Biting My Own Bullets (Owich!)
by rsbakker
Aphorism of the Day: A blog is what happens when hypocrisy gets knocked up by vanity, and decides to put the baby up on the Internet for adoption.
Make no mistake, I’m pimping a very specific world-view–and a controversial one at that. At the South Park end of the cartoon spectrum it comes down to: humans are too stupid to see their stupidity. At the Marvel end (because there’s no escaping cartoons): humans unconsciously game ambiguities both to affirm their mythical self-identities, and to confirm their various cognitive and social commitments.
The science, I think, leaves little room for doubt. I like to think that nothing more than a relatively short implicative hop separates my global theory from the specific empirical findings that motivate it. But I urge anyone unfortunate enough to encounter this discouraging thesis to investigate the matter themselves. My theory, after all, is a theory, another story about invisible and pernicious forces.
Another attempt to shed light on the darkness that comes before.
But just because I haven’t been able to find my way past this present position (for several years now–a record for me), doesn’t mean that others, most others, won’t see it all as a bunch of bullshit. You live with any set of ‘facts’ long enough and they will come to seem self-evident: I know I’ve been surprised on several occasions, sitting, having a beer with people who got quite irate at the suggestion that humans beings chronically and compulsively bullshit themselves. Some people have to be eased into the fact of their own self-serving stupidity.
Beyond that, there’s several arguments and complaints that I’ve resigned myself to facing over and over (and over) again:
1) The charge of hypocrisy, that I exemplify the very things I criticize. My answer to this is simply, “Yes. That’s my point.”
2) The charge of over-simplification. I actually have a dim view of this criticism, primarily because I came to think of it as a pseudo-critical crutch during my philosophy days, as well as–aside from equivocation–one of the best ways of building strawmen to knock down. Things are always more complicated, so saying as much, it seems to me, simply amounts to dressing the obvious in critical clothing. For this charge to have any force, you need to point out the factor that I’m missing, and argue what makes it relevant. (Having met a handful of ‘pro-fantasy professors,’ I’m afraid, doesn’t do the trick). Otherwise it devolves into, “You’re missing something,” an empty blandishment if there every was one.
3) The ‘human achievement’ counter-argument. How could we be so stupid when we have achieved so much? The answer: because we’ve stumbled across ways to structure our practices that have the effect of correcting for our myriad biases. If you think about it, the fact that we require the mangled social prosthetics of science to merely sometimes get things right is not at all flattering. Otherwise, outwitting pets and livestock simply makes you smarter than pets and livestock.
4) Scientism, and/or positivism. Trust me, few people want to see science knocked off the cognitive throne more than me. If you think scientific cognition is easy to bracket or dismiss, then show me how you have managed to find your way past your own set of cognitive disabilities–otherwise, I’m going to assume that, all thing being equal, you’re simply one more fool who thinks he’s won the Magical Belief Lottery–no different than me. As soon as you decide to stop listening to the guys in the white coats, the problem becomes one of distinguishing your brand of theory from the likes of new age inspirational theorists. At least they seem to make people happy.
The new one, the one that Mina references aside from (1) in her comment (so inspiring this post), I think can be summed up as 5) Anybody can criticize.
I actually think I’ve been pretty clear about my constructive inclinations–maybe not, but either way, I’m pretty sure this will be a recurring criticism simply because it isn’t realistic to assume that those coming to the blog for the first time will read much more than the About and the most current post.
What do I think we should do? Tear down our culture of self-congratulation, for one. Because of my profession and institutional affiliations I am primarily focussed on the literary and academic building blocks of that culture–the one’s most apt to proclaim their ‘criticality.’ And what should we replace this culture with? One less mythical, less manipulative, and a whole lot more dubious. How should we go about building this new culture? Convincing critically and creatively minded individuals to plug into popular culture, to reach out to dissenting audiences, for one.
For another, to begin rebuilding our educational institutions. In learning how stupid humans are, we have simultaneously learned that our educational institutions were developed to solve a problem that no one really understood–and as a result, got things wrong, horribly so, as in the case of the ‘college essay.’ How drastic this revision needs to be, I have no idea. The best we could do, it seems to me, is to start experimenting. In the meantime, we need to at least impart what we do know about our stupidity to our kids: particularly the ways they are continually primed and manipulated by the media, and the ways they will continually game local ambiguities to prosecute their global self-interests, cognitive or otherwise, all the while feeling they have been ‘fair and balanced.’ As well as the way all these things lead to problems as pedestrian as divorce and drug abuse, and as epic as wars between faiths and nations.
