Three Pound Brain

No bells, just whistling in the dark…

The Point Being…

by rsbakker

Louie Savva has our podcast interview up over at Everything is Pointless. It was fun stuff, despite the fact that this one time farm boy has devolved into a complete technical bumbleclad.

It also really got me thinking about the most challenging whirlpool at the heart of my theory, and how to best pilot understanding around it. Say the human brain possessed two cognitive systems A and X, the one dedicated to prediction absent access to sources, the other dedicated to prediction via access to sources. And say the brain had various devious ways of combining these systems to solve even more problems. Now imagine the conscious subsystem mediating these systems is entirely insensitive to this structure, so that toggling between them leaves no trace in experience.

Now consider the manifest absurdity:

It is true that there is no such thing as truth.

If truth talk belonged to system A, and such thing talk belonged to system X, then it really could be true that there’s no such thing as truth. But given conscious insensitivity to this, we would have no way of discerning the distinct cognitive ecologies involved, and so presume One Big Happy Cognition by default. If there is no such thing as truth, we would cry, then no statement could be true.

How does one argue against that? short knowledge of the heuristic, fractionate structure of human cognition. Small wonder we’ve been so baffled by our attempts to make sense of ourselves! Our intuitions walk us into the same traps over and over.

 

 

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April Fool’s Update

by rsbakker

Jorge linked this, and for transparent reasons I thought it worth linking again. I can almost see the idol of Ajokli, laughing.

Life was so much simpler back when children could just pull the legs off insects.

I’m doing a Q&A on Reddit Fantasy beginning next Monday morning, April 3rd. With The Unholy Consult completed I’m looking forward to talking more freely about the World (trying to be mindful, of course, of any potential spoilers). Spread the word. The organizers recommended I keep the intro jaunty and light, so I decided to begin with, “If God is dead, then fantasy is His grave.”

I’m also scheduled to do a couple podcast interviews, one for Everything is Pointless, and another for Stuff to Blow Your Mind. My hope is to keep doing as many interviews, media pieces, as I can running up to the release of The Unholy Consult. Ideas are always appreciated.

I’ve also accumulated a fair number of book related links, thanks to emails sent and comments posted. Barnes and Nobles had a readout of Book Three, The Great Ordeal, which The Fantasy Faction selected for their Best of 2016 list (weird, isn’t it, the way everything ‘pre-Trump’ seems ancient and naive). The Great Ordeal was also given a rave review for SFF Den by silentroamer, who can see the narrative lens drawing into tighter focus. JP Gowdner offers an excellent aesthetic assessment of the series so far, though he finds himself morally troubled by many of my apparent decisions. For those hemming and hawing about starting The Aspect-Emperor, I heartily recommend Leona Henry’s eloquent review of The Judging Eye. I’ve noticed, lately, that almost all reviews of my books concede that they may inaccessible to the tastes of some readers, and even though this is undoubtedly true, the whole point of writing fantasy, for me, is to challenge actual readers as opposed to ‘ideal philistines,’ to confront folks with an unfamiliar (and probably uncomfortable) story-telling sensibility. If the election has taught us anything, I think, it’s that we desperately need to create a culture dedicated to spanning ingroup boundaries. We need to be urging one another to take risks, to drink from strangers’ glasses instead of hogging the same old straw for the entirety of our lives. We need to shame our most talented communicators back into honest dialogue with the communities that make their ingroup luxury possible.

Next up for TPB, someone not only stumbles across the semantic apocalypse in complete independence from my work, they even end up calling it the ‘semantic apocalypse.’

 

The Truth Behind the Myth of Correlationism

by rsbakker

A wrong turn lies hidden in the human cultural code, an error that has scuttled our every attempt to understand consciousness and cognition. So much philosophical activity reeks of dead ends: we try and we try, and yet we find ourselves mired in the same ancient patterns of disputation. The majority of thinkers believe the problem is local, that they need only tinker with the tools they’ve inherited. They soldier on, arguing that this or that innovative modification will overcome our confusion. Some, however, believe the problem lies deeper. I’m one of those thinkers, as is Meillassoux. I think the solution lies in speculation bound to the hip of modern science, in something I call ‘heuristic neglect.’ For me, the wrong turn lies in the application of intentional cognition to solve the theoretical problem of intentional cognition. Meillassoux thinks it lies in what he calls ‘correlationism.’

Since I’ve been accused of ‘correlationism’ on a couple of occasions now, I thought it worthwhile tackling the issue in more detail. This will not be an institutional critique a la Golumbia’s, who manages to identify endless problems with Meillassoux’s presentation, while somehow entirely missing his skeptical point: once cognition becomes artifactual, it becomes very… very difficult to understand. Cognitive science is itself fractured about Meillassoux’s issue.

What follows will be a constructive critique, an attempt to explain the actual problem underwriting what Meillassoux calls ‘correlationism,’ and why his attempt to escape that problem simply collapses into more interminable philosophy. The problem that artifactuality poses to the understanding of cognition is very real, and it also happens to fall into the wheelhouse of Heuristic Neglect Theory (HNT). For those souls growing disenchanted with Speculative Realism, but unwilling to fall back into the traditional bosom, I hope to show that HNT not only offers the radical break with tradition that Meillassoux promises, it remains inextricably bound to the details of this, the most remarkable age.

What is correlationism? The experts explain:

Correlation affirms the indissoluble primacy of the relation between thought and its correlate over the metaphysical hypostatization or representational reification of either term of the relation. Correlationism is subtle: it never denies that our thoughts or utterances aim at or intend mind-independent or language-independent realities; it merely stipulates that this apparently independent dimension remains internally related to thought and language. Thus contemporary correlationism dismisses the problematic of scepticism, and or epistemology more generally, as an antiquated Cartesian hang-up: there is supposedly no problem about how we are able to adequately represent reality; since we are ‘always already’ outside ourselves and immersed in or engaging with the world (and indeed, this particular platitude is constantly touted as the great Heideggerean-Wittgensteinian insight). Note that correlationism need not privilege “thinking” or “consciousness” as the key relation—it can just as easily replace it with “being-in-the-world,” “perception,” “sensibility,” “intuition,” “affect,” or even “flesh.” Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 51

By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call correlationism any current of thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every philosophy which disavows naive realism has become a variant of correlationism. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5

Correlationism rests on an argument as simple as it is powerful, and which can be formulated in the following way: No X without givenness of X, and no theory about X without a positing of X. If you speak about something, you speak about something that is given to you, and posited by you. Consequently, the sentence: ‘X is’, means: ‘X is the correlate of thinking’ in a Cartesian sense. That is: X is the correlate of an affection, or a perception, or a conception, or of any subjective act. To be is to be a correlate, a term of a correlation . . . That is why it is impossible to conceive an absolute X, i.e., an X which would be essentially separate from a subject. We can’t know what the reality of the object in itself is because we can’t distinguish between properties which are supposed to belong to the object and properties belonging to the subjective access to the object. Quentin Meillassoux,”Time without Becoming

The claim of correlationism is the corollary of the slogan that ‘nothing is given’ to understanding: everything is mediated. Once knowing becomes an activity, then the objects insofar as they are known become artifacts in some manner: reception cannot be definitively sorted from projection and as a result no knowledge can be said to be absolute. We find ourselves trapped in the ‘correlationist circle,’ trapped in artifactual galleries, never able to explain the human-independent reality we damn well know exists. Since all cognition is mediated, all cognition is conditional somehow, even our attempts (or perhaps, especially our attempts) to account for those conditions. Any theory unable to decisively explain objectivity is a theory that cannot explain cognition. Ergo, correlationism names a failed (cognitivist) philosophical endeavour.

It’s a testament to the power of labels in philosophy, I think, because as Meillassoux himself acknowledges there’s nothing really novel about the above sketch. Explaining the ‘cognitive difference’ was my dissertation project back in the 90’s, after all, and as smitten as I was with my bullshit solution back then, I didn’t think the problem itself was anything but ancient. Given this whole website is dedicated to exploring and explaining consciousness and cognition, you could say it remains my project to this very day! One of the things I find so frustrating about the ‘critique of correlationism’ is that the real problem—the ongoing crisis—is the problem of meaning. If correlationism fails because correlationism cannot explain cognition, then the problem of correlationism is an expression of a larger problem, the problem of cognition—or in other words, the problem of intentionality.

Why is the problem of meaning an ongoing crisis? In the past six fiscal years, from 2012 to 2017, the National Institute of Health will have spent more than 113 billion dollars funding research bent on solving some corner of the human soul. [1] And this is just one public institution in one nation involving health related research. If you include the cognitive sciences more generally—research into everything from consumer behaviour to AI—you could say that solving the human soul commands more resources than any other domain in history. The reason all this money is being poured into the sciences rather than philosophy departments is that the former possesses real world consequences: diseases cured, soap sold, politicians elected. As someone who tries to keep up with developments in Continental philosophy, I already find the disconnect stupendous, how whole populations of thinkers continue discoursing as if nothing significant has changed, bitching about traditional cutlery in the shadow of the cognitive scientific tsunami.

Part of the popularity of the critique of correlationism derives from anxieties regarding the growing overlap of the sciences of the human and the humanities. All thinkers self-consciously engaged in the critique of correlationism reference scientific knowledge as a means of discrediting correlationist thought, but as far as I can tell, the project has done very little to bring the science, what we’re actually learning about consciousness and cognition, to the fore of philosophical debates. Even worse, the notion of mental and/or neural mediation is actually central to cognitive science. What some neuroscientists term ‘internal models,’ which monolopolize our access to ourselves and the world, is nothing if not a theoretical correlation of environments and cognition, trapping us in models of models. The very science that Meillassoux thinks argues against correlationism in one context, explicitly turns on it in another. The mediation of knowledge is the domain of cognitive science—full stop. A naturalistic understanding of cognition is a biological understanding is an artifactual understanding: this is why the upshot of cognitive science is so often skeptical, prone to further diminish our traditional (if not instinctive) hankering for unconditioned knowledge—to reveal it as an ancestral conceit

A kind of arche-fossil.

If an artifactual approach to cognition is doomed to misconstrue cognition, then cognitive science is a doomed enterprise. Despite the vast sums of knowledge accrued, the wondrous and fearsome social instrumentalities gained, knowledge itself will remain inexplicable. What we find lurking in the bones of Meillassoux’s critique, in other words, is precisely the same commitment to intentional exceptionality we find in all traditional philosophy, the belief that the subject matter of traditional philosophical disputation lies beyond the pale of scientific explanation… that despite the cognitive scientific tsunami, traditional intentional speculation lies secure in its ontological bunkers.

Only more philosophy, Meillassoux thinks, can overcome the ‘scandal of philosophy.’ But how is mere opinion supposed to provide bona fide knowledge of knowledge? Speculation on mathematics does nothing to ameliorate this absurdity: even though paradigmatic of objectivity, mathematics remains as inscrutable as knowledge itself. Perhaps there is some sense to be found in the notion of interrogating/theorizing objects in a bid to understand objectivity (cognition), but given what we now know regarding our cognitive shortcomings in low-information domains, we can be assured that ‘object-oriented’ approaches will bog down in disputation.

I just don’t know how to make the ‘critique of correlationism’ workable, short ignoring the very science it takes as its motivation, or just as bad, subordinating empirical discoveries to some school of ‘fundamental ontological’ speculation. If you’re willing to take such a leap of theoretical faith, you can be assured that no one in the vicinity of cognitive science will take it with you—and that you will make no difference in the mad revolution presently crashing upon us.

We know that knowledge is somehow an artifact of neural function—full stop. Meillassoux is quite right to say this renders the objectivity of knowledge very difficult to understand. But why think the problem lies in presuming the artifactual nature of cognition?—especially now that science has begun reverse-engineering that nature in earnest! What if our presumption of artifactuality weren’t so much the problem, as the characterization? What if the problem isn’t that cognitive science is artifactual so much as how it is?

