The Ptolemaic Restoration: Object Oriented Whatevery and Kant’s Copernican Revolution
by rsbakker
“And now, after all methods, so it is believed, have been tried and found wanting, the prevailing mood is that of weariness and complete indifferentism” –Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason
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So, continuing my whirlwind interrogation of the new Continental materialisms, I want to turn to Object-Oriented Whatevery via the lens of Levi Bryant’s, “The Ontic Principle: Outline of an Object Oriented Ontology.” As always, I need to impress I’m a tourist and not a native of these philosophical climes, so I sincerely encourage anyone who comes across what seems to be an obvious misreading on my part to expose the offending claims in the comments. My goals, once again, are both critical and constructive: in the course of showing you why I think it’s obvious that Bryant cannot deliver the goods as advertised, I want to demonstrate the explanatory reach and power of BBT, not as any kind of theoretical panacea, but as a system of empirically tractable claims that, in the tradition of scientific theory more generally, are quite indifferent to what we want to be the case. Like I’ve said before, the conclusions suggested by BBT are so radical as to almost qualify as a reductio, were it not for the fact that a reductio is precisely the way it would appear were it true. And besides, as I hope some of you are at least beginning to see, there is something genuinely uncanny about its explanatory power.
Essentially I want to argue that BBT may actually deliver on what Bryant advertises–a way out of the philosophical impasses of the tradition, even a ‘flat ontology’ rationalized via difference!–though its consequences are nowhere near so kind. I’ve corresponded with Levi in the past, and he strikes me as a good egg. It’s his position I find baffling. With any luck he’ll do what Hagglund found incapable: acknowledge, expose, and contradict–inject some much-needed larva into Three Pound Brain!
Bryant begins, not by rehearsing the primary motive of critical philosophy–namely, how the failure of dogmatic philosophy to produce theoretical knowledge convinced philosophers to examine knowing–but rather the claim of critical philosophy, the notion “that prior to any claims about the nature of reality, prior to any speculation about objects or being, we must first secure a foundation for knowledge and our access to beings” (262). This allows him, quite without irony, to rehearse what he takes to be the primary motive of Object Oriented Ontology: the failure of critical philosophy to produce theoretical knowledge. “Faced with such a bewildering philosophical situation,” he writes, “what if we were to imagine ourselves as proceeding naively and pre-critically as first philosophers, pretending that the last three hundred years of philosophy had not taken place or that the proper point of entry into philosophical speculation was not the question of access?” In other words, given the failure of three centuries of critical philosophy to produce theoretical knowledge, perhaps the time has come to embrace, as best we can, the two millennia of dogmatic failure that preceded it.
Thus he motivates a turn away from the subject of knowledge to the object of knowledge, from the epistemological to the ontological–as we should, apparently, given that the object comes first. After all, as Heidegger made ‘clear,’ “questions of knowledge are already premised on a pre-ontological comprehension of being” (263). Unlike Heidegger, however, who saw in this pre-ontological comprehension an interpretative basis for theorizing a collapse of subject and object (which quickly came to resemble a conceptually retooled subject), Bryant sees a call to theorize, in tentative fashion, the ‘ultimate generalities’ that objectively organize the world. Premier among these tentative ultimate generalities, he asserts, is difference. This leads Bryant to pose what he calls the ‘Ontic Principle,’ the claim “that ‘to be’ is to make or produce a difference” (263).
Why should difference be our ‘fundamental principle’? Well, because all epistemology presupposes it. As he writes:
Paradoxically it therefore follows that epistemology cannot be first philosophy. Insofar as the question of knowledge presupposes a pre-epistemological comprehension of difference, the question of knowledge always comes second in relation to the metaphysical or ontological priority of difference. As such, there can be no question of securing the grounds of knowledge in advance or prior to an actual engagement with difference. 265
To which the reader might be tempted to ask, How do you know?
This is one of those junctures that makes me (if only momentarily) appreciate Derrida and his tireless attempts to show philosophers the inextricable co-implication of dokein and krinein. The easiest way to illustrate it here is to simply wonder aloud what is ‘presupposed’ by difference. If difference comes before epistemology because epistemology ‘presupposes’ difference as its ‘condition,’ and if the ultimate ‘first first,’ no matter how ‘tentative,’ is what we are after, then we should inquire into the presuppositions of our alleged presupposition. Since there can be no difference without the negation of some prior identity, for instance, perhaps we should choose identity–snub Heraclitus and do a few rails with Parmenides.
Can counterarguments be adduced against the ontological primacy of identity? Of course they can (and Bryant helps himself to a few), just as counterarguments can be adduced against those counterarguments, and so on and so on. In other words, if critical philosophy is motivated by the failure of dogmatic philosophy to produce theoretical knowledge, and if Bryant’s neo-dogmatic philosophy is motivated by the failure of critical philosophy to produce theoretical knowledge, then perhaps we should skip the ‘and centuries passed’ part, assume the failure of neo-dogmatism to produce theoretical knowledge and, crossing our fingers, simply leap straight into neo-critical philosophy.
Far from ‘escaping’ or ‘solving’ anything, this strategy–quite obviously in my opinion–perpetrates the very process it sets out to redress. Let’s call this state of oscillating institutional emphasis on the subject and the object of knowledge, ‘correlativity.’ And let’s call ‘correlativism’ the idea according to which philosophy can only ever prioritize either subject or object and never any term other than these two.
Why has correlativism so dominated philosophy since its Modern inception? I actually think I can give a naturalistic answer to this question. The dichotomy of subject and object, of course, possesses a myriad of conceptual attenuations, binaries such as thought and being, mind and body, spirit and matter, ideal and real, epistemology and ontology, to name but a few of the oppositions that have constrained the possibilities of coherent, speculative thought for centuries now. There are other binaries, certainly, categorical conceptual oppositions (such as that between difference and identity) that a number of philosophers (like Heidegger) have recruited in various attempts to think beyond subjectivity and objectivity, only to find themselves, inexorably it seems, re-inscribed within the logic of ‘correlativism.’ In this sense, I will be following a very well-trodden path, though one quite different than the one proposed by Bryant above–or so I like to think.
The primary problem I see with Bryant’s approach is that it takes the failure of critical philosophy to produce theoretical knowledge to obviate the need to answer the primary question that it sought to answer, which is, namely, the question of securing speculative truth despite the limitations of our nature. We are afflicted with numerous ‘cognitive scandals,’ basic questions it seems we should be able to answer but for whatever reason cannot. What is the good? Does the external world exist? What is beauty? Does the past exist? What is justice? Do other minds exist? What is consciousness? No matter how many answers we throw at these and other questions, the skeptic always seems to carry the day–and handily.
For whatever reason, we lack the capacity to decisively answer these questions. When it comes to the problems of critical philosophy, Bryant would have you focus on the ‘critical’ and to overlook the ‘philosophy.’ What precisely failed when it came to critical philosophy? Given the manner it seeks to redress the failure of dogmatic philosophy, the more obvious answer (by far one would think) is philosophy. And indeed, the more cognitive psychology learns about human reasoning, the more understandable the generational failure of philosophy to produce theoretical knowledge becomes. Human beings are theoretically incompetent, plain and simple. Doubtless we have the capacity to theorize, but it is a capacity that evolved long before our theories could exhibit any accuracy. Whatever fitness it rendered our ancestors had precious little to do with theoretical ‘discovery.’ Science would not represent the signature institutional achievement of our times were it otherwise.
In all likelihood, the critical impulse, the call for reason to critique reason, had no special part to play in critical philosophy’s failure to secure theoretical knowledge. So why then did it fail to improve the lot of philosophy? Well, who’s to say it hasn’t? Perhaps it improved the cognitive prospects of philosophy in a manner that philosophy has yet to discern. It’s worth recalling that for Kant, the project of critique was in an important sense continuous with the greater enterprise of Enlightenment. Noting the power of mathematics and natural science, he writes:
Their success should incline us, at least by way of experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the analogy which, as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may commit. Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have ended in failure. We must therefore make trial of whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved around the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects. (Critique of Pure Reason, 22)
If it is the case that the sciences more or less monopolize theoretical cognition, then the most reasonable way for reason to critique reason is via the sciences. The problem confronting Kant, however, was nothing less than the problem confronting all inquiries into cognition until very recently: the technical and theoretical intractability of the brain. So Kant was forced to rely on theoretical reason absent the methodologies of natural science. In other words, he was forced to conceive critique as more philosophy, and this presumably, is why his project ultimately failed.
The best Kant could do was draw some kind of moral from the sciences, a ‘procedural analogy’ as he puts it. Taking Copernicus as his example, he thus proposes ‘to put the spectator into motion.’ Kant scholars have debated the appropriateness of this analogy for centuries. As Russell notoriously points out, Kant does not so much put the subject into motion about the object as he puts the object into motion about the subject and so “would have been more accurate if he had spoken of a ‘Ptolemaic counter-revolution’ since he put Man back at the centre from which Copernicus had dethroned him” (Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, 1). Where the Descartes’ subject anchored the possibility of knowledge, the Kantian subject anchors the possibility of experience. As the invariant frame of every possible experience, transcendental subjectivity would seem to be ‘motionless’ if anything. So if one takes the ‘spectator’ in Kant’s analogy to be the subject, it becomes hard to understand what he means.
In a famous note to the Second Preface a few pages subsequent, however, Kant suggests he’s after an ‘analogous change in point of view,’ one allowing us to see truths that are otherwise “contradictory of the senses” (25). After all, for thousands of years the prevailing assumption was that the subject had no constitutive role to play, that objects could thus be known without consideration of the knower. And in this sense, his analogy functions quite well. Consider, for instance, the elaborate theoretical machinery once required to make sense of the retrograde motion of Mars across the night sky, and how simply putting the spectator-earth into motion allows us to resolve this otherwise perplexing experience. Our problematic experience of Mars is literally an illusion pertaining to our ignorance of earth. Kant is claiming the ‘retrograde motions’ of metaphysics are likewise an illusion pertaining to our ignorance of cognition.
The parallel, as he sees it, lies in the attribution of activity to the ‘spectator.’ In early 1772, Kant wrote to Marcus Herz regarding the question of “how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible,” a letter that clearly signals the decisive break in his thought leading to the so-called ‘silent decade’ separating his dogmatic Inaugural Dissertation from the Critique. “If such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity,” he asks, “whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects–objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby?” All critical philosophy, you could say, is struck from the hip of this question–one that could just as easily be posed to Bryant and his fellow Speculative Realists today…
So where Copernicus resolved the manifest problems of astronomy by attributing planetary motion to the earth, Kant thinks he has resolved the manifest problems of metaphysics by attributing representational activity to the subject. Expressed thus, the analogy is quite clear. So then why does it also seem to constitute an egregious disanalogy as Russell and others insist? Call this Kant’s Copernican paradox: the way his attribution of activity to the subject, though analogous to Copernicus’ attribution of motion to the earth, somehow commits him to a Ptolemaic conception of subjectivity. As preposterous as it sounds, I think the resolution to this paradox could entail nothing less than the end of philosophy as we know it…
Like everything else, these strange fucking days.
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First I want to point out a couple of strange features that no one, to my knowledge anyway, has called attention to before. The first regards the curious assumption of spectatorial immobility or inactivity. Why is it that both the astronomical and the metaphysical tradition initially assumed the immobility of the earth and the inactivity of the subject respectively? Why should, in other words, immobility or inactivity be the default, the intuition to be overcome?
The second regards Kant’s hubristic cognitive presumption, the fact that he quite literally believed he had solved all the problems of metaphysics. For all its notorious technicality, the Critique possesses a bombast that would make a laughingstock of any philosopher writing today, and yet, not only do we find Kant’s proclamations forgivable, we somehow find them–implicitly at least–understandable as well. Somehow we intuitively understand how Kant, given the unprecedented nature of his approach, could be duped into thinking his way was the only way. Why does ignorance of alternatives generate the illusion of univocality? Or conversely, why does the piling on of interpretations tend to undermine the plausibility of novel interpretations?
This latter, of course, turns on the invisibility of ignorance–or as the Blind Brain Theory terms it, sufficiency. Our brains are mechanistic systems, astronomically complex symphonies of stochastically interrelated activities. Sufficiency simply follows from our mechanistic nature: central nervous systems operate according to information activated. This is the basic reason why insufficiency is parasitic upon sufficiency (and ultimately why falsehood is parasitic upon truth). The cognition of insufficient information as insufficient always requires more information. And so Kant, lacking information regarding the insufficiency of his interpretations, information that only became available as the array of viable alternatives became ever more florid, assumed sufficiency, that is, the apodictic status of his ‘transcendental deductions.’
The former also turns on sufficiency, albeit in a different respect. Cognizing the mobility of the earth requires information to that effect. In the absence of such information, we quite simply lack the ability to differentiate the position of the earth one moment to the next. Thus the manifest experience of the heavens moving about a motionless earth. The same goes for the subject: cognizing the activity of the subject requires information regarding differences made. In the absence of that information quite simply no difference is made. Thus the dogmatic metaphysical stance, where the philosopher, possessing only information regarding the objects of knowledge, attributes all activity (differentiation) to those objects and assumes cognition is a passive register.
So what does any of this have to do with the Copernican paradox described above? As we noted, the analogy works insofar as it attributes what is manifest to the activity of the subject. The analogy fails, on the other hand, because of the way it seems to render the subject the motionless centre about which objects now revolve. The solution to this paradox, not surprisingly, turns on the question of where the information runs out. Kant himself refers, on occasion, to finding the ‘data sufficient to determine the transcendental,’ assuming (given sufficiency, once again) that the information he had available was all that he required. But, as the subsequent profusion of variant transcendental interpretations have made plain, the information at his disposal does not even come close to possessing apodictic sufficiency. Given the pervasive and not to mention persuasive nature of sufficiency, it is worth rehearsing how the accumulation of scientific information has transformed our traditional metacognitive understanding of memory. Our traditional metacognitive assumption was that memory was a kind of storehouse, like the aviary Plato immortalized in the Theaetetus. With Ebbinghaus in the 19th century memory at last became an object of scientific inquiry. The story then becomes one of accumulating distinctions between different kinds of memory, as well as a drastic reappraisal of its veridical and systematic role. The picture that has emerged is so complicated, in fact, so different from our initial metacognitive assumptions, that some researchers now advocate dispensing with the traditional notion of memory altogether.
Our metacognitive sense of memory, what makes Plato’s analogy so convincing, is quite simply an artifact of informatic neglect, our inability not only to cognize the complexities of our capacity to remember, but to cognize that inability to cognize. BBT maintains that metacognitive blindness or neglect is a wholesale affair. Thus the ‘introspection illusion.’ Thus the troubling nature of dissociations such as that found in ‘pain asymbolia.’ Thus the ‘peculiar fate’ of reason, how, as Kant notes at the beginning of his first Preface to the original Critique, “it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer” (7). Thus, in other words, the blindness of reason to itself.
And, most importantly here, thus the transcendental. The idea is this: the problems besetting dogmatic philosophy provided Kant the information required to attribute activity to various aspects of subjective cognition and nothing more. The reason Kant’s Copernican analogy takes the peculiar, Ptolemaic form it does has to do with the way metacognitive neglect combined with the illusion of sufficiency forces him to locate the activities he attributes beyond the circuit of nature–to characterize them as ‘transcendental.’ Thus, lacking the information required to differentially situate these activities, they seem to reside nowhere. The conceptual activity of the subject finds itself nested within the empirically occluded and therefore apparently ‘motionless’ frame of transcendental subjectivity. And this is how Kant, in the act of prosecuting his Copernican revolution, simultaneously achieves a Ptolemaic restoration. Where in dogmatic philosophy the known invariably moves the knowing, in critical philosophy the knowing becomes the unmoved mover of everything that can be possibly known.
The cognition of difference requires information. Absent that information, identity is the default, be it the ‘positional’ self-identity of a motionless earth or a transcendental subject. It’s worth noting that this diagnosis applies whether one opts for an ontological or formal interpretation of Kant. Interpret Kant’s concepts any way you will, if they are to be active in any meaningful sense they have to be natural, which is to say, situated. The Blind Brain Theory maintains that the information integrated into consciousness and made available for conscious deliberation does not magically cut our ‘inner world’ at the joints. It is a brute fact that astronomical information asymmetries characterize the actual operations of our brain and our metacognitive sense of ‘mind.’ BBT provides a way of interpreting the metacognitive conundrums of intentionality and consciousness as artifacts of this asymmetry, the result of various forms of ‘information blindness,’ anosognosias that in some cases generate profound illusions. Consciousness is remarkably low-dimensional, not in the information-conserving sense of compression, but in the ‘lossy’ sense of depletions, distortions, and occlusions. Given that the information available to consciousness is the only information available for conscious cognition, we should not be surprised that this empirical fact possesses profound consequences across the whole range of human cognition. The Copernican paradox is one of these consequences, a striking example of the way information privation generates what might be called the ‘out-of-play’ illusion, the sense that the earth is the motionless centre of the universe on the one hand, and the sense that transcendental activity stands outside the circuit of nature, on the other. When combined with sufficiency, or what might be called the ‘only-game-in-town’ illusion, it becomes easy to understand why both geocentrism and transcendental idealism commanded the heights of cognition as long as they did.
(It’s worth noting in passing that both of these illusions are amenable to empirical verification. Any number of experiments can be imagined. Once again, unlike the speculative positions critiqued here, the Blind Brain Theory is continuous with the natural sciences.)
So to return to our question above: Why did ‘critical philosophy’ fail to provide the kind of theoretical knowledge that dogmatic philosophy could not? Because, simply enough, Kant and his successors not only lacked the information they required to naturalize the activity of the subject, they lacked the information required to realize they suffered this lack in the first place! Identifying activity, which is to say, identifying the difference the subject makes, will go down in history as Kant’s signature achievement, his gift to human civilization. But his insight was premature: only now, given the theoretical and technical resources belonging to the sciences of the brain, are we in a position to situate this activity within the greater arena of the natural world.
And this is what makes Bryant’s critique of critical philosophy so retrograde–even atavistic. Here the sciences of brain of the brain are actually making good on the goal of critical philosophy, laying bare the mechanistic activities that underwrite experience and knowledge, and Bryant is calling for a wholesale repudiation, not simply of critical philosophy, but of this very goal. So for instance, we already have a pretty good empirical understanding of why dogmatic philosophy was doomed to failure: humans are theoretically incompetent absent the institutional, conceptual, and procedural prosthetics of the sciences. We also have a good empirical understanding of the heuristic nature, not simply of human cognition, but of all animal cognition. The same way memory research has progressively complicated our traditional monolithic, metacognitive sense of memory, the sciences of the brain are doing the same with regard to cognition more generally. The more we learn, the more clear it’s becoming that cognition is fractionate, a concatenation of specialized tools, heuristics that conserve computational resources via the systematic neglect of information.
On the Blind Brain Theory, the subject-object paradigm is another one of these heuristics, which is to say, a way to effectively comport our organism to its environments absent certain kinds of information. Recapitulating distal (environmental) information exhausts the resources of the mechanisms involved. Recapitulating proximal (neural) information thus requires supplementary mechanisms, which, given the sheer complexity of the neural mechanisms required to recapitulate distal information, either need to be far more powerful than those mechanisms, or to settle for far less fidelity. More brain, in other words, is required for the brain to track itself the way it tracks its environments. Given the exorbitant metabolic expense (not to mention the absence of direct evolutionary pressures) of such secondary tracking systems, it should come as no surprise that the brain suffers medial neglect, a wholesale inability to track its own functions. This is why the neurofunctional context of any information integrated into conscious cognition (the way it is actually utilized) escapes conscious cognition–why, in other words, experience is ‘transparent.’ This is why we perceive objects while remaining almost utterly blind to the machinery of perception. And this is why our sense of subjectivity is so granular, ineffable, and mysterious. The usurious expense of proximal cognition imposes drastic constraints on our metacognitive capacities, constraints that themselves utterly escape metacognition.
The subject-object paradigm is a heuristic solution according to BBT, a way for the brain to maximize cognitive effectiveness while minimizing metabolic costs. So long as the medial mechanisms involved in the recapitulation of environmental information do not impact the environment tracked, then medial neglect possesses no immediate liabilities and leverages tremendous gains in efficiency. Our brains can track various causal systems in its environment without having to account for any interference generated by the systems doing the tracking. But as soon as those tracking systems do impact their targets–as soon as observation finds itself functionally entangled with its targets–cognition quickly becomes difficult if not impossible. In such instances it must track effects that it cannot, given the occlusion of its own causal activities (medial neglect), situate within the causal nexus of any natural environment. As a heuristic, the subject-object paradigm is not a universal problem solver, though the only-game-in-town illusion (sufficiency) means metacognition is bound to intuit it as such. This explains, not only why we continue to find experience mysterious even as our environmental cognition presses to the asymptotic limits of particle physics and cosmology, but also why those perplexities take the shape they do.