(As a postscript to Leon, I agree that considerations of value are presently unavoidable, but I’m not so optimistic as to think that value will not be either eliminated (explained away) or naturalized (given a functional explanation). Who knows? The sky is literally the limit, things are that crazy when it comes to scientific theories of consciousness. Either way, I’m guessing there will be a post-scientific humanities (I wouldn’t have called it such, otherwise), and I’m not sure where you got the contrary impression. The question, as mentioned above, is one of how drastic the revision will need to be. Given that the ‘manifest image,’ the way experience appears to us, seems to be at such drastic odds with what we are discovering, and given that this manifest image is what grounds the humanities as they stand, my guess is that the rupture will be fairly drastic.)
Three Pound Brain 
You’re already disseminating this information, however informally. There is large potential for social and cultural zeitgeists to manifest through your writing. It’s been worth it, for me, to adopt a continuously shifting perspective, to attempt a learning strategy where my only motivation has been to understand the implications of an “objective” view to my mind/body. Even if that means acutely perceiving the cataclysm of our conceptual world, the apocalypse of meaning. How will this rupture change our qualitative, experiential beings? I don’t know. I am completely down to find out – to be a potential realized human.
By the way, since your lectures are not readily available to us North Americans, is there someplace to read these papers, specifically, The New Theory: A Provisional Manifesto.
Bakkerism anyone lol?
Sounds to me like you’re trying to make something obvious, “humans game ambiguities to promote self interest” into a sublime realization. After that, it sounds like your trying to rationalize your own sense of superiority, and impulse to be argumentative. Gaming ambiguities? Or rationalizing an argumentative streak? Chasing the argumentation scent to find a stance so fundamental, and paradoxical, that no one can defeat it. And where a breach in the armor appears, -“oh shit, I write fantasy”- the rationalizations really ramp up.
Isn’t it enough that swords and “loops of blood” are both cool, and awesome?
“Trust me, few people want to see science knocked off the cognitive throne more than me.”
But it’s HARD isn’t it?
Scott will any of your future books address the qualia problem or the knowledge problem? I ask only because it’s one of my favorite subjects as a philosopher by avocation (problems such as the p-zombie, Mary’s room, etc are real headache inducers) mostly due to the facts that they are some of the few arguments that can strongly challenge my reductive materialism.
(I’ll preface this by indicating I’m relatively new to this blog, and I am sort of picking up the argument in bits and pieces between it and having read the books).
What you’re missing: As I understand your argument, you’re engaging in static analysis. Humans are learning machines with some built-in capabilities, and it’s relevant to consider more than the current state of their biochemistry. To pick an example out of thin air, suppose a human faces a decision which is similar to decisions he has made before. His brain recognizes the patterns in the decision he faces and recognizes the similarity to previous decisions, resulting in what we can call a pre-decision: a decision similar to and driven by past decisions. The human can then consider the pre-decision in light of the results of previous decisions and any new parameters. Perhaps his examination is rational; perhaps it is merely mood-driven; perhaps it is some mix. Nonetheless, it is an opportunity to make a new decision that will, in turn, be taken into account in future similar decisions.
Starting from nothing, a decision taken with no historical context (such as with an infant learning to move its limbs), we see near randomness. Yet as the results of those decisions are learned and considered, coherent thoughts and actions develop. If a human decides to train his body in martial arts, for example, he has made a decision to adjust his reflexive reactions to certain stimuli. At first the decision is weak and must be “thought about” and carefully directed; eventually the action is natural.
Does it eliminate biases or biological drivers for decision making? No, but it can reduce or counter the effect of those biases even if rarely used to do so. More importantly, though, absent brute-force manipulation of the mechanisms of consciousness, it allows for free will to emerge not as the result of a supernatural motive force but instead as the perfectly natural consequence of a gradual learning process.