After all, we’ve learned a tremendous amount about this how in the past decades: the idea of dismissing all this detail on the basis of a priori guesswork seems more than a little suspect. The track record would suggest extreme caution. As the boggling scale of the cognitive scientific project should make clear, everything turns on the biological details of cognition. We now know, for instance, that the brain employs legions of special purpose devices to navigate its environments. We know that cognition is thoroughly heuristic, that it turns on cues, bits of available information statistically correlated to systems requiring solution.

Most all systems in our environment shed information enabling the prediction of subsequent behaviours absent the mechanical particulars of that information. The human brain is exquisitely tuned to identify and exploit the correlation of information available and subsequent behaviours. The artifactuality of biology is an evolutionary one, and as such geared to the thrifty solution of high impact problems. To say that cognition (animal or human) is heuristic is to say it’s organized according to the kinds of problems our ancestors needed to solve, and not according to those belonging to academics. Human cognition consists of artifactualities, subsystems dedicated to certain kinds of problem ecologies. Moreover, it consists of artifactualities selected to answer questions quite different from those posed by philosophers.

These two facts drastically alter the landscape of the apparent problem posed by ‘correlationism.’ We have ample theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that mechanistic cognition and intentional cognition comprise two quite different cognitive regimes, the one dedicated to explanation via high-dimensional (physical) sourcing, the other dedicated to explanation absent that sourcing. As an intentional phenomena, objectivity clearly belongs to the latter. Mechanistic cognition, meanwhile, is artifactual. What if it’s the case that ‘objectivity’ is the turn of a screw in a cognitive system selected to solve in the absence of artifactual information? Since intentional cognition turns on specific cues to leverage solutions, and since those cues appear sufficient (to be the only game in town where that behaviour is concerned), the high-dimensional sourcing of that same behavior generates a philosophical crash space—and a storied one at that! What seems sourceless and self-evident becomes patently impossible.

Short magic, cognitive systems possess the environmental relationships they do thanks to super-complicated histories of natural and neural selection—evolution and learning. Let’s call this their orientation, understood as the nonintentional (‘zombie’) correlate of ‘perspective.’ The human brain is possibly the most complex thing we know of in the universe (a fact which should render any theory of the human neglecting that complexity suspect). Our cognitive systems, in other words, possess physically intractable orientations. How intractable? Enough that billions of dollars in research has merely scratched the surface.

Any capacity to cognize this relationship will perforce be radically heuristic, which is to say, provide a means to solve some critical range of problems—a problem ecology—absent natural historical information. The orientation heuristically cognized, of course, is the full-dimensional relationship we actually possess, only hacked in ways that generate solutions (repetitions of behaviour) while neglecting the physical details of that relationship.

Most significantly, orientation neglects the dimension of mediation: thought and perception (whatever they amount to) are thoroughly blind to their immediate sources. This cognitive blindness to the activity of cognition, or medial neglect, amounts to a gross insensitivity to our physical continuity with our environments, the fact that we break no thermodynamic laws. Our orientation, in other words, is characterized by a profound, structural insensitivity to its own constitution—its biological artifactuality, among other things. This auto-insensitivity, not surprisingly, includes insensitivity to the fact of this insensitivity, and thus the default presumption of sufficiency. Specialized sensitivities are required to flag insufficiencies, after all, and like all biological devices, they do not come for free. Not only are we blind to our position within the superordinate systems comprising nature, we’re blind to our blindness, and so, unable to distinguish table-scraps from a banquet, we are duped into affirming inexplicable spontanieties.

‘Truth’ belongs to our machinery for communicating (among other things) the sufficiency of iterable orientations within superordinate systems given medial neglect. You could say it’s a way to advertise clockwork positioning (functional sufficiency) absent any inkling of the clock. ‘Objectivity,’ the term denoting the supposed general property of being true apart from individual perspectives, is a deliberative contrivance derived from practical applications of ‘truth’—the product of ‘philosophical reflection.’ The problem with objectivity as a phenomenon (as opposed to ‘objectivity’ as a component of some larger cognitive articulation) is that the sufficiency of iterable orientations within superordinate systems is always a contingent affair. Whether ‘truth’ occasions sufficiency is always an open question, since the system provides, at best, a rough and ready way to communicate and/or troubleshoot orientation. Unpredictable events regularly make liars of us all. The notion of facts ‘being true’ absent the mediation of human cognition, ‘objectivity,’ also provides a rough and ready way to communicate and/or troubleshoot orientation in certain circumstances. We regularly predict felicitous orientations without the least sensitivity to their artifactual nature, absent any inkling how their pins lie in intractable high-dimensional coincidences between buzzing brains. This insensitivity generates the illusion of absolute orientation, a position outside natural regularities—a ‘view from nowhere.’ We are a worm in the gut of nature convinced we possess disembodied eyes. And so long as the consequences of our orientations remain felicitous, our conceit need not be tested. Our orientations might as well ‘stand nowhere’ absent cognition of their limits.

Thus can ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ be naturalized and their peculiarities explained.

The primary cognitive moral here is that lacking information has positive cognitive consequences, especially when it comes to deliberative metacognition, our attempts to understand our nature via philosophical reflection alone. Correlationism evidences this in a number of ways.

As soon as the problem of cognition is characterized as the problem of thought and being, it becomes insoluble. Intentional cognition is heuristic: it neglects the nature of the systems involved, exploiting cues correlated to the systems requiring solution instead. The application of intentional cognition to theoretical explanation, therefore, amounts to the attempt to solve natures using a system adapted to neglect natures. A great deal of traditional philosophy is dedicated to the theoretical understanding of cognition via intentional idioms—via applications of intentional cognition. Thus the morass of disputation. We presume that specialized problem-solving systems possess general application. Lacking the capacity to cognize our inability to cognize the theoretical nature of cognition, we presume sufficiency. Orientation, the relation between neural systems and their proximal and distal environments—between two systems of objects—becomes perspective, the relation between subjects (or systems of subjects) and systems of objects (environments). If one conflates the manifest artifactual nature of orientation for the artifactual nature of perspective (subjectivity), then objectivity itself becomes a subjective artifact, and therefore nothing objective at all. Since orientation characterizes our every attempt to solve for cognition, conflating it with perspective renders perspective inescapable, and objectivity all but inexplicable. Thus the crash space of traditional epistemology.

Now I know from hard experience that the typical response to the picture sketched above is to simply insist on the conflation of orientation and perspective, to assert that my position, despite its explanatory power, simply amounts to more of the same, another perspectival Klein Bottle distinctive only for its egregious ‘scientism.’ Only my intrinsically intentional perspective, I am told, allows me to claim that such perspectives are metacognitive artifacts, a consequence of medial neglect. But asserting perspective before orientation on the basis of metacognitive intuitions alone not only begs the question, it also beggars explanation, delivering the project of cognizing cognition to never-ending disputation—an inability to even formulate explananda, let alone explain anything. This is why I like asking intentionalists how many centuries of theoretical standstill we should expect before that oft advertised and never delivered breakthrough finally arrives. The sin Meillassoux attributes to correlationism, the inability to explain cognition, is really just the sin belonging to intentional philosophy as a whole. Thanks to medial neglect, metcognition,  blind to both its sources and its source blindness, insists we stand outside nature. Tackling this intuition with intentional idioms leaves our every attempt to rationalize our connection underdetermined, a matter of interminable controversy. The Scandal dwells on eternal.

I think orientation precedes perspective—and obviously so, having watched loved ones dismantled by brain disease. I think understanding the role of neglect in orientation explains the peculiarities of perspective, provides a parsimonious way to understand the apparent first-person in terms of the neglect structure belonging to the third. There’s no problem with escaping the dream tank and touching the world simply because there’s no ontological distinction between ourselves and the cosmos. We constitute a small region of a far greater territory, the proximal attuned to the distal. Understanding the heuristic nature of ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity,’ I restrict their application to adaptive problem-ecologies, and simply ask those who would turn them into something ontologically exceptional why they would trust low-dimensional intuitions over empirical data, especially when those intuitions pretty much guarantee perpetual theoretical underdetermination. Far better trust to our childhood presumptions of truth and reality, in the practical applications of these idioms, than in any one of the numberless theoretical misapplications ‘discovering’ this trust fundamentally (as opposed to situationally) ‘naïve.’

The cognitive difference, what separates the consequences of our claims, has never been about ‘subjectivity’ versus ‘objectivity,’ but rather intersystematicity, the integration of ever-more sensitive orientations possessing ever more effectiveness into the superordinate systems encompassing us all. Physically speaking, we’ve long known that this has to be the case. Short actual difference making differences, be they photons striking our retinas or compression waves striking our eardrums or so on, no difference is made. Even Meillassoux acknowledges the necessity of physical contact. What we’ve lacked is a way of seeing how our apparently immediate intentional intuitions, be they phenomenological, ontological, or normative, fit into this high-dimensional—physical—picture.

Heuristic Neglect Theory not only provides this way, it also explains why it has proven so elusive over the centuries. HNT explains the wrong turn mentioned above. The question of orientation immediately cues the systems our ancestors developed to circumvent medial neglect. Solving for our behaviourally salient environmental relationships, in other words, automatically formats the problem in intentional terms. The automaticity of the application of intentional cognition renders it apparently ‘self-evident.’

The reason the critique of correlationism and speculative realism suffer all the problems of underdetermination their proponents attribute to correlationism is that they take this very same wrong turn. How is Meillassoux’s ‘hyper-chaos,’ yet another adventure in a priori speculation, anything more than another pebble tossed upon the heap of traditional disputation? Novelty alone recommends them. Otherwise they leave us every bit as mystified, every bit as unable to accommodate the torrent of relevant scientific findings, and therefore every bit as irrelevant to the breathtaking revolutions even now sweeping us and our traditions out to sea. Like the traditions they claim to supersede, they peddle cognitive abjection, discursive immobility, in the guise of fundamental insight.

Theoretical speculation is cheap, which is why it’s so frightfully easy to make any philosophical account look bad. All you need do is start worrying definitions, then let the conceptual games begin. This is why the warrant of any account is always a global affair, why the power of Evolutionary Theory, for example, doesn’t so much lie in the immunity of its formulations to philosophical critique, but in how much it explains on nature’s dime alone. The warrant of Heuristic Neglect Theory likewise turns on the combination of parsimony and explanatory power.

Anyone arguing that HNT necessarily presupposes some X, be it ontological or normative, is simply begging the question. Doesn’t HNT presuppose the reality of intentional objectivity? Not at all. HNT certainly presupposes applications of intentional cognition, which, given medial neglect, philosophers pose as functional or ontological realities. On HNT, a theory can be true even though, high-dimensionally speaking, there is no such thing as truth. Truth talk possesses efficacy in certain practical problem-ecologies, but because it participates in solving something otherwise neglected, namely the superordinate systematicity of orientations, it remains beyond the pale of intentional resolution.

Even though sophisticated critics of eliminativism acknowledge the incoherence of the tu quoque, I realize this remains a hard twist for many (if not most) to absorb, let alone accept. But this is exactly as it should be, both insofar as something has to explain why isolating the wrong turn has proven so stupendously difficult, and because this is precisely the kind of trap we should expect, given the heuristic and fractionate nature of human cognition. ‘Knowledge’ provides a handle on the intersection of vast, high-dimensional histories, a way to manage orientations without understanding the least thing about them. To know knowledge, we will come to realize, is to know there is no such thing, simply because ‘knowing’ is a resolutely practical affair, almost certainly inscrutable to intentional cognition. When you’re in the intentional mode, this statement simply sounds preposterous—I know it once struck me as such! It’s only when you appreciate how far your intuitions have strayed from those of your childhood, back when your only applications of intentional cognition were practical, that you can see the possibility of a more continuous, intersystematic way to orient ourselves to the cosmos. There was a time before you wandered into the ancient funhouse of heuristic misapplication, when you could not distinguish between your perspective and your orientation. HNT provides a theoretical way to recover that time and take a radically different path.