Subject-object cognition, thanks to medial neglect, is utterly incapable of producing genuine theoretical metacognition. Given the subject-object paradigm, the brain remains a necessary blind-spot, something that it can only cognize otherwise. Thus the invisibility of activity, and the epochal nature of Kant’s critical insight. Thus the default nature of dogmatic philosophy, why millennia of errant groping were required before realizing that we were not, as far as cognition was concerned, out of play.
It’s hard to overstate the eerie elegance of this account–damn hard. Whatever the case, BBT is an exhaustive interpreter. Not only does it seem to resolve a number of notorious, hitherto unresolvable conundrums pertaining to consciousness using one basic insight, it claims to offer understanding, in impressionistic outline at least, of why philosophical inquiry has followed the trajectory it has.
In the present context, however, the thing to remember is simply this: To speak of subjects and/or objects as metaphysically fundamental is to immediately commit oneself to the universality of a certain kind of low-dimensional cartoon, which is to say, a heuristic that organizes information in a manner that enables or impedes cognition depending on the particular ecology it finds itself deployed in. The cartoonishness of this cartoon, the way it betrays as opposed to facilitates cognition, is something numerous critics in numerous contexts have called attention to (perhaps illuminating portions of BBT from less comprehensive perspectives). For proponents of so-called embodied cognition, for instance, the subject-object paradigm constitutively neglects what might be called the brain-environment, the greater mechanism that explains the profound continuity of our organism with its environments. For Heidegger, on the other hand, it’s a paradigmatic expression of the ‘metaphysics of presence,’ the wilderness through which the tribes of thought wander awaiting the promise of ‘being.’ For other thinkers in the phenomenological and post-structural traditions, it distorts and conceals essential relations, generating structurally inescapable impasses, social alienation, as well as facilitating myriad abuses of authority and capital.
And for ‘speculative realists’ such as Bryant, Harman, and Meillasoux, it confounds the possibility of genuine theoretical knowledge. Thus the curious canard of ‘correlation,’ and the even more curious conceit that simply naming the subject-object paradigm as a problem provides theoretical egress, rather than, as even the most rabid enthusiast must recognize as a storm-cloud on the horizon, simply more of the same. Gone are the early days of novelty, and with it the only-game-in-town illusion of genuine philosophical progress. Speculative realism is now mired in the same ‘bewildering philosophical situation’ it takes as its motive, making claims to theoretical knowledge on inferential grounds every bit as interpretative as those it seeks to supplant, pinning skyhook to skyhook, in the effort to conceal the fact that everything is left hanging…
No different than before.
So many ironies and problems bedevil this approach I simply don’t know where to begin. I’ve already mentioned the unfortunate timing involved in denying activity to cognition just as the bona fide sciences of those activities are in bloom. If theoretical knowledge is what Bryant is after, as he claims, then he need only embrace these sciences, embrace naturalism and foreswear his metaphysical fundamentalism. It’s a good rule-of-thumb, I think most will be inclined to agree, to be incredulous of any systematic set of claims that argues against incredulity. But this is precisely what Bryant does in arguing that, even though all his claims are in fact conditioned by his cognitive capacities, personal history, social context, and so on, one should pretend all these potential confounds are out of play. There is no question more honest than, “How do you know?” yet he would have us relegate it on the basis of speculation that, coincidentally enough, has no way of answering this very question.
And it is for this reason, more than any other, that so much Speculative Realism strikes me as desperate philosophy, as the work of weary, thoroughly captive souls that nonetheless refuse to remain indifferent. “There must be some way out!” This has been the cry, naming a need that for many has become so urgent they are willing to suspend disbelief to attain the appearance or approximation of ‘escape.’ This wilful credulity, this opportunistic refusal to critique, is what raises the irony of Byrant’s approach to its most debilitating pitch. After all, questions are what make ignorance visible, what reveals the insufficiencies of our thought–the information missing. Questions, in other words, bring to light differences not made. Thus Bryant, by eschewing Kant’s critical question regarding the differences cognition makes, is in effect occluding the very differences he claims are fundamental. He is not, in fact, interested in ‘doing justice to the plural swarm of differences’ so much as he is interested in differences of the right sort–namely, those that conserve the identity of his Object Oriented Ontology.
The final irony is that BBT, like Bryant’s approach, is decisively concerned with differences–only understood as information, systematic differences making systematic differences. But unlike, Object Oriented Ontology, my approach takes information as an unexplained explainer that is warranted by the theoretical work it enables, and not as a metaphysical primitive that warrants all that follows. Theorizing the kinds of informatic constraints (the crucial differences not made) faced by human cognition, BBT provides a powerful diagnosis of the subject-object paradigm, one that not only explains myriad traditional philosophical difficulties, but also allows, on an empirical basis, a means to think beyond the perennial, oscillating tyranny of subject and object, thought and being, and here’s the important thing, when required. It begins with theoretical knowledge, the sciences of the brain, offering speculative claims that will find decisive, empirical arbitration in the due course of time. Object Oriented Ontology, however, is yet another metaphysical fundamentalism–and an anachronistic one at that. It wades into the swamp of metaphysical argumentation claiming to discover firm ground. Unable to conceive a way beyond the subject-object paradigm, it seizes upon the unfashionable partner, the object, buys it a new dress and dancing shoes, then takes it to the philosophical ball proclaiming discovery. And so, with difference upon its lips, it gets down to the business of perpetuating the same, magically offering rationales for what its practitioners cherish, and critiques of what they despise.
The situation is quite the reverse with BBT. In promising to overthrow noocentrism in a manner consistent with the overthrow of geocentrism and biocentrism centuries previous, it offers far more heartbreak than otherwise…
An escape from all that matters.
This is where the trail of clear inferences comes to an end. I’ve been mulling over ways to characterize a ‘big picture’ that might follow from this crazy attempt to explore post-intentional philosophy. Does it argue a kind of Wittgensteinian quietism, an admission that it lies beyond the ken of our motley tools, or does it suggest some species of informatic pluralism, where you acknowledge the shortcomings of the kinds of understanding you can come to in terms of a universe parsed into possibilities of informatic interaction? Arguing what it is not seems far easier. It is neither a materialism nor an idealism. It is not rationalist or contextualist or instrumentalist or interpretationist. It is, for whatever it’s worth, an extension of the explanatory paradigm of the life and other sciences into the traditional domain of the intentional. Since the intentional domain has no claim it recognizes as cognitive, no traditional philosophical characterization applies. It refuses projection across any one heuristic plane because it recognizes that all such planes are just that, heuristic. There is no subject or object on BBT, no ‘correlativity,’ no fundamental ‘inside/outside,’ only a series of heuristic lenses (to opt for a visual heuristic) allowing various kinds of grasp (to opt for a kinesthetic heuristic). Given that the prostheses of science do allow for counter-to-heuristic knowledge (as with particle physics, most famously) it accords precedence to scientific discovery and the operationalizations that make them possible. To the question of whether we are a global workspace or a brain or a brain-environment (where the latter is understood in any one of many senses (social, historical, biological, cosmological, and so on)) it seems to answer, Yes.
And there is I suppose a certain kind of peace to be found in such a picture.
I keep looking.
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Reblogged this and commented: Bakker’s BBT (Blind Brain Theory) goes in the direction that Deleuze was taking in his “brain turn” and like many philosophies, contrary to a legend that OOO would like to convince us of, has nothing to do with correlationism: “There is no subject or object on BBT, no ‘correlativity,’ no fundamental ‘inside/outside,’ only a series of heuristic lenses (to opt for a visual heuristic) allowing various kinds of grasp (to opt for a kinesthetic heuristic)”. I too think it is heuristics all the way down. My question is: To what degree is the BBT itself heuristic and not just another theory of heuristic theories? Is the BBT a new foundation or a new heuristic? Can the history of the brain be tied via deep history to Latour’s geostory, which Latour seems to want to turn into a quasi-foundational grand narrative?
I do not know if I fully agree with Bakker but I think that he is exploring further and with energy a position that has always been outside the correlationist coconut.
I rather like coconut. Thanks, terence. If BBT is a grand or meta ‘narrative’ it’s one that explodes the traditional understanding of narrative. If it is confirmed, then it resituates ‘us’ relative to ourselves much the way astronomy and biology have resituated us relative to the cosmos and life. And like I keep saying, this will be nothing short of disastrous.
My only problem so far Scott with your approach is that if BBT is a scientific theory and not per se philosophy, then why do you founder on the trying to beat philosophy over the head for not being Science. For most philosophers science is a condition of philosophy, not philosophy proper…. Even Plato and Aristotle never confused the two domains, not did they try to stipulate that philosophy would or could explain the details of science beyond formalizing its framework and conditioning its tools of use: categories, principles, axioms, etc.
Now if you want to philosophize about BBT then you need a philosophical framework within which to actually substantiate your theory; otherwise it seem to behoove you to market your theory to the scientific elite where funding and initiatives might actually be banked to test the theory in a practical way.
If on the other hand you want to raise this theory into philosophical discourse you need to lay the base line, enter it into let’s say the discursive domain of the philosophy of mind etc. where this kind of theory needs to be honed into a fitting tool. Your BBT is neither epistemology nor ontology, it is specific to the domain of the cognitive sciences and seems ludicrous as a tool to challenge domains outside its purview.
Maybe, I’m all wet, but just doesn’t seem interesting what your attempting. It would be more interesting to see you fill out the scientific details and theories of testability, what procedures it would take to make your theory a practical tool for cognitive scientists rather than wasting time using it as a tool to bash philosophical domains to which it has no real access or standing other than a quaint scientific theory. The whole idea of BBT as some Grand Critical Machine to beat philosophy at its own game seems a vein pursuit my friend… maybe I’m wrong, I’ve been wrong before… just an opinion from the farmlands of thought…. 😉
You seem to be making some kind of explanatory relevance claim but I’m not sure I understand how it’s supposed to work. If the argument is that there’s no possibility of overlap between the domains of science and philosophy then you are making an argument I’ve never encountered before. All of historical natural philosophy has been replaced by science, which is to say ‘beaten at its own game,’ hasn’t it? What makes the soul or intentionality any different? Do you literally believe that a scientifically verified theory of consciousness would have no philosophical relevance?
As for demanding empirical verification this very moment now, then I’m equally confused. I’m a theoretician, a dude who fears/thinks he’s come up with one of the holy grails of philosophy: a way to naturalize intentionality. I’m not sure how the fact that BBT is susceptible to empirical verification could possibly count against it, as opposed to speculative positions that cannot be arbitrated one way or another, perhaps ever.
I guess what I’m wondering is simple: why spend so much effort destroying and / or undermining philosophy when you could be developing this supposed ‘holy grail’: what’s the point? Just to do it? Just to show everyone how great BBT is and how unsatisfactory everything from Parmenides to this moment in philosophy is passé? Is that the point?
If so, then by all means have a field day… just seems a wasted effort since you could actually be developing a book with the meat of your theory filled out instead of all this blogging on pointless efforts to convince the philosophical community how great you are and how stupid it is to continue to pursue philosophy.
You’re better than that… so why continue this line of destruction? Do something positive: continue filling out the details of your system, tease out the power of its insights rather than distilling artificial battles with straw men. It’s just boring. If you believe in your theory then do something with it: write a book worthy of peer review, or at least an offering for the public stage where worthy opponents can truly measure its power. Quit nickel and diming your self…
Are you a nickel? No.
Did I straw man Bryant? I certainly hope not! If I have, then show me what you mean.
Otherwise, if it weren’t for this blog, none of this would see the light of the day. I simply cannot revise anything theoretical without arguing myself into an exhaustive rewrite (which must be revised, and so on). Twenty years of trying have have convinced me I don’t have the marbles for that game. Should I hire a second shrink?
Abstain from critique? The way you do?
I understand that you have some animus against this piece, me, BBT, whatever – I hate them as well! – but you don’t seem to be very clear on where it’s coming from!
I have no animus against you Scott. Far from it. I’m simply challenging you to publish this grand theory with the verve and philosophical flair you present on this blog in book form for the scientific or philosophical peer review process where it can truly quail its foes or fall by the wayside if that is the case.
As in all things, we blog for our own egoist personal reasons, otherwise its just a game of solitaire we’re playing with ourselves. Obviously you seek feedback like all humans. You want a worthy opponent, or even others to recognize what you see as confirmation of your efforts. But if you keep it bound to a blog, as you suggest, it probably will only be for your own benefit, a therapy as you suggest. If that’s all you see in this theory – so be it.
You assume I despise what your doing when in fact the inverse is true, yet I’m pushing buttons that obviously get under your skin. For all your cynical defiance your bark is louder than your bite, my friend.
And, you bring up a good point, my reasoning for abstaining from critique – as you put it, is simple: critique of another’s work takes a methodical and deep survey of that other’s full oeuvre; and, should not be taken lightly, for the truth be told not only your own reputation as a philosopher or poet or whatever is at stake, but the reputation of the one that you have so lightly decided to destroy with your great theory. If you attack someone to engender a greater confrontation with their system, that is one thing; but if you use them as a whipping boy for your own pretentious ploy to further your own designs or to bolster your own egoistic needs then this is of little value in the long term. Which are you doing in this – so to speak, critiques of yours?
And in fact I agree with Paul Churchland in his new book, Plato’s Camera:
“We insist on the critical scrutiny of the alleged results by the rest of the professional community, and on the need to replicate the relevant findings in independent laboratories. Further, we evaluate the proposed theory’s consistency and explanatory consilience with the already established corpus of (provisional) theoretical wisdom accumulated over centuries of prior scientific activity, similarly collective in nature and similarly technique-driven. Finally, we try to divine potential consiliences among a population of new and potentially revolutionary theories, theories that might displace our current conventional wisdom.” (p. 247)
This is science and theory in consilience, working out the physical basis of theoretical praxis. Obviously for you blogging is as for many of us a way to blow off a little steam, to rouse the world, to awaken people to think and react positively or negatively, feedback loops, etc. Just hope to see you enact this in a truly great effort of scholarship rather than spinning your wheels dispersing your intellect in short shrifts of meaningless castigation. I’m behind you… just want to see positive things come out of this theory… buddy…
This is my notepad. This is the way I work things, through. I am not a scholar, nor will I ever be one – let alone afford to be one! I’m just a lonely loon with lot’s of questions, too much imagination, and no organizational skills to speak of. BBT is something I’m only able to present, and leave to others to disprove. And once again, I’m not sure what you find objectionable about this. Why is this getting under your skin?
I don’t think anything positive will come out of this theory, but I am sappy enough to think that it’s always worth giving the devil it’s due. We stand at an unprecedented historical crossroads: surely you think it behooves us to consider the worst-case scenario, a theory that explains why, for instance, neuromarketing is as effective as it is?
No problem, Scott, you have spun my thoughts into their opposite negative aspect. I had assumed that you saw in your theory something worthy of philosophical review. I see now that this is not the case. If you do not see that “anything positive will come out of this theory” then I understand your reactions to my own thoughts. For me everything counts for something positive: even if I use negative dialectics to push the limits of that positivity. In the short order of life we all count, even those who do not have a voice, nor have ever read a philosophical or poetic work or heard the utterances of that ancient tribe from Parmenides to Zizek.
And, yes, I do take serious the efforts of governments and corporations as they invest in such cognitive sciences to impose their supposed globalist economic, socio-cultural, etc. agendas on us. And, yes, your fiction portrays in an immersive way the truth of your own affective relations to such ideas. I commend you, sir, for you efforts.
As Dylan Thomas once uttered:
Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
may you always rage, buddy!
Christ. I haven’t seen the back of so many hands since attending that bitch-slap rally back in ’98!
I dunno, Noir, I think posting these as blog entries seems very much in keeping with the sort of “cross-genre” theme of bridging the gap between the academic and the popular that Scott has preached for years. 🙂
What is most interesting about Bryant’s refusal to embrace the neuroscientific event, that you mention above, is his dedication to psychoanalysis. It is strange to me that Bryant will assert the importance of something like physics, and mobilizes concepts from physics in his writings, but does not seem to break from psychoanalysis. From his posts, he seems to be invested in it, not just theoretically, but personally (undergoing analysis) and professionally (giving talks for Lacanians). I believe Terrence Blake has made some movements towards this problem. (side note: thanks for pointing to Churchland [I have read Plato’s Camera”] and Rosenberg.)
I suppose the cynical interpretation would be that he’s simply conserving prior intellectual labour, rationalizing. Part of the reason I’m hoping he will respond is that I don’t feel as though I genuinely understand the ‘gestalt’ of his position. Even as I was writing this I felt that there had to be more. But I am coming at him from an angle I don’t think many Continental thinkers are accustomed to. After reading all the cog-psych I have, the kind of faith he shows in metaphysical reasoning – as in the Harman arguments he endorses in his paper – only hignlights the rampant nature of confirmation bias, the human genius for spinning gospel out of abstract ambiguity.
i find this kinda funny, really.
on a certain level, knowing what Bakker knows about motivated reasoning, he must know better than trying to convince philosophers like Bryant what hopeless horseshit they are peddling, since it does, in a way, literally feed them and their families.
on the other hand, in so doing, he’s forced to pick up these turds, crush them in his hands, and scream “It’s all shit – it’s shit ALL THE WAY THROUGH!”
given the reliance on heuristics, here’s one – if someone is talking about the brain/mind/soul/consciousness and makes no references to measuring anything, or using math or statistics, go ahead and back away before you have to smell the shit at all. you might go wrong in a few cases, but you will save yourself some time in the long run.
on a related note, i would recommend bakker (and anyone) read “a universe from nothing” because of a fun analog to BBT – let’s call it the “Blind Brane Theory”. Krauss describes how much of what we know about cosmology and the origin of our universe is only possible because of WHEN we made the relevant observations. he can even predict when cosmologists will no longer have access to the information we used in the past to theorize the Big Bang, etc.
it’s fascinating to see epistemology turned around in quite that way – not all the information we need to figure out certain things was or will always be “out there” to discover.
funny “our” “own” brains are on that list where “introspection” is concerned.
Chaitin has interesting things to say about this. Are you familiar with his Omega stuff, ohlo?
I’m up to my eyeballs in Craver at the moment but it’s been a while since I’ve enjoyed some cosmology.
i am familiar with Chaitin’s “Omega” notion, having read about it after seeing it mentioned on one of these threads. i see why you might mention it in the context of “limits on knowledge”, but otherwise i am missing the connection. i see a difference between knowledge to which we lack access (that’s why scientists are constantly inventing new analytical tools and devices), and the epistemologically strange-looped Godelian-style conundra in which someone PROVES we can’t know something that we could only really ever know in principle, and don’t really want to know (e.g., the count of operations preceding a halting state in an idealized computing device).
as far as the book (“a universe from nothing”) goes, it clocks in at a highly readable 190 pages or so, so it’s not a big commitment. having read (and enjoyed) brian greene too, i got a kick out of krauss dumping on string theorists a little. you know, because they don’t measure or predict anything.
not sure what the appeal of craver is for you – i checked out a few articles and it just seems like backseat driving to me. blech.
for example (in the interest of concreteness) this….
Click to access hunemanfunctionssubmit.pdf
…sucked.
To wit,
“If we are to make sense of the task of fitting a phenomenon into the causal nexus in neuroscience, we will have to extend our understanding of the causal nexus to make it into a properly mechanical nexus.”
Click to access funct_mech_cont_neuro.pdf
I would argue that this is an empirical claim, and a false one, in the sense that no one I know who actively does neuroscience is concerned with this, nor is this blissful obliviousness an impediment to scientific progress. it’s like insisting that carpenters need a detailed theory of the root systems of trees before they can start building a house. it’s madness.
but, whatever. this is a familiar complaint from me, and a boring one.
i still can’t believe that the Synthese in your novels isn’t some kind of inside-joke about the Journal:
Piccinini, G. and Craver, C.F. (2011) “Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches” Synthese 183: 283-311.
i was kinda psyched to have “figured it out”. but i guess i only “figured it out” in the sense that Craver and Co. are “figuring out” how i my colleagues and i will be able to do our jobs, once they have laid down a solid theoretical foundation for what a fucking neurotransmitter “truly” “is” in the deepest ontological/epistemological sense. and also because notwithstanding “nexus.”
heh.
i know it must seem like i don’t take these Deeper Philosophical Issues seriously – and it’s true. i don’t. i think taking some of these things TOO seriously is, in fact, the problem. that is, the problem, to me, is that all the Serious High-Minded Talk seems to involve the endless parsing of words, and never, ever the making of actual STUFF (drugs, prosthetics, etc.) that promises to tackle what i see as the truly Serious Issues – blindness, deafness, Parkinson’s, etc.
it might seem like i would see it as “harmless” but i don’t – i think there is a genuine opportunity cost for everyone. smart people waste their intellect on it when they could be doing other things (it’s almost the opposite of Wall Street, which also siphons off tremendous intellectual talent but does quite a bit of genuine harm).
what other things, you ask?
like, oh i dunno….writing the final volume of the Aspect-Emperor trilogy?
and so i “heh” again. but really, i hear the metaphysical stakes are high, so someone should really get on that, right?
p.s. final (unlrelated) question for Bakker – why do you write “ohlo” as an abbreviation for ochlocrat? do you know something about Greek i don’t? it would be easy, since i know next to nothing about Greek, beyond loving the sound of “omicron”, which sounds like a Transformer from ancient times.
