complex systems absent any causal handle on those systems.  When Cimpion and Saloman write,

“To reiterate, the pool of facts activated by the mental shotgun for the purpose of generating an explanation for a pattern may often be heavily biased toward the inherent characteristics of that pattern’s constituents. As a result, when the storytelling part of the heuristic process takes over and attempts to make sense of the information at its disposal, it will have a rather limited number of options. That is, it will often be forced to construct a story that explains the existence of a pattern in terms of the inherent features of the entities within that pattern rather than in terms of factors external to it. However, the one-sided nature of the information delivered by the mental shotgun is not an impediment to the storytelling process. Quite the contrary – the less information is available, the easier it will be to fit it all into a coherent story.” 464

I think they are also describing what’s going on when philosophers attempt to theoretically solve intentionality, intentional cognition, relying primarily on the resources of intentional cognition. In fact, once you understand the heuristic nature of intentional cognition, the interminable nature of intentional philosophy becomes very easy to understand. We have no way of carving the complexities of cognition at the joints of the world, so we carve it at the joints of the problem instead. When your neighbour repairs your robotic body servant, rather than cognizing all the years he spent training to be a spy before being inserted into your daily routines, you ‘attribute’ him ‘knowledge,’ something miraculously efficacious in its own  right, inherent. And for the vast majority of problems you encounter, it works. Then the philosopher asks, ‘What is knowledge?’ and because adducing causal information scrambles our intuitions of ‘inherence,’ he declares only intentional idioms can cognize intentional phenomena, and the species remains stumped to this very day. Exactly as we should expect. Why should we think tools adapted to do without information regarding our nature can decode their own nature? What would this ‘nature’ be?

The best way to understand intentional philosophy, on a blind brain view, is as a discursive ‘crash space,’ a point where the application of our cognitive tools outruns their effectiveness in ways near and far. I’ve spent the last few years, now, providing various diagnoses of the kinds of theoretical wrecks we find in this space. Articles such as this convince me I won’t be alone for much longer!

So to give a brief example. Once one understands the degree to which intentional idioms turn on ‘inherence heuristics’–ways to manage causal systems absent any behavioural sensitivity to the mechanics of those systems–you can understand the deceptiveness of things like ‘intentional stances,’ the way they provide an answer that functions more like a get-out-of-jail-free card than any kind of explanation.

Given that ‘intentional stances’ belong to intentional cognition, then the fact that intentional cognition solves problems neglecting what is actually going on reflects rather poorly on the theoretical fortunes of the intentional stance. The fact is ‘intentional stances’ leave us with a very low dimensional understanding of our actual straits when it comes to understanding cognition–as we should expect, given that it utilizes a low dimensional heuristic system geared to solving practical problems on the fly and theoretical problems not at all.

All along I’ve been trying to show the way heuristics allow us to solve the explanatory gap, to finally get rid of intentional occultisms like the intentional stance and replace them with a more austere, and more explanatorily comprehensive picture. Now that the cat’s out of the bag, more and more cognitive scientists are going to explore the very real consequences of heuristic neglect. They will use it to map out the neglect structure of the human brain in ever finer detail, thus revealing where our intuitions trip over their own heuristic limits, and people will begin to see how thought can be construed as mangles of parallel-distributed processing meat. It will be clear that the ‘real patterns’ are not the ones required to redeem reflection, or its jargon. Nothing can do that now. Mark my words, inherence heuristics have a bright explanatory future.

Bonfire bright.