I don’t think you’re completely off base at all, I just think that you like to run your argument all the way up to the edge of the cliff… and then you fall off the edge before you really look down.
Mike Hillcoat, I’ve sent a request to the organizer for permission to record Scott’s talks in audio/video form, and, given Scott’s blessing, will be transcribing them. If everybody is cool with it they should find their way to the ‘net, just like his Semantic Apocalypse talk (http://speculativeheresy.wordpress.com/2008/11/26/the-semantic-apocalypse/). (I’ve been particularly thankful for that one, so I’m definitely down to make the effort for the rest of you guys.)
William, it may sound obvious to you, but most people can’t even comprehend what that means, let alone accept that they are always doing it often without even realizing it.
Theories need a purpose, or they are soon moot. Somehow this whole thing reminds me of String Theory. Sure it’s all nice and internally consistent, but isn’t it ultimately pointless?
“humans are too stupid to see their stupidity”
So what? I can agree with this, or not, I don’t see much difference.
How about this: “humans game ambiguities to promote their own interests” = “people argue things that are arguable from a position that supports their argument.”.
Undermine the very nature of discourse, cry “bullshit” to any contradicting opinion because it is by its very nature a self serving rationalization, and own your own culpability in the same. It’s the skeleton key of argumentation; leaves your “partner” with nowhere to go.
Fair point. But in terms of your partner having somewhere to go – well, it’s not like if two humans argue then one of them must be right. Both could be wrong, utterly. Neither may be correct enought to deserve somewhere to go on a matter. I think Scott is trying to cut himself off as well – a kind of double suicide, to put it in dark humour. But if you think he’s building himself up while undercutting the partner, I’d agree to me that seems something to watch out for – you pull the trigger, he almost pulls the trigger, so to speak.
Giving up on atleast someone being right is a tender moment – a bit like a hermit crab between shells. Procedurally I’d suggest dialog ends at such a point – as the person outside their shell is just vulnerable. They need to get used to it by themselves, before they can dialog with someone else without a shell either.
Or something.
humans are too stupid to see their stupidity
I think it’s valid to say we are NOT complex enough to understand how complex we are. The idea of ‘stupid’ is just us not being complex enough to use anything else but that sledgehammer of an idea.
It’s something I say about the biomechanical arguement as well – ‘machine’ is a kludge word we use, we try to apply it to ourselves and find it horrible. But it’s a kludge word – it’s like looking at your own face in a broken mirror (except it’s your perception that is fractured/not complex enough, of course) – of course it looks horrible. But I’m going off subject.
5) Anybody can criticize.
Mmmm, seems like weasel word territory. What does ‘anybody’ mean? That they can do it right now, off the bat? Or that anybody could (or could not) learn to do it, ever?
‘Critical thinking is a skill’ seems worthwhile saying. It implies something you work at to develop and just as much, some people may not have. Perhaps a butt load of people.
My brains full for now, so I’ll leave it there. Hope I got my html tags right this time…
I do not believe the charge of hypocrisy is so easily dismissed as “Yes, that’s my point.” What makes your argument seem hypocritical is not that you are somehow trying to pretend the things you say don’t apply to you as well (which is obviously not the case). How seriously do you expect to be taken, when you seem to be saying (to me, at least, my apologies if I’ve missed something) that there is a fundamental problem with the way our psyche operates, that you acknowledge that you share this problem, and that you are content to do nothing to correct your own self-proclaimed flaws? While certainly an important first step, being aware that a problem exists does little to solve said problem by itself.
The ideas you do propose as a solution are certainly interesting, but at best they do seem viable steps along the path, though not a starting point. How would such institutions even have a chance to succeed, when the people whom they are comprised of remain fundamentally flawed? At worst, they seem like you’re doing little more than trying to hoist the responsibility of a solution on others. It’s certainly true that such a thing would not happen overnight, nor even be accomplished by yourself alone, but isn’t it important to self-correct before an attempt at mass-correction can succeed? Is it not practical to begin by making an attempt not to do these things?
While many institutions as they currently exist are certainly not perfect, would you agree that at least some tools that have the potential to enable us to correct ourselves have arisen from them? Through Psychology, for example, I have trained myself to observe what I am thinking, when I am thinking it, as well as why, in order to consciously semi-control the way my brain seems hard-wired to self-deprecate. Could such tactics be used to help solve some of the psychological issues you are addressing? Also, I’m not terribly familiar with your academic and literary institutions, but are there at least aspects of them you would personally deem worth saving, even if as a whole they are indeed scrapped?