As a bona fide theory of cognition, HNT provides a way to understand our spectacular inability to understand ourselves. HNT can explain ‘aporia.’ The metacognitive resources recruited for the purposes of philosophical reflection possess alarm bells—sensitivities to their own limits—relevant only to their ancestral applications. The kinds of cognitive apories (crash spaces) characterizing traditional philosophy are precisely those we might expect, given the sudden ability to exercise specialized metacognitive resources out of school, to apply, among other things, the problem-solving power of intentional cognition to the question of intentional cognition.

As a bona fide theory of cognition, HNT bears as much on artificial cognition as on biological cognition, and as such, can be used to understand and navigate the already radical and accelerating transformation of our cognitive ecologies. HNT scales, from the subpersonal to the social, and this means that HNT is relevant to the technological madness of the now.

As a bona fide empirical theory, HNT, unlike any traditional theory of intentionality, will be sorted. Either science will find that metacognition actually neglects information in the ways I propose, or it won’t. Either science will find this neglect possesses the consequences I theorize, or it won’t. Nothing exceptional and contentious is required. With our growing understanding of the brain and consciousness comes a growing understanding of information access and processing capacity—and the neglect structures that fall out of them. The human brain abounds in bottlenecks, none of which are more dramatic than consciousness itself.

Cognition is biomechanical. The ‘correlation of thought and being,’ on my account, is the correlation of being and being. The ontology of HNT is resolutely flat. Once we understand that we only glimpse as much of our orientations as our ancestors required for reproduction, and nothing more, we can see that ‘thought,’ whatever it amounts to, is material through and through.

The evidence of this lies strewn throughout the cognitive wreckage of speculation, the alien crash site of philosophy.

 

Notes

[1] This includes, in addition to the neurosciences proper, research into Basic Behavioral and Social Science (8.597 billion), Behavioral and Social Science (22.515 billion), Brain Disorders (23.702 billion), Mental Health (13.699 billion), and Neurodegenerative (10.183 billion). https://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx 21/01/2017

 

Occult Wellness versus Being Philosophical

by rsbakker

This is a picture of where (I think) my books belong, somewhere in the blurry boundary between these folk/commercial and scholarly/non-commercial genres of intentional confusion.

It’s been a mad couple of months, but the final draft of The Unholy Consult is out the door. Now I can only wring my hands while pretending to crack my knuckles… My seventeen year old self stands agog.

My schedule is still brimming, but it now includes finishing off a number of posts left hanging by the arrival of the manuscript. First up will be a piece on heuristic neglect and correlationism.

Framing “On Alien Philosophy”…

by rsbakker

dubbit

Peter Hankins of Conscious Entities fame has a piece considering “On Alien Philosophy.” The debate is just getting started, but I thought it worthwhile explaining why I think this particular paper of mine amounts to more than yet just another interpretation to heap onto the intractable problem of ourselves.

Consider the four following claims:

1) We have biologically constrained (in terms of information access and processing resources) metacognitive capacities ancestrally tuned to the solution of various practical problem ecologies, and capable of exaptation to various other problems.

2) ‘Philosophical reflection’ constitutes such an exaptation.

3) All heuristic exaptations inherit, to some extent, the problem-solving limitations of the heuristic exapted.

4) ‘Philosophical reflection’ inherits the problem-solving limitations of deliberative metacognition.

Now I don’t think there’s much anything controversial about any of these claims (though, to be certain, there’s a great many devils lurking in the details adduced). So note what happens when we add the following:

5) We should expect human philosophical practice will express, in a variety of ways, the problem-solving limitations of deliberative metacognition.

Which seems equally safe. But note how the terrain of the philosophical debate regarding the nature of the soul has changed. Any claim purporting the exceptional nature of this or that intentional phenomena now needs to run the gauntlet of (5). Why assume we cognize something ontologically exceptional when we know we are bound to be duped somehow? All things being equal, mediocre explanations will always trump exceptional ones, after all.

The challenge of (5) has been around for quite some time, but if you read (precritical) eliminativists like Churchland, Stich, or Rosenberg, this is where the battle grinds to a standstill. Why? Because they have no general account of how the inevitable problem-solving limitations of deliberative metacognition would be expressed in human philosophical practice, let alone how they would generate the appearance of intentional phenomena. Since all they have are promissory notes and suggestive gestures, ontologically exceptional accounts remain the only game in town. So, despite the power of (5), the only way to speak of intentional phenomena remains the traditional, philosophical one. Science is blind without theory, so absent any eliminativist account of intentional phenomena, it has no clear way to proceed with their investigation. So it hews to exceptional posits, trusting in their local efficacy, and assuming they will be demystified by discoveries to come.

Thus the challenge posed by Alien Philosophy. By giving real, abductive teeth to (5), my account overturns the argumentative terrain between eliminativism and intentionalism by transforming the explanatory stakes. It shows us how stupidity, understood ecologically, provides everything we need to understand our otherwise baffling intuitions regarding intentional phenomena. “On Alien Philosophy” challenges the Intentionalist to explain more with less (the very thing, of course, he or she cannot do).

Now I think I’ve solved the problem, that I have a way to genuinely naturalize meaning and cognition. The science will sort my pretensions in due course, but in the meantime, the heuristic neglect account of intentionality, given its combination of mediocrity and explanatory power, has to be regarded as a serious contender.

“On Alien Philosophy”

by rsbakker

alien-philosophy

The Journal of Consciousness Studies published “On Alien Philosophy” today–a nice way ring in my 50th year on this planet! The quotable version can be found here, but I’ve also uploaded the preprint version (with a handful of errors, including one on Dennett caught by Dennett himself no less) here. This paper has it all, only laid out in a way that saddles critics with an enormous abductive challenge. Quibbling with this or that atom of my argument is easy–too easy. The challenge is to do so in a manner explaining as much as parsimoniously.

Abstract: Given a sufficiently convergent cognitive biology, we might suppose that aliens would likely find themselves perplexed by many of the same kinds of problems that inform our traditional and contemporary philosophical debates. In particular, we can presume that ‘humanoid’ aliens would be profoundly stumped by themselves, and that they would possess a philosophical tradition organized around ‘hard problems’ falling out of their inability to square their scientific self-understanding with their traditional and/or intuitive self-understanding. As speculative as any such consideration of ‘alien philosophy’ must be, it provides a striking, and perhaps important, way to recontextualize contemporary human debates regarding cognition and consciousness.

Having contributed my bit to the great endeavour to unravel the mysteries of consciousness and cognition, I now turn to more traditional methods of unravelling consciousness and cognition… gracefully, or not. 50 deserves a hangover.

Scripture become Philosophy become Fantasy

by rsbakker

scripture

Cosmos and History has published “From Scripture to Fantasy: Adrian Johnston and the Problem of Continental Fundamentalism” in their most recent edition, which can be found here. This is a virus that needs to infect as many continental philosophy graduate students as possible, lest the whole tradition be lost to irrelevance. The last millennium’s radicals have become this millennium’s Pharisees with frightening speed, and now only the breathless have any hope of keeping pace.

ABSTRACT: Only the rise of science allowed us to identify scriptural ontologies as fantastic conceits, as anthropomorphizations of an indifferent universe. Now that science is beginning to genuinely disenchant the human soul, history suggests that traditional humanistic discourses are about to be rendered fantastic as well. Via a critical reading of Adrian Johnston’s ‘transcendental materialism,’ I attempt to show both the shape and the dimensions of the sociocognitive dilemma presently facing Continental philosophers as they appear to their outgroup detractors. Trusting speculative a priori claims regarding the nature of processes and entities under scientific investigation already excludes Continental philosophers from serious discussion. Using such claims, as Johnston does, to assert the fundamentally intentional nature of the universe amounts to anthropomorphism. Continental philosophy needs to honestly appraise the nature of its relation to the scientific civilization it purports to decode and guide, lest it become mere fantasy, or worse yet, conceptual religion.

KEYWORDS: Intentionalism; Eliminativism; Humanities; Heuristics; Speculative Materialism

All transcendental indignation welcome! I was a believer once.

Reactionary Atheism: Hagglund, Derrida, and Nooconservatism*

by rsbakker

The difference between the critic and the apologist in philosophy, one would think, is the difference between conceiving philosophy as refuge, a post hoc means to rationalize and so recuperate what we cherish or require, and conceiving philosophy as exposure, an ad hoc means to mutate thought and so see our way through what we think we cherish or require. Now in Continental philosophy so-called, the overwhelming majority of thinkers would consider themselves critics and not apologists. They would claim to be proponents of exposure, of the new, and deride the apologist for abusing reason in the service of wishful thinking.

But this, I hope to show, is little more than a flattering conceit. We are all children of Hollywood, all prone to faux-renegade affectations. Nowadays ‘critic,’ if anything, simply names a new breed of apologist. This is perhaps inevitable, in a certain sense. The more cognitive science learns regarding reason, the more intrinsically apologetic it seems to become, a confabulatory organ primarily adapted to policing and protecting our parochial ingroup aspirations. But it is also the case that thought (whatever the hell it is) has been delivered to a radically unprecedented juncture, one that calls its very intelligibility into question. Our ‘epoch of thinking’ teeters upon the abyssal, a future so radical as to make epic fantasy of everything we are presently inclined to label ‘human.’ Whether it acknowledges as much or not, all thought huddles in the shadow of the posthuman–the shadow of its end.

I’ve been thumping this particular tub for almost two decades now. It has been, for better or worse, the thematic impetus behind every novel I have written and every paper I have presented. And at long last, what was once a smattering of voices has become a genuine chorus (for reasons quite independent of my tub thumping I’m sure). Everyone agrees that something radical is happening. Also, everyone agrees that this ‘something’ turns on the every-expanding powers of science–and the sciences of the brain in particular. This has led to what promises to become one of those generational changes in philosophical thinking, at least in its academic incarnation. Though winded, thought is at last attempting to pace the times we live in. But I fear that it’s failing this attempt, that, far from exposing itself to the most uncertain future humanity has ever known, materially let alone intellectually, it is rather groping for ways to retool and recuperate a philosophical heritage that the sciences are transforming into mythology as we speak. It is attempting to innoculate thought as it exists against the sweeping transformations engulfing its social conditions. To truly expose thought, I want to argue, is to be willing to let it die…

Or become inhuman.

My position is quite simple: Now that science is overcoming the neural complexities that have for so long made an intentional citadel out of the soul, it will continue doing what it has always done, which is offer sometimes simple, sometimes sophisticated, mechanical explanations of what it finds, and so effectively ‘disenchanting’ the brain the way it has the world. This first part, at least, is uncontroversial. The real question has to do with the ‘disenchantment,’ which is to say the degree to which these mechanical explanations will be commensurate with our intentional self-understanding, or what Sellars famously called the ‘manifest image.’ Since there are infinitely more ways for our mechanistic scientific understanding to contradict our intentional prescientific understanding, we should, all things being equal, expect that the latter will be overthrown. Indeed, we already have a growing mountain of evidence trending in this direction. Given our apologetic inclinations, however, it should come as no surprise that the literature is rife with arguments why all things are not equal. Aside from an ingrained suspicion of happy endings, especially where science is concerned (I’m inclined to think it will cut our throats), the difficulty I have with such arguments lies in their reliance on metacognitive intuition. For the life of me, I cannot understand why we are in any better position peering into our souls than our ancestors were peering into the heavens. Why should the accumulation of scientific information be any friendlier to our traditional, prescientific assumptions this one time around?

