More Disney than Disney World: Semiotics as Theoretical Make-believe
by rsbakker
I: SORCERERS OF THE MAGIC KINGDOM (a.k.a. THE SEMIOTICIAN)
Ask a humanities scholar their opinion of Disney and they will almost certainly give you some version of Louis Marin’s famous “degenerate utopia.”
And perhaps they should. Far from a harmless amusement park, Disney World is a vast commercial enterprise, one possessing, as all corporations must, a predatory market agenda. Disney also happens to be in the meaning business, selling numerous forms of access to their propriety content, to their worlds. Disney (much like myself) is in the alternate reality game. Given their commercial imperatives, their alternate realities primarily appeal to children, who, branded at so young an age, continue to fetishize their products well into adulthood. This generational turnover, combined with the acquisition of more and more properties, assures Disney’s growing cultural dominance. And their messaging is obviously, even painfully, ideological, both escapist and socially conservative, designed to systematically neglect all forms of impersonal conflict.
I think we can all agree on this much. But the humanities scholar typically has something more in mind, a proclivity to interpret Disney and its constituents in semiotic terms, as a ‘veil of signs,’ a consciousness constructing apparatus designed to conceal and legitimize existing power inequities. For them, Disney is not simply apologetic as opposed to critical, it also plays the more sinister role of engendering and reinforcing hyperreality, the seamless integration of simulation and reality into disempowering perspectives on the world.
So as Baudrillard claims in Simulacra and Simulations:
The Disneyland imaginary is neither true nor false: it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real. Whence the debility, the infantile degeneration of this imaginary. It is meant to be an infantile world, in order to make us believe that the adults are elsewhere, in the ‘real’ world, and to conceal the fact that the real childishness is everywhere, particularly among those adults who go there to act the child in order to foster illusions of their real childishness.
Baudrillard sees the lesson as an associative one, a matter of training. The more we lard reality with our representations, Baudrillard believes, the greater the violence done. So for him the great sin of Disneyland lay not so much in reinforcing ideological derangements via simulation, but in completing the illusion of an ideologically deranged world. It is the lie within the lie, he would have us believe, that makes the second lie so difficult to see through. The sin here is innocence, the kind of belief that falls out of cognitive incapacity. Why do kids believe in magic? Arguably, because they don’t know any better. By providing adults a venue for their children to believe, Disney has also provided them evidence of their own adulthood. Seeing through Disney’s simulations generates the sense of seeing through all illusions, and therefore, seeing the real.
Disney, in other words, facilitates ‘hyperreality’—a semiotic form of cognitive closure—by rendering consumers blind to their blindness. Disney, on the semiotic account, is an ideological neglect machine. Its primary social function is to provide cognitive anaesthesia to the masses, to keep them as docile and distracted as possible. Let’s call this the ‘Disney function,’ or Df. For humanities scholars, as a rule, Df amounts to the production of hyperreality, the politically pernicious conflation of simulation and reality.
In what follows, I hope to demonstrate what might seem a preposterous figure/field inversion. What I want to argue is that the semiotician has Df all wrong—Disney is actually a far more complicated beast—and that the production of hyperreality, if anything, belongs to his or her own interpretative practice. My claim, in other words, is that the ‘politically pernicious conflation of simulation and reality’ far better describes the social function of semiotics than it does Disney.
Semiotics, I want to suggest, has managed to gull intellectuals into actively alienating the very culture they would reform, leading to the degeneration of social criticism into various forms of moral entertainment, a way for jargon-defined ingroups to transform interpretative expertise into demonstrations of manifest moral superiority. Piety, in effect. Semiotics, the study of signs in life, allows the humanities scholar to sit in judgment not just of books, but of text,* which is to say, the entire world of meaning. It constitutes what might be called an ideological Disney World, only one that, unlike the real Disney World, cannot be distinguished from the real.
I know from experience the kind of incredulity these kinds of claim provoke from the semiotically minded. The illusion, as I know first-hand, is that complete. So let me invoke, for the benefit of those smirking down at these words, the same critical thinking mantra you train into your students, and remind you that all institutions are self-regarding, all institutions cultivate congratulatory myths, and to suggest that the notion of some institution set apart, some specialized cabal possessing practices inoculated against the universal human assumption of moral superiority, is implausible through and through. Or at least worth suspicion.