Thanks, Proctonaut. I’ve actually had the opportunity to read the Semantic Apocalypse lecture a couple times. I like the idea of Bakker’s oratory. I appreciate the effort to transcribe this latest one and congrats on seeing the lectures in person.
William and Erik, I just wanted to add that, I think, realistically there is a cognitive end point to Bakker’s argument.
In an extremely incendiary though descriptively worded manner, I’d say he’s promoting a conceptual war on ignorance, our complete shared human dilemma.
If we wish to survive as a species, we can’t simply proceed for progressions sake. We are simply a biological virus, a cancer to even ourselves, unless there is evolution in rationally, logically, honestly, and resolutely seeking to turn the scientific lens on ourselves – as Kellhus and Leweth in the Sobel wastes – and hunting our egos and consciousness’ to a more objective perspective. I really do believe that Bakker’s point overall is a positive one, that our innate senselessness, exhibited in the completely extreme world we inhabit, is a product of our fear and ignorance, our young human childishness to demand that the world be how we want rather than learning and adhering to how it is. And that things might get better for us, the sooner we stop lying to ourselves.
By the way, Bakker, as much as you might not think so, people are inclined to read the old blogs because they’re your words. I have a feeling that there are more than a couple of us who’ve read them all once or two.
Peace.
I’d like to point out that Science is merely another of the many belief systems that humanity has invented to explore and explain the cosmos. This idea really blew my mind back in college when one of my professors introduced the idea. Science? A belief system? I really wish I could remember the factual argument he used to prove it. RSB, are you familiar with this concept? Maybe you know how it goes…
Ah! Here’s a site that explains it: http://spaz.ca/aaron/school/science.html
To Mina and John R. Fultz,
Bakker’s argument is based on a Popperian philosophy of science – that is, theories approximate truth on the basis of infinite cycles of objective skepticism. In layman’s terms, science figures out what’s “most right” by continually trying to prove itself wrong. This is the definition of scientific knowledge. All other claims are, by virtue of not adhering to this definition, essentially baseless. This means that so-called “discussions of value” in the Humanities are as groundless as church sermons. By corollary, any claim or observation made by an individual is equally worthless because it does not subject itself to methodical skepticism.
You can tout this “science is belief” nonsense all the way to your mosque if you want, but the fact is that detractors of science are, to a man, Coffee Shop Luddites that with one gesture dismiss the achievements of quantum mechanics and solid state physics, while millions of transistors fire in sequence to bring their digital outcry into reality in the form of an article (or blog post).
Science is skepticism. Skepticism of the scientific method is denial. You can call it “belief” because its axioms are worded in a way which precludes falsifiability, but this is a technicality when you consider the achievements of science. The method is sound. Scott’s argument, as I see it, is that this method is all we have, and ANY belief to the contrary is self-aggrandizing delusion. In this, because of the scientific training I have, I agree.
Really? That’s your argument? Oh dear…
Okay, let’s just make sure that we’re on the same page here. First, Mina wasn’t disagreeing, it seems, with Scott at all. If anything, Mina’s questions are just asking for the extension of the arguments, which Scott gave. There was no disagreement here at all. So it surprises me that you constructed such a blatant strawman argument to get on your polemic high horse.
The problem Mina (sorry to use your name in vain there Mina, please step in and correct me when I go off-base) raises is one of how we ought to live, and that’s one that science finds as hard to deal with as anyone else. Questions of what we *ought* to do are still open questions, which (I can only guess) is why Scott doesn’t have a whole bunch of answers. There isn’t much science can yet do to give us many answers to that without an appeal to value, which is why scientists can and are part of the Magical Belief Lottery as much as anyone. Science can show us how to get where we want to go, but has few answers and where exactly we should go.