I simply don’t think the human, or for that matter, any of the concepts science has chased from the world into the shadows of the human brain, will prove to be the miraculous exception. Science will rewrite ‘rules’ the way it has orbits, ‘meanings’ the way it has planets, and so on, doing what it has done so many times in the past: take simplistic, narcissistic notions founded on spare and fragmentary information and replacing them portraits of breathtaking causal complexity.

This is why I’m so suspicious of the ongoing ‘materialist turn’ in Continental philosophy, why I see it more as a crypto-apologetic attempt to rescue traditional conceptual conceits than any genuine turn away from ‘experience.’ This is how I read Zizek’s The Parallax View several weeks back, and this is how I propose to read Martin Hagglund’s project in his recent (and quite wonderfully written), Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Specifically, I want to take issue with his materialist characterization of Derrida’s work, even though this seems to be the aspect of his book that has drawn the most praise. Aaron Hodges, in “Martin Hagglund’s Speculative Materialism,” contends that Radical Atheism has “effectively dealt the coup de grace to any understanding of deconstructive logic that remains under the sway of idealist interpretation.” Even John Caputo, in his voluminous counterargument concedes that Hagglund’s Derrida is a materialist Derrida; he just happens to think that there are other Derridas as well.

Against the grain of Radical Atheism’s critical reception, then, I want to argue that no Derrida, Hagglund’s or otherwise, can be ‘materialist’ in any meaningful sense and remain recognizable as a ‘Derrida.’ He simply is not, as Hagglund claims, a philosopher of ‘ultratranscendence’ (as Hagglund defines the term). Derrida is not the author of any singular thought ‘beyond’ the empirical and the transcendental. Nor does he, most importantly, provide any way to explain the fundamental ‘synthesis,’ as Hagglund calls it, required to make sense of experience.

To evidence this last point, I will rehearse the explanation of ‘synthesis’ provided by the Blind Brain Theory (BBT). I will then go on to flex a bit of theoretical muscle, to demonstrate the explanatory power of BBT, the way it can ‘get behind’ and explicate philosophical positions even as notoriously arcane as Husserlian phenomenology or Derridean deconstruction. This provides us with the conceptual resources required to see the extent of Derrida’s noocentrism, the way he remains, despite the apparent profundity of his aleatory gestures, thoroughly committed to the centrality of meaning–the intentional. Far from ‘radical,’ I will contend, Derrida remains a nooconservative thinker, one thoroughly enmeshed in the very noocentric thinking Hagglund and so many others seem to think he has surpassed.

For those not familiar with Radical Atheism, I should note the selective, perhaps even opportunistic, nature of the reading I offer. From the standpoint of BBT, the distinction between deconstruction and negative theology is the distinction between deflationary conceptions of intentionality in its most proximal and distal incarnations. Thus the title of the present piece, ‘Reactionary Atheism.’ To believe in meaning of any sort is to have faith in some version of ‘God.’ Finite or infinite, mortal or immortal, the intentional form is conserved–and as I hope to show, that form is supernatural. BBT is a genuinely post-intentional theoretical position. According to it, there are no meaning makers,’ objective or subjective. According to it, you are every bit as mythological as the God you would worship or honour. In this sense, the contest between atheistic and apophatic readings of Derrida amounts to little more than another intractable theological dispute. On the account offered here, both houses are equally poxed.

My reading therefore concentrates on the first two chapters of Radical Atheism, where Hagglund provides an interpretation of how (as Derrida himself claims) trace and differance arise out of his critique of Husserl’s Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness. Since Hagglund’s subsequent defence of ‘radical atheism’ turns on the conclusions he draws from this interpretation–namely, the ‘ultratranscendental’ status of trace and differance and the explanation of synthesis they offer–undermining these conclusions serves to undermine Hagglund’s thesis as a whole.

Horn head

Atheism as traditionally understood, Hagglund begins, does not question the desire for God or immortality and so leaves ‘mortal’ a privative concept. To embrace atheism is to settle for mere mortality. He poses radical atheism as Derrida’s alternative, the claim that the conceptual incoherence of the desire for God and immortality forces us to affirm its contrary, the mortal:

The key to radical atheism is what I analyze as the unconditional affirmation of survival. This affirmation is not a matter of choice that some people make and others do not: it is unconditional because everyone is engaged by it without exception. Whatever one may want or whatever one may do, one has to affirm the time of survival, since it opens the possibility to live on–and thus to want something or to do something–in the first place. This unconditional affirmation of survival allows us to read the purported desire for immortality against itself. The desire to live on after death is not a desire for immortality, since to live on is to remain subjected to temporal finitude. The desire for survival cannot aim at transcending time, since the given time is the only chance for survival. There is thus an internal contradiction in the so-called desire for immortality. Radical Atheism, 2

Time becomes the limit, the fundamental constraint, the way, Hagglund argues, to understand how the formal commitments at the heart of Derrida’s work render theological appropriations of deconstruction unworkable. To understand deconstruction, you need to understand Derrida’s analysis of temporality. And once you understand Derrida’s analysis of temporality, he claims, you will see that deconstruction entails radical atheism, the incoherence of desiring immortality.

Although Hagglund will primarily base his interpretation of deconstructive temporality on a reading of Speech and Phenomena, it is significant, I think, that he begins with a reading of “Ousia and Gramme,” which is to say, a reading of Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s reading of Hegel! In “Ousia and Gramme,” Derrida is concerned with the deconstructive revision of the Heideggerean problematic of presence. The key to this revision, he argues, lies in one of the more notorious footnotes in Being and Time, where Heidegger recapitulates the parallels between Hegel’s and Aristotle’s considerations of temporality. This becomes “the hidden passageway that makes the problem of presence communicate with the problem of the written trace” (Margins of Philosophy, 34). Turning from Heidegger’s reading of Hegel, Derrida considers what Aristotle himself has to say regarding time in Physics (4:10), keen to emphasize Aristotle’s concern with the apories that seem to accompany any attempt to think the moment. The primary problem, as Aristotle sees it, is the difficulty of determining whether the now, which divides the past from the future, is always one and the same or distinct, for the now always seems to somehow be the same now, even as it is unquestionably a different now. The lesson that Derrida eventually draws from this has to do with the way Heidegger, in his attempt to wrest time from the metaphysics of presence, ultimately commits the very theoretical sins that he imputes to Hegel and Aristotle. As he writes: “To criticize the manipulation or determination of any one of these concepts from within the system always amounts, and let this expression be taken with its full charge of meaning here, to going around in circles: to reconstituting, according to another configuration, the same system” (60). The lesson, in other words, is that there is no escaping the metaphysics of presence. Heidegger’s problem isn’t that he failed to achieve what he set out to achieve–How could it be when such failure is constitutive of philosophical thought?–but that he thought, if only for a short time, that he had succeeded.

The lesson that Hagglund draws from “Ousia and Gramme,” however, is quite different:

The pivotal question is what conclusion to draw from the antinomy between divisible time and indivisible presence. Faced with the relentless division of temporality, one must subsume time under a nontemporal presence in order to secure the philosophical logic of identity. The challenge of Derrida’s thinking stems from his refusal of this move. Deconstruction insists on a primordial division and thereby enables us to think the radical irreducibility of time as constitutive of any identity. Radical Atheism, 16-17

If there is one thing about Hagglund’s account that almost all his critics agree on, it is his clarity. But even at this early juncture, it should be clear that this purported ‘clarity’ possesses a downside. Derrida raises and adapts the Aristotelian problem of divisibility in “Ousia and Gramme” to challenge, not simply Heidegger’s claim to primordiality, but all claims to primordiality. And he criticizes Heidegger, not for thinking time in terms of presence, but for believing it was possible to think time in any other way. Derrida is explicitly arguing that ‘refusing this move’ is simply not possible, and he sees his own theoretical practice as no exception. His ‘challenge,’ as Hagglund calls it, lies in conceiving presence as something at once inescapable and impossible. Hagglund, in other words, distills his ‘pivotal question’ via a reading of “Ousia and Gramme” that pretty clearly runs afoul the very theoretical perils it warns against. We will return to this point in due course.

Having isolated the ‘pivotal,’ Hagglund turns to the ‘difficult’:

The difficult question is how identity is possible in spite of such division. Certainly, the difference of time could not even be marked without a synthesis that relates the past to the future and thus posits an identity over time. Philosophies of time-consciousness have usually solved the problem by anchoring the synthesis in a self-present subject, who relates the past to the future through memories and expectations that are given in the form of the present. The solution to the problem, however, must assume that the consciousness that experiences time in itself is present and thereby exempt from the division of time. Hence, if Derrida is right to insist that the self-identity of presence is impossible a priori, then it is all the more urgent to account for how the synthesis of time is possible without being grounded in the form of presence. 17

Identity has to come from somewhere. And this is where Derrida, according to Hagglund, becomes a revolutionary part of the philosophical solution. “For philosophical reason to advocate endless divisibility,” he writes, “is tantamount to an irresponsible empiricism that cannot account for how identity is possible” (25). This, Hagglund contends, is Derrida’s rationale for positing the trace. The nowhere of the trace becomes the ‘from somewhere’ of identity, the source of ‘originary synthesis.’ Hagglund offers Derrida’s account of the spacing of time and the temporalizing of space as a uniquely deconstructive account of synthesis, which is to say, an account of synthesis that does not “subsume time under a nontemporal presence in order to secure the philosophical logic of identity” (16).

Given the centrality of the trace to his thesis, critics of Radical Atheism were quick to single it out for scrutiny. Where Derrida seems satisfied with merely gesturing to the natural, and largely confining actual applications of trace and difference to semantic contexts, Hagglund presses further: “For Derrida, the spacing of time is an ‘ultratranscendental’ condition from which nothing can be exempt” (19). And when he says ‘nothing,’ Hagglund means nothing, arguing that everything from the ideal to “minimal forms of life” answers to the trace and differance. Hagglund was quick to realize the problem. In a 2011 Journal of Philosophy interview, he writes, “[t]he question then, is how one can legitimize such a generalization of the structure of the trace. What is the methodological justification for speaking of the trace as a condition for not only language and experience but also processes that extend beyond the human and even the living?”

Or to put the matter more simply, just what is ‘ultratranscendental’ supposed to mean?

Derrida, for his part, saw trace and differance as (to use Gasche’s term) ‘quasi-transcendental.’ Derrida’s peculiar variant of contextualism turns on his account of trace and differance. Where pragmatic contextualists are generally fuzzy about the temporality implicit to the normative contexts they rely upon, Derrida actually develops what you could call a ‘logic of context’ using trace and differance as primary operators. This is why his critique of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena is so important. He wants to draw our eye to the instant-by-instant performative aspect of meaning. When you crank up the volume on the differential (as opposed to recuperative) passage of time, it seems to be undeniably irreflexive. Deconstruction is a variant of contextualism that remains ruthlessly (but not exclusively) focussed on the irreflexivity of semantic performances, dramatizing the ‘dramatic idiom’ through readings that generate creativity and contradiction. The concepts of trace and differance provide synchronic and diachronic modes of thinking this otherwise occluded irreflexivity. What renders these concepts ‘quasi-transcendental,’ as opposed to transcendental in the traditional sense, is nothing other than trace and differance. Where Hegel temporalized the krinein of Critical Philosophy across the back of the eternal, conceiving the recuperative role of the transcendental as a historical convergence upon his very own philosophy, Derrida temporalizes the krinein within the aporetic viscera of this very moment now, overturning the recuperative role of the transcendental, reinterpreting it as interminable deflection, deferral, divergence–and so denying his thought any self-consistent recourse to the transcendental. The concept DIFFERANCE can only reference differance via the occlusion of differance. “The trace,” as Derrida writes, “is produced as its own erasure” (“Ousia and Gramme,” 65). One can carve out a place for trace and differance in the ‘system space’ of philosophical thinking, say their ‘quasi-transcendentality’ (as Gasche does in The Tain of the Mirror, for instance) resides in the way they name both the condition of possibility and impossibility of meaning and life, or one can, as I would argue Derrida himself did, evince their ‘quasi-transcendentality’ through actual interpretative performances. One can, in other words, either refer or revere.