Backseat driving is an apellation that I think he’d be okay with, though. When he makes claims like the causal nexus one you quote, he presumes he’s simply making explicit what you all are doing implicitly, then organizing you in a more general register. He’s genuinely doing a kind of sociological epistemology – all second order observation. Of course you’re offended! He’s the guy in khakis and you all are the indigenous Amazonians. But before guys like Craver they were trying to argue that your practice was a kind of poor cousin to physics. An inferential beggar. And let’s not forget that you guys have your heads up your asses in your own way. That ain’t sunshine you smell. A field study or two is never a bad thing.
I hear you on the opportunity cost as well. If I am engaging in silliness I at least know that I will eventually be cured of it. And if BBT were verified, it would shut down whole traditions – which should please you!
And as for ‘ohlo’ – I didn’t know I was making the mistake until now… !
Hows that for proof in the pudding?
just a few quibbles and questions (@ Bakker)
first, i’m not “offended.” i’m just disinterested, and with the exception of a few points of contact provided by your blog, largely oblivious (it does take me back to my college days, which involved a fair amount of “critical theory” (hah!) and philosophy in my coursework).
having taken the time to read some of Craver’s essays, i think my lack of interest is well-motivated. i don’t think they are bad, or even wrong, just…inutile. polysyllabic fluff, mostly.
i know you would claim he’s doing something different – “sociological epistemology” or whatever. i agree. i just also think what’s he’s doing is not worth doing for anything other than its entertainment value (this thread makes clear that there is a heavily invested, albeit small audience for that sort of thing). the argument about “opportunity cost” strikes me as the only one with merit. i’m definitely not trying to keep people from having fun. it’s…chess with pieces made of air, and a ruleset that is perenially, unendingly up for debate.
the khaki/amazonian analogy is just straight up trolling. #iseewhatyoudidthere.
please. it’s like using the term “offended”. i think you know better, and suspect that you knew better when you wrote it. takes one to know one?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fashionable_Nonsense
i’m not sure who “they” are in “before guys like Craver they were trying to argue” – but i assume you mean something like this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_programme
is that more or less right?
consider, if only for the sheer polemical fun of it:
i would like to know more about what you mean when you say that we have our heads up our asses in our “own way”. our collective blindness to the cyborgic dystopia were are unwittingly unleashing on ‘Old Style’ humans? kidding aside, i would like to know more precisely what you mean.
i would also like to reask a my question – I know that you think BBT creates problems for particular philosophical approaches to knowledge about the brain/mind. however, do you really – i really mean really, here – think that you can “shut down whole traditions”?
in a way, this takes me back to my original comment about you “knowing better”. as sinclair put it, “it’s hard to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding.”
i appreciate the fact that what little i understand of BBT is at least empirically driven, at least in general outline. i don’t pretend to follow much of it – frankly, i find that the clarity of your expository writing suffers from the allusive ambiguity that enriches your fantasy writing. you also seem at pains to the use the jargon that you feel is necessary to establish your credibility with your intended audience of professional philosophers, which forces you to belabor a number of highly nuanced semantic distinctions (more colloquially, ‘ant-fucking’).
is the true objective of BBT not to tell us about the brain, but instead to tell people to stop trying to tell us about the brain in such a dipshitty way?
“Yes. Their agents have killed thirty-eight of us.” The Superbright dabbed uneasily at the sweat budding on his swollen forehead. “We are not mentally unsound, Kluster-Chairman. We will not cause you any trouble. We only want a quiet place to finish working while God eats our brains.”
– Bruce Sterling, “Twenty Evocations”
I’m leaving for a couple weeks tomorrow so I can’t reply at length until I return. I just wanted to make another pitch for you pull together a guest blog while I’m away, ochlo. Think about it…
Well, I found this and it was quite interesting and fun:
While this discussion is hard to follow, sometimes I recognize some patterns:
Premier among these tentative ultimate generalities, he asserts, is difference. This leads Bryant to pose what he calls the ‘Ontic Principle,’ the claim “that ‘to be’ is to make or produce a difference”
That’s again the stuff I studied in Luhmann, and the basis of my previous comments where I went with the digital/analog distinction.
It’s certainly the basic problem since it lays at the foundation. Cognition doesn’t exist without producing differences. Perceiving everything undifferentiated means perceiving nothing at all. It’s obvious as we simply know in opposition. So the digital idea as in “breaking” reality in functional parts. Being able to point something because you recognize it’s different from something else. This is the basis of language too, and the language is the basis of cognition, which is the mean through which we try to know the world. So this is an inescapable principle.
Yet you can see how this shares something with the “oneness” of consciousness. Consciousness is weird to describe because it’s problematic.
And then again you can see how it gets more complicated. The metalinguistic function is the property of self-description. That’s consciousness too, a looping thought. You constantly examine yourself. Your thoughts then are taken reflexively, going on forever. (so the “strange loops” in GEB)
This is a tricky process simply because in order to self-observe you need to take yourself, separate yourself from it, and analyze it as an object. Which means: how it’s possible to self-observe if the premise of cognition is the making of distinctions? So that’s the strange loop. Continuously cycling between being and observing. Subject and object. If there’s a conflict it is because it’s simply the nature of this tricky process.
About “objects a priori” I see things rather simply. We don’t know reality, we simply deal with a model of reality, a simulation that we are able to build. And this simulation is “true” only as long it’s useful. And it is useful as long it lets us making decent predictions. To understand how this work you can simply use the computer example. There a distinction between the hardware and software. Thee hardware is the hard stuff. The data you get from the external world. The software is cognition. How you use and organize that data.
Before the hardware input is used in the software it is simply a sequence of 0 and 1. It’s pretty meaningless and useless. So it waits for cognition/software to “make sense” of it. To define, name and recognize. To organize in a model so that those sequence of numbers represent a tree or a person. That’s how the model of reality works too, and why human beings “make sense” of the world. Give it a meaning, in the same way the software can organize the data so that it produces a game.
The fact that we can turn 1s and 0s into images, and make them characters, and then create a story, and then having someone else engage with that story and identify with it. It’s all about that skill about creating symbolic simulations. Representing the world so that we can navigate it.
From this perspective Copernicus simply followed the system as it always works: we previously had a system of reality that worked fine. Then Copernicus observed some things that didn’t quite fit, and built a new system that could better predict reality. So it’s all about the model being refined. And the model being always a simulation of reality. The moment it fails to be useful there’s the necessity to build a better one that can satisfy new demands. And the more we refine it, the more it becomes “detailed”. Which means it contains (it can explain and know) more details and moving parts, more complexity.
It’s like a drawing made by a kid, and then seeing how his drawing skills increase across the years, as he acquires more competency.
It’s a consequence that the model we have about how the brain works sucks worse than the model we have for reality. It is relatively young and filled with problems due to its complexity and the fact that the hardware data is really hard to organize.
And yes, “sufficiency” is also emergent from what is needed. If a model fails, creating the need for a better one, it is because we suddenly have information about how that model isn’t good enough. Because we always live in simulation, and the simulation doesn’t require work to perfect it as long it is satisfying. But even while we are satisfied we never have a simulation that is actually a perfect rendering of the world. It’s just perfect as it is suitable. It’s a subjective judgement we make.
Instead I don’t agree with the conclusion:
To the question of whether we are a global workspace or a brain or a brain-environment
“We are” that. But the problem is that we still perceive dualism even if theory allows us to theorize beyond. Awareness of what we are does not correct what we feel we are.
So we are still simply limited to conscious cognition, the way it feels. And it may even be that the “true” picture is so horrific that we’ll simply ignore truth and fabricate our model in a reassuring way (like a loving god).
We are not a brain. Because it’s that feeling that circumscribes perception. And this won’t change with theory, it can only change if you can manipulate the feeling itself.
But ‘manipulating the feeling’ is the next step. This is why BBT has such troubling implications for the post-human. Taking shelter in experience has a shelf life – short or long, depending on who you ask.
But more, the same way quantum mechanics outruns our heuristic understanding in so many ways, there are consequences to this divorce between knowledge and experience, consequences that more and more capital is attempting to exploit in the pursuit of competitive advantages. In a very real sense, experience offers no shelter at all, just anaesthetic.
At some point I want to actually post on BBT and second-order systems theory.
That video I just linked above has some funny quips about the gap between knowledge and experience, so it quite fits 🙂
“How do you know?”
An excellent post. I too have been perplexed not just by OOO’s failure to answer the question adequately but by the persistent refusal even to regard the question as worthy of response. I think though that I might have figured it out. If an object is characterized primarily by its difference, and if an idea is a kind of object, then ideas too are characterized by their difference. But what about their truth? If the truth of an idea is judged by its correspondence with or representation of a reality existing outside of the idea, then truth is characterized by a kind of sameness between the idea and its referent. But OOO isn’t about sameness; it’s about difference, and especially the “difference that makes a difference.” So too with OOO ideas. In a Larval Subjects post entitled On the Function of Philosophy, Levi Bryant explicitly rejects the norm of truth for judging philosophical work. Instead he proposes that evaluation be based on usefulness and craftsmanship:
“Some people seem to think that the function of philosophy is to rigorously ground claims so as to get at The Truth(tm)… Philosophy has no Truths of its own and is thus a sort of empty square that travels an aleatory course throughout history… Concepts are not representations, nor are they ideas in minds. Rather, they are lenses and tools. They are apparatuses, every bit as tangible and real as hammers. It makes as much sense to ask “is this concept true?” as it does to ask “is a hammer true?” …The proper questions when encountering a hammer is not “is it true?”, but rather “what does it do?”, “what can I do with it?”, “is it put together well for these tasks? …Everywhere with this question of whether a concept is true, whether it represents the world, we encounter the desire to police, dominate, subordinate, and render subservient. Like Kafka’s Court or Castle, these philosophical technologies everywhere seek to trap, ensnare, halt, and limit. They create the illusion of free movement and autonomy, while everywhere weaving a semantic web about engagement seeking to fix it. The question “is it true?” is the insecure and narcissitic fantasy of academic philosophy wishing to redeem itself by functioning as master discipline, legislator, and judge of all other disciplines, practices, and experiences.”
In a sense Levi, following Graham Harman, takes the Blind Brain Theory to heart, extending it to all objects: No object has access to the essential reality of any other object, the mind/brain of a philosopher or a scientist is an object, therefore… But if I understand you correctly, then BBT isn’t an excuse for throwing up one’s hands at the futility of finding facts, knowledge, truth. BBT just makes the task more difficult than it seems intuitively or introspectively. Have you read Ray Brassier’s essay “Concepts and Objects” in the edited compilation The Speculative Turn, pdf available here? I think you’d like it. It begins:
1. The question ‘What is real?’ stands at the crossroads of metaphysics and epistemology. More exactly, it marks the juncture of metaphysics and epistemology with the seal of conceptual representation.
2. Metaphysics understood as the investigation into what there is intersects with epistemology understood as the enquiry into how we know what there is. This intersection of knowing and being is articulated through a theory of conception that explains how thought gains traction on being.
3. That the articulation of thought and being is necessarily conceptual follows from the Critical injunction which rules out any recourse to the doctrine of a pre-established harmony between reality and ideality. Thought is not guaranteed access to being; being is not inherently thinkable. There is no cognitive ingress to the real save through the concept. Yet the real itself is not to be confused with the concepts through which we know it. The fundamental problem of philosophy is to understand how to reconcile these two claims.
4. We gain access to the structure of reality via a machinery of conception which extracts intelligible indices from a world that is not designed to be intelligible and is not originarily infused with meaning. Meaning is a function of conception and conception involves representation—though this is not to say that conceptual representation can be construed in terms of word-world mappings. It falls to conceptual rationality to forge the explanatory bridge from thought to being.
5. Thus the metaphysical exploration of the structure of being can only be carried out in tandem with an epistemological investigation into the nature of conception.
Thanks for this. So you would say that Bryant’s real problem in this piece is that he actually denies himself the very ground he uses to impugn critical philosophy? I’ve thought, on several occasions, that object oriented ontology is trying to parachute into the space that BBT (by dint of actually explaining intentionality) carves out.
Take the quote you give, where Bryant provides an instrumental theory of truth not for philosophy, but for everything (so suggesting that everything is an ’empty square’). This is well and fine, so long as you find some alternative way of explaining the cognitive difference between claims, what makes his claims more useful (powerful) in general, rather than just to himself. Do you think he would agree that it was merely convenient for him at the moment to take difference to be prior to the question of difference, but that the situation could change at any time?
More than little whiff of the subject in that. Why spend so much time criticizing contextualism if it turns out you are one?
In a sense Levi, following Graham Harman, takes the Blind Brain Theory to heart, extending it to all objects: No object has access to the essential reality of any other object, the mind/brain of a philosopher or a scientist is an object, therefore… But if I understand you correctly, then BBT isn’t an excuse for throwing up one’s hands at the futility of finding facts, knowledge, truth. BBT just makes the task more difficult than it seems intuitively or introspectively.
On BBT this way of looking at things is to simply impale yourself on the opposite horn of the same dilemma, to insist on the universal application of a heuristic adapted to distinct (namely, observationally indifferent) ecologies of problem-solving. Is hope an object? Is love an object? How about green? The interpretative gymnastics required to discharge a universalized commitment to ‘object-orientation’ in these or other instances is a diagnostic marker for heuristic troubles.
“what makes his claims more useful (powerful) in general, rather than just to himself.”
Based on the excerpt from his post Levi seems to be aiming not for the general but for the specific: if you can find some job for which OOO is the right tool, great; if not, that’s okay too. Presumably if enough people find it useful then OOO attains greater societal power, stronger claims to truth as a social construction.
And how do you square these contextualist commitments with his critique of contextualism?
Hi Scott,
Thanks for the generous post. I’m not sure I fully understand or follow your argument here. You seem to be attributing a desire for foundations and certainty to me. However, “The Ontic Principle” seeks to do exactly the opposite. What I there attempt to do is undermine the epistemological quest for foundations or certainty. One consequence that follows from this is that there is no longer any a priori knowledge of being. Rather, the only way we arrive at knowledge– in my view –is through experimental engagement with the world around us. This comes out more clearly in the first chapter after the introduction of The Democracy of Objects. Further, it seems to me that the opacity of ourselves to ourselves or ourselves to our brains is well covered by the withdrawal thesis. Not only do we never have direct access to other objects, but we never have direct access to ourselves either. For example, if I’m suffering from a massive anxiety attack there’s no way for me to discern whether this results from my “being-towards-death” as Heidegger would have it, or something I ate.
The project that I’m engaged in arises out of a desire to *step out* of these sorts of debates, so as to be able to talk about other things. Within philosophical circles and much of critical theory the vast majority of the time is spent in a debate between foundationalism and skepticism (the postmodernisms). This seems to be a debate useless to everyone except humanities academics seeking to pad their cvs. It is far more important, I think, to generate frameworks of thought that might investigate how features of geography contribute to power relations, the implications of neurology on what we are, how people tolerate the intolerable not because they’re duped or somehow believe these social systems are just and right, but simply because they’re exhausted by their working day and are dependent on certain sources of energy in the form of fuel and calories to live and function at all, and so on.
Someone remarks about how it’s strange that I still talk about psychoanalysis while talking about physics. Why not neurology? First, I have written quite a bit on neurology over at Larval Subjects. Second, there are different levels of engagement in the clinic. Speech is capable of having effects on neurological systems and is itself a product of neurological systems. There’s no contradiction between psychoanalysis and neurology on this point. Psychoanalysis works with people at a different level of materiality than neurology does. Do I think that all mental maladies are subject to psychoanalytic treatment? Certainly not.
It is disappointing to read Olcholrat suggest that I only advocate certain positions for the cynical reason of feeding myself and my family. I make next to no money for my books and haven’t been particularly rewarded by the academy for my work. I occupy a college position that requires no research whatsoever because I’m at a teaching institution rather than a research institution. I have no tenure and can be fired at any time for no reason at all. Further, my research doesn’t contribute to my advancement at the institution where I am. Like anyone else, I am just trying to figure things out as best I can. If I argue something it’s because I believe it to be true and I attempt to provide reasons for those beliefs. I found that analysis had a profound impact in both my own life and the lives of others that I treated when I was still practicing. For that reason, I continue to draw on elements of it in my own work.
Hi Levi. Thank you! Ohlo is simply being his fearless self, and I’ve met enough people from the neuroscience community (like himself) to know that his attitudes are by no means isolated. What he’s saying is that you and I have a real credibility crisis in his neck of the research woods. I’m not so sure it isn’t deserved.
I appreciate your desire to escape, but what I don’t understand is how or why you think you have escaped. I’m trying to follow the inferential crumbs. You often make naturalistic sounding claims, but if this is the case, if you truly have turned your back on the apriori, then why this concern with ‘difference,’ ‘objects,’ ‘withdrawals,’ and so on? In other words, why all the metaphysical argumentation?
Do you see the disconnect? I’m in entire agreement with need to move on from the semantic fetishism of post-structuralism and phenomenology, that enough is enough. I’m also on board with the kinds of conceptual experimentation you speak of: what I can’t understand is why you think it necessary to execute this, an agenda that can be realized in multiple ways, through the narrow metaphysical lens of ‘object orientation,’ one that you think warrants ignoring THE question everyone will inevitably bring to you: How do you know?
Scott,
I think that every proposition, whether it recognizes it or not, makes ontological claims. They’re inescapable. A couple of points in response to the “how do you know?” question. First, you can find my arguments for why the world is composed of discrete units here (apologies for sending you to more reading):
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/9750134.0001.001/1:5/–democracy-of-objects?rgn=div1;view=fulltext
Second, I believe that any claims I make are fallible. Just because language has a name for something or someone believes that something exists (say dark matter, phlogiston, ghosts, brains, or corporations) it doesn’t follow that these things do exist. Rather, there have to be experimental protocols for establishing the existence of something. I personally think the philosophical question “how do we know?” is misguided. Instead, we should be talking about processes of inquiry and learning, such as we find in the sciences. For me the question is less one of how we know that the proposition “the cat is on the mat” corresponds to a state-of-affairs out there in the world, as a question of how, through engaged and embodied inquiry through the use of both our own bodies and technologies such as super-collidors and vapor chambers we discover the existence of various entities. We should spend less time asking “how do we know Einstein’s papers on relativity are true?” and more time looking at the practices by which working laboratory scientists verify the existence of various things. Have you by any chance read Latour’s Science in Action? That gives a fair picture of where I stand with respect to “how do you know?” questions.
Interesting stuff, Levi, but I fear I still don’t understand the metaphysical bother. If you think that cognitive difference (however you want to define it) turns on experimentation, then why begin – let alone bother – with claims that lie beyond the pale of experimentation? Whether every proposition ‘makes ontological claims’ or not is besides the point. For me, what you’re saying should amount to:
1) Empirical experimentation (or as I would say, ‘institutionalized science’) is the best way to determine ‘what is.’
2) All claims presuppose some determination of ‘what is.’
/3) The best way to determine the ‘what is’ presupposed by our claims is via empirical experimentation (institutionalized science).
How would you attenuate this argument?
I think you are in danger of falling into the same sort of performative contradiction that you find in Levi and that his reply exemplifies. Despite espousing “non-foundationalism” and conceptual experimentation Levi does have a foundational level and vocabulary, which his appeal to “the withdrawal thesis” illustrates. This is not a semantic contradiction as Levi is careful to distinguish verbally epistemology and ontology. You highlight that this is still foundational by talking of the “metaphysical lens” of obect oriented ontology, which poses an ontological foundation with its withdrawing objects. You emphasise that Levi is still responsible before the question “How do you know”.
But Levi could easily reply with a tu quoque argument and ask you “How do you Scott know?”. Secondly your brain talk seems to be your foundational level. This objection seems to be behind noir-realism’s slant that what you are doing is more metaphysics than science, and bad metaphysics at that. You seem to be proposing an interpretative synthesis based on the cognitive sciences and thus shielding yourself from scientific testability.