You are almost certainly deluded in some respect. What follows merely illustrates how. Nothing magical protects you from running afoul your cognitive shortcomings the same as the rest of humanity. As such, it really could be the case that you are the more egregious sorcerer, and that your world-view is the real ‘magic kingdom.’ If this idea truly is as preposterous as it feels, then you should have little difficulty understanding it on its own terms, and dismantling it accordingly.
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II: INVESTIGATING THE CRIME SCENE
Sign and signified, simulation and simulated, appearance and reality: these dichotomies provide the implicit conceptual keel for all ideologically motivated semiotic readings of culture. This instantly transforms Disney, a global industrial enterprise devoted to the production of alternate realities, into a paradigmatic case. The Walt Disney Corporation, as fairly every child in the world knows, is in the simulation business. Of course, this alone does not make Disney ‘bad.’ As an expert interpreter of signs and simulations, the semiotician has no problem with deviations from reality in general, only those deviations prone to facilitate particular vested interests. This is the sense in which the semiotic project is continuous with the Enlightenment project more generally. It presumes that knowledge sets us free. Semioticians hold that some appearances—typically those canonized as ‘art’—actually provide knowledge of the real, whereas other appearances serve only to obscure the real, and so disempower those who run afoul them.
The sin of the Walt Disney Corporation, then, isn’t that it sells simulations, it’s that it sells disempowering simulations. The problem that Disney poses the semiotician, however, is that it sells simulations as simulations, not simulations as reality. The problem, in other words, is that Disney complicates their foundational dichotomy, and in ways that are not immediately clear.
You see microcosms of this complication everywhere you go in Disney World, especially where construction or any other ‘illusion dispelling’ activities are involved. Sights such as this:
where pre-existing views are laminated across tarps meant to conceal some machination that Disney would rather not have you see, struck me as particularly bizarre. Who is being fooled here? My five year old even asked why they would bother painting trees rather than planting them. Who knows, I told her. Maybe they were planting trees. Maybe they were building trees such as this:
Everywhere you go you stumble across premeditated visual obstructions, or the famous, omnipresent gates labelled ‘CAST MEMBERS ONLY.’ Everywhere you go, in other words, you are confronted with obvious evidence of staging, or what might be called premeditated information environments. As any magician knows, the only way to astound the audience is to meticulously control the information they do and do not have available. So long as absolute control remains technically infeasible, they often fudge, relying on the audience’s desire to be astounded to grease the wheels of their machinations.
One finds Disney’s commitment to the staging credo tacked here and there across the very walls raised to enforce it:
Walt Disney was committed to the notion of environmental immersion, with the construction of ‘stages’ that were good enough, given various technical and economic limitations, to kindle wonder in children and generosity in their parents. Almost nobody is fooled outright, least of all the children. But most everyone is fooled enough. And this is the only thing that matters, when any showman tallies their receipts at the end of the day: staging sufficiency, not perfection. The visibility of artifice will be forgiven, even revelled in, so long as the trick manages to carry the day…
No one knows this better than the cartoonist.
The ‘Disney imaginary,’ as Baudrillard calls it, is first and foremost a money making machine. For parents of limited means, the mechanical regularity with which Disney has you reaching for your wallet is proof positive that you are plugged into some kind of vast economic machine. And making money, it turns out, doesn’t require believing, it requires believing enough—which is to say, make-believe. Disney World can revel in its artificiality because artificiality, far from threatening the primary function of the system, actually facilitates it. Children want cartoons; they genuinely prefer low-dimensional distortions of reality over reality. Disney is where cartoons become flesh and blood, where high dimension replicas of low-dimension constructs are staged as the higher dimensional truth of those constructs. You stand in line to have your picture taken with a phoney Tinkerbell that you say is real to play this extraordinary game of make-believe with your children.
To the extent that make-believe is celebrated, the illusion is celebrated as benign deception. You walk into streets like this:
that become this:
as you trudge from the perpendicular. The staged nature of the stage is itself staged within the stage as something staged. This is the structure of the Indiana Jones Stunt Spectacular, for instance, where the audience is actually transformed into a performer on a stage staged as a stage (a movie shoot). At every turn, in fact, families are confronted with this continual underdetermination of the boundaries between ‘real’ and not ‘real.’ We watched a cartoon Crush (the surfer turtle from Finding Nemo) do an audience interaction comedy routine (we nearly pissed ourselves). We had a bug jump out of the screen and spray us with acid (water) beneath that big ass tree above (we laughed and screamed). We were skunked twice. The list goes on and on.