Since second-order philosophical accounts are condemned to the former, it has become customary in the philosophical literature to assign content to the impossibility of stable content assignation, to represent the way performance, or the telling, cuts against representation, or the told. (Deconstructive readings, you could say, amount to ‘toldings,’ readings that stubbornly refuse to allow the antinomy of performance and representation to fade into occlusion). This, of course, is one of the reasons late 20th century Continental philosophy came to epitomize irrationalism for so many in the Anglo-American philosophical community. It’s worth noting, however, that in an important sense, Derrida agreed with these worries: this is why he prioritized demonstrations of his position over schematic statements, drawing cautionary morals as opposed to traditional theoretical conclusions. As a way of reading, deconstruction demonstrates the congenital inability of reason and representation to avoid implicitly closing the loop of contradiction. As a speculative account of why reason and representation possess this congenital inability, deconstruction explicitly closes that loop itself.

Far from being a theoretical virtue, then, ‘quasi-transcendence’ names a liability. Derrida is trying to show philosophy that inconsistency, far from being a distal threat requiring some kind of rational piety to avoid, is maximally proximal, internal to its very practice. The most cursory survey of intellectual history shows that every speculative position is eventually overthrown via the accumulation of interpretations. Deconstruction, in this sense, can be seen as a form of ‘interpretative time-travel,’ a regimented acceleration of processes always already in play, a kind of ‘radical translation’ put into action in the manner most violent to theoretical reason. The only way Derrida can theoretically describe this process, however, is by submitting to it–which is to say, by failing the way every other philosophy has failed. ‘Quasi-transcendence’ is his way of building this failure in, a double gesture of acknowledging and immunizing; his way of saying, ‘In speaking this, I speak what cannot be spoken.’

(This is actually the insight that ended my tenure as a ‘Branch Derridean’ what seems so long ago, the realization that theoretical outlooks that manage to spin virtue out of their liabilities result in ‘performative first philosophy,’ positions tactically immune to criticism because they incorporate some totalized interpretation of critique, thus rendering all criticisms of their claims into exemplifications of those claims. This is one of the things I’ve always found the most fascinating about deconstruction: the way it becomes (for those who buy into it) a performative example of the very representational conceit it sets out to demolish.)

‘Quasi-transcendental,’ then, refers to ‘concepts’ that can only be shown. So what then, does Hagglund mean by ‘utlratranscendental’ as opposed to ‘transcendental’ and ‘quasi-transcendental’? The first thing to note is that Hagglund, like Gasche and others, is attempting to locate Derrida within the ‘system space’ of philosophy and theory more generally. For him (opposed to Derrida), deconstruction implies a distinct position that rationalizes subsequent theoretical performances. As far as I can tell, he views the recursive loop of performance and representation, telling and told, as secondary. The ultratranscendental is quite distinct from the quasi-transcendental (though my guess is that Hagglund would dispute this). For Hagglund, rather, the ultratranscendental is thought through the lense of the transcendental more traditionally conceived:

On the one hand, the spacing of time has an ultratranscendental status because it is the condition for everything all the way up and including the ideal itself. The spacing of time is the condition not only for everything that can be cognized and experienced, but also for everything that can be thought and desired. On the other hand, the spacing of time has an ultratranscendental status because it is the condition for everything all the way down to minimal forms of life. As Derrida maintains, there is no limit to the generality of differance and the structure of the trace applies to all fields of the living. Radical Atheism, 19

The ultratranscendental, in other words, is simply an ‘all the way’ transcendental, as much a condition of possibility of life as a condition of possibility of experience. “The succession of time,” Hagglund states in his Journal of Philosophy interview, “entails that every moment negates itself–that it ceases to be as soon as it comes to be–and therefore must be inscribed as trace in order to be at all.” Trace and differance, he claims, are logical as opposed to ontological implications of succession, and succession seems to be fundamental to everything.

This is what warrants the extension of trace and differance from the intentional (the kinds of contexts Derrida was prone to deploy them) to the natural. And this is why Hagglund is convinced he’s offering a materialist reading of Derrida, one that allows him to generalize Derrida’s arche-writing to an ‘arche-materiality’ consonant with philosophical naturalism. But when you turn to his explicit statements to this effect, you find that the purported, constitutive generality of the trace, what makes it ultratranscendental, becomes something quite different:

This notion of the arche-materiality can accommodate the asymmetry between the living and the nonliving that is integral to Darwinian materialism (the animate depends upon the inanimate but not the other way around). Indeed, the notion of arche-materiality allows one to account for the minimal synthesis of time–namely, the minimal recording of temporal passage–without presupposing the advent or existence of life. The notion of arche-materiality is thus metatheoretically compatible with the most significant philosophical implications of Darwinism: that the living is essentially dependant on the nonliving, that animated intention is impossible without mindless, inanimate repetition, and that life is an utterly contingent and destructible phenomenon. Unlike current versions of neo-realism or neo-materialism, however, the notion of arche-materiality does not authorize its relation to Darwinism by constructing an ontology or appealing to scientific realism but rather articulating a logical infrastructure that is compatible with its findings. Journal of Philosophy

The important thing to note here is how Hagglund is careful to emphasize that the relationship between arche-materiality and Darwinian naturalism is one of compatibility. Arche-materiality, here, is posited as an alternative way to understand the mechanistic irreflexivity of the life sciences. This is more than a little curious given the ‘ultratranscendental’ status he wants to accord to the former. If it is the case that trace and differance understood as arche-materiality are merely compatible with rather than anterior to and constitutive of the mechanistic, Darwinian paradigm of the life sciences, then how could they be ‘ultratranscendental,’ which is to say, constitutive, in any sense? As an alternative, one might wonder what advantages, if any, arche-materiality has to offer theory. The advantages of mechanistic thinking should be clear to anyone who has seen a physician. So the question becomes one of what kind of conceptual work do trace and differance do.

Hagglund, in effect, has argued himself into the very bind which I fear is about to seize Continental philosophy as a whole. He recognizes the preposterous theoretical hubris involved in arguing that the mechanistic paradigm depends on arche-materiality, so he hedges, settles for ‘compatibility’ over anteriority. In a sense, he has no choice. Time is itself the object of scientific study, and a divisive one at that. Asserting that trace and differance are constitutive of the mechanistic paradigm places his philosophical speculation on firmly empirical ground (physics and cosmology, to be precise)–a place he would rather not be (and for good reason!).

But this requires that he retreat from his earlier claims regarding the ultratranscendental status of trace and differance, that he rescind the claim that they constitute an ‘all the way down’ condition. He could claim they are merely transcendental in the Kantian, or ‘conditions of experience,’ sense, but then that would require abandoning his claim to materialism, and so strand him with the ‘old Derrida.’ So instead he opts for ‘compatibility,’ and leaves the question of theoretical utility, the question of why we should bother with arcane speculative tropes like trace and differance given the boggling successes of the mechanistic paradigm, unasked.

One could argue, however, that Hagglund has already given us his answer: trace and differance, he contends, allow us to understand how reflexivity arises from irreflexivity absent the self-present subject. This is their signature contribution. As he writes:

The synthesis of the trace follows from the constitution of time we have considered. Given that the now can appear only by disappearing–that it passes away as soon as it comes to be–it must be inscribed as a trace in order to be at all. This is the becoming-space of time. The trace is necessarily spatial, since spatiality is characterized by the ability to remain in spite of temporal succession. Spatiality is thus the condition for synthesis, since it enables the tracing of relations between past and future. Radical Atheism, 18

But as far as ‘explanations’ are concerned it remains unclear as to how this can be anything other than a speculative posit. The synthesis of now moments occurs somehow. Since the past now must be recuperated within future nows, it makes sense to speak of some kind of residuum or ‘trace.’ If this synthesis isn’t the product of subjectivity, as Kant and Husserl would have it, then it has to be the product of something. The question is why this ‘something’ need have anything to do with space. Why does the fact that the trace (like the Dude) ‘abides’ have anything to do with space? The fact that both are characterized by immunity to succession implies, well… nothing. The trace, you could say, is ‘spatial’ insofar as it possesses location. But it remains entirely unclear how spatiality ‘enables the tracing of relations between past and future,’ and so becomes the ‘condition for synthesis.’

Hagglund’s argument simply does not work. I would be inclined to say the same of Derrida, if I actually thought he was trying to elaborate a traditional theoretical position in the system space of philosophy. But I don’t: I think the aporetic loop he establishes between deconstructive theory and practice is central to understanding his corpus. Derrida takes the notion of quasi-transcendence (as opposed to ultratranscendence) quite seriously. ‘Trace’ and ‘differance’ are figures as much as concepts, which is precisely why he resorts to a pageant of metaphors in his subsequent work, ‘originary supplements’ such as spectres, cinders, gifts, pharmakons and so on: The same can be said of ‘arche-writing’ and yes, even ‘spacing’: Derrida literally offers these as myopic and defective ways of thinking some fraction of the unthinkable. Derrida has no transcendental account of how reflexivity arises from irreflexivity, only a myriad of quasi-transcendental ways we might think the relation of reflexivity and irreflexivity. The most he would say is that trace and differance allow us to understand how the irreflexivity characteristic of mechanism operates both on and within the synthesis of experience.

At the conclusion of “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Derrida discusses the ‘radicalization of the thought of the trace,’ adding parenthetically, “a thought because it escapes the binarism and makes binarism possible on the basis of a nothing” (Writing and Difference, 230). This, once again, is what makes the trace and differance ‘quasi-transcendental.’ Our inability to think the contemporaneous, irreflexive origin of our thinking means that we can only think that irreflexivity under ‘erasure,’ which is to say, in terms at once post hoc and ad hoc. Given that trace and differance refer to the irreflexive, procrustean nature of representation (or ‘presence’), the fact that being ‘vanishes’ in the disclosure of beings, it seems to make sense that we should wed our every reference to them with an admission of the vehicular violence involved, the making present (via the vehicle of thought) of what can never be, nor ever has been, present.

In positioning Derrida’s thought beyond the binarism of transcendental and empirical, Hagglund is situating deconstruction in the very place Derrida tirelessly argues thought cannot go. As we saw above, Hagglund thinks advocating ‘endless divisibility’ is ‘philosophically irresponsible’ given the fact of identity (Radical Atheism, 25). What he fails to realize is that this is precisely the point: preaching totalized irreflexivity is a form of ‘irresponsible empiricism’ for philosophical reason. Trace and differance, as more than a few Anglo-American philosophical commentators have noted, are rationally irresponsible. No matter how fierce the will to hygiene and piety, reason is always besmirched and betrayed by its occluded origins. Thus the aporetic loop of theory and practice, representation and performance, reflexivity and irreflexivity–and, lest we forget, interiority and exteriority…

Which is to say, the aporetic loop of spacing. As we’ve seen, Hagglund wants to argue that spacing constitutes a solution to the fundamental philosophical problem of synthesis. If this is indeed the cornerstone of Derrida’s philosophy as he claims, then the ingenious Algerian doesn’t seem to think it bears making explicit. If anything, the sustained, explicit considerations of temporality that characterize his early work fade into the implicit background of his later material. This is because Derrida offers spacing, not as an alternate, nonintentional explanation of synthesis, but rather as a profound way to understand the aporetic form of that synthesis:

Even before it ‘concerns’ a text in narrative form, double invagination constitutes the story of stories, the narrative of narrative, the narrative of deconstruction in deconstruction: the apparently outer edge of an enclosure [cloture], far from being simple, simply external and circular, in accordance with the philosophical representation of philosophy, makes no sign beyond itself, toward what is utterly other, without becoming double or dual, without making itself be ‘represented,’ refolded, superimposed, re-marked within the enclosure, at least in what the structure produces as an effect of interiority. But it is precisely this structure-effect that is being deconstructed here. “More Than One Language,” 267-8

The temporal assumptions Derrida isolates in his critique of Husserl are clearly implicit here, but it’s the theme of spacing that remains explicit. What Derrida is trying to show us, over and over again, is a peculiar torsion in what we call experience: the ‘aporetic loop’ I mentioned above. It’s most infamous statement is “there is nothing outside the text” (Of Grammatology, 158) and its most famous image is that of the “labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits” (Speech and Phenomena, 104). Derrida never relinquishes the rhetoric of space because the figure it describes is the figure of philosophy itself, the double-bind where experience makes possible the world that makes experience possible.