I however am not so sure, but I feel the question remains. I think noir-realism is extrapolating beyond his usual complexity, raising the tone in view of a certain deafness he may be perceiving. In a recent “argument” over Bruno Latour with Philip of Circling Squares ‘http://circlingsquares.blogspot.fr/) we first seemed to differ over Latour’s primacy of empirical research over arm-chair speculation. However we began to agree once we clarified that empirical research or fieldwork can be accomplished by philosophers open to conceptual experimentation and so to new information coming from the sciences. In this understanding the dividing line between the BBT as philosophical speculation and BBT as empirical fieldwork becomes a little more subtle, but does not vanish.
You seem to recognise and acknowledge these complications by claiming that BBT is “continuous with the natural sciences”, I gloss continuous but not identical, continuous because continuing the fieldwork on the interpretative and so conceptual level. I do not insist that you familiarise yourself with contemporary philosophy of mind, quelle horreur! I find a Laruellian non-standard philosophy ring to the phrase. So my question is pluralist: do you admit the value of other quite different approaches that aim at being “continuous with the natural sciences” suchas for example Bruno Latour’s? If yes then great as you are maintaining your pluralism and applying it to yourself. If no, then I fear your baby is not only drowning in metaphysical bathwater, it is dissolving in it. Which would be regrettable.
Of course I do. BBT is a worst-case scenario, at best. It has certain theoretical virtues – explanatory economy among them (the way it apparently cuts through so many philosophy of mind conundrums for instance) – but it really is what I call the Big Fat Pessimistic Induction that makes the biggest claim, I think, for paying it attention. Whatever domain science colonizes, it revolutionizes, and we are being served up on a plate. Here’s a gander at how radical that revolution might be.
I just don’t understand Levi’s position on, ‘How do you know?’ My answer to the question is, ‘I don’t! I have this theory possessing this and that virtue that makes positive claims that will be substantiated or rejected by the sciences of the brain in the course of time.’ His answer seems to be, ‘That’s an illegimate question.’
The question “How do you know?” to Levi does not ask about observable facts nor even about scientific generalisations, but about his ontological foundation. The answer to that is not forthcoming in Latour’s SCIENCE IN ACTION. The question though open is at least in part rhetorical : How do you square your ontological foundation with your epistemological non-foundationalism ie the epistemological question crops up in fundamental ontology and cannot be evacuated by semantic word-magic.
Ktismatics,
Are you suggesting that I adopt a sophists conception of truth as whatever the majority of people happen to believe and whatever belief happens to be statistically dominant in a population of people? I don’t. I merely recognize that our empirical claims about the world are fallable and subject to revision as a result of further inquiry. I certainly don’t think that it was ever true that lightning resulted from the god Odin striking his hammer, regardless of however many Vikings might have believed this. You ask how do I know? I’m fine recognizing that I might be wrong while also holding that the preponderance of evidence supports the theory that lightning results from static electricity arising from various particles of dust and water rubbing against one another in turbulent clouds among other things. Recognizing that a certain group of people believes x is different from claiming that their consensus or belief somehow makes something true.
Hi Levi,
“I merely recognize that our empirical claims about the world are fallable and subject to revision as a result of further inquiry.”
Me too; I’m just trying to make sense of the claims you made in the Larval Subjects post that I quoted, where you assert that “It makes as much sense to ask “is this concept true?” as it does to ask “is a hammer true?”.Maybe that was a hyperbolic remark you made in the heat of the moment, because certainly most empirical concepts make stronger truth claims than that. “The cat is on the mat” sounds to me like an empirically testable claim about everyday objects and their relative positions, even if it doesn’t get down to the quantum level. I might be wrong, but based on the available evidence I’m prepared to assert the truth of my statement about the cat. Certainly the claim might be fallible — it’s not really a mat but a rug, etc. — but as you say it’s particularly important to specify and to evaluate the procedures for supporting or refuting the claim.
In following your blog I see more movement toward acknowledging that subjective perceptions of external objects aren’t just different from the objects themselves, but that the perceptions aren’t as “real;” e.g., my perception of a cat isn’t what the cat “really” looks like. Certainly the same must hold true for a scientific hypothesis: it’s not just different from the reality it purports to describe or explain; the hypothesis is derivative, secondary. But the hypothesis does purport to capture certain invariants about the reality it describes, just as visual perception captures invariants about electromagnetic radiation bouncing off the surfaces of the cat. I can see why you might want to reject the term “representation” for what visual perception does. It’s a lens to be sure: a lens for looking at the world itself. Human vision might have extremely limited bandwidth, but its usefulness as a tool depends on its ability to see accurately what’s really out there in the world. So too for empirical hypotheses, I should think.
Now that I’m ready to post this response I see that discussion continues further down this thread, which I’ve not yet read. Glancing ahead though, I see that you propose that a hypothesis doesn’t represent reality, but that it draws attention to certain features of the world. I’d say that people who do empirical science go beyond an attempt to draw attention to something: they pay attention in order to understand what it is that’s out there.
Best,
John
Once again Levi displaces the general question “How do you know your foundational ontology is true” onto specific questions such as Odin versus static electricity as an account of lightning. Further, here all Latour’s work on different régimes of truth is thrown to the wind and we have a scientistic re-doubling of his non-empirical ontology, as if the one could palliate the deficiencies of the other. The problem posed is that of the non-empirical ontology.
Scott,
I think something’s getting lost in translation between the two of us. You’re taking the term theory to be “representation of reality”. I take a theory to be a guiding hypothesis that draws our attention to certain features of the world or experience for the sake of inquiry. An ontology is proposing the hypothesis that such and such beings exist and should be the object of inquiry, while others do not. My ontology is basically naturalist. As such, at the most rudimentary level it holds that 1) only material beings exist, 2) all causes are physical, and 3) that there is no interaction between two entities without some sort of physical connection (e.g., you and I can’t talk without sound-waves to convey our speech or fiber optic cables to relate us). This is an operating hypothesis for how to inquire into the world. For example, confronted with a woman who is screaming obsescenities uncontrollably, speaking all sorts of blasphemous things, seeing things that others can’t see, etc., the naturalist will work on the premise that she’s suffering from schizophrenia or some other physical disorder, not possession. We reject the possession hypothesis because our ontology as guiding hypothesis has already excluded supernatural causation. Now, if after all sorts of work on her we can find no difference between her and other people who don’t suffer from these things, we might admit defeat and say that our ontology or guiding hypothesis was mistaken and we have to go back to the drawing board.
With you, I largely share the thesis that only scientific experimentation yields knowledge of the world. We simply can’t discover things about the way the world is from our armchairs. We have to actually work with substances and act on them to discover what powers things have and what causes what in this or that case. I’m less certain that science delivers us understanding of things such as literary works or norms or art works, etc (we’ve discussed this in the past), but I also don’t reject the possibility a priori. I just haven’t yet seen illuminating scientific work in these areas (depending on what we’re calling science).
So what’s the point of all this? Why write the sorts of things I write at all? Why not just do science or say that science tells us what being is (a thesis I largely hold)? Because there are different audiences. My audience consists primarily of people in the humanities who are some variant of idealist (while calling themselves “materialists”) and who believe that the world is constructed by thought, beliefs, signs, language, narratives, discourses, and so on. While I believe that the semioticians have made a number of valuable contributions to our understanding of the social world, I also believe there are significant problems with these positions. My work addresses these audiences and attempts to persuade them to take account of materiality and rework their understanding of signifying systems and phenomenological experience in a naturalistic framework.
By and large, I understood this was your position in outline, before and not just now. For the sake of clarification, I by no means understand ‘theory’ in representational terms. You’re not actually a ‘naturalist’ given any standard understanding of the term, so you’ll likely confuse readers by referring to yourself as such. The term is a fuzzy one, to be sure, but a common defining characteristic of naturalism is a desire to minimize the kind of metaphysical argumentation you engage in. So from my perspective, for instance, making metaphysical claims, far from ‘clarifying ontological commitments’ simply increases the burden of unexplained explainers. Cog-psych has demolished any claim we had to theoretical competence. Science isn’t simply the one theoretical claim-making institution that can definitively arbitrate its disputes, its ‘discoveries’ are literally fundamental performative springs driving technological society. It works with or without your interpretations, which is probably why there are so many different interpretations out there. So why not stick with the science and remain as metaphysically agnostic as possible, knowing that some finding could at any moment pull the plug on your intellectual labour, but also knowing you’re riding the rocket that’s either going to exterminate us or turn us into gods?
Here’s a question that’ll help frame the issue between us: the estimate is that about only 10% of the information involved in vision is sensory. There’s a growing acceptance that the brain is a predictive engine, that there is no clear distinction between perception and cognition, and that the senses primarily provide a supervisory role. How constructed does your conception (which you take as an object) of object as a matter of material fact need to be before you would abandon object orientation? If the subject-object paradigm were scientifically confirmed as a heuristic with a limited range of applicability, would you abandon your metaphysical commitments?
I think it is plain for all to see that Levi’s answer to the question “How do you know?” is also “I don’t”, and the rest is misdirection. I am reminded of Popper’s notion of metaphysical research programmes that are continuous with the sciences without (yet) being part of the sciences. A metaphysical programme can guide and promote testable research and protect it from premature criticism while being itself testable, at least for the moment. Eliminate these “metaphysical” research programmes (scare quotes because metaphysical here has no relation to transcendence) and you would eliminate all science. You seem to be saying that your BBT is a metaphysical research programme (or hypothesis) on the way to testability. Which should reassure people like noir-realism, I hope.
Terence,
I’m not dodging the question at all. I’ve been quite clear that we only arrive at knowledge of the world through empirical inquiry or experiment and observation. It’s impossible to refute cultural relativists such as yourself as you sit in your armchair and say “there’s no difference between the Viking that claims that lightning is caused by Odin’s hammer and the scientist that claims its caused by the build up of static electricity under certain condition”, simultaneously ignoring all the evidence and experimental work that has led to the latter hypothesis (i.e., you have no logic of probabilities in your thought). It’s the same problem with trying to refute the solipsist. At a certain point you can only walk away, recognizing that at the level of the person’s ontology– relativism is a particular ontology, not the rejection of ontology –they say one thing in their theory, but nonetheless go to a doctor when they suffer from a cold rather than a priest or shaman.
I have already analysed Levi’s version of naturalism (it is not as empirical as advertised) here: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2013/02/24/on-vacuous-naturalism/
Wonderfully ruthless. I should be so lucky to have such a critic! I hope you begin sharpening your BBT knives at some time terrence – sincerely.
Answer my arguments Levi instead of hallucinating things I’ve never said. I am not a cultural relativist nor is Latour who I was referencing. On the doctor argument I have already replied here: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2012/11/02/bruno-latours-table-cognitive-dissonance-and-the-limits-of-scientism/
If my general argument about dogmatic ontology vs research ontology is too compact one can see it developped in more detail here:http://www.theoria.fr/is-ontology-making-us-stupid/
Terence,
I guess I’m unclear on yoru position, then. On the one hand, there’s your adherence to Feyerabend who seems to be your principle influence. On the other hand, your arguments in the past have generally amounted to claims like “Levi is terrible because he rejects the thesis that Odin causes lightning, thereby rejecting the beliefs of others!” I remember one discussion about religion, in particular, that evoked this response in you. Perhaps you could clarify just what your own commitments are.
Well, that settles it. Unless someone comes up with a good rebuttal, I won’t waste any more time with speculative realism.
Back to bringing about the apocalypse.
(I’m becoming a full-fledged member of the Unholy Consult this April! Hurray!)
Hi Levi,
Speech is capable of having effects on neurological systems and is itself a product of neurological systems.
I think it’d be better to say vibrating air is itself a product of neurological systems.
If the notion of ‘speach’ (what we call vibrations in the air) is like a virtual projection of the mind but we say ‘speach’ is a product of the neurological system, then it doesn’t note where the notion of ‘speach’ came from. So if one says speach comes from a neurological system (rather than sound waves), the notion of ‘speach’ has lost it’s note of where the notion of ‘speach’ came from. Without that attached note, it seems like ‘speach’ is just an existant thing generated by the neurological system.
Also I might be wrong, but ochlocrat may have been roughly saying that in concern for you getting atleast the basics necessities of life. I don’t think he wasn’t saying that you engage these ideas so as to buy a second holiday house by the sea or anything! It was roughly put – but I slip into that method of speaking myself sometimes as well. Habits!
Ktismatics,
I take it that only propositions/assertions about the world are true or false. Concepts, in and of themselves, are neither true nor false. What I was trying to suggest in the post you reference is that concepts are to be evaluated in terms of what they allow us to do. They’re like lenses or microscopes that propose certain forms of action, certain forms of inquiry, that draw certain features of ourselves, the world, and others into relief. This is what I was getting at with the comparison of concepts to hammers. We don’t ask whether a hammer is true or false, but whether or not it does a good job at the task we’re engaged in. For example, rubber hammers might be great for checking nerve response in the doctor’s office, but aren’t very good at fastening boards to build houses.
Take a philosophical concept like “phenomenon” as developed by the phenomenologists. There’s no real sense in asking whether phenomenon denotes what the phenomenologists say it does, because it is a technical definition or tool used within a particular theoretical framework. The important question is what this concept allows us to do and whether it allows us to do this well. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon draws us to how things are given to us in conscious experience and invites us to describe those experiences. Compare how the neurologist describes fear and how the phenomenologist describes feature. The neurologist would talk about neurological events that take place when a person is afraid, physiological changes in their body, etc. They might also link fear to some sort of biological survival imperative. The phenomenological concept of “phenomenon” invites us to “bracket” all that as none of these things are given to us in our conscious experience, and instead simply describe our experience of being in fear. In other words, the concept of phenomenon draws our attention to a certain feature of the world or our experience that we might otherwise miss. It leads us to conduct our inquiry in a particular way. Such analysis might be valuable in correcting mistaken assumptions that nerologists and cognitive scientists have about fear or what they’re to explain in naturalistic terms.
My point is that we do something with concepts and use them. Now we can ask whether or not these conceptual tools are good tools or well fitted to their task. Suppose we want to use phenomenology as a method of treatment in the clinic. We might find that this is a terrible idea because it leads us to assume all sorts of things about causation in our maladies that have nothing to do with why we suffer from these things. If we’re followers of Heidegger, for example, we might think that our constant anxiety has to do with our “being-towards-death” and the meaning of our existence. We might think that we experience this anxiety because we’re “fleeing” our authenticity and being absorbed in the “they”. Such a treatment would then prescribe coming to terms with our “ownmost” meaning of existence and our being-towards-death. Certainly anxiety seems this way from the standpoint of our first person conscious or phenomenological experience. But what if our anxiety is really just the result of a chemical imbalance? Wouldn’t it be better to simply change our diet in such cases, or take a particular psychotropic drug? Wouldn’t the therapist that made our therapy all about coming to terms with the meaning of our existence or our death, in this case, be like a shaman that tries to treat schizophrenia with an exorcism? Here the point is not that phenomenology is mistaken or false. It gives damned good descriptions of how we experience the world. The point is that in cases where our psychic malady is organic it’s the wrong sort of tool for the job. Does this make a bit more sense?
Reading your analysis of Kant I’m reminded of a line from one of your books. “And there it was: the mysteries of the Psukhe, which had baffled sorcerous thinkers for centuries, dispelled in a handful of words.”
Now given that you’re not the freaky asymptotic limit of a self moving soul, you need more than just a few words to invoke that sense of wonder. But still, I feel like now I understand so much more!
Which is downright spooky in that I’ve never actually read anything by Kant and probably still have no idea what he or you were talking about. How could I feel the rush of revelation if I was so totally ignorant as to not even have been baffled in the first place?
Anyway, aside from the spooky seeming disconnect between the feelings of confusion and understanding, I’d just like to say your bongs are still most delightful and I wish to subscribe to your newsletter.
It just gets worse from this point on Frank! I hate to say it, but Kant remains a must-read.
Levi,
“I take it that only propositions/assertions about the world are true or false. Concepts, in and of themselves, are neither true nor false.”
Yes, that makes sense. It also makes sense to assert that even true assertions about the world remain subject to possible future revisions that might make them even more completely true or more probably true. I also agree that even true assertions about the world typically support some specific uses and not others, that the truth about the cat on the mat is of more use to the person looking for the cat than to the organic chemist. Of course the pragmatic utility of any assertion becomes suspect if intentionality is disallowed…
Post intentional philosophy – http://lodown.net/
This guy is fer real. Awesome link, James. Hopefully Ben sees this…
Levi I never discuss Odin you do. In the discussion on religion you asked very rudely for clarification after caricaturing and sneering at my position. I referred you to my actual words and you apologised, not publicly, but in an email, which I still have. I have published at http://www.theoria.fr/ 4 articles that summarise my position expressed over two and a half years of intense philosophical blogging. Let’s cut the crap about Odin and discuss if you want, I remain open.
From on of rsbakker’s previous comments above:
“You seem to be making some kind of explanatory relevance claim but I’m not sure I understand how it’s supposed to work. If the argument is that there’s no possibility of overlap between the domains of science and philosophy then you are making an argument I’ve never encountered before. All of historical natural philosophy has been replaced by science, which is to say ‘beaten at its own game,’ hasn’t it? What makes the soul or intentionality any different? Do you literally believe that a scientifically verified theory of consciousness would have no philosophical relevance?”
I think we need to make the difference between science and philosophy more clear. It’s getting muddled. A lot else has followed the above comment but I think we can get down to what is putting us all at crossed purposes if we examine this point more closely. Here’s how I’d explain it (forgive me that it’s a little bit of a tangential chain of reasoning):
Any question or problem can, in principle, be analysed by using either philosophical or scientific methods.
As a matter of historical fact, the methods of science have displaced those of philosophy for answering many questions. This gradual process began in early modernity; as science advanced philosophy retreated; over time philosophy went from musing and perusing the entire cosmos to being restricted to the psyche, language, aesthetics, morals, etc.
This loss of authority and shrinking of purview gave us the impression that science and philosophy pertain to different *domains* – science with ‘causes,’ ‘nature’ and the ‘real world’ and philosophy with ‘mind,’ ‘society’ and ‘meaning’ – but this impression is illusory. Any subject matter can, in principle, be treated with either kind of method. If there are separate ‘domains’ these are territories – areas where authority has been ceded to either the practice of science or that of philosophy; but this attribution is ongoing, contested and historical; it’s a matter of authority, not ontology.
Science, being the expansionist power that it is, covets all of philosophy’s turf. With advances in neuroscience it is now indeed knocking on the door of such cherished citadels as intentionality, consciousness, etc. These hitherto ‘philosophical’ topics can now be addressed scientifically.
What noir-realism seems to be claiming, rsbakker, is that you are not presenting a philosophical argument but a scientific one. That is, you are not speaking the language of philosophy but rather that of science. This is the basic point: Just because you are debating seemingly ‘philosophical’ topics such as intentionality, consciousness, etc. does not mean that you are ‘doing’ philosophy. You are addressing these issues from a basically scientific point of view, not a philosophical one. You are continuing science’s expansionist drive to lay claim to philosophy’s last few bits of territory. You are displacing philosophy *with* science. You’re not engaging with philosophy per se because that would require developing a philosophical argument in philosophical terms; that is, with philosophical methods.
That isn’t to say that you’re *wrong* to be doing all that but the point still stands: debating a traditionally ‘philosophical’ topic does not a philosophy make. The essential difference between science and philosophy is not topic but method.
So, of course a scientifically legitimated theory of consciousness would have huge impact on philosophy. Firstly, it would immolate the last of philosophy’s pretensions with regard to having epistemic terrain of its own. Second, philosophers would surely adopt and enfold this new scientific theory into their philosophies of mind, reconstituting it in their own terms. Philosophers would philosophise, as is their wont; but they would do so philosophically, not scientifically.
To put it in simpler but more jargonised terms: Science and philosophy are different ‘regimes of truth.’ It is a category error to argumentatively confront one in the terms of the other.
There has to be a degree of translation between the conceptual vocabularies of each regime. Just slapping down a theory and yelling ‘Science!’ and expecting the philosophers to give up and agree just won’t do. It isn’t the truthfulness of the *theory* that’s at issue as such – it’s the methods, the concepts, the language, the modes of thought that are being used to frame and address the *question*.
I hope I’ve not arrived too late to the party to appear at least halfway constructive in my criticism! That is the spirit in which it is intended.
+1 Philip.
You don’t think that Bakker is using the Language of Philosophy, like he uses the Language of Fantasy or Mystery, to communicate novelty.
I’ve read these interactions and blogs and I figure Bakker is doing both things you are highlighting: proposing a novel hypothesis of cognition and philosophic paradigm.
Clearly, he doesn’t have to convince the CogSci’s, neh? It seems an endeavour to orient the quality minds of philosophy – a necessary and worthwhile pursuit, in my mind, lest we lost philosophers in the future – towards a more immediately impending doom (of the humanities, as per your description).
For my money, the one question I’d hazard of these minds:
What makes a universal commitment to Heuristic-Orientation more sound than commitment to OOO?