All these ‘attractions’ both celebrate and exploit the narrative instinct to believe, the willingness to overlook all the discrepancies between the fantastic and the real. No one is drugged and plugged into the Disney Matrix against their will; people pay, people who generally make far less than tenured academics, to play make-believe with their children.
So what are we to make of this peculiar articulation of simulations and realities? What does it tell us about Df?
The semiotic pessimist, like Baudrillard, would say that Disney is subverting your ability to reliably distinguish the real from the not real, rendering you a willing consumer of a fictional reality filled with fictional wars. Umberto Eco, on the other hand, suggests the problem is one of conditioning consumer desire. By celebrating the unreality of the real, Disney is telling “us that faked nature corresponds much more to our daydream demands” (Travels in Hyperreality, 44). Disney, on his account, whets the wrong appetite. For both, Disney is both instrumental to and symptomatic of our ideological captivity.
The optimist, on the other hand, would say they’re illuminating the contingency of the real (a.k.a. the ‘power of imagination’), training the young to never quite believe their eyes. On this view, Disney is both instrumental to and symptomatic of our semantic creativity (even as it ruthlessly polices its own intellectual properties). According to the apocryphal quote often attributed to Walt Disney, “If you can dream it, you can do it.”
This is the interpretative antinomy that hounds all semiotic readings of the ‘Disney function.’ The problem, put simply, is that interpretations falling out of the semiotic focus on sign and signified, simulation and simulated, cannot decisively resolve whether self-conscious simulation a la Disney serves, in balance, more to subvert or to conserve prevailing social inequities.
All such high altitude interpretation of social phenomena is bound to be underdetermined, of course, simply because the systems involved are far, far, too complicated. Ironically, the theorist has to make due with cartoons, which is to say skewed idealizations of the phenomena involved, and simply hope that something of the offending dynamic shines through. But what I would like to suggest is that semiotic cartoons are particularly problematic in this regard, particularly apt to systematically distort the phenomena they claim to explicate, while—quite unlike Disney’s representations—concealing their cartoonishness.
To understand how and why this is the case, we need to consider the kinds of information the ‘semiotic stage’ is prone to neglect…
Don’t you find it interesting that people who specialize in “signs” and “symbols” often can’t do math?
don’t you find it interesting that people who specialize in “math” often can’t do “signs” and “symbols”?
A mathematician needs symbols and signs as well but they need to have a precise semantics, so that one is able to work with them. In the field of arts it seems that one enjoys a certain ambigousness of the semantics and there is the relation to emotions. E.g. The LOTR scene with the elvish beautiful runes on the stone wall showing up in the moonlight, how is that really different from my iPad screen getting illuminating by its backlight unit, asking me for a pin code to enter?
I think that’s only the case with certain individuals. Linguistics, remember, is a jungle of formalisms.
A lot of liberal arts majors are calculus refugees…
I’m interested in how BBT interfaces with economics. Is ‘Disneyland’ something that only exists in the brain that is communicated ‘mouth-to-mouth’ or is it some function of something called ‘economics’? Very new to this sort of theory
This is actually something I hope to pursue through these Disney pieces… Ultimately I want to sketch a far more sinister picture than Baudrillard’s.
I think Bataille is more on the money than Baudrillard
That would be because Bataille IS money…
But isn’t Baudrillard’s story kind of salient to BBT, specifically his showing how fetishism merges with use value and isn’t subordinated to it. Isn’t this analagous to your claim that cognition is continuous with metacognition?
Baudrillard is just warmed over Lukacs in this regard, isn’t he? A poor man’s Adorno. Your points taken, though. Neglect plays a signature role in all post-structural semiotics. I sometimes think that the so-called ‘philosophies of difference’ are best understood as an attempt to get a handle on the heuristic dimension of language and cognition without the benefit of Darwin or Simon. They were trying to find ways of accommodating the heuristic nature of intentionality via second order intentional cognition. I think this leads them down some predictable blind alleys…
No matter your aim, scope, Art or metier, one should possess a healthy skepticism of assured correctness; a dispossession, if you will, of certitude. It is the questioning mind that recognizes knowledge is unceasing, churning forth in a multitude of manifestations. That other path – the inviolate sacral belief in the unverified sanctity of your belief – runs straight into the dogmatic and the doomed.