What Hagglund calls synthesis is at once the solution and the dilemma. It relates to the outside by doubling, becoming ‘inside-outside,’ thus exposing itself to what lays outside the possibility of inside-outside (and so must be thought under erasure). Spacing refers to the interiorization of exteriority via the doubling of interiority. The perennial philosophical sin (the metaphysics of presence) is to confuse this folding of interiority for all there is, for inside and outside. So to take Kant as an example, positing the noumenal amounts to a doubling of interiority: the binary of empirical and transcendental. What Derrida is attempting is nothing less than a thinking that remains, as much as possible, self-consciously open to what lies outside the inside-outside, the ‘nothing that makes such binarisms possible.’ Since traditional philosophy can only think this via presence, which is to say, via another doubling, the generation of another superordinate binary (the outside-outside versus the inside-outside (or as Hagglund would have it, the ultratranscendental versus the transcendental/empirical)), it can only remain unconsciously open to this absolute outside. Thus Derrida’s retreat into performance.

Far from any ‘philosophical solution’ to the ‘philosophical problem of synthesis,’ spacing provides a quasi-transcendental way to understand the dynamic and aporetic form of that synthesis, giving us what seems to be the very figure of philosophy itself, as well as a clue as to how thinking might overcome the otherwise all-conquering illusion of presence. Consider the following passage from “Differance,” a more complete version of the quote Hagglund uses to frame his foundational argument in Radical Atheism:

An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization). And it is this constitution of the present, as an ‘originary’ and irreducibly nonsimple (and therefore, stricto sensu nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that soon will reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call archi-writing, archi-traces, or differance. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization. Margins of Philosophy, 13

Here we clearly see the movement of ‘double invagination’ described above, the way the ‘interval’ divides presence from itself both within itself and without, generating the aporetic figure of experience/world that would for better or worse become Derrida’s lifelong obsession. The division within is what opens the space (as inside/outside), while the division without, the division that outruns the division within, is what makes this space the whole of space (because of the impossibility of any outside inside/outside). Hagglund wants to argue “that an elaboration of Derrida’s definition allows for the most rigourous thinking of temporality by accounting for an originary synthesis without grounding it in an indivisible presence” (Radical Atheism, 18). Not only is his theoretical, ultratranscendental ‘elaboration’ orthogonal to Derrida’s performative, quasi-transcendental project, his rethinking of temporality (despite its putative ‘rigour’), far from explaining synthesis, ultimately re-inscribes him within the very metaphysics of presence he seeks to master and chastise. The irony, then, is that even though Hagglund utterly fails to achieve his thetic goals, there is a sense in which he unconsciously (and inevitably) provides a wonderful example of the very figure Derrida is continually calling to our attention. The problem of synthesis is the problem of presence, and it is insoluble, insofar as any theoretical solution, for whatever reason, is doomed to merely reenact it.

Derrida does not so much pose a solution to the problem of synthesis as he demonstrates the insolubility of the problem given the existing conceptual resources of philosophy. At most Derrida is saying that whatever brings about synthesis does so in a way that generates presence as deconstructively conceived, which is to say, structured as inside/outside, self/other, experience/world–at once apparently complete and ‘originary’ and yet paradoxically fragmentary and derivative. Trace and differance provide him with the conceptual means to explore the apparent paradoxicality at the heart of human thought and experience at a particular moment of history:

Differance is neither a word nor a concept. In it, however, we see the juncture–rather than the summation–of what has been most decisively inscribed in the thought of what is conveniently called our ‘epoch’: the difference of forces in Nietzche, Saussure’s principle of semiological difference, difference as the possibility of [neurone] facilitation, impression and delayed effect in Freud, difference as the irreducibility of the trace of the other in Levinas, and the ontic-ontological difference in Heidegger. Speech and Phenomena, 130

It is this last ‘difference,’ the ontological difference, that Derrida singles out for special consideration. Differance, he continues, is strategic, a “provisionally privileged” way to track the “closure of presence” (131). In fact, if anything is missing in an exegetical sense from Hagglund’s consideration of Derrida it has to be Heidegger, who edited The Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness and, like Derrida, arguably devised his own philosophical implicature via a critical reading of Husserl’s account of temporality. In this sense, you could say that trace and differance are not the result of a radicalization of Husserl’s account of time, but rather a radicalization of a radicalization of that account. It is the ontological difference, the difference between being and beings, that makes presence explicit as a problem. Differance, you could say, startegically and provisionally renders the problem of presence (or ‘synthesis’) dynamic, conceives it as an effect of the trace. Where the ontological difference allows presence to hang pinned in philosophical system space for quick reference and retrieval, differance ‘references’ presence as a performative concern, as something pertaining to this very moment now. Far from providing the resources to ‘solve’ presence, differance expands the problem it poses by binding (and necessarily failing to bind) it to the very kernel of now.

Contra Hagglund, trace and differance do not possess the resources to even begin explaining synthesis in any meaningful sense of the term ‘explanation.’ To think that it does, I have argued, is to misconceive both the import and the project of deconstruction. But this does not mean that presence/synthesis is in fact insoluble. As the above quote suggests, Derrida himself understood the ‘epochal’ (as opposed to ‘ultratranscendental’) nature of the problematic motivating trace and differance. A student of intellectual history, he understood the contingency of the resources we are able to bring to any philosophical problem. He did not, as Adorno did working through the same conceptual dynamics via negative dialectics and identity thinking, hang his project from the possibility of some ‘Messianic moment,’ but this doesn’t mean he didn’t think the radical exposure whose semantic shadow he tirelessly attempted to chart wasn’t itself radically exposed.

And as it so happens, we are presently living through what is arguably the most revolutionary philosophical epoch of all, the point when the human soul, so long sheltered by the mad complexities of the brain, is at long last yielding to the technical and theoretical resources of the natural sciences. What Hagglund, deferring to the life sciences paradigm, calls ‘compatibility’ is a constitutive relation after all, only one running from nature to thought, world to experience. Trace and differance, far from ‘explaining’ the ‘ultratranscendental’ possibility of ‘life,’ are themselves open/exposed to explanation in naturalistic terms. They are not magical.

Deconstruction can be naturalized.

Colonoscopy

So what then is synthesis? How does reflexivity arise from irreflexivity?

Before tackling this question we need to remind ourselves of the boggling complexity of the world as revealed by the natural sciences. Phusis kruptesthai philei, Heraclitus allegedly said, ‘nature loves hiding.’ What it hides ‘behind’ is nothing less than our myriad cognitive incapacities, our inability to fathom complexities that outrun our brain’s ability to sense and cognize. ‘Flicker fusion’ in psychophysics provides a rudimentary and pervasive example: when the frequency of a flickering light crosses various (condition-dependent) thresholds, our experience of it will ‘fuse.’ What was a series of intermittent flashes becomes continuous illumination. As pedestrian as this phenomena seems, it has enormous practical and theoretical significance. This is the threshold that determines, for instance, the frame rate for the presentation of moving images in film or video. Such technologies, you could say, actively exploit our sensory and cognitive bottlenecks, hiding with nature beyond our ability differentiate.

Differentiations that exceed our brain’s capacity to sense/cognize make no difference. Or put differently, information (understood in the basic sense of systematic differences making systematic differences) that exceeds the information processing capacities of our sensory and cognitive systems simply does not exist for those systems–not even as an absence. It simply never occurs to people that their incandescent lights are in fact discontinuous. Thus the profundity of the Heraclitean maxim: not only does nature conceal itself behind the informatic blind of complexity, it conceals this concealment. This is what makes science such a hard-won cultural achievement, why it took humanity so long (almost preposterously so, given hindsight) to see that it saw so little. Lacking information pertaining to our lack of information, we assumed we possessed all the information required. We congenitally assumed, in other words, the sufficiency of what little information we had available. Only now, after centuries of accumulating information via institutionalized scientific inquiry, can we see how radically insufficient that information was.

Take geocentrism for instance. Lacking information regarding the celestial motion and relative location of the earth, our ancestors assumed it was both motionless and central, which is to say, positionally self-identical relative to itself and the cosmos. Geocentrism is the result of a basic perspectival illusion, a natural assumption to make given the information available and the cognitive capacities possessed. As strange as it may sound, it can be interpreted as a high-dimensional, cognitive manifestation of flicker fusion, the way the absence of information (differences making differences) results in the absence of differentiation, which is to say, identity.

Typically we construe ‘misidentifications’ with the misapplication of representations, as when, for example, children call whales fish. Believing whales are fish and believing the earth is the motionless centre of the universe would thus seem to be quite different kinds of mistakes. Both are ‘misrepresentations,’ mismatches between cognition and the world, but where the former mistake is categorical, the latter is empirical. The occult nature of this ‘matching’ makes it difficult to do much more than classify them together as mistakes, the one a false identification, the other a false theory.

Taking an explicitly informatic view, however, allows us to see both as versions of the mistake you’re making this very moment, presuming as you do the constancy of your illuminated computer screen (among other things). Plugging the brain into its informatic environment reveals the decisive role played by the availability of information, how thinking whales are fish and thinking the earth is the motionless centre of the universe both turn on the lack of information, the brain’s inability to access the systematic differences required to differentiate whales from fish or the earth’s position over time. Moreover, it demonstrates the extraordinarily granular nature of human cognition as traditionally conceived. It reveals, in effect, the possibility that our traditional, intentional understanding of cognition should itself be seen as an artifact of information privation.

Each of the above cases–flicker fusion, geocentrism, and misidentification–involve our brain’s ability to comprehend its environments given its cognitive resources and the information available. With respect to cognizing cognition, however, we need to consider the brain’s ability to cognize itself given, once again, its cognitive resources and the information available. Much of the philosophical tradition has attributed an exemplary status to self-knowledge, thereby assuming that the brain is in a far better position to cognize itself than its environments. But as we saw in the case with environmental cognition, the absence of information pertaining to the absence of information generates the illusion of sufficiency, the assumption that the information available is all the information there is. A number of factors, including the evolutionary youth of metacognition, the astronomical complexity of the brain, not to mention the growing mountain of scientific evidence indicating rampant metacognitive error, suggest that our traditional assumptions regarding the sufficiency theoretical metacognition need to be set aside. It’s becoming increasingly likely that metacognitive intuitions, far from constituting some ‘plenum,’ are actually the product of severe informatic scarcity.

Nor should we be surprised: science is only just beginning to mine the informatic complexities of the human brain. Information pertaining to what we are as a matter of scientific fact is only now coming to light. Left to our own devices, we can only see so much of the sky. The idea of our ancient ancestors looking up and comprehending everything discovered by modern physics and cosmology is, well, nothing short of preposterous. They quite simply lacked the information. So why should we think peering at the sky within will prove any different than the sky above? Taking the informatic perspective thus raises the spectre of noocentrism, the possibility that our conception of ourselves as intentional is a kind of perspectival illusion pertaining to metacognition not unlike geocentrism in the case of environmental cognition.