Not quite as good as Bakker’s heuristic metaphor from illusory perception above though…
First sentence should be a question & lose instead of lost in the third paragraph. Reread fail
Thanks, Philip, but I fear your rephrasing of the issue just makes it that much more mysterious to me. Saying that science and philosophy comprise ‘different conceptual regimes’ is something I can understand. But what warrants the conclusion that it is ‘a category error to argumentatively confront one in the terms of the other’? Where, for instance, is the ‘category error’ in the following claim: “The ancient Greeks were wrong to think the universe consisted of four elements”?
Otherwise, I appreciate your concern that my critique is at cross-purposes. But I’m afraid you need to give me actual examples where this is the case. ‘Just slapping down a theory and yelling ‘Science” is far from what I’ve been doing in these posts. As a matter of fact, it is quite self-consciously what I’ve been avoiding. In each case, what I set out is to show the way some central set of intuitions underwriting some theoretical position, in this case, Levi’s, can be empirically redescribed given the theoretical resources of the Blind Brain Theory. I’m not saying this is a good thing. I personally think it means disaster. What I am saying is that this, all things being equal, is likely the future. If it isn’t BBT it’s going to be something else – perhaps somewhat friendlier, perhaps not, but alien and unexpected all the same.
At an affective level, I understand, profoundly so, why it is people are so alienated by all this. Given what I know of cog-psych, I realize that most everyone argues to rationalize preexisting commitments, that when it comes to theory almost no one is genuinely interested in anything other than being right. I understand, in other words, that arguments like mine are doomed to face furious resistance (my whole theory regarding Akratic society turns on this, in fact). What I’m trying to tell people is that the party is over, one way or another. Nothing possesses any ‘intrinsic immunity’ to scientific discourse (as you yourself admit), save that ignorance makes it appear so. Theory is theory, bad or good. If we’re going to battle this stuff with anything more than wishful thinking, if we’re going to avoid the fate of fundamentalist denial or New Age conceptual chicanery, we need to reinvent ourselves in some radically new way.
The preceding post was a great summation of your argument, IMHO. But I don’t believe it’s all bleakness. Even the best parties can go on past their prime. BBT, if it’s nothing else, is a profoundly HUMBLING theory. I think more humility is something society desperately needs.
Hi Terence,
I wasn’t saying that you evoked Odin, but was asking how you distinguish between claims like “Odin causes lightning” and a scientific account of lightning. Your theoretical pluralism seems to suggest that we must place these accounts of lightning on equal footing. Having read your piece over at Theoria, I’m confused as to how it is any less foundationalist and dogmatic than Harman and the Althusserians you critique. Like Harman and the Foundationalist you propose a meta-theory and vocubulary restricting how we ought to talk about and approach the world that forbids alternatives. You claim that this position is pluralist in contrast to Harman and the Althusserians, but only so long as the person making claims articulates them in the framework that you propose. The consequence of your position seems to be that we are forbidden from making any positive claims about the world because to do so falls into what you see as the trap of synchronic ontology. Moreover, you criticize Harman and the Althusserians for the abstractness of their discourse that removes us from the flesh of the concrete, yet you do all of this in abstract terms removed from the flesh of the concrete.
Hi Scott,
I’m not familiar with the version of naturalism that you here refer to. By “naturalism” I understand the thesis that only natural beings exist, governed by the basic laws of physics (whatever they might happen to be) and so on. Naturalism thus refuses the existence of incorporeal entities such as Platonic universals, essences, and the supernatural. What natural beings might turn out to be– energy, Lucretian atoms, fields, etc –is something that can only be discovered through scientific investigation. I take it that this is a metaphysics or an ontology because it is making a claim as to what is.
Your remarks about perception are intriguing as you seem to treat natural perception and individuals as the seat of this knowledge. There’s no reason to suppose that how we perceive the world in its everydayness is reflective of the way the world really is. Fortunately, scientific inquiry isn’t based on natural perception in its claims about being. It relies on scientific experimentation, communities of researchers, and above all technologies of measurement to allow us to discern what is and is not. I cannot perceive radio waves, infrared light, and ultra-violet light, but we do have technologies that allow us to infer the existence of these electro-magnetic waves and their properties.
What would lead me to abandon my claims about objects? A better and more explanatory model of the world. For the time being I trudge along with the limited and fallable tools at my disposal and do the best that I can. I don’t think this is any different than how its done in all areas of inquiry. I don’t claim to have gotten things right once and for all or have to arrived at the one true ontology. I claim only to have a working model for approaching the world that has to be revised when encountering new phenomena.
‘Methodological naturalism’ is the general term. It could very well be an artifact of the kind of authors I primarily read, but ‘naturalism’ all on its own typically refers to this, or even more specifically, pragmatic naturalism, such as that promoted by Dennett for instance. I call myself a skeptical naturalist to distinguish my brand, which is heavily informed by the way cognitive psychology has demolished human rationality as traditionally understood. In my experience authors espousing positions similar to yours typically self-identify themselves simply as physicalists, or more rarely ‘metaphysical naturalists.’ As I mentioned, I take human theoretical incompetence to be a matter of empirical fact, albeit one that is taking its dear time soaking into the academy! So again, I simply cannot understand how metaphysical interpretations, unless qualified as pure guesswork meant to goose creativity, do anything but undermine the credibility of a naturalist position. I highly recommend you take a look at something like Daniel Kahneman’s latest book, Thinking, Fast and Slow.
It took me a few moments to figure out the communicative short-circuit here, then I realized you were misreading me as making an empiricist claim. What I’m saying is that the trend in brain science is more and more to take a ‘heuristics all the way down’ approach to the brain (BBT is on the right side of the curve in this respect). The point is, neural computation is expensive (our beans comprise less than 5% our mass and yet gobble up 20% of our calories), and it’s becoming more and more apparent that the brain has evolved to economize at every turn, to do the most it can with as little as it can. If you take caloric intake as an index of activity, it would seem that modern brain science isn’t simply confirming Kant, it’s doing him one better.
This is what I found so confusing about your critique of critical philosophy.
The funny thing is, I think I’m actually coming to understand what it is you want to argue. For you (as for me), the key is to resist the representational interpretation of this activity, to see it as ‘just more nature here’ interacting with ‘more nature there.’ If I’m right, this explains my host of subsequent confusions (which I really am willing to chalk up to haste and density on my part). So, refusing to take the representational first-person is one thing (like I say, I do it to), but this leaves you the task of explaining all the things we typically resort to the representational stance to do. Since you have no naturalistic (in the methodological sense) means of doing this, you have to go metaphysical, and so pile on all the baggage regarding ‘withdrawal’ and so on that I’m being such a prick about. The problem, in other words, is that the reservoir of problems pertaining to the first-person doesn’t go away. So if you were to debate an anglophone philosopher of mind on the topic, she would scratch her head and say, “Well, an obvious property pertaining to neural models of the world is that they can be true of false. Representations (which are taken as a given throughout cognitive science) provide us a way to understand that.” Your reply is, “No, there’s just ‘objects bearing on objects that withdraw.'” To which the philosopher of mind might reply, “What that does that explain? By virtue of what do these particular objects bear and do these particular objects withdraw, such that we natively assume our claims and experiences to be true and false?” It would strike her as obscurantism – and understandably so, given that she comes from a position so embedded in the sciences.
So here’s my question: What is your theory of meaning? I’m starting to think that many of the elements of your position that strike me as metaphysically ad hoc and confusing all bear on your attempts to explain what seem to be obvious semantic phenomena, those first-personal elements that you cannot simply ignore.
You do see the problem with this answer? It is a scientific fact that we nonconsciously game ambiguities to confirm our preexisting commitments. It’s hard to see how ‘better and more explanatory’ possesses anything approaching the criterial clarity to assure that your biases are not getting the better of you. This is why the question I asked was much more specific: If science confirmed the heuristic status of the subject-object paradigm, would you abandon your commitment to object-orientation?
I changed your question to Levi: “If science confirmed the heuristic status of the subject-void paradigm, would you abandon your commitment to subject-orientation? – since transcendental materialists start with the subject-void dilemma. Got me to thinking about heuristics itself. Modeling, mapping, etc.
Different individuals use different heuristics to process the information before them based on their available schema and the framing of the information. Issues may resonate with different schemata depending on the individual and the way the issue is framed. For example, “exploring sub-cortical regions” may activate schemata relating to affectivity: rage, and fear, seeking, etc. while “exploring for emotion” may activate schemata related to protecting the a dog or one’s child, Scientific pride, and Scientific innovation. These two terms refer to the same activity, but when they are framed differently, different schemata are activated, which results in the use of different heuristics.
So, at least for me, no I wouldn’t give up my own heuristic device or cognitive mapping and framing, but I would incorporate science as a condition for my own philosophical reflections. As a software developer I have had opportunity to use heuristics as a device to supervene between two domains of knowledge. End users often need to increase their understanding of the basic framework that a software project entails (so that their expectations are realistic), and developers often need to push to learn more about their target audience (so that their learning styles can be judged). Business rules crucial to the organization are often so obvious to the end-user that they are not conveyed to the developer, who may lack domain knowledge in the particular field of endeavor the application is meant to serve. So developing these different frameworks helps overcome that distance in knowledge that otherwise might go unstated and misapprehended on the part of one or both parties.
Even in cognitive neurosciences there are battles over domain knowledge all the time. Hell for that matter it happens in almost every area of science. Science like other human institutions builds walls, defense systems against other domains of knowledge to protect their own territory. Why? Maybe BBT has an answer to that? Hahah.. kidding! What I’m really getting at is the questions that Science frames using heuristics is in some ways different than those same questions framed by Philosophy. Does this mean one should displace the other just because they have discovered a particular truth? Of course not. It all depends on the framework within which you are asking the questions: the problems for science and philosophy may be in different domains of knowledge; so the solutions, too, may be different. There is no right or wrong domain of knowledge: only differing ways and means of applying heuristics.
I’m not sure how Levi could resort to ‘framework dependance’ and remain consistent. Otherwise, science, like all human institutions tends to conserve its interests at the expense of the interests of others, no doubt. It tends to be horribly transparent to capital as well. Two more reasons why I think the overthrow of noocentrism would be so disastrous. But I think you need to extend the messiness you attribute to domain/level debates in the sciences of the brain (to get a sense of how messy, simply ask people from the field to delineate neuroanatomy from psychophysics from neuropsychology from theoretical neuroscience from cognitive neuroscience and so on!) to the notion of ‘framework’ you raise. The boundary between philosophy and science is fuzzy at best, the degree of domain overlap is increasing daily, and the historical trend is pretty damn clear. People still practice astrology, and I’m sure some of them use some version of the ‘Keep your cognition out of my domain argument.’ The situation is messy, but historically at least, the garbage tends to accumulate in one direction.
Levi, however, is committed to the naturalist conception of theoretical knowledge. If science confirmed the heuristic status of the subject-object paradigm he would have to abandon either that commitment (and join the astrologists) or his object orientation.
Scott,
I’m just not sure how to respond to your questions here. First, you’re appealing to neurology to defend your skepticism, yet in doing so you undermine your own position as you’re committed to the thesis that we have access to **truths** about the brain. A consistent skepticism of the sort you’re defending couldn’t even have access to the brain nor defend to neurology to make its claims. Second, your questions are couched in a thoroughly a prioristic vocabulary, yet I’ve already repeated endlessly that I think we can only arrive at knowledge of the world empirically. Ask me something specific such as why I believe in evolution or that neutrinos exist and we can have a relevant discussion of knowledge there. Philosophical epistemology is almost entirely useless to practicing knowers. Third, I’m well aware of confirmation bias and we all potentially suffer from it, but again, the question has to be raised on a case by case basis.
Not working in the analytic tradition I can’t speak to the questions you raise in that tradition, so I’ll set that aside. As for withdrawal (which for me is really just two things), it’s valuable for two reasons: first, it reminds us that nothing is ever identical to how it is represented,but always possess the possibility of surprising us. Second, it reminds us that each entity grasps the world in its own way as in your example of neurological constructivism and the brain only having 5% access to the world. I think both of these points are quite amenable to your skeptical naturalism.
I’m a skeptical naturalist, as I said. I’m not sure how I even remotely implied I was a radical skeptic.
‘A prioristic vocabulary’? How and where? I’m asking you a genuinely empirical question. You don’t think the brain relies on heuristics… at all? I’m genuinely confused now.
The questions I raised in the hypothetical discussion belong as much to cognitive science as to philosophy of mind (much of which has radically departed from the ‘analytic tradition’). But I find it hard to believe that the question, What is meaning? is one you think doesn’t apply to you because it belongs to another tradition (?). The list of illegitimate questions keeps getting longer, Levi! If the shoe were on the other foot, wouldn’t you start thinking that something hinky was going on?
So you do believe in representations? I’m confused.
Confirmation bias is simply the tip of the iceberg. Sperber and Mercier provide a pretty good review of the research in this BBS article: http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/MercierSperberBBS.pdf
Since you ducked the question twice now, I’ll ask a third time, reminding you of your claim that “we can only arrive at knowledge of the world empirically”: If science confirmed the heuristic status of the subject-object paradigm, would you abandon your commitment to object-orientation?
Hi Scott,
I wasn’t suggesting that the question is illegitimate. I was making a statement of modesty. I’m not familiar with the analytic literature on these issues so I’m in no position to respond to them.
You are attributing claims to me that I’m simply not making. Our discussion has had this form:
Can you explain what you’re getting at here with your reference to the subject/object paradigm? What is the subject-object paradigm according to you?
I don’t advocate, to my knowledge, the subject-object paradigm. I advocate the thesis that the world is composed entirely of units, substances, or entities that exist at a variety of different scales, ranging from the smallest particles or strings, to larger-scale entities such as stars, planets, and so on. As I mentioned before, I present my arguments for this thesis in the first chapter of The Democracy of Objects. Put differently, objects are not correlates of subjects and need no perceivers or subjects to exist. A planet is an object that exists just fine without any being there to perceive it.
I’m unclear as to how the issue of how the brain constructs its relation to the world is relevant to whether or not units, generative mechanisms, or substances exist. The issue of how one entity A relates to another entity B– which you’re talking about with your neural constructivism –is different from the issue of whether or not B, in fact, exists. You write:
First, I don’t deny anything you say here about sensation and cognition. I’ve never suggested nor argued that how we perceive the world in phenomenological experience is an accurate representation of the world. This is a thesis you’re attributing to me, not one I’ve made. I made this point earlier in the thread above, yet you’re still attributing this claim to me.
Second, and more importantly, what are the conditions for the possibility of the neurologist making the claim that only about 10% of the information involved in vision being sensory? To make such a claim the neurologist must have some means of comparing how people see the world and the world, otherwise they’d never be able to come up with such a percentage? In other words, they must be capable of showing how experience distorts the world systematically. That entails access to both brains and world. The point here is not that the neurologist is wrong– he’s not –but that the whole story isn’t being told here.
Third, in order to practice neurology at all, aren’t we minimally committed to the existence of brains? If you concede that point, then you’ve agreed to what I’m claiming, that there are units or substances that exist such as brains, regardless of whether anyone knows about them or perceives them.
We’re definitely arguing at cross-purposes here, Levi. Hmm. I need to find a way to be more clear.
Interpretations of conditions of possibility are just that, interpretations – as you well know. One consideration warranting metaphysical agnosticism (and thus methodological naturalism) is the apparent fact that scientific facts don’t really give a damn about the heuristic architecture of the human brain. SMPP, the most powerful scientific theory known, runs roughshod across those heuristics. It literally took a generation to extricate it from our intuition anxiety, to realize that there was more, as you say, to the subatomic story than our onboard cognitive capacities could grasp. Heuristics have ecologies (check out Todd and Gigarenzer on ‘rational ecology’ if you get a chance), sets of regularly re-occurring problems that drove their evolution. Metacognition, however, provides no obvious means of knowing that we are even applying a heuristic (and it seems clear we always are), let alone whether we’re applying it properly. So if you take ‘objects’ as a no-brainer condition of possibility for any scientific cognition whatsoever, you are actually staking out an empirical position. You’re saying that your understanding of objects possesses universal applicability – that it is not heuristic.
So I’ll pose my question a third time: If science confirmed the heuristic status of the subject-object paradigm, would you abandon your commitment to object-orientation?
“Third, in order to practice neurology at all, aren’t we minimally committed to the existence of brains? If you concede that point, then you’ve agreed to what I’m claiming, that there are units or substances that exist such as brains, regardless of whether anyone knows about them or perceives them.”
Yes, with the proviso that existence is itself a heuristic, one that seems to work very well in certain ecologies, namely those involving environmental cognition, and less well, even poorly in others, such as, for instance, particle physics, and all the issues pertaining to qualia or phenomenality and so on.
The picture I’m offering is very strange, I admit, but it recognizes the almost empirical certainty that our brains are a kind of cartoon factory, continually cherry-picking information to meet environmental challenges (that had nothing to do with theoretical cognition). A such it offers a view that is neither subjective nor objective, recognizing that these heuristics are too granular, but rather informational, a view that allows us to bypass at least certain procrustean side-effects of our heuristic nature (for ‘information’ is itself another cartoon or low-dimensional mechanistic recapitulation), and to assert the possibility of things like the ‘subexistential’ for instance, to turn up or turn down the resolution, to zoom in or zoom out, depending on the kind of problem considered. Add to this versatility the fact that it actually provides a natural and comprehensive way to understand intentionality, the proverbial holy grail in some corners, and it becomes at least worth a careful look, it’s oddities notwithstanding.
[…] very interesting discussion between R.Scott Bakker and Levi Bryant, and many others, over at Bakkers Blog. I wish to regroup […]
Levi, I shall reply to your comments and to your questions as best I can, though I find them very bizarre. I have already begun here: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/bbt-vs-ooo/
and also here:http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/on-the-correlationism-kerfuffle-the-decline-of-the-house-of-harman/
Terence,
I’m still not seeing an answer to my questions in your posts. First, do you believe that there is equal epistemic warrant for the claims of the doctor and the claims of the voodoo priest regarding the treatment of sickness? Your pluralism suggests that you do. Second, how is the pluralism that you advocate in your Theoria piece not a dogmatic, foundationalist meta-vocabulary that striates things every bit as much as Harman and Althusser? I suspect, though might be wrong, that the voodoo priests believe they really are interacting with spirits and all sorts of extra-worldly spirits and that they aren’t just adopting a particular perspective or vocabulary to describe the world. I further suspect that they think that other ways of describing the world are mistaken. Would this be dogmatic for you and guilty of the sorts of problems that you outline in your Theoria post? If so, can your position really be described as pluralist?
I’m curious as to how much you’ve actually read of Harman, as you seem to significantly distort his claims. While it is indeed true that Harman defends the existence of real objects independent of how they’re perceived or knowledge, he is also careful to underline that each objects grasps other objects in its own particular way. Harman does not deny that we grasp the table in a particular way as what he calls “sensual objects”, but merely points out that the real object cannot be reduced to sensual objects. This is really no different than what Scott says above about only 10% of our experience of objects coming from the sensible world with the rest being the work of cognitive construction such that it’s not really there in the object itself.
Hello Levi, don’t worry I will reply but it will take a little time as this is a busy period for me with end of term exams and staffmeetings. Today I left home at 7AM and only got back at 8PM (half an hour ago). But as you are like my technical students , who are a little unruly, I will give you a preliminary response right now. (Note: I have compared you to an unruly boy, but perhaps a better term would be edgy, I refer you to this post where I was thinking of you amongst others: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2012/11/07/a-one-sided-debate-is-not-a-monologue-charity-towardstouchy-and-edgy-intercesseurs/).
First I must say you are an unreliable reader (as one talks of an unreliable narrator). In my previous reply I said: “Levi, I shall reply to your comments and to your questions as best I can, though I find them very bizarre”. You complain: “I’m still not seeing an answer to my questions in your posts”. Do you see your error? You let drop the word “comments”. In the blog posts I cite (for memory: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/bbt-vs-ooo/ and also here:http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/on-the-correlationism-kerfuffle-the-decline-of-the-house-of-harman/) I do begin to reply to your comments. Why is it important to correct this misunderstanding and over-simplification of my very short sentence?