The big catch is that it’s unavoidable. It’s an endless game of gotcha that you’re more doomed to lose more convinced you are that you possess a healthy skepticism of assured correctness. That’s why it pays to use cognitive pejoratives as your theoretical terms.
Is there quite a fork in the road, between ‘healthy’ and ‘at a guess what might be a healthy’? I presume it could sort of punt the ‘I’m right’ back a step to ‘I might not be right – but I have a ‘healthy’ amount of skepticism of being right – so I must have checked everything since I DO have what IS a healthy amount of skepticism (implication; I’m right…)’. Or am I just imagining that road?
Welcome to the TPB, Sean! 🙂
“That’s why it pays to use cognitive pejoratives as your theoretical terms.” LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL
Even the fork has shaky tines 🙂 I am enjoying the banter and the flow of ideas. By healthy my intended meaning was that one must ALWAYS be open to the possibility that your conclusions can be upended. Perhaps it is the simultaneous confluence of the Physicist and English Lit majors in me. And of course the scientist is supposed to know and hold fast to the maxim that any new experiment or finding can invalidate what has gone before. The unavoidable catch is that what comes before is institutionalized and thus resists any efforts to delegitimize or alter its meaning.
I’m glad you like, Sean! This why it pays to make ones claims as testable as possible, and to always ask–of all claims–how they might be tested. It’s just all guesswork, otherwise.
In one of my favorite Richard Pryor stories a young junkie begs an old wino “tell me some more of those lies of yours and make me stop thinking about the truth.” In your own response to one of Wilshire’s comments a few posts ago you said ” you tell yourself that your weaknesses leverage your strengths, not because it’s true, but because it’s too toxic tell yourself otherwise.” In Rants Ben Cain discusses at length the use of technology to blind ourselves to the undeadness of the universe. Apparently we need lies. As your visit to Disney World suggests, we need lies so much that we’re willing to pay for them.
The Wikipedia article on homeostasis states “homeostasis requires a sensor to detect changes in the condition to be regulated, an effector mechanism that can vary that condition; and a negative feedback connection between the two.” Escapist fantasies are an effector mechanism. We seek them out when we sense our existential dread creeping above its normal range. Some escapist fantasies are built in. We have elections every so often because they create the illusion that we common folk have some control over the institutions that control us. Elections ensure that our outrage at the way we are governed never rises outside its normal range and into a range that might encourage real political action.
It’s possible that if semiotics “has managed to gull intellectuals into actively alienating the very culture they would reform” it has done so in the service of homeostasis. University professors depend for their livelihood on the state and/or on the industrialists/philanthropists whose names adorn the university buildings. The alienation of academic intellectuals from popular culture has the effect of discouraging any attempts of academic intellectuals to make common cause with workers. The hostility of academic intellectuals toward popular culture is reactionary in the sense that it makes leftward political change less possible. It serves to maintain the political status quo.
Lovely analogy, comparing fantasies to ‘effector mechanisms.’ I’m going to be sorely tempted to use it in the next piece! In my own theory, the humanities are a kind preventative effector mechanism, allowing the system to avoid breakdowns in homeostasis by redirecting critical creativity away from culture at large. If you think about it, given the way groupishness drives politics, the best thing a privilege conserving system could do is provide the conditions requisite for the left to mutate into something unrecognizable to the typical voter. The dynamics of social association take over from there.
The fantasy would be the negative feedback connection, wouldn’t it? That’s why terrorists fly planes into the twin towers of fantasy spinning.
Sounds like you had a lot of fun there, maybe not the intended one. 🙂 A video documentary with your comment would certainly be enlightning and entertaining.
We visited Disneyland Paris once and it was a strange experience, we never expected such bad food in France, the queing times were unbelievable for a few minutes ride and we first learned here that one can buy passes which cut down the waiting (so much about égalité). I visited almost all merchandise shops and could not bring me to buy one of the numerous items although I tried.