Thus the Blind Brain Theory, the attempt to naturalistically explain intentional phenomena in terms of the kinds and amounts of information missing. Where Hagglund claims ‘compatibility’ with Darwinian naturalism, BBT exhibits continuity: it takes the mechanistic paradigm of the life sciences as its basis. To the extent that it can explain trace and difference, then, it can claim to have naturalized deconstruction.

According to BBT, the intentional structure of first-person experience–the very thing phenomenology takes itself to be describing–is an artifact of informatic neglect, a kind of cognitive illusion. So, for instance, when Hagglund (explaining Husserl’s account of time-consciousness) writes “[t]he notes that run off and die away can appear as a melody only through an intentional act that apprehends them as an interconnected sequence” (56) he is literally describing the way that experience appears to a metacognition trussed in various forms of neglect. As we shall see, where Derrida, via the quasi-transcendentals of trace and differance, can only argue the insufficiencies plaguing such intentional acts, BBT possesses the resources to naturalistically explain, not only the insufficiencies, but why metacognition attributes intentionality to temporal cognition at all, why the apparent paradoxes of time-consciousness arise, and why it is that trace and differance make ‘sense’ the way they do. ‘Brain blindness’ or informational lack, in other words, can not only explain many of the perplexities afflicting consciousness and the first-person, it can also explain–if only in a preliminary and impressionistic way–much of the philosophy turning on what seem to be salient intentional intuitions.

Philosophy becoming transcendentally self-conscious as it did with Hume and Kant can be likened to a kid waking up to the fact that he lives in a peculiar kind of box, one not only walled by neglect (which is to say, the absence of information–or nothing at all), but unified by it as well. Kant’s defining metacognitive insight came with Hume: Realizing the wholesale proximal insufficiency of experience, he understood that philosophy must be ‘critical.’ Still believing in reason, he hoped to redress that insufficiency via his narrow form of transcendental interpretation. He saw the informatic box, in other words, and he saw how everything within it was conditioned, but assuming the sufficiency of metacognition, he assumed the validity of his metacognitive ‘deductions.’ Thus the structure of the empirical, the conditioned, and the transcendental, the condition: the attempt to rationally recuperate the sufficiency of experience.

But the condition is, as a matter of empirical fact, neural. The speculative presumption that something resembling what we think we metacognize as soul, mind, or being-in-the-world arises at some yet-to-be naturalized ‘level of description’–noocentrism–is merely that, a speculative presumption that in this one special case (predictably, our case) science will redeem our intentional intuitions. BBT offers the contrary speculative presumption, that something resembling what we think we metacognize as soul, mind, or being-in-the-world will not arise at some yet-to-be naturalized ‘level of description’ because nothing resembles what we think we metacognize at any level. Cognition is fractionate, heuristic, and captive to the information available. The more scant or mismatched the information, the more error prone cognition becomes. And no cognitive system faces the informatic challenges confronting metacognition. The problem, simply put, is that we lack any ‘meta-metacognition,’ and thus any intuition of the radical insufficiency of the information available relative to the cognitive resources possessed. The kinds of low-dimensional distortions revealed are therefore taken as apodictic.

There are reasons why first-person experience appears the way it does, they just happen to be empirical rather than transcendental. Transcendental explanation, you could say, is an attempt to structurally regiment first-person experience in terms that take the illusion to be real. The kinds of tail-chasing analyses one finds in Husserl literally represent an attempt to dredge some kind of formal science out of what are best understood as metacognitive illusions. The same can be said for Kant. Although he deserves credit for making the apparent asymptotic structure of conscious experience explicit, he inevitably confused the pioneering status of his subsequent interpretations–the fact that they were, for the sake of sheer novelty, the ‘only game in town’–for a kind of synthetic deductive validity. Otherwise he was attempting to ‘explain’ what are largely metacognitive illusions.

According to BBT, ‘transcendental interpretation’ represents the attempt to rationalize what it is we think we see when we ‘reflect’ in terms (intentional) congenial to what it is we think we see. The problem isn’t simply that we see far too little, but that we are entirely blind to the very thing we need to see: the context of neurofunctional processes that explains the why and how of the information broadcast to or integrated within conscious experience. To say the neurofunctionality of conscious experience is occluded is to say metacognition accesses no information regarding the actual functions discharged by the information broadcast or integrated. Blind to what lies outside its informatic box, metacognition confuses what it sees for all there is (as Kahneman might say), and generates ‘transcendental interpretations’ accordingly. Reasoning backward with inadequate cognitive tools from inadequate information, it provides ever more interpretations to ‘hang in the air’ with the interpretations that have come before.

‘Transcendental,’ in other words, simply names those prescientific, medial interpretations that attempt to recuperate the apparent sufficiency of conscious experience as metacognized. BBT, on the other hand, is exclusively interested in medial interpretations of what is actually going on, regardless of speculative consequences. It is an attempt to systematically explain away conscious experience as metacognized–the first-person–in terms of informatic privation and heuristic misadventure.

This will inevitably strike some readers as ‘positivist,’ ‘scientistic,’ or ‘reductive,’ terms that have become scarce more than dismissive pejoratives in certain philosophical circles, an excuse to avoid engaging what science has to say regarding their domain–the human. BBT, in other words, is bound to strike certain readers as chauvinistic, even imperial. But, if anything, BBT is bent upon dispelling views grounded in parochial sources of information–chauvinism. In fact, it is transcendental interpretation that restricts itself to nonscientific sources of information under the blanket assumption of metacognitive sufficiency, the faith that enough information of the right kind is available for actual cognition. Transcendental interpretation, in other words, remains wedded to what Kant called ‘tutelary natures.’ BBT, however, is under no such constraint; it considers both metacognitive and scientific information, understanding that the latter, on pain of supernaturalism, simply has to provide the baseline for reliable theoretical cognition (whatever that ultimately turns out to be). Thus the strange amalgam of scientific and philosophical concepts found here.

If reliable theoretical cognition requires information of the right kind and amount, then it behooves the philosopher, deconstructive or transcendental, to take account of the information their intentional rationales rely upon. If that information is primarily traditional and metacognitive–prescientific–then that philosopher needs some kind of sufficiency argument, some principled way of warranting the exclusion of scientific information. And this, I fear, has become all but impossible to do. If the sufficiency argument provided is speculative–that is, if it also relies on traditional claims and metacognitive intuitions–then it simply begs the question. If, on the other hand, it marshals information from the sciences, then it simply acknowledges the very insufficiency it is attempting to fend.

The epoch of intentional philosophy is at an end. It will deny and declaim–it can do nothing else–but to little effect. Like all prescientific domains of discourse it can only linger and watch its credibility evaporate into New Age aether as the sciences of the brain accumulate ever more information and refine ever more instrumentally powerful interpretations of that information. It’s hard to argue against cures. Any explanatory paradigm that restores sight to the blind, returns mobility to the crippled, not to mention facilitates the compliance of the masses, will utterly dominate the commanding heights of cognition.

Far more than mere theoretical relevance is at stake here.

On BBT, all traditional and metacognitive accounts of the human are the product of extreme informatic poverty. Ironically enough, many have sought intentional asylum within that poverty in the form of apriori or pragmatic formalisms, confusing the lack of information for the lack of substantial commitment, and thus for immunity against whatever the sciences of the brain may have to say. But this just amounts to a different way of taking refuge in obscurity. What are ‘rules’? What are ‘inferences’? Unable to imagine how science could answer these questions, they presume either that science will never be able to answer them, or that it will answer them in a manner friendly to their metacognitive intuitions. Taking the history of science as its cue, BBT entertains no such hopes. It sees these arguments for what they happen to be: attempts to secure the sufficiency of low-dimensional, metacognitive information, to find gospel in a peephole glimpse.

The same might be said of deconstruction. Despite their purported radicality, trace and differance likewise belong to a low-dimensional conceptual apparatus stemming from a noocentric account of intentional sufficiency. ‘Mystic writing pad’ or no, Derrida remains a philosopher of experience as opposed to nature. As David Roden has noted, “while Derrida’s work deflates the epistemic primacy of the ‘first person,’ it exhibits a concern with the continuity of philosophical concepts that is quite foreign to the spirit of contemporary naturalism” (“The Subject”). The ‘advantage’ deconstruction enjoys, if it can be called such, lies in its relentless demonstration of the insufficiency plaguing all attempts to master meaning, including its own. But as we have seen above, it can only do such from the fringes of meaning, as a ‘quasi-transcendentally’ informed procedure of reading. Derrida is, strangely enough, like Hume in this regard, only one forewarned of the transcendental apologetics of Kant.

Careful readers will have already noted a number of striking parallels between the preceding account of BBT and the deconstructive paradigm. Cognition (or the collection of fractionate heuristic subsystems we confuse for such) only has recourse to whatever information is available, thus rendering sufficiency the perennial default. Even when cognition has recourse to supplementary information pertaining to the insufficiency of information, information is processed, which is to say, the resulting complex (which might be linguaformally expressed as, ‘Information x is insufficient for reliable cognition’) is taken as sufficient insofar as the system takes it up at all. Informatic insufficiency is parasitic on sufficiency, as it has to be, given the mechanistic nature of neural processing. For any circuit involving inputs and outputs, differences must be made. Sufficient or not, the system, if it is to function at all, must take it as such.

(I should pause to note a certain temptation at this juncture, one perhaps triggered by the use of the term ‘supplementary.’ One can very easily deconstruct the above set of claims the way one can deconstruct any set of theoretical claims, scientific or speculative. But where the deconstruction of speculative claims possesses or at least seems to possess clear speculative effects, the deconstruction of scientific claims does not, as a rule, possess any scientific effects. BBT, recall, is an empirical theory, and as such stands beyond the pale of decisive speculative judgment (if indeed, there is such a thing).)

The cognition of informatic insufficiency always requires sufficiency. To ‘know’ that you are ‘wrong’ is to be right about being wrong. The positivity of conscious experience and cognition follows from the mechanical nature of brain function, the mundane fact that differences must be made. Now, whatever ‘consciousness’ happens to be as a natural phenomenon (apart from our hitherto fruitless metacognitive attempts to make sense of it), it pretty clearly involves the ‘broadcasting’ or ‘integration’ of information (systematic differences made) from across the brain. At any given instant, conscious experience and cognition access only an infinitesimal fraction of the information processed by the brain: conscious experience and cognition, in other words, possess any number of informatic limits. Conscious experience and cognition are informatically encapsulated at any given moment. It’s not just that huge amounts of information are simply not available to the conscious subsystems of the brain, it’s that information allowing the cognition of those subsystems for what they are isn’t available. The positivity of conscious experience and cognition turns on what might be called medial neglect, the structural inability to consciously experience or cognize the mechanisms behind conscious experience and cognition.

Medial neglect means the mechanics of system are not available to the system. The importance of this observation cannot be overstated. The system cannot cognize itself the way it cognizes its environments, which is to say, causally, and so must cognize itself otherwise. What we call ‘intentionality’ is this otherwise. Most of the peculiarities of this ‘cognition otherwise’ stem from the structural inability of the system to track its own causal antecedents. The conscious subsystems of the brain cannot cognize the origins of any of its processes. Moreover, they cannot even cognize the fact that this information is missing. Medial neglect means conscious experience and cognition are constituted by mechanistic processes that structural escape conscious experience and cognition. And this is tantamount to saying that consciousness is utterly blind to its own irreflexivity.

And as we saw above, in the absence of differences we experience/cognize identity.