The fact is I find this manner of questioning very undeleuzian, and very un-Continental, and your unruly hectoring repetition even more so. As you know Deleuze relegates such questions AND THEIR EXPECTED RESPONSES to the dogmatic image of thought. You construct no problematic, you just presume that you can rattle off stereotyped debater style crushing questions destined to embarrass and perplex, and so reduce to silence, the cultural relativist. I have already tried to give you a clue to reading my text by telling you that I am not a cultural relativist. That should have permitted you to see on a second reading what you missed in the first, where I talk about how for Feyerabend the real must respond positively to our theories for their to be knowledge, and that in most cases it doesn’t. But just as in the case of my short sentence (“Levi, I shall reply to your comments and to your questions as best I can, though I find them very bizarre”) you let drop a very important part of my text, unfortunately the very part that replies to your questions. In both caes you scotomise what does not suit the stereotype you are trying to construct to replace me, but I am Real and I do not respond positively to this stereotype. So you do not construct my problematic correctly, because you read badly. You do not construct it at all, because you do not feel the need to (in this yoou are un-Deleuzian and un-Continental) and you seem incapable of recognising it. This is important to indicate because in my blogging I have several times indicated that OOO is concept-blind and criticises other positions by first removing their concepts and then dismissing them with hectoring questions and mocking remarks. I would place your remark “I’m curious as to how much you’ve actually read of Harman” in the second category, that of mocking remarks. We are talking here about my critiques of your interventions. I do not bring up questions about your reading in general nor about your (intellectual) relation to Harman. I do however talk about your reading of my comments and of my published articles, as this is the question at hand (By the way you talk about my “Theoria post”, but I have published 4 articles there, not posts as http://www.theoria.fr/ is an online philosophy journal. But perhaps it suits your purposes to scotomise this and to call them posts. I am forced to guess and I suppose you are referring to my article “Is Ontology Making Us Stupid?”, http://www.theoria.fr/is-ontology-making-us-stupid/, which is a revised and expanded version of a paper, not a blog post, that I gave at Bernard Stiegler’s Summer Academy in 2012). So I find you both unreliable and un-Deleuzian as a reader.
Unfortunately your questions, which target no problematic in my own work, construct no discernible problematic for themselves either. They represent cheap debaters’ objections against a position I do not even hold. Once again, the whole procedure is very un-Deleuzian and very un-Continental. Deleuze detested this whole fast-food question and answer approach as he affirmed that it forced thought into pre-given binary oppositions and actively hindered the emergence and the perception of alternatives outside the all too familiar stereotypes. They are instruments of scotomisation and of concept-blindness, and I thank you for illustrating my theses so perfectly. Don’t worry, I am not preparing to avoid your questions with a pseudo-deleuzian smokescreen. I will answer them, and I have already begun (here in this reply included) as I am going to give a real answer and so construct a problematic at the same time as an answer.
It’s funny that you give yourself out as a Continental philosopher and yet pose analytic style questions and demand analytic style answers. Your questions are substantially the same as one of my old professors, David Armstrong, used to pose to the Quineans and the Kuhnians in the 70s. The resemblance is astonishing, the hectoring mocking tone included. I have spent 32 years in France, and one reason was to get away from such intellectual laziness. Is this what is considered Continental philosophy in the English-speaking world? How amazing.
I am a Continental philosopher and I think in terms of problematics. Another thing I learned here is that no Continental philosopher replies to a question of any importance without first deconstructing the question (which also involves, of course, deconstructing the problematic behind the question). And I’m not talking just about Derrida and Derrideans. You can see this reflex at work in Lyotard, Serres, Deleuze, Badiou, Nancy etc, although sometimes it happens so fast that unprepared you might miss it, substituting one word for another could be enough, in other cases several pages of deconstructing the question go by before the philosopher gets round to answering the question on the basis of a renewed problematic.It does not matter so much whether one refers to Deleuze and Badiou or to Quine and Feyerabend, or to noone at all, what distinguishes the Continental philosopher is this emphasis on problematics and on deconstructing the question. On this criterion, I feel I am very much more a Continental philosopher than you, to go by your comments and questions. Your “Continentality” seems to be rather a question of administrative status in the American university system and of favorite textual references than of argumentative and conceptual style. But by this quick response I wanted to reassure you that I will respond as best I can to your rather analytic comments and questions.
Yikes Terence! Your response here is riddled with ad hominems, projection, and a lot of speculation about my motives, not to mention a number of insults! I am merely attempting to understand your positions and what, exactly, you’re claiming and committed to. The fact that you say you’re not a cultural relativist, does not entail that you’re not a cultural relativist. Nearly every racist and misogynist says their not a racist nor a misogynist, but that doesn’t change the fact that they are. All I’m asking for is simple clarification of your positions (here on Scott’s blog, please, not on yours). You have a tendency to do this that I don’t think you recognize in yourself. I strongly suspect that this is what really happened to you when you were still in graduate school. Having observed your interactions with people for some time now, I suspect that it wasn’t that the Althusserians and Lacanians were dogmatic and dismissive of you, but that you were dogmatic and dismissive of them and got your own behavior reflected back at you.
It might be that I’m a careless or bad reader. I try to do the best that I can. Language is not a transparent medium, we come from differently theoretical backgrounds and influences, so it takes time to get clear on what people involved in discussion are saying. I also find your evocation of Deleuze and being Deleuzian peculiar here. What makes Deleuze the standard of how we ought to read? While I’m certainly influenced by Deleuze on some points, I don’t take him as a normative model.
So I’ll repeat my questions and ask that you answer them here when you get the time: For you, are the claims of the doctor and the voodoo priest on equal footing? If not, why? Second, how is your pluralism not a meta-theoretical framework that a priori excludes any position that doesn’t work in that framework? Would you make similar criticisms of the voodoo priest that dismisses science and claims that we’re really working with spirits and possession?
Levi,
In response to comment 13 by you, I will repeat what others are saying in a different way that might clarify issues. If you claim that your metaphysics is an “experimental hypothesis,” which is a legitimate move that I myself would make, you are then bound by certain limitations of speculative metaphysics since you have invoked abductive logic (the logic of hypotheses that science embraces). The ongoing problem is that you ignore the logical limitations while critiquing others, and deny that you do so.
Your claims about withdrawal and powers ontology either require foundational premises or “arguments to the best explanation.” You rarely if ever give the latter,and your metaphysical statements function as if the former no matter what you call them. Hence, people call you on it. I posted long ago on my blog why Democracy of Objects doesn’t solve the problem, yet you link it again.
When this gets brought up, as Terrence has doggedly done, you shift from a general discussion to an example as if the existence of an example proved the general case, or deny it outright. Looking over your responses to him, you give Odin/lightning examples and declare his philosophical inheritance to be suspect. Those are not arguments.
We are not “missing it,” Levi, and you are not addressing the question. Your responses are repetitive and beside-the-point. Recall our long conversations years ago? It’s all familiar.
In truth, I’m not really writing this for Levi, but the other participants, although he has the chance to respond to my standing arguments.
Thank you for this, Jason. I wasn’t aware of the debate. Could you post the links? Levi… What Jason and Terrence are pressing you on isn’t ill-willed or blinkered artifacts of an incommensurable philosophical tradition; it’s pretty boilerplate, and the squints we’re raising literally leap from your own discourse. If you continue building your system without addressing issues like these, well…
I know I’m one to talk, but that’s the reason I try to invite and provoke as much criticism as I can scare up. I keep poking people in the eye with BBT hoping to spur this very kind of response. We’re all wankers here (with the exception of ohlo!). It would be the height of folly for any one of us to think we’ve won the Magical Belief Lottery, to actually trust the assurances of our intuition. Any opportunity to test our views is a gift. Any one who burns an afternoon or a day or God forbid a week of their life trying to figure out what we’re wanking about has done us a profound favour, in direct proportion to the intelligence of their savagery. In the novel writing biz, what Jason has pointed out is a ‘quorum,’ a problem that is real even if it ultimately turns out to be a problem of perception. The only person you harm in failing to address it is yourself.
Rsbakker,
I’ll try to find a few choice counter-arguments that I proposed to Levi, and the discussions he did engage in. You can also search my blog.
Jason,
I beg to differ. In The Democracy of Objects I give detailed arguments as to why I believe that a powers ontology is the best explanation for a wide range of phenomena. I do the same for withdrawal there as well. As I recall, our previous discussion consisted of you making claims about how to properly interpret C.S. Peirce and what the Peircian framework was. In other words, you were engaged in a discussion about a particular philosopher rather than the issues being discussed. I’m curious as to where you see me making foundationalist claims. In TDO I make a transcendental argument, following the work of Roy Bhaskar. There I argue that the world must be structured in a particular way for scientific experimentation to be intelligible as an activity: it must be composed of generative mechanisms (another word for “objects”), these mechanisms must be structured, they must be capable of existing without acting or causing anything, their powers or capacities to affect must be capable of being veiled by the intervention of other generative mechanisms in open systems, and they must be capable of being isolated in closed systems. The lion’s share of scientific experiment consists in creating closed systems to isolate generative mechanisms or objects so as to determine what they’re powers are when triggered under these conditions. The thesis that generative mechanisms can exist without exercising what they can do is identical to the thesis that they are defined by their powers or capacities. The match doesn’t have to be burning to have the power to produce fire. The thesis that generative mechanisms can exist without acting is one side of what it is to be “withdrawn” (though I don’t use this language anymore because it gets confused with Harman’s conception of withdrawal).
Levi says: ” In TDO I make a transcendental argument, following the work of Roy Bhaskar.” For an explication of Roy Bhaskar’s inutility see: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2012/11/01/bhaskar-and-nostalgic-naturalism-back-to-the-70s/
I have at last understood Levi’s puzzling references to “Odin’s hammer” making lightning. This is quite surprising as it is Thor’s hammer,. So this just goes to confirm my general thesis that Levi is an unreliable reader and an unreliable narrator. To which titles, given his performance on this blog, we must add unreliable arguer. In an old blog post I talk about Harman’s hammer: “this technique of de-differentiating the subtle distinctions by flattening them out into a binary choice should be called Harman’s Hammer”. I add ” Harman’s “Master Argument” … is in fact rather a description of his incomprehension of diachronic ontologies”. It is only normal that Levi as a pious OOOxian conflates Harman with Odin.
Levi says ” The lion’s share of scientific experiment consists in creating closed systems to isolate generative mechanisms or objects so as to determine what they’re powers are when triggered under these conditions”. This is the exact opposite of Latour’s view of science that he cites favorably earlier on.
Does he even notice (unreliable reader syndrome, concept-blindness)? Does he even care? (oops, sorry the last question was ad hominem or was it? maybe Levi should revise the definition (here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem) which seems more descriptive of his approach than mine. The whole article, not a blog post Levi!, is relevant, especially tu quoque and guilt by association and the halo effect. Levi’s contributions here on this blog amply illustrates all four.
Rsbakker,
I see no reason to push the “theory-incompetence” of humans; it does not preclude doing theory, else science itself is just folly. You’re drawing too fine a line. In your favor, however, I would push for speculative metaphysics for precisely that reason, and one of its goals would be to provide fruitful first premises for scientific practice.
We are theoretically incompetent outside the sciences, which is one reason science has proven so revolutionary, mind-boggling so at this point. As for pushing, I think TI is something we need to begin teaching kids in public schools. When highschool kids begin winning science fairs by engineering new forms of bacteria, the time has come to stop bullshitting ourselves, and acknowledge that we have real problems when it comes irrational theoretical commitment. You don’t think this is the case?
Certainly it doesn’t preclude theory, but advocates, as you say, that we keep at least one eye aimed at the empirical. And a good dollop of epistemic humility in all our endeavours otherwise.
Rsbakker,
Hence, you should retract your claim that “we are theoretically incompetent outside the sciences,” because you seem to presume the falsity that other fields are not empirical or that science is not theoretical as well. (non-exclusive or).
Nothing you say precludes anything, and even non-empirical metaphysics is logically necessary for science if for no other reason that some basic assumptions must be made to get the very possibility of science off the ground. Our bodies do metaphysics, you know, as it’s not only the realm of thought.
I don’t get it. We are theoretically incompetent insofar as we are literally built to believe. I’m not making it up. You’re welcome to contest the evidence. Now how this entails I disbelieve science I don’t get. In fact, it provides a good way to explain why science has made the profound difference it has. Otherwise, we have to muddle on with the tools we got, acknowledge that we gotta wrap the plasticity of the brain against some pronounced structural grains. What else can we do? I’m open to suggestions…
But the thing none of you guys seems to appreciate is really how deep all this goes: So you say ‘if for no other reason that some basic assumptions must be made to get the very possibility of science off the ground,’ and it sounds for you (as it once did for me) self-evident, absolutely nothing guarantees the accuracy of that intuition. We assume its the science doing the real work, of course, but why do you assume that any words you tack onto some intuited conceptual ‘before’ those practices ‘capture’ anything? ‘Linguaformalism’ seems a long shot. We often don’t receive our own verbal reports the way we might like. The fact of the matter is once you acknowledge that self-transparency is an illusion, then all forms of theoretical metacognition become suspect. Where does the information come from? What function does it serve? The thing to realize is that your intuitive sense of centrality need not have anything to do with what’s going on. Once you understand that your experience can lie anywhere on the information food chain and yet feel like it lies at the top then our intuitive sense of ourselves begins to look like a series of long bets made on bad information.
[…] Bakker. The Ptolemaic Restoration: Object Oriented Whatevery and Kant’s Copernican Revolution. (on blog). 2. Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. The […]
It’s like some sort of weird bar fight –
“You take it back about ‘we are theoretically incompetent outside the sciences,’
“Okay, let’s take this outside!”
They leave the science bar and outside of it suddenly have absolutely no means of fighting.
What are you gunna do to make him take it back? Set up a series of cognitive tests centered around examining the quality of human theorising and…DAMN, were back in the bar!
The futility of the back and forth aught to be an indicator, except that’s kind still standing in the doorway to realise it.
Yep, Callan.
The form of my argument is, btw, that the given premises do not support the conclusion offered. Depending on how it’s cashed out, it’s either formally invalid or informally beside the point. Hence, Rsbakker keeps repeating premises, incredulously, as if I would deny them when I would not.
Actually, Rsbakkar, do you not realize that your words might be a bit offensive to a “room” full of educated people and Ph.D.s? Instead of presuming that we don’t know basic science, try supposing that we’re saying something else. In Levi’s case, I think you really do need to address the argument he gave in his link. In mine, you would need to address the point that “theory” is required to do science, and that science as a practice does not rest solely on a perfect ground of truth. I bet most if not all present know that.
No offense, intended Jason. I spend a great deal of time in the company of academics and am regularly amazed at how little they know regarding their cognitive shortcomings. Perhaps you know more. If so, then riddle me this: How is it, despite all we have come to learn regarding human cognition, that you think theoretical deliberation outside the sciences possesses reliability?
As for your argument, your conclusion simply do not follow. The fact that a one-legged man can’t run left to his own devices does not mean that he can’t run given the proper prostheses. Science is what has allowed theoretical cognition to run.
Otherwise, of course science doesn’t rest on a ‘perfect ground of truth.’ Does this mean it requires a systematic metaphysics to supplement it? Or just hunches here and there – unexplained explainers – to get it up and running?
Levi’s given me a few links, now. Which question do you mean? (In the meantime, it would be nice to hear his answer to the question I’ve asked a couple times now!)
Jason, it’d be quite obvious to you that if you have an arrangement of a button that a second after being pressed pulls the trigger of a revolver pressed to the button presses temple, that the theory involved in pressing the button isn’t needed for the resultant process. The initial theory isn’t so needed that the device cannot execute it’s process.
The button triggering the gun (and the guns hammer triggering the bullet) is not folly, does not somehow fail if the theory behind pressing the button was incompetent (“What’s this button do?”).
The button/gun arrangement really doesn’t validate any theory outside of it as being competent. The competence of science does not validate any theory outside of it as competent.
I don’t think it’s been futile. I’ve learned quite abit from reading the post and comments. Alot of things revealed in the above.
Terrance and Jason both had some really good points, and Scott’s ideas are all the more intriguing to me now.
Callan,
Theory alone does not validate itself, and reality can get along without it–is that not your conclusion.
In response, I say that *humans* need “theory” in order to ever think of arranging the contraption that your propose. In a sense, a “theory” need not be more than a certain sort of hypothetical. In some cases it will be an empirical theory, and in some cases it *cannot* be an empirical theory–at least in the same way macro-physics is empirical.
Most of the arguments I’ve seen against theory here aim for a straw man. Instead, suppose that we know all the easy critiques–because we likely do–and propose something not obvious, e.g., like what I asked Rsbakker below.
RsBakker,
And there we are. I never claimed that theoretical thinking, in the sciences or out, possessed “reliability.” This is what I meant by pointing out the besides the point fallacy: you’re presuming too many assumptions of your interlocutor and then aiming at a different target. Moreover, you’re committing hasty generalizations about academics: scientists are academics too, btw, and I regularly talk to a lot of lab and field biologists on the subject. That said, I am very pleased that we can get this out of the way.
Per the one-legged man, can you prove that we have the capability to create a prosthesis? Or are we just “making do,” and science happens to be the most successful practice of “making do?” You see, your statements should be far more qualified than they have been, and that’s why I’m pushing back. I’m not in fundamental disagreement, but you have been far too aggressive on the subject.
As for needing systematic metaphysics to support science, of course not. Who said that? Not me. I doubt anyone here would claim that without at least a few major qualifies if not a truckload of them. Moreover, what’s wrong with systematic metaphysics, anyway? Nothing per se. Scientific practice has a de facto metaphysics, and the modeling assumptions of various non-experimental sciences such as volcanology operate much like a metaphysic.
It makes me wonder what you think the word “metaphysics” means. It’s actually quite broad and vague until we get specific.
Also, please remember that logic is in fact a science, and it is the principle domain of philosophers.
In sum, you’ are putting far too many words in many people’s mouths, and I think the conversation would be more productive if you did not.
I’m not sure I belong in that room you described, Hills, I’m somewhere between the extremes (sorry, ochlo!).
I’d really like to see someone answer Bakker’s question though: how can you commit to epistemic arguments without accounting for the “basic science” – a reduction I find a little unfair, aside – which amounts to heuristic brain through and through?
Science as a practice is as deceptive as math or language when viewed through the lens of BBH but nowhere is the contradiction so glaring than in academic philosophy…
Mike,
and Rsbakker,
Simple. If I understand BBT or BBH correctly, which I would not strongly claim, then I note that criticisms of theory presume that such theory is representationalist. Given that cognitive science (BBT being one thesis) has demonstrated that consciousness cannot be representational, some infer that theory must be of little value. The problem in that argument is that it assumes that all theory is founded on representation, which is in fact not true.
I do not hold a representational view of consciousness, and thus my theorizing is not in principle affected by the mechanisms of representation, e.g., whether my body is representing well or not.
Perhaps this is the answer Rsbakker is looking for. Was he (?) assuming that his interlocutors were representalists claiming to represent what cannot be represented, e.g., the true nature of the universe or even what the water on my desk really is what it appears to be? Irrelevant.
Perhaps now would be a good time to point out that there are at least three distinct traditions of philosophy being represented in these comments, and perhaps not everyone here is aware that they have radically different presuppositions. Hence, Rsbakker’s claims may be beside the point because he’s targetting, say, analytic or continental philosophy of a certain sort. I represent neither, though am knowledgeable of both.
I really don’t want to have a “tell me about yourself” moment, as that would not forward the discussion, but what would forward it is being *very precise* about claims. That’s why Terrence and Levi are giving links. Otherwise….
Sorry, I missed this Jason. Far and away most cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and consciousness research is explicitly representationalist, so I’m not sure what you mean by ‘cognitive science demonstrating consciousness cannot be representational’ and to the subsequent suggestion that this is why people in these disciplines think theory has little. The prevalent attitude, in fact, is fairly well summed by the old slogan that ‘Theory without practice is empty, and practive without theory is blind.’ Otherwise, I really don’t understand what it is you’re arguing beyond this. I certainly wasn’t attributing representationalism to Levi.
Rsbakker,
p.s., I started reading your Blind Brain article, and I keep saying “yep” to what I read, and then think “that’s why I and others don’t do that kind of metaphysics anymore and haven’t for well over a century.”
And, I have to agree with most of what Levi says in return. Woah. Agreeing with Levi. He’d better have champaign to celebrate the occassion. Or just roll an eye?
Then you’re misreading me, because Levi certainly is. I can accept that this is a shortcoming on my part regarding presentation. I’ll keep tweaking, trying. You could help by simply asking me questions rather than leaping to assumptions, however!
Sorry again, Jason. I will endeavour to ask questions rather than assume that I know what you mean. I’m sure you’ll extend me the same charity, perhaps ask what I mean rather than faulting me for not providing the qualifications you want? Do you really believe I think that scientists don’t share all the same cognitive shortcomings as the rest of us? Charity, brother, please. It’ll save us both pixels.
“In sum, you’ are putting far too many words in many people’s mouths, and I think the conversation would be more productive if you did not.” My sentiment exactly!
“Also, please remember that logic is in fact a science, and it is the principle domain of philosophers.”
Ah, yes, formal semantics. Not much content though. Nevertheless, this is where BBT certainly seems to crash into an intentional wall. Pete Wolfendale will be guest-blogging on TPB in the near future, and I’m sure this will be a point he focusses on in his critique of BBT. What are your worries?