What science is great it is showing us that the world is not what we think it is, and we are not who we think we are. In that you are correct—and Scott is (well, we all seem to think) applying this falsificationism to certain pre-existing conceptions of human nature, which is *excellent.* As one of your “Coffee Shop Luddites” disregarding of course my degrees in physics, I happen to welcome scientists coming around with a whole bunch of reasons why certain parts of humanities should be discarded. There are a bunch of people in the humanities who read the neurosientific, cognitive science, IT and biological literature closely, and who have degrees in these fields who want to at least have a crack at giving some action-guiding principles that aren’t completely without some grounding in what science can tell us about humans. Moral naturalism is emerging, and the proponents of it are versed in science in their attempts to answer questions. And insofar as there are people out there who want that, they will try to work towards a post-scientific humanities as much as anyone else. We haven’t escaped yet, but then again no-one else has.
Moreover, you actually show what you attempt deny. Science is trying to get to the truth of the matter as best it can, and it is doing bloody well at it relative to any other type of endeavor humans have tried. But ultimately, there is still that last leap based on the weight of evidence not entailing the truth of the matter (which other, non-Popperian falsificationists have criticised Popper for, as it were). Still, what we’ve got so far is super-useful, as what science has accomplished in terms of the knowledge it has led to and the technologies that have been created. But scientists still rely on a tiny bit of instrumentalism. The difference is that scientists are (usually, I mean watch a controversy unfold or a pet theory get challenged and then watch the feathers fly and the Magical Belief Lottery member cards come out!) willing to abandon their beliefs much easier than others. This is weaker thesis than much of literary or critical theory seem to want to try and push (not being one of being chucked out of their departments I wouldn’t know), but woe betide (sigh, again) that people in the humanities would not all be the same!
In fact, you’ve quoted a well known *philosopher* of science as the entire premise of your argument. “Conjectures and Refutations” is littered with references about the lack of surety in science and thus its reliance on an (albiet minor) component of belief that something works by virtue of the weight of its resistance to disproof—Popper’s other works continue that trend. As someone so concerned with falsificationism, I’m surprised you used Popperian falsificationism as your go-to-model, as there are far more robust ones out there. But no matter.
Moreover, you sir are a thug. You’ve resorted to strawman arguments, ad hominem attacks, some some pretty egregious intolerance towards people of faith (especially as you owe the Islamics the origins of *algebra*), and a gross misunderstanding of the way falsificationism and instrumentalism interact. You’ve tried to bounce appeals to certainty off of the success of technological advancement. All in all, pretty poor for someone trying to demonstrate their credentials as an enlightened scientist.
Then again, maybe it just shows you are still part of the glorious Magical Belief Lottery club. If so, welcome. You most certainly aren’t alone.
(To John R. Fultz again): PS. in regards to the article you posted, there’s plenty of evidence for the electron. Millikan measured the charge in 1909, you can read about it here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil-drop_experiment)
Xingbot,
I see now how my post could be interpreted as ad hominem. English is not my native language; it wasn’t what I set out to do. I didn’t mean to attack Mina and John R. Fulz, only to point out that I was replying to their posts.
You apparently saw Islamophobia in my post, which wasn’t my attention either. A mosque is a place of faith, like a church, and there is no difference between them. This is not an “egregious intolerance towards people of faith”, only a disregard for faith itself. Since the post was about scientific knowledge, I was hoping people would make the connection. I’m sorry, I should have worded it differently.
In regards to your other criticism, I don’t understand where our opinions differ. I’m not allowed to point to technological advancement as a proof-of-concept for the scientific method? What then, the amount of textbooks over time? I have no delusions as to the way falsificationism and instrumentalism interact, I don’t know where you got that idea. Science is a very gradual accomplishment.
(To Mr. Bakker:)
Alright. I’ve just read the Semantic Apocalypse lecture, and the responses of Mr. Srnicek and Mr McMillan.
I think I can make my point (or rather, question) quite clear. Mostly because I agree with you fully, but draw different implications from the Bottleneck Thesis.
As you say, we get stuck in an Ouroboros situation. We’re natural beings. But, as you say, “there’s no such natural phenomena as ‘consciousness.’” There is no natural phenomena of “forness”, “rightness”, and so on.
Science studies natural phenomena. Thus, if we wish to study rightness and forness, we cannot do it in science. We cannot have empirical evidence for or against an interpretation or the appreciation of a literary text. Simply because these are not natural phenomena – they are magic, coin tricks, products of our blinkered perspective.