On BBT, then, the ‘fundamental synthesis’ described by Hagglund is literally a kind of flicker fusion,’ a metacognitive presumption of identity where there is none. It is a kind of mandatory illusion: illusory because it egregiously mistakes what is the case, and mandatory because, like the illusion of continuous motion in film, it involves basic structural capacities that cannot be circumvented and so ‘seen through.’ But where with film environmental cognition blurs the distinction between discrete frames into an irreflexive, sensible continuity, the ‘trick’ played upon metacognition is far more profound. The brain has evolved to survive and exploit environmental change, irreflexivity. First and foremost, human cognition is the evolutionary product of the need to track environmental irreflexivity with enough resolution and fidelity to identify and avoid threats and identify and exploit opportunities. You could say it is an ensemble of irreflexivities (mechanisms) parasitic upon the greater irreflexitivity of its environment (or to extend Craver’s terms, the brain is a component of the ‘brain/environment’). Lacking the information required to cognize temporal difference, it perceives temporal continuity. Our every act of cognition is at once irrevocable and blind to itself as irrevocable. Because it is blind to itself, it cannot, temporally speaking, differentiate itself from itself. As a result, such acts seem to arise from some reflexive source. The absence of information, once again, means the absence of distinction, which means identity. The now, the hitherto perplexing and inexplicable fusion of distinct times, becomes the keel of subjectivity, something that appears (to metacognition at least) to be a solitary, reflexive exception in an universe entirely irreflexive otherwise.

This is the cognitive illusion that both Kant and Husserl attempted to conceptually regiment, Kant by positing the transcendental unity of apperception, and Husserl via the transcendental ego. This is also the cognitive illusion that stands at the basis of our understanding of persons, both ourselves and others.

When combined with sufficiency, this account of reflexivity provides us with an elegant way to naturalize presence. Sufficiency means that the positivity of conscious experience and cognition ‘fills the existential screen’: there is nothing but what is experienced and cognized at any given moment. The illusion of reflexivity can be seen as a temporalization of the illusion of sufficiency: lacking the information required to relativize sufficiency to any given moment, metacognition blurs it across all times. The ‘only game in town effect’ becomes an ‘only game in time effect’ for the mere want of metacognitive information–medial neglect. The target of metacognition, conscious experience and cognition, appears to be something self-sustaining, something immediately, exhaustively self-present, something utterly distinct from the merely natural, and something somehow related to the eternal.

And with the naturalization of presence comes the naturalization of the aporetic figure of philosophy that so obsessed Derrida for the entirety of his career. Sufficiency, the fact that conscious experience and cognition ‘fills the screen,’ means that the limits of conscious experience and cognition always outrun conscious experience and cognition. Sufficiency means the boundaries of consciousness are asymptotic, ‘limits with only one side.’ The margins of your visual attention provide a great example of this. The limits of seeing can never be seen: the visual information integrated into conscious experience and cognition simply trails into ‘oblivion.’ The limits of seeing are thus visually asymptotic, though the integration of vision into a variety of other systems allows those limits to be continually, effortlessly cognized. Such, however, is not the case when it comes to the conscious subsystems of the brain as a whole. They are, once again, encapsulated. Conscious experience and cognition only exists ‘for’ conscious experience and cognition ‘within’ conscious experience and cognition. To resort to the language of representation favoured by Derrida, the limits of representation only become available via representation.

And all this, once again, simply follows from the mechanistic nature of the human brain, the brute fact that the individual mechanisms engaged in informatically comporting our organism to itself and its (social and natural) environments, are engaged and so incapable of systematically tracking their own activities let alone the limitations besetting them. Sufficiency is asymptosis. Such tracking requires a subsequent reassignation of neurocomputational resources–it must always be deferred to a further moment that is likewise mechanically incapable of tracking its own activities. This post hoc tracking, meanwhile, literally has next to nothing that it can systematically comport itself to (or ‘track’). Thus each instant of functioning blots the instant previous, rendering medial neglect all but complete. Both the incalculably intricate and derived nature of each instant is lost as is the passage between instants, save for what scant information is buffered or stored. And so are irreflexive repetitions whittled into anosognosiac originals.

Theoretical metacognition, or philosophical reflection, confronts the compelling intuition that it is originary, that it stands outside the irreflexive order of its environments, that it is in some sense undetermined or free. Precisely because it is mechanistic, it confuses itself for ‘spirit,’ for something other than nature. As it comes to appreciate (through the accumulation of questions (such as those posed by Hume)) the medial insufficiency of conscious experience as metacognized, it begins to posit medial prosthetics that dwell in the asymptotic murk, ‘conditions of possibility,’ formal rationalizations of conscious experience as metacognized. Asymptosis is conceived as transcendence in the Kantian sense (as autoaffection, apperceptive unity, so on), forms that appeal to philosophical intuition because of the way they seem to conserve the illusions compelled by informatic neglect. But since the assumption of metacognitive identity is an artifact of missing information, which is to say, cognitive incapacity, the accumulation of questions (which provide information regarding the absence of information) and the accumulation of information pertaining to irreflexivity (which, like external relationality, always requires more information to cognize), inevitably cast these transcendental rationalizations into doubt. Thus the strange inevitability of deconstruction (or negative dialectics, or the ‘philosophies of difference’ more generally), the convergence of philosophical imagination about the intuition of some obdurate, inescapable irreflexivity concealed at the very root of conscious experience and cognition.

Deconstruction can be seen as a ‘low resolution’ (strategic, provisional) recognition of the medial mechanicity that underwrites the metacognitive illusion of ‘meaning.’ Trace and differance are emissaries of irreflexivity, an expression of the neuromechanics of conscious experience and cognition given only the limited amount of information available to conscious experience and cognition. As mere glimmers of our mechanistic nature, however, they can only call attention to the insufficiencies that haunt the low-dimensional distortions of the soul. Rather than overthrow the illusions of meaning, they can at most call attention to the way it ‘wobbles,’ thus throwing a certain image of subjective semantic stability and centrality into question. Deconstruction, for all its claims to ‘radicalize,’ remains a profoundly noocentric philosophy, capable of conceiving the irreflexive only as the ‘hidden other’ of the reflexive. The claim to radicality, if anything, cements its status as a profoundly nooconservative mode of philosophical thought. Deconstruction becomes, as we can so clearly see in Hagglund, a form of intellectual hygiene. ‘Deconstructed’ intentional concepts begin to seem like immunized intentional concepts, ‘subjects’ and ‘norms’ and ‘meanings’ that are all the sturdier for referencing their ‘insufficiency’ in theoretical articulations that take them as sufficient all the same. Thus the oxymoronic doubling evinced by ‘deconstructive ethics’ or ‘deconstructive politics.’

The most pernicious hallucination, after all, is the hallucination that claims to have been seen through.

The present account, however, does not suffer happy endings, no matter how aleatory or conditional. According to BBT, nothing has nor ever will be ‘represented.’ Certainly our brains mechanically recapitulate myriad structural features of their environments, but at no point do these recapitulations inherit the occult property of aboutness. With BBT, these phantasms that orthogonally double the world become mere mechanisms, environmentally continuous components that may or may not covary with their environments, just more ramshackle life, the product of over 3 billion years of blind guessing. We become lurching towers of coincidence, happenstance conserved in meat. Blind to neurofunctionality, the brain’s metacognitive systems have no choice but to characterize the relation between the environmental information accumulated and those environments in acausal, nonmechanical terms. Sufficiency assures that this metacognitive informatic poverty will seem a self-evident plenum. The swamp of causal complexity is drained. The fantastically complicated mechanistic interactions constituting the brain/environment vanish into the absolute oblivion of the unknown unknown, stranding metacognition with the binary cartoon of a ‘subject’ ‘intending’ some ‘object.’ Statistical gradations evaporate into the procrustean discipline of either/or.

This, if anything, is the image I want to leave you with, one where the traditional concepts of philosophy can be seen for the granular grotesqueries they are, the cartoonish products of a metacognition pinioned between informatic scarcity and heuristic incapacity. I want to leave you with, in effect, an entirely new way to conceive philosophy, one adequate to the new and far more terrifying ‘Enlightenment’ presently revolutionizing the world around us. Does anyone really think their particular, prescientific accounts of the soul will escape unscathed or emerge redeemed by what sciences of the brain will reveal over the coming decades? Certainly one can argue points with BBT, a position whose conclusions are so dismal that I cannot myself fully embrace them. What one cannot argue against is the radical nature of our times, with the fact that science has at long last colonized the soul, that it is, even now, doing what it always does when it breaches some traditional domain of discourse: replace our always simplistic and typically flattering assumptions with portraits of bottomless intricacy and breathtaking indifference. We are just beginning, as a culture, to awaken to the fact that we are machines. Throw words against this prospect if you must. The engineers and the institutions that own them will find you a most convenient distraction.

Wire Finger

*Originally posted 02/27/2013

The Unholy Consult

by rsbakker

the-unholy-consult-cover

 

The cover is out as those of you who frequent Wertzone already know. The Unholy Consult, the penultimate book of The Aspect-Emperor, is set to be released this July, ending a story arc that has been my obsession for some thirty years now. I’m far from done with the Three Seas, of course: The Second Apocalypse possesses one final chapter. But this arc was the animating vision, the feverish sequence of glimpses I used to paint the whole.

The B&N Sci-Fi & Fantasy Blog has it listed among their top twenty ‘can’t wait to read’ 2017 releases, but I find myself growing… not so much reluctant as coy, I think—you know that wariness you get when encountering circumstances you should know, but don’t for some reason. Ever since the catalogue with the cover arrived in the mail everything has felt marginally displaced, troubled by a mismatch between shadows and sources of light. It’ll be strange, for instance, being able to talk candidly about the story. What if I decide I want to remain entombed?

It would be nice if The Unholy Consult pushed the popularity of the series over some kind of threshold, but the entire project has been a slow fuse, so I’m not going to hold my breath. The Great Ordeal made the Fantasy Hotlist’s top ten of 2016, but I’ve found that the reviews take longer to trickle in the deeper I get into the series. Epic Fantasy has become an astonishingly crowded subgenre, blessing these crazy books, I hope, with the distinction belonging to landmarks, even while increasing the number of attractions in between. My guess is that it’ll take time.

By coincidence, I just sent out the final proofs “On Alien Philosophy” to The Journal of Consciousness Studies, so in sense this summer will see my two great artistic and theoretical aspirations simultaneously fulfilled. Cosmos and History, meanwhile, just accepted “From Scripture to Fantasy,” my critique of Continental philosophy a la Adrian Johnston, so you can even throw a little revenge fantasy into the mix! If I were in my early twenties, I would worry that I was developing schizophrenia, so many threads are twining together. Add Trump’s election to the mix, and the fear has to be that I’m actually a character in a L. Ron Hubbard novel…

Not Phillip K. Dick.

Braced for Launch

by rsbakker

Happy New Year all. I greeted 2017 with the Norovirus, so I guess you could say I’m not liking the omens so far. Either I’ll be immune when the shit starts flying in Washington or I’ll fold like a napkin.

I did have occasion to reread my interview of David Roden for Figure/Ground a while back, and I thought it worth linking because I believe the points of contention between us could very well map the philosophy of the future. I think the heuristic dependence of intentional cognition on ancestral cognitive backgrounds means intentional cognition has no hope of surviving the ongoing (and accelerating) technological renovation of those backgrounds. The posthuman, whatever it amounts to, will crash our every attempt to ethically understand it. David thinks my pessimism is premature, that ethical cognition, at least, can be knapped/exapted (via minimal notions of agency and value) into something that can leap the breach between human and posthuman. You decide.

Parental Advisory: Contains Grammatical Violence, Excessive Jargon, and Scenes of Conceptual Nudity.