Rsbakker,
I’ve already said it, but I will phrase it even more simply.
If I’m understanding your criticism against philosophical theory, then my counter-argument has been to return that criticism back onto itself, and thus resulting in a reduction to absurdity.
So, when you write
“How is it, despite all we have come to learn regarding human cognition, that you think theoretical deliberation outside the sciences possesses reliability?”
I will respond that 1) theoretical deliberation outside of the sciences does not aim at reliability as understood by the physical sciences and 2) if you deny such deliberation even a “less reliable” status, then you would diminish scientific reliability as well.
I have trotted out some well-worn arguments against what you appear to be doing as a blog post ( http://immanenttranscedence.blogspot.com/2013/03/defending-philosophy-against-scientism.html ).
I think we’re either talking past each other, or you’re falling into a very, very weak argumentative position. GIven that I doubt it’s the latter, but I don’t know you, I will presume that it’s the former.
Scott,
You need to slow down and read as I’m not making the claims you’re attributing to me. As a consequence we find ourselves in the following situation:
I am making a very minimal claim: that existence is composed of units. That’s it. I am not making the claim that these units are given through sensation or that we have incorrigible knowledge of them. I am not making the claim that our intuitions about how the world is are always right. I fully advocate the thesis you articulate here:
At this point, I’m beginning to wonder if you’re not engaged in a form of performance art. Earlier in the thread you wrote:
It seems that you’re performatively enacting the phenomenon of our preexistent commitments gaming our interpretation. You interpreted what I was saying in a particular way. I said that that’s not what I’m saying and that my claims aren’t about the “subject-object paradigm” or our first-person experience of the world. I further claimed that how we experience the world is not a reliable guide to how the world is. You have then repeatedly proceeded to ask why I accept the subject-object paradigm and the thesis that our way of experiencing the world as a reliable guide to the world, despite the fact that I have repeated endlessly that I don’t advocate either position. You have subsequently made points about quantum mechanics and neurology, both of which I have no disagreement with because I had already indicated that I don’t think our first person experience is a reliable guide to the world.
Here we might have some genuine disagreement:
I am happy to accept the thesis that there is a difference between our theories of the brain (that they’re a “heuristic”), and the brain itself, but I am committed to the existence of larger-scale entities such as trees, fish, stars, brains, and so on. The specific nature of those entities is something that can only be discovered through experimental inquiry. Our theories about them can be mistaken. In a number of instances it can turn out that something we thought existed– like phlogiston –turns out not to exist. However, none of this is a reason for denying that units exist, that they exist at a variety of scales, or that only quantum particles– whatever they might turn out to be –exist.
Lots of foreheading palming on my end too, I assure you! Let me rephrase then: Are units a heuristic?
Scott,
I don’t understand the question. What would I be committing myself to if I claimed that units are heuristic?
That the machinery the brain uses to cognize ‘units’ leverages problem-specific efficiencies via informatic neglect. In short, that it lacks universal applicability.
Scott,
Units, if they exist, are not heuristics. They just are what they are, regardless of whether any other being cognizes them. All cognition of units is heuristic and necessarily so. My cognition of Scott Bakker is a heuristic that vastly distorts and simplifies his being. Scott Bakker himself, if he exists and is a unit, is not a heuristic. Scott Bakkers cognition of his own being and existence as a physical being is a heuristic. Scott Bakker’s material existence as a unit is not a heuristic (assuming he exists, and we might find out that beings such as my cat, and you and me don’t exist). The reason that we can know that our cognition is heuristic is that through experimental science we’ve discovered a great deal about units that isn’t reflected in our cognition. You seem to be confusing our cognition of things with whether or not things are; or, in the fashion of Berkeley, trying to collapse being into perception (or cognition or discourse or theory).
Positing units based on the cognition of units, which is heuristic, seems a fallacy?
Mike,
Fortunately I’m not committing that fallacy because, as I’ve repeated ad nauseum throughout this thread, our knowledge of the things that exist is 1) fallable (we can believe something exists when it doesn’t and we can be mistaken about the properties of what exists), and 2) it is not our natural perception that tells us what exist, but the instruments we use in the sciences, scientific communities, the experimental setting, and so on. Even posing the question of knowledge in terms of how an embodied subject knows a world is the wrong place to begin given the nature of our scientific practices.
So I understood you all along. If brain science confirmed that ‘unit’ is a kind of heuristic, you would assert the priority of your metaphysical claim over the science, citing conditions of possibility or something, and assuming that the science would be ammended somehow in the future. That just means you are a bona fide metaphysical naturalist, and so have a small herd of unexplained explainers that are going to cause you endless interlocutive headaches (like here, for instance!). But it also means that the BBT diagnosis of your view is generally on the mark (my concern was that I had systematically misread you) – as far as BBT is concerned. You are a ‘correlativist’ (to use my tongue-in-cheek term), which is to say trapped within the Subject OR Object heuristic. I’m not sure this should concern you, given that BBT is at best a fringe theory (though it seems to be slowly corralling some interest).
But I would make a pitch, if I could, Levi. The biggest problem faced by ontic/mechanistic approaches is one of accounting for (or explaining away) subjectivity/intentionality using only ontic/mechanistic resources. In my experience, this is a big reason positions like yours are summarily dismissed. This is what should concern you. Aside from our differing positions on metaphysics, the big difference between BBT and OOO is that the former actually has a detailed, explanatory story to tell regarding intentionality. I’m not suggest you buy that story. But at least give it a look, if only on the promise of some left-field inspiration on ways you might elaborate an account of intentionality organic to your own position.
The funny thing is, in many respects, BBT actually sketches a broadstroke picture similar to your own. It doesn’t collapse thought into being as you suggest so much as it resituates all the old questions into a quite different comic book. There is no ‘thought’ on BBT! The way you contrast the cognition of RSB to the actuality of RSB as if there were two ‘things’ instead of a singular informatic system possessing alternate functional possibilities is symptomatic of the procrustean nature of the Subject/Object heuristic.
Scott,
How would neurology ever confirm such a thing? All neurology can demonstrate is that we cognize things in particular ways. It can’t legislate what exists and what does not exist. Moreover, the entire project of neurology becomes incoherent if 1) brains do not exist (i.e., neurology is committed to the existence of at least one unit), and 2) if it has no means of comparing how we experience the world and how the world is. This second point is especially important. Your claim that brain distorts our access to the world is based on an account of how the world is beyond experience.
Yes, I told you earlier that I’m an ontological naturalist. As a consequence, this shouldn’t be a surprise to you.
The very act of making any claim generates disagreement and controversy. This isn’t unique to me, but is every bit as true of the positions you defend.
I don’t see how you’ve proposed a third position.
I’ll leave this project to people such as yourself, neurologists, and practicing cognitive scientists (I don’t think philosophy has much to contribute to discussions of mind from their armchairs, though folks such as the Churchlands, Andy Clark, and Metzinger fare better as they actually work with the empirical findings). My project is ontology at a very abstract level. Brains are specific entities and are thus a regional issue for a particular science.
That’s great! But again, I’m not working on issues of intentionality. Asking me to have a detailed picture of intentionality is a bit like asking a neurologist to have a detailed picture of quantum mechanics or black holes. It’s just not what neurologists are doing. I’ll leave it to the neurologists to give that account of intentionality.
This is what I’ve been trying to tell you, but you keep atttributing claims to me that I’m not making.
Maybe so, but I find that I’m regularly surprised by RSB, suggesting that my heuristic models of him are different than the actual being or that RSB himself is “withdrawn” from me.
Exactly: It would identify the mechanisms responsible for cognizing what we report as ‘units’ as mechanisms that cherry pick information, and are thus, ecology specific. It shows us, therefore, the fractionate limits of cognition. You dispute this? And if so, on what grounds? Take Pirsinger’s famous Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation experiments eliciting the ‘God experience’ in his lab for instance. Critics argue that the ability to mechanically induce these experiences in no way disproves the existence of God, and they are quite right. What they do prove, however, is the experience of cognizing God is no proof of God either. Likewise, discovering that cognizing ‘units’ is heuristic in nature means that ‘reasoning about units’ as you do, is constrained by the fact you can only do so heuristically. ‘Units’ are a kind of evolutionary simplification, begging the question, simplifications how?
Except that the questions pertinent to claims about black holes do not impinge in any obvious way on questions pertinent to claims about brains – so far (my bet is that neuroscience will revolutionize our understanding of mathematics at some point). I’m not sure what tradition you take yourself to be working in, but the abstract question of what there is in general has always and continually been engaged with the question of what subjectivity, experience, or what have you are… Is this not the case? If you don’t think so, I can assure you that a good number of your peers do, and so you might want to develop some kind of argument as to why, despite being engaged in the question of what there is, you are only interested in those ises that don’t seem to give your general explanatory outlook a hard time. Otherwise they will be prone to assume that you are far more interested in conserving your view than testing it.
Levi says – You seem to be confusing our cognition of things with whether or not things are; or, in the fashion of Berkeley, trying to collapse being into perception (or cognition or discourse or theory).
Yeah, but how could we have knowledge about how things are other than through cognition – I guess this is where OOO comes in because you posit a substrate of objects “all the way down”.
James,
Berkeley said that in response to a vaguely Lockean idea of what perception was. If Levi does not have a Lockean conception, then a critique via Berkeley is misplaced.
I could rehearse that conception if needed if my reference is unclear.
James,
Through the use of instruments such as super-collidors, vapor chambers, geiger counters, computers, pain staking experiments, careful measurements, and all the rest. The question of knowledge is not the question of how an embodied subject or cognizer comes to represent the world as it is. Clearly the idea that embodied subjects represent the world as it is is a doomed project because we are unable to perceive the world at the small and large scales at which things unfold, because we are unable to experience all the potential sources of information that exist (for example, ultra-violet waves, radio waves, and radio waves), and because we are unable to experience things at the scale of time at which they unfold. Instruments such as microscopes, electron microscopes, telescopes, PET scanning devices, fMRI’s, super-collidors, and so on allow us to surmount the limitations of our embodied perception and overcome the illusions and distortions they introduce.
We didn’t need neurology to tell us that embodied perception distorts the world we already knew this as far back as the Greek atomist, Lucretius, and learned it again from Copernicus. From the standpoint of embodied cognition, the sun appears to rise and set and some of the stars seem to wander erratically around the heavens. Through careful and pain-staking measurement, we were able to determine that this is an illusion of perspective. From the standpoint of embodied cognition, the tree across from me looks as if it is stable and unchanging. Through the use of things such as microscopes, time lapse photography, and so on, we learned that the tree is an incredibly dynamic unit that is changing at every instant or that it is a process. Embodied cognition is, as Bakker argues, put together for getting around in the world and surviving with the least caloric expenditure possible. It’s not there for knowing the world or accurately representing it. To get anything like knowledge of the world we need entire institutions of researchers (not individual cognizers), all sorts of careful measurements, and all sorts of instruments like cameras that can detect things in a broad spectrum of electro-magnetic waves, at different scales of time and space, etc. Knowledge of climate change, for example, is not based on an individual, embodied cognizer, but on measuring devices placed all around the globe, satellites tracking patterns from out of space, electron-microscopes measuring the dust and carbon content of ice core samples, data banks and fiber optic cables that allow this information to be transported from research institution to research institution, super-computers that compile this information, and so on.
Can these instruments be mistaken? Yes. Nothing’s perfect and I’ve never suggested that things are perfect. I think that our measurements of the rate at which carbon decays are highly probable and likely to be true, and thus go with dating of the earth and fossils, but that doesn’t entail that I rule out the possibility of subsequent evidence undermining our understanding of how atomic elements function (though at this point, it’s a pretty well validated theory). Are institutions, including scientific institutions, conservative and characterized by confirmation bias? Yes. But that doesn’t mean that they— not individual, embodied cognizers –aren’t the best technology we’ve devised yet for getting at the truth of the world.
Scott keeps asking what would lead me to abandon the thesis that the world is composed of units. I suppose I would abandon the thesis if we were to discover, through scientific experimentation, that the world is one big interconnected mush where everything is ultimately one as in the case of Spinoza’s monism. There are some aspects of quantum mechanics that suggest such a possibility as in the case of quantum entanglement. However, at present, our experimental practice seems to have made it fairly clear that entities can be isolated from one another and placed in largely closed settings, suggesting that being is composed of units. This might subsequently be disconfirmed. In the meantime, I go with what seems to be most plausible based on the evidence.
Dear Levi,
I will ignore the personal stuff for a moment as you do not seem to realise that my apparently personal stuff is embedded in a problematic constructed in the course of my discussion with you.
You state: ” The fact that you say you’re not a cultural relativist, does not entail that you’re not a cultural relativist”. Once again you scotomise the reference to the part of my article where this is shown to be false.
Is it ad hominem to accuse you of being an unreliable reader and then to give concrete example? No, not if we are discussing your reading of me. On the other hand, you giving a sort of medium’s reading of my relations with the Althusserians is not supported by any examples. Given your enthusiasm for Rancière’s book ALTHUSSER’S LESSON and for my description of my problems with the Althusserians (remember you even devoted a blog post to my account, calling it “fantastic”: http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/09/17/terence-blakes-lesson-theory-meta-theory-and-dispotifs/ ) I find you guilty of special pleading and thetic lability here.
You talk about my “evocation of Deleuze” without mentioning that I expand this evocation to discuss the distinctive features of Continental philosophy and I give my criteria. As you label yourself a Continental philosopher I examine that thesis and explain why I think it false. I give concepts, criteria, and arguments – but you don’t mention them, preferring to say I “evoke” Deleuze. When I talk about Deleuze I know what I am saying, I was his student for 7 years. In your replies to me you “evoke” Feyerabend and it is clear you have no idea of what he says, not even of that part of his ideas that I recount in my article. As to your hectoring questions I have already assured you that I will answer both your comments and your questions, even though I find them silly and with no relation to what I have written. I will answer in Continental (and Blakean!) fashion, which means a real answer. Your cheap debaters’ questions are quickly asked, but it takes time to give a proper answer. You have chosen to scotomise the concepts and arguments in my quick answer, that I did as a personal favour to you, and that took far more time to compose than your questions. So you will have to be a little patient now.
You seem to think that you are in a position to give me orders, requiring to answer right away and commanding me not to reply on my blog. This is very strange. But just as I do not accept your self-description as a Continental philosopher, I do not accept your description of my position nor your attempt to give me orders.
Hi Terence,
Yikes again! You’re sounding very insecure here and are strangely personalizing things instead of engaging what should be about the evaluation of claims and arguments.
I feel very much the same. My impression of you has arisen from my interactions with you where I have found that you tend to be very rude and to engage in personal attacks. In other words, that impression has been constructed in the course of our discussions.
I either did not understand your argument or, as I prefer to think, found your argument unconvincing. If you’re so inclined, please explain here why I’m mistaken rather than sending me to a link or article. I’m genuinely willing to be persuaded otherwise.
Not at all, nor did I suggest it was. You do, however, in your response spend a lot of time talking about my motives and character which is a form of ad hominem argumentation irrelevant to the claims being made.
I was speculating about what happened based on observation of your behavior online with a variety of different people. Your tendency is to be rude, obnoxious, and insulting, attacking persons rather than claims and generally giving rather bizarre interpretations of claims (as you do in the case of Harman’s thought). Given this behaivor, it would not surprise me that you behaved this way in graduate school and folks finally got exasperated and showed you the door. In other words, I think you’re basically getting your own behavior reflected back at you, yet are failing to recognize how it arises from your way of interacting with others. I could, of course, be mistaken, but having known you for a while now I suspect not. You just don’t take disagreement well and confuse others articulating why they disagree or raising questions as some sort of personal attack.
You’ll have to explain this one. I thought your post responding to my post on Althusser’s Lesson was great. That doesn’t entail that you don’t suffer from the very dogmatic tendencies you so denounce in other orientations of theory.
You like to evoke this– and you’re essentially making an argument from authority –but the fact that you attended Deleuze’s classes (which were open to the public) doesn’t entail that you have any special knowledge of his work or thought. In fact, I’ve never seen any writing from you that suggests that you have knowledge of his thought. On the other hand, I’ve published countless peer reviewed articles on his thought, a book, and given countless talks that have passed the scrutiny of fellow scholars in this area. I’ll measure you by the content of your claims and whether they reflect a knowledge of what you’re talking about, not whether or not you were in a particular place for seven years.
Yes Terence, as I said in my previous we come from different theoretical backgrounds. I explicitly asked you to educate me. I claimed no special, nor expert knowledge of Feyerabend.
I’ll look forward to this and hope that you do it here, where the discussion is actually taking place. They probably are silly and I’m more than happy to defer to your superior knowledge and wisdom. Certainly I have no desire to reside in silliness!
This is a very interesting thing for an alleged Deleuzian to claim. You here suggest that a molar identity known as “Continental philosophy” exists and that you’ll answer in this fashion. Who knew? Last I checked, “Continental philosophy” was riddled with all sorts of antagonistic debates, rival schools of thought, different methodologies and so on. Who knew!
Ah, here you go with the ad hominem speculation about my motives again. “Cheap debaters questions”. That suggests that I’m playing some sort of game in asking them, and am trying to “win” or something. It suggests that there’s something dishonest about asking those questions. I can assure you, however, that I asked them in earnest. Given what I’ve understood about your claims, I genuinely wonder how these conclusions do not follow. I would very much like to see why I’m wrong (here where the discussion is taking place). I’m also curious as to what sort of mind or desire concludes that questions such as these are “cheap debater’s questions”. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume remarks that people interpret the rest of the world in terms of the affects that animate them. For example, the selfish person interprets everyone else’s motives in terms of selfishness and can’t understand what animates the generosity of friendship or charity. I wonder what affects and desires animate your way of interpreting others.
Again, I’m genuinely looking forward to it!
My poor man! You’re being given orders? Commands even? Here I thought I just asked questions and asked for the courtesy of you responding where the discussion was actually taking place. It must be truly horrible to be dominated and oppressed so! My apologies.
I have no particular attachment to being called a “Continental philosopher”, yet you seem strangely attached to such a label. I don’t even have any particular attachment to being called a philosopher. Lord knows, I work as much with biology, sociology, psychology, literary theory, and a host of other disciplines that it’s difficult to determine where I fall. You’ll just have to do a better job expressing your position if you want me to represent it accurately. Your responsibility if you want others to represent your positions accurately is to explain them to others. It’s not anyone else’s responsibility to understand your position. The onus is on the writer, not the reader. This is why I take so much time responding to people who ask me questions about my claims; and contrary to what you suggest above, I make every effort not simply to subordinate them to my thought, but to integrate their claims where they make good and strong arguments. At the end of the day, I don’t really have a position at all, just a series of resting points I occupy at a particular point in time. Nonetheless, you don’t seem to recognize that the onus is on you to make your positions comprehensible to others. I know its a pain. Over the many years I’ve been writing online and publishing on my blog, I’ve encountered countless questions that struck me as “silly” and ridiculous. It’s a Sisyphusian task responding to them. As an elementary school teacher, I’m sure you experience this with your students. Year after year of responding to the same questions. However, we all know that everyone is not acquainted with everything and that questions that strike us as silly are often good questions that reveal our own blind spots and assumptions. I never gave you an order. I expressed curiosity about your positions and asked you for the courtesy of responding where the discussion is taking place. Returning to Hume’s point, however, it’s intriguing that you interpret things in this way.
Please don’t bastardize ‘attack the claim, not the claim maker’ by saying it right after telling the other guy he’s insecure. Terrence keeps himself to attacks on your techniques of discourse and not yourself directly.
The idea is that ‘units’ are an virtual distinction. The distinction between the ‘cat’ ‘unit’ and the air around said unit is virtual. Matter and more matter only. Drawing a line in the sand between the two is the virtual projection of a hueristic.
Arguably once you get down to atoms, perhaps the distinction is less a virtual one. But then you get particle physics which appears to make seperate atoms a virtual distinction again.
Callin,
If I hadn’t engaged with this person for two years, I’d agree. Read the posts in this thread and decide for yourself.
Scott’ll mod how he wants of course, but otherwise no, there isn’t a tit for percieved tat get out clause. There was no place for an ad hominem by you.
Levi, you haven’t engaged with me for 2 years, you have avoided engaging with me for two years.
God, I thought this thread would never fucking end (took an hour to read through all comments)! Classical displays of awesomeness from Objectologist the Son – sends one back 3-5 years ago at very least! Good luck trying to not let him slither out of answering questions though – 20 or so more comments and y’all are going to be accused of stalking him, blackmailing him and your deans/bosses are going to be receiving whiny letters with complaints about your online behavior. You best back off before it’s too late, kids!