So, essentially, if we do want to deal with literary texts, or beauty, or rightness, we must do so outside of science. In the “humanities”. And we both agree that we will want to do so, so some form of humanities will survive.
The question I have is why there must be a rupture at all between the current humanities and post-scientific humanities? Why does the discovery that beauty and truth are not natural phenomena, but are in fact coin tricks, require us to do anything differently when we want to write about coin tricks. Sure, the reason I cannot perceive myself as a caused being through introspection is because of a cognitive deficiency… This informs the debate in philosophy of mind. But what implication does this have in making a new humanities in general?
To put it another way, what implication does a field of inquiry which works with concepts (natural phenomena) exclusively within the purview of the outside (neuroscience) have on a field of inquiry which works with concepts (beauty, meaning, value) exclusively within the purview of the inside (introspection), if you believe that the two cannot mix?
The major paradigm shifts in the humanities have come when we denied the existence of objective values, from the inside.
OK, to sum up, perhaps neuroscience will eliminate (explain away) value, or naturalize (functionalize) it. In either case, it will not deal with it, by definition. The coin trick dissolves away upon explanation, and explaining the evolutionary function of the experience of beauty is not precisely dealing with the experience of beauty. If we, however, wish to deal with the coin trick of beauty (for whatever reason it is we do, and probably will continue to do so), we cannot really make recourse to a discipline which does not deal with it (neuroscience).
So I guess I’m wondering what made you give up your “odd brand of contextualism” for your “downright bizarre species of sceptical naturalism”. What is it about knowing that we are hardwired into a blinkered perspective that makes a difference in our inquiry into how things look from that perspective?
[[Sorry for the bother, I’m sure I’m missing something fairly obvious.]]
!!!!!
WOAHWOAHWOAH, scratch that, I got it. The implication, the difference it makes it that we have to admit that we lie to ourselves. We cherry pick confirming evidence and utterly overlook disconfirming evidence. We rewrite memories to minimize the threat of inconsistencies. How the heck can I make any claim at all about the beauty and the meaning of a text or the “right thing to do” if I’m going to ignore the objection you’re about to make and repeat my argument to myself until I believe it again?
What we’d need to do, if we still want to concern ourselves with these subjects, is have humanities which take this into account, which are much more humble in their claims. So it’s like poststructuralism, but based on neuroscience instead of introspection.
Well. Wow. Lemme have a think about this. I’ll tell you if I have any ideas.
[To rejoin the discussion on Mina’s point)
I think the problem here is, again, quite simple. It concerns two different readings of a sceptical statement.
There were two schools of scepticism in the ancient world, which I will now attempt to caricature. “Academic Scepticism” basically held that we can know nothing: we know that we can know nothing. “Pyrronian Sceptics” believed that even that was dogmatic: they did not assert that we could know nothing, they merely questioned any specific knowledge claim your resident Platonist cared to make.
Now, people to this day accuse Academic Sceptics of hypocrisy: to assert the falsity of all knowledge claims is to undermine your own assertion. Perhaps. But if you look at it from a Pyrronian perspective, all Mr. Bakker is doing is highlighting something that is a problem for someone who does want to make certain claims, not truly making a claim himself. It is not hypocrisy to point out a cognitive deficiency, it is merely highlighting a weakness in an opponent’s argument – as it happens, making a general sceptical point means that your opponent is pretty much everyone.
Think of it this way. A guy standing on a roof says “Oooh, look at my house! It’s so big! I’m gonna build ten more stories!” Mr. Bakker, his neighbour, comes along and says “Dude, there’s a global infection of termites, and your foundations are about to fall.” And the guy goes, “Ah, if that’s true, then your house must have termites too!” And Mr. Bakker says “I never said it didn’t. What I do say is that we should stop building houses, and build subterranean Hobbithouses instead. I don’t wanna just go build one myself, cus then I’d be lonely and I nobody would be around to provide me with such services as live music and foot massages. So wanna come down with me and build some Hobbithouses?”
…I think.
“What do I think we should do? Tear down our culture of self-congratulation, for one.”
Ah, I found what was nagging me.