The captain EO show with Michael Jackson and the Star Wars rides would have been super cool, if I had visited them 25 years earlier, they aged not that well, the technological progress cought up for the masses (that Nintendo 3DS in my pocket had nice 3D too) and the strange real life bio of MJ made us wonder more at the 80ies weirdnesses than the intended fun points, Star Wars suffered a bit from too much Star Wars in general and the bad prequels, but here my view might change again the last trailer from JJ gives hope.
In summary we were very surprised that this pinacle of US entertainment was more expensive and less fun than a day on the Munich Oktoberfest or the Phantasialand theme park next to Bonn. Do the latter maybe just better cater to the local taste? Or is the French Disneyland not as good as one based in the US? Not sure if I would go there now if I had the chance to visit the US.
For my wife and I, our experience was entirely mediated by our daughter, who I think was prime Disney World age. Disney corp’s genius lies in mediating these kinds of mediations; they’ve set up a toll booth between every parent and child in the world. I went as a teenager many, many moons ago and hated it.
but you CAN get Mulan dolls there, this is important
http://www.philpercs.com/2015/05/dark-phenomenology.html
Awesome!
This essay is impoverished with a lack of any grasp on the history of the fields in question, their actual claims, and the differences between a methodology of interpretation and the uses to which such can be put.
Semiotics is no more politically motivated than logic, rhetoric, or grammar. Semiotics as we have inherited it was developed largely by Charles S. Peirce as a propaedeutic to logic – you can’t have logic without some theory of signs, as Aristotle was well aware, and as was evident in the debates between the Realists and the Nominalists in the Middle Ages. The first modern theories of signs were put forth by Locke and Hobbes; Peirce recognized a need to codify such theories. At roughly the same time, Saussre in Switzerland came up with a similar but weaker codification, semiology. That’s important, because the essay has confused the practice of a mildly interesting semiologist, Baudrillard, with that of one of the truly great semioticians, Umberto Eco. These are fairly substantial difference between the two theoretical stances, as one would know by reading the theoretical material and their histories.
In semiology, signs can be illusory, as projections of the interpretor’s desires. In semiotics, signs are always real, so the interesting questions are how we deploy them (as signifying animals), and how we respond to them.
That “faked nature corresponds much more to our daydream demands” is hardly any news, historically; the gardens of Versailles are ‘faked nature,’ humans have been faking nature for quite some centuries. So the interesting question is, what does this tell us about ourselves. Whatever answers we come up with, we will be discussing signs and their possible interpretations, and our disagreements will hopefully follow reasonable disagreements concerning these interpretations.
Finally, you seem to be drawing a false distinction between semantics in logical terms – the study of meaning – and signification, which also happens to be the study of meaning in semiotic terms. There’s no conflict between the two; it’s simply a question of which order of communication we are choosing to study. As it happens, your essay is a semiotic argument, since the domain of semiotics includes non-truth-decidable cultural significations that linguistic/logical semantics is not intended to address. A great deal of human creativity can not be realized in sentences that then can be interpreted for meaning – but it is always manifest in the signs we generate (semiosis is necessarily creative, even when conventionally constrained).
It’s a cartoon, no doubt; the question is whether it picks out some dynamic that can be generalized or no. It also happens to be the first part of larger series, which means you’re dismissing an argument you actually haven’t seen yet – I probably should have spelled that out.
I certainly agree that the connection between semiotics and politics is ersatz, but nonetheless, semiotics as applied to cultural criticism is almost always ideologically motivated. It’s been years since I waded through the literature, I admit, but at one time I thought semiotics (post-structural semiotics in particular) would be my bread and butter. I took it very seriously, and wasted (I now think) far too much time reading it. I’ve never thought highly of Baudrillard myself (I always saw him as too derivative of Derrida), and though I haven’t read as much of Eco as I should have (several essays and three novels, two of which continue casting shadows over my own fiction), The Hyperreality essay I think clearly demonstrates his approach as more skeptically minded and more nuanced, and certainly more critical of intellectual institutions, than Baudrillard.
At this point you’re making assumptions on the basis of dismissive surface impressions. Save your energy for the argument: I’m very keen on debating the degree to which my cartoon generalizes to the jungle of different semiotic cartoons out there.