Yes, I am exhausted. The funny thing is Levi claims that he has engaged with me for 2 years but I never noticed it. No replies to my posts and articles, no emails, twitter or facebook messages, nothing! Unless he has been stalking me and hiding behind a pseudonym. He just gets weirder and weirder. He insults me and anything I have ever revealed about my life, ignoring that each time I revealed something it was in a conceptual context and to further an argument. He actually “psychoanalyses” me a little. You are right, he is trying to construct a picture of me he can complain about: declaring ex cathedra that my arguments are ad hominem, and that I know nothing about Deleuze, as I have not written scholarly deleuziana like him. Yet he accuses me of argument from authority. He criticises me for setting up Deleuze as a normative model, yet he sets himself up as a normative model for me: know like me, write like me, respond where and when and how I do. The injunctions are piling up! I feel out of my depth here (not intellectually, of course, but in sheer twisting and twisted logic).. He has even x-rayed my affects with a reference to Hume. The man has god-like powers!
What can I do? I have promised to respond to a set of irrelevant point-style comments and questions to a guy who not only keeps pretending not to understand anything I say or have said, but piles on insult after insult. Yet somehow all the negativity is projected (oops, psychoanalytic term!) onto me. So there is a stereotype being constructed before my eyes to replace me. To what end?
I think you mean weirder and weirder claims, Terence. Equally, you don’t need to assign such a descriptor to him personally.
If everyone bought into the methods as being legit and related to the arguments, I could see the problem you’d have. But surely it’s clear that alot of folk can see various bits of fluff in his approach, a distraction by making the personal seem relevant to the arguments, when it doesn’t matter.
Surely it’s clear to many that insults (not to methods of discussion the other person uses but directly to the other person) simply undermine the position of the person who wrote them?
But yeah, I think the less someone respects a person, the less they are going to consider their ideas – so moderation wise I don’t think it works to allow even if TPB is supposed to be the crossroads of various conflicting positions. Not much point in a crossroad if folk can’t hear the other persons argument over the insults they are hurling at them.
Note: I was spoiled by frequenting a forum for a very long time that would crack down on this shit and pretty much compare this against that.
Yes, point taken. It should read “His claims just get weirder and weirder”. I will modify this on my blog, and if Scott modifies it here I would be happy. If you have any other such suggestions I would be glad to here them.
People like Bryant have the following logic – my philosophy is great, people do not seem to like or understand it, there is either something horribly wrong with it or there is something wrong with them – to admit that something is wrong with my philosophy is to assume their criticisms (that are now, as you can see, coming from all over the place) are valid, therefore, there must be something personally wrong with them. I love reading the dude’s comments (it’s an acquired taste) – I mean the self-delusion is strong in that one. How can any sane person accused others of personal attacks in one sentence and then follow it up with personal attacks in the next sentence later justifying it with “he started it”? And the constant whining about being a humble community college teach – amazing stuff.
Keep up the good work though, I haven’t been following much of the philosophical blogosphere but lately read all of your posts – great stuff!
Thanks for the encouragement, I am not made of stone. I did not realise that you were speaking from experience above. I hope no harm was done to your situation in life.
Thanks, my situation in life is mostly in “I don’t give a shit” realm so it cannot be harmed!
Nice place to be. How’s the weather?
[…] Bryant has been hammering me hard at THREE POUND BRAIN with some pretty amazing questions dreamed up on the spur of the moment, citing absolutely nothing in my articles, just vague […]
[…] an epic flame war over at Three Pound Brain in response to Scott Bakker’s discussion of Levi Bryant’s Object Oriented Ontology. […]
Why do you people even bother? Over 40 lengthy comments. Don’t you have better things to do?
@Kenneth. Because it isn’t apparent yet that Levi Bryant is an “internet crazy.”
@Mikhail. Speaking of internet crazies and how they do some insane things…I can’t believe that happened (what you mentioned above). Sorry to hear that man. I’ve heard rumors that he does that sort of thing. What does he hope to accomplish in doing that?
I dunno…just”creepy” sort of weird to all go off and stalk people where they go to school or work and then write or call their boss up just to talk shit. All just to try to get even for shit that’s gone down on the internet. That’s cowardice if you ask me.
I made it through all the comments and I think there are some frighteningly good thinkers on here who can’t be easily dismissed. I hope nobody’s feelings were hurt. If they were, realize it was for the greater good of the whole! This is a seriously great conversation which raises interesting questions all around.
Bakker seems to be proposing the idea that nobody can make universal claims to truth. A deflationary stance! Love it. I’m not so on board with the claim that science is the only valid way to approach reality, but I look forward to seeing Bakker’s development of BBT. Also, seriously good writer. (Check out his Twitter feed! Hard to compete with such a clever wit).
Blake is within his right to take the continental stance and I love that, too! I really like the continental way of addressing the problematic instead of the question. (As Zizek says, don’t answer a yes or no question, ask instead whether the question itself is correct or not). I’m sorry that Blake and Bryant have such a strained relationship because I really appreciate both thinkers’ thought. Again, I hope nobody’s feelings were hurt — I for one got a visceral thrill out of the verbal jousting! Two great minds going head to head, it was like an MMA cage match but with intellectuals. I think Blake has a wonderful tone which gets at a kind of evocative poetic mode of expression that just speaks to me at a visceral level.
Bryant was generous and gracious — certainly at times things got a little stressed, but under the circumstances Bryant did a wonderful job of staying cool under pressure. I mean, everyone was ganging up on him! Dude did a great job of keeping cool and doing his best to address the questions. I still have a special place in my heart for Bryant’s thought and hope he is not disillusioned by some of the detractors.
All in all, we have three tremendous thinkers squaring off in a public setting. I feel lucky to have gotten to witness such a thing. To the thinkers involved, please do not feel remorse over exposing your feelings personally in a public forum. It takes great courage to do what you do! Baring your soul on philosophy comment thread takes gusto.
Now, for some light humor — we have BBT and OOO, what about BBB? (Bakker-Blake-Bryant) — you guys can be the Fab Three, despite the fact you all disagree with each other! I would pay to listen to a weekly podcast debate between the three of you. 🙂
Hello Jonah, you take the cake for being generous and gracious. You organise the podcast and I will participate.
[…] with me this assumption was undercut by the embarrassing fact that Bakker in his post and the majority of contributors to the comments section were far more sophisticated than him. […]
Also, anyone notice that the cartoon series ‘Adventure Time’ is set in the land of OOO?
There’s a few hidden references in that series, stuff like ‘after the mushroom wars’ and such. They even referenced once, both directly and indirectly, the issue of date rape in that series. So it covers alot in between the candy.
Scott:
You write:
“Our brains can track various causal systems in its environment without having to account for any interference generated by the systems doing the tracking.”
How do you know there are causal systems in an environment, one of them being “brains”?
“Causal systems” are, more or less, what Levi means when he says “objects.” Are causal systems made up of systematic differences? Or is this the way the brain must “track” them? Or both?
I am trying to get at how close a “subject-object” heuristic is to “brains tracking causal systems in an environment.” I don’t see much a difference at this point.
Joseph as a point.
I’m sure that there is a difference, but it hasn’t been explained.
The thing to remember is that we are starting with the mechanistic paradigm of the sciences (whatever that amounts to). Because you have a favourite metaphysical interpretation you want to apply to this is neither here nor there for sciences themselves. Whose position should we adopt? You’re welcome to assume this one or that, declare BBT ‘derivative’ but you’re stranded with a metaphysical interpretation all the same. The sciences, meanwhile, truck on transforming the world. BBT is thus agnostic as far as it can get away with. Whatever the interpretation, it will either be confirmed or rejected bearing all the implications it does for those interpretations that would seek to draw its fangs ‘a priori.’
Hi Joseph. I’m doing this from a phone so forgive the typos [FYI, I’m obtrusively extending my guest-blogging duties to proofreading. -REE]. I just realized I leapt to the metaphysical criticism implicit in your question and not the question directly. Brain-environments include consideration of all the information neglected in subject-object considerations. So where OOO would have you forget the limits and constraints of cognition (and thus foreclose on the question of how), BBT acknowledges the brain-environment systematicity involved in brain-environment cognition as well as providing a means for interpreting the kinds of cognitive illusions pertaining to medial neglect that arise. So in a sense, it genuinely ‘flattens’ in a manner that OOO can only accomplish via assertoric fiat. Given the S-O heuristic, ‘brain-environment’ appears to be an ‘object’ of apprehension: the second-order systematicity is occluded, opening the space of subjectivity. OOO never escapes this space, and so always begs the question of the subject (and drives people to distraction for its wilful refusal to acknowledge as much). BBT, however, is able to explain it all away as the very thing we should expect given the kind of cognitive system science has revealed us to be. That’s pretty contracted: does that help, Joseph?
I appreciate your responses, though they only raise further questions for me. Not that what you said isn’t clear. But I’m going to reread the full post above, first, as I might have missed something crucial.
You’ve lurked long enough, Joseph. Time to fire away with some questions!
I’ve been reading enough about Scott’s BBT Thesis over these last few months to realize and agree with him that it is not what we can think or conclude about the brain but simply how we think about the brain.
I simply disagree that there is no new “how” but an inability by most to find it yet.
I think I have.
If you are a good neuroscientist, then you can certainly be proficient at tracing the circuits and functions of the brain but that does not necesarily help you to think how nature “thinks” when it made central nervous systems and brains.
Most neroscientists and philosophers are not talented naturalists so they wind up with BBT.
That’s my starting point…..
Except that no one has wound up with BBT in ‘big picture’ terms yet. The trick for me at least is how to move past it without abandoning naturalism for supernaturalism. And as you say, the problem may be a deficit of the imagination or it could be we really are trapped with a fistful of cognitive illusions for a soul.
I just watched a wonderful talk on quantum computing and data compression which seems to synch up with Bakker’s idea of “heuristics all the way down.” (Or was it Terence who first characterized BBT in that way?)
“The thing I’m going to talk about specifically is this idea that human cognition — all of our sensory input, seems different, we got vision, sound, touch, taste — but there’s evidence, I think very compelling evidence, that what we actually do under the hood may be driven by a single algorithm. So progress in understanding what that algorithm is and how it works has a very significant impact on the field of machine learning and more generally on humanity.”
— Geordie Rose,
I’m wondering if this “single algorithm” Rose talks about is the heuristic gesture itself, the ability to compress information, to recognize patterns. As Rose says in the talk, data compression isn’t just for JPEGs, in fact all human cognition seemingly relies on this ability.
Usually when people talk about a single algorithm in these climes they’re referring Friston’s free-energy account. But as I’ve mentioned before, it was talk like this that convinced me to begin fleshing BBT out publicly. It really feels as if multiple strands are converging on something like it. The theorist in me exults while the novelist weeps. Fucked up.
Whoops, link didn’t make it. The talk by Geordie Rose is called “Geordie Rose (D-Wave Systems) [Jan 2012, NASA QFTC] Compressive sensing and semi-supervised…” and the part I quoted from is from around 10 minutes in. It’s on YouTube.
The interesting thing that Rose shows is that you can start with very few source patterns in a “dictionary” (basically a sub-, pre- or non-representational level) and then you can use these few patterns to generate a tremendous amount of sensory input. Kind of like implicate and explicate reality, or the non-representational “greater mind” and our representational smaller (conscious) mind with which we experience first-person subjectivity.
To give an example of this level of data compression, you could imagine taking every image on the web and trying to reconstruct those images based on this “dictionary.” If the dictionary only has a couple basic images, say, square, triangle, circle — these basic images will not be able to reproduce the immense variety of images on the internet. However, you would be surprised how few images you actually need! When you get to a few hundred or even a thousand of these “dictionary” images, you can dial them in to various percentages (overlapping each other) and get “pretty good” representations of almost any image! It’s really incredible.
Say you have 100 billion images (representations). Instead of storing those 100 billion images as-is, which is quite an inefficient and expensive proposal, you can store only maybe 1000 (pre-representational) source images which can be used to generate the 100b final product.
This capacity to combine “dictionary” images and produce representations is quite shocking. It’s not only limited to images but all sensory input. We can create any timbre of sound based on combinations of these “archetypal” dictionary entries. Same goes for touch, taste, smell. I may not be explaining it very well but if you check out the video, Geordie Rose shows actual examples of the inputs and outputs of certain (quantum) computer algorithms and it’s pretty impressive!
Will most definitely check it out. Thanks JD!
I need to catch up with comments but I wanted to say that these days I saw a bunch of movies and documentaries by Werner Herzog, who’s one of the most interesting directors out there, and in one of his lessons on movie-making he talks about the perception of space with a cosmologist and mathematician.
Some of it was quite pointless, but there was an idea that caught my attention and that may be an approximation of what could be a post-conscious and post-human world.
It’s basically contained in a image and what it represents:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klein_bottle
The idea is basically the possibility of space that has only one side. Look at it.
What’s interesting is that it’s an example of something that we can understand and describe, since it comes from math, but that we cannot “experience”, since it’s an impossible picture. So it reproduces that gap we were discussing between knowledge and experience.
But the image is curious also because the simplification used in order to make it “representable” suggests maybe another property: the reflexivity. See how that space exits and reenters? It’s like a Moebius strip that goes on in one direction. It seems to mimic consciousness. A process whose output feeds itself. A subjects that makes a distinction, making itself object in order to observe itself and modify itself. Subject/object.
And in the end there’s always the same intuition. If you can manipulate the “feel” you don’t simply reach deeper into “truth”, but also deeper into fiction and illusion. We can say that our experience is distant from reality, in the same way thinking that the sun orbiting earth was distant from the truth, but if we reach for the “feel” we can also completely divorce experience from reality. The Klein bottle as a model of reality isn’t simply reflexive, but determines itself completely. It’s self contained and wholly independent. It doesn’t have an “environment”, and so it doesn’t even have to exist in “reality”, because its own dimension is solely the truth of it. It’s that boundless space described in consciousness and that generates the qualia of sufficiency.
In the model I previously described to criticize (or disarm) BBT I said that relativity is everything. So saying that “truth” is only important and usable if you pinpoint it to a frame of reference and where you can assert something. Science for example mediates between speculation and environment, otherwise it can’t exist. But in a post-human world, as in the Klein bottle, the relativity is completely defeated, since something needs to be relative to something else in order for relativity to exist. But the space being one-sided means that what’s relative isn’t anymore so.
Hence this appears to be an unavoidable conclusion. Post-human may enforce a link with truth as it can sever it. A post-human consciousness is a Klein bottle that doesn’t even need an environment anymore.
I never did understand your previous critique, Abe. (I’m guessing my reply got sucked into your spam folder.) The klien bottle is a great metaphor for PART of the structure I’m describing (I discuss it extensively in the Hagglund piece in its deconstructive incarnation). The key to BBT which prevents it from collapsing into any extreme relativism that makes cognition impossible to understand is the OPENNESS of this system to its natural conditions.
My spam folder? On the mail, or the website? I don’t even think my mail has a spam folder.
Anyway, I was still referring to this mostly:
http://loopingworld.com/2013/01/04/the-brain-is-blind-but-it-doesnt-matter/
I understand your idea of “openness” if it refers to the classic distinction between mind and nature. So consciousness is the secluded space alienated from nature. But if you explain consciousness through science, you reabsorb that space within nature (as it is reasonable to expect). So solving the hard problem.
But again as in the comment above I draw your attention of the fact that consciousness is where “we” are (which is our anchor to a perspective), and where we are going to stay, as long “we” = being conscious. So you said that the post-human is about trying to put together knowledge with experience, or otherwise they remain separate.
So yes, BBT theory is open and without agency. But its use is not. Extreme relativism isn’t part of the theory, but a possible effect given the fact that you can manipulate experience.
My critique about relativism is more cosmological. Besides, I started reading “Dune” after writing that thing, and found lots of aspects with it in common. It’s all about the system/environment and where you place an observer relative to it. From the outside things look in a certain way (deterministic, no free will), from the inside in another (free will). The paradox happens if someone inside a closed system is able in some way to get information only accessible from someone outside. But it’s not a “possible” paradox, because even this possibility implies that the system actually wasn’t closed.
In that case my conclusion is that the gap between experience and knowledge won’t be filled, because it’s still caught in a closed system. Or more stupidly: awareness of the lack of free will won’t produce free will. So what changes? Nothing, but free will remains the illusory consequence of a limited point of view.
Going back one step it’s like consequences of BBT could go both ways. In one (the one you push the most) consciousness is undressed from the natural side. So only this natural side remains (and we can imagine free will defeated completely), consciousness retreats till it simply vanishes. In the other (the one you define extreme relativism) consciousness is made larger, giving it a better grip, more control and so on.
In this other case all features of consciousness aren’t defeated, instead they get inflated. Including free will as the product of the limited point of view. Meaning that consciousness with a perfect grasp of itself will follow its own agency, which may contrast with scientific truth. And by asserting its point of view, it asserts a relativity of judgement. And so very likely negate some other “truth” that is truth simply because it’s pinpointed to a different frame and point of view.
Yeah, some Askimat thing. You almost certainly do have a spam folder somewhere.
I see what you’re saying. I would amend your claim by saying, ‘Consciousness is where we think we are.’ BBT is a theory about why consciousness appears the way it does, not a theory of consciuosness. We need to remember that everything changes when a scientifically verified theory of consciousness is developed. BBT seems to favour certain theories, but it doesn’t have much to say one way or another. Given that it is naturalistic, I wouldn’t hold out much hope for your ‘road not taken’ interpretation (which I find appealing in principle) simply because there are innumerable possible roads branching from the juncture you shrewdly mark, and the ugly ones far, far outweigh the happy
Looking at the history of science, I think we can guess that noocentrism is in deep shit.
It’s probably my lack of imagination.
For consciousness and its point of view I always think about the appearance of conscious. Being conscious, self aware. The homunculus living in the Cartesian theater.
I could say that in the evolution of life consciousness had an important role because only human beings were able to engineer their ambient so profoundly. Even the possibility to push knowledge further than experience seems an important feature. Is this possible without consciousness and self-awareness? Seems unlikely.
Is there a way to strip away the “feel” of consciousness and what we consider “being conscious” while preserving all its features? This is where my imagination stops. A body acting exactly as it was conscious seems again like your story of the alien thing that goes residing in the brain. How can you tell the difference? It becomes a linguistic thing where two things are identical but have two different names. Can we become “otherwise conscious”?
I can’t understand what it is being conscious without the appearance of consciousness (since it negates our idea of being conscious). So I imagine that either consciousness is expanded (so that the improved model is more ACCURATE, adjusted in the representation of itself, like my second scenario), or it is stripped away, becomes part of the natural world. The post semantic thing, which also falls back into full determinism (so non-conscious, without free-will by definition). They end up appearing as exclusive to me.
Ultimately I was saying that “free will” is the true thing that exists in its limited perspective. As long this perspective is valid. And it is valid as long you can’t exit that frame of reference that binds it (the internal/external thing). Describing this internal state from outside obviously has the consequence of eliminating free will, but because it’s the context to change. You say that it is possible to exit this system, while I was saying that this system either is expanded or it is abandoned. If expanded all its features remain. If it’s abandoned then lack of free will is a sure thing, because the limited perspective and its relativity is left behind too.
In summary I was simply saying that you can’t have both of those. You can’t bring that knowledge back into consciousness. And I personally find quite hard to believe the possibility of something equivalent to consciousness that is not conscious the way we intend it, as in a closed system (which is without its singular perspective that binds it with free will).
A robot that looks and performs exactly like a human being, is it conscious? How can you say by just observing it?
P.S.
Akismet, is the spam plugin on the site. It has a spam folder but I clean it sort of regularly and I never found legit comments in there, so it seems odd. It probably says it if it deletes a comment right away.
P.S.
I was watching right now another documentary by Herzog:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cave_of_Forgotten_Dreams
About the oldest cave painting found, made somewhere 40.000 years ago.
One interesting idea the scientists explained is about the possibility of an “homo spiritualis”, in the sense that those “men” didn’t have an idea of the world clearly defined. Of animals and men where one can’t become the other. So an idea of the world blurred, with no defined boundaries. Spirits existing and blurring into real things.
And all this is very close to what I was saying about the problem of language and the dichotomy of digital/analog space. The fact that consciousness and language separated the world, made it into a very precise representation. And that the natural world is instead “fluid”.
Or even that “progress” is giving us better defined models. Adding resolution. Making more and more distinctions. It’s almost a believable version of the stuff about quantum physics and the idea that we shape the world actively.
[…] fleet as I bring my leaky rowboat about. The (at times heated) debate we had following “The Ptolemaic Restoration,” has left me more rather than less puzzled by the ongoing ‘materialistic turn’ in […]
[…] sciences of the mind over the past three years: Quentin Meillasoux in CAUSA SUIcide, Levi Bryant in The Ptolemaic Restoration, Martin Hagglund in Reactionary Atheism, and Slavoj Zizek in Zizek Hollywood, each of which has […]