Where’s your evidence for what this can do, simply presented? That so and so procedure can do task X better? Aren’t you hitting the magical belief lottery in just saying what we ‘should’ do?
I happen to estimate alot of what your saying is true, but were not getting down to running tests comparing using the idea and not using the idea and presenting the comparative evidence. Your just working from ‘I have a dream!’ territory for what people should do next. And yeah, people get hooked into that excitement – but in the same old belief system way.
See, this is exactly what I got hung up on!
“What kind of normative implication does any scientific discovery have in and of itself?” I asked myself. I understood that he was implying that something in and of neuroscience itself made it necessary to change our institutions in a specific a way.
That’s not what I think is going. Let me have another try at paraphrasing it.
1) Neuroscience tells us that our judgements are flawed in a fundamental way.
2) Therefore, institutions which sustain the belief that we are Magical Rational Truth Generators are flawed in a fundamental way.
3) If it’s broke, fix it.
4) We’ve got to fix our institutions. (Mr. Bakker draws on his experience as a failed academic and aspiring author to criticise literary and academic institutions. If he were a journalist, he’d ostensibly apply it to the media. If a politician, to political institutions, perhaps.)
Now, I think too much emphasis has been laid on the wrong part of point 1. There are other ways to show our judgement is fundamentally flawed. Greatest among them is what Paul Ricoeur calls the “hermeneutics of suspicion” (a pretentious label which I’ll try to unpack). It means a systematic distrusting peoples’ claims. The three great figures Ricoeur identifies in this approach are Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.
So. Academic A goes “I am an uncaused, freethinking, rational being, and I have rationally decided that poetry is the highest form of art.”
Marx goes: “Bullshit. You’re not unchaused and freethinking, you’re determined by material economic causes. You’re part of the social stratum of academics, who have the education and time to read poetry. If you were a dock worker, you’d be all about the thrashcore.”
Freud says “You’re actually determined by unconscious forces.”
And Nietzsche just goes, “BAM!” Actually, many of his ideas correlate perfectly with Bakker’s: his unremitting naturalism, his pointing out of the way we constantly deceive ourselves. To give one example:
“We rewrite memories to minimize the threat of inconsistencies.” – R. Scott Bakker
“”I have done that,” says my memory. “I cannot have done that” — says my pride, and remains adamant. At last — memory yields.” – Freddy Nietzsche
So if you don’t want to trust science, you could just as well do this.
1) Marx and Nietzsche tell us our judgements are flawed in a fundamental way.
At any rate, the jump from “our judgement is flawed” to “we must fix institutions which treat our judgement as if it weren’t flawed” is not a very mind-blowing one. Neither is it hypocritical, really.
Now, if he set forth abstract principles as to how our institutions should be changed further than taking our flaws into account, that’d be self-defeating. But he has largely avoided doing so.
Which leads me to my new little qualification to his New Theory: if Theory is indeed at a crisis point, it’s going to be a looong crisis, and progress will be, as always, halting and slow.
Here’s one of my aphorisms for you.
“Being a hypocrite does not make me wrong.”
Science is simply another way of understanding what cannot be understood. An “electron” is only an electron when we label it as such. In reality (quantum physics tells us) it is simply part of a vast, limitless field of potential (i.e. universal consciousness). In your argument, Procto, you seem to claim that science is the Only Answer and that by its very nature it cannot be contested. THAT is exactly the same thing that religious fanatics claim. Science is simply a way of viewing, exploring, and qualifying the universe, and like OTHER ways of doing this, it has its own benefits and results. Technology is one of these benefits. And it was Arthur C. Clarke who said: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
To clarify: Science, like religion, is a Belief System. It simply happens to be a far more effective belief system when it comes to manipulating the physical world.
Scott — I’m convinced that you’re right about the way we’re led around by our brains, and I’m interested in learning more.
Question: you mention our kids and
“the ways they will continually game local ambiguities to prosecute their global self-interests, cognitive or otherwise, all the while feeling they have been ‘fair and balanced.’ ”
Sorry — I didn’t go to college as long as you did — can you explain the phrase “game local ambiguities” for me? It seems like it might be important…
By the way I’ve enjoyed every book of yours I’ve gotten my hands on, inside & out of Earwa…I hope you can continue to write.
–Luther