I agree that this one of Eco’s more banal observations. What you say following seems entirely straightforward until you ask what ‘signs’ and ‘interpretations’ are, why they have the apparent theoretical power they do, but never seem to deliver, and how they can be understood ontologically. As it stands, ‘faked nature’ tells us as many stories as there are theorists. It’s at least worth considering that this is not simply a ‘cost of doing interpretative business,’ but that it evidences what is in fact a serious theoretical misstep, wouldn’t you agree?
How would we know one way or another?
I’m using ‘semantic’ and ‘meaningful’ and ‘intentional’ interchangeably here (the way I always do). I’m well aware of the distinctions you’ve recapitulated. If you find some juncture where equivocation cuts against my case, by all means call me on it. But hear out my case first.
What all of these theorists were trying to come to grips with was how telecomputational techniques affected social relationships. I find Baudrillards technical analysis unorganized, but it nevertheless contains some insights. Human nervous system really isn’t able to distinguish excitations that come from media simulations (the ecstacy of communication) in contrast from excitations produced by live or face to face social interactions between bodies. Von Foerster distills this as the principle of undifferentiated encoding. All a sensory receptor, or a neuron “sees” is how much and where, not “what”. And the telecomputationally enabled “hyperrealities” have immersive and intensive qualities that may surpass “actual” interactions. To me all of this can occur well apart from the folk moralism that is an undercurrent in Baudrillard’s work. It would be interesting here to see some studies on the brain. I remember Krugman’s classical studies on television showed that images produced on CRT screens really do alter the global firing patterns in the brain.
Agreed and agreed. For me, the interesting question is one of reconceptualising the ‘semiotic scene’ of sign and signified in terms of heuristic neglect and seeing what this makes of Disney – a kind of ‘zombie semiotics.’ The neurocognitive story of language is bound to have a huge role to play here, but we’re pretty much stuck in the same position as semioticians: theorizing in the absence of HD information regarding what is going on. The question is one of building a framework that can accommodate that information as it comes in.
I do think it will help to distinguish Peircean semiotics and Sausserean semiology. I’ve never had any use for semiology (and I lost interest in Baudrillard long ago). But semiotics seems to have a real foundation.
I’m not writing condescendingly to you, but for other readers, a brief consideration of one of the basic examples of semiotics, understood well before the dissemination of the word ‘semiotics’ – the relation between smoke and fire. This example has been used for many centuries, in both Western and Eastern philosophies, in consideration of the relation between empirical phenomena and possible logical claims one can make about them.
Smoke is a sign of fire; in the West, this has usually been considered a certain sign (thus providing a ground for deduction); in the East it is treated more as a probable sign (thus an instance of inductive reasoning).
Most of semiotics is about this relationship – the sign and its significance. Some semioticians would extend its scope to include responses and cultural implications (I would), but the bottom line has to do with questions such as, whether smoke signifies fire.
That the relation between semiotic methodology and the politics for which it may be used is effectively neutral, is revealed by the fact that, in the US, semiotics now is most frequently taught in classes on advertisement in business schools. I’m not happy about that, and thus I think deploying semiotics critically is a useful response to this; but the fact is that the political neutrality of semiotics – like that of rhetoric – certainly opens the door to such variant uses.
The healthy response to the misuse of rhetoric is learning a stronger rhetoric and its critical deployment. The healthy response to theoretical missteps in semiotics is developing a stronger, critical semiotics.
I agree that Travels in Hyperreality is lesser Eco. But that “‘faked nature’ tells us as many stories as there are theorists,” could actually be a good thing; I mentioned the gardens at Versailles for this purpose – one cannot write history without considering such questions as why this seems to be a tendency of human creativity, and what are the signs of it. And this does need to be brought up to date, since significance is always historically contingent. Eco’s Disney interpretation may have been a misstep (his early shorter essays were intended for Italian journals, usually with a left-wing bent), but that doesn’t necessarily impugn his theoretical ground.
“But hear out my case first.” – I wouldn’t be following your blog if I weren’t interested in it. I just think that this post could have used greater clarity and specificity.
“I just think that this post could have used greater clarity and specificity.”
I agree… All theory is a rehearsal of Dunkirk, if you think about it. It’s what makes blogging theory so ideal: the troops left behind always get a chance to invade!
One can argue that science is ideologically neutral, but modern ‘big science’ is expensive. Perhaps the very cost of science skews scientific research toward the interests of the people who pay for it. The recent tendency of pharmaceutical companies to focus on drugs that manage chronic conditions instead of drugs that cure diseases might be considered an example. You say below that semiotics is taught in advertising classes. Is there something about semiotics or the relation of semiotics to the wider society that skews the uses to which it is put in the direction of for profit corporations? I’m not sure that any human activity can be politically or economically neutral.
On a related issue, do semioticians work with neuroscientists regarding the way brains/minds react to or process signs?
Interesting questions; in the given social context semiotics shares some of the same problems with the study of rhetoric, in that it includes analysis of social responses to signification; such analysis can then be used in practice in problematic ways. I’m not sure that this is avoidable.
(Again, however, semiotics goes beyond the domain of rhetoric as study of signification per se. Not all semiotics is bound to human culture; for instance, zoosemiotics is a branch that studies sign-behavior among other signifying animals.)
As to your final question, this goes beyond my research into the matter, so I’ll need to look into the matter further; but it would not surprise me that if no previous semiotics research has intersected the neurosciences, future semiotics will.
To my knowledge, neuroscientists ignore what semioticians have to say on these topics entirely (to our credit, I would argue, since it’s profoundly nonscientific, and generally risible).
I would add that most of the comments above made by DivisionbyZer0 regarding how sensory systems process their inputs are something between nonsensical and trivially true. Perhaps there’s a jargon problem clouding the issue.
With regards to Michael Murden’s comment, it is absolutely the case that the distribution of funding sources skews the directions of scientific research. I, like most researchers at large research institutions, regularly receive emails about funding opportunities, increasingly in “translational medicine”, which are geared towards bringing therapies to market.
The aspect of the distribution of funding sources which seems most relevant is the balance between public (e.g., NIH) and private (e.g., Bayer) sources. Declines in the former send more and more investigators scrambling to cobble to together a research program from the latter. Since my wife has transitioned from academic science to industry, it provides an interesting perspective on the differences. For example, you rarely see venture capitalists at meetings focused on basic neuroscience, but you will certainly see them at meetings focused on cancer.
Finally, regarding Bakker’s post, I feel very conflicted about the fact that I’ve yet to explain how Sofia the First’s lifestyle almost certainly presupposes substantial class-based oppression to my daughter. She’s 3. Have I waited to long already?
How many tears is my strong preference for Dinosaur Train worth on those mornings where I need to take a shower for work while she eats breakfast in front of the television? I’m afraid that Baudrillard’s America has done little to resolve this. Is Octonauts a reasonable compromise? How sinister is the “Vegimal” concept in the larger scheme of things?
The Vegimals have always been, to me, the thing I most fear encountering when lit. Think about it: they have… no… Creature Report!
But this, in the end, what it’s all about: stuffing that little, ahem, angel with cultural candy, sugared meaning. Three’s about the age Ruby started transitioning out of the preschool content desert, and into the jungles and sewers of culture more generally. It might be different for you, but I actually find myself passing judgement more and more a la Baudrillard the older she gets. Wait till she gets into Monster High! Ah… happy times.
this is all that I know of:
https://books.google.com/books?id=4cRoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=the+nature+and+origin+of+language+saussure&source=bl&ots=28xRqoGOKC&sig=Nu6YL772px4gNMTo2Wu3jOBG3Uc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=BjhdVauDO4W1sASQloCICw&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=the%20nature%20and%20origin%20of%20language%20saussure&f=false
“I would add that most of the comments above made by DivisionbyZer0 regarding how sensory systems process their inputs are something between nonsensical and trivially true. Perhaps there’s a jargon problem clouding the issue”
yeah that puzzled me too.
basic research funding is quickly becoming a thing of the past,
part of why I’m so skeptical about much of the predictions by our good host and others about future progress of science/engineering, not so much philosophical barriers but lack of political will, but than we can’t even maintain bridges and sewers here in the US…
http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-may-20-2015-1.3080098/canadian-scientist-steve-campana-quits-over-government-muzzling-1.3080114
Ochlo,
Freakin dinosaur train…WTF? Why is there a train…and dinosaurs…and…??
I think the burn is the nesting propaganda these cartoons sell – how everyones polite and nice and smiling and – it’s like being inside a big cozy nest. As if everything is nuturing. As if the whole world supports that somehow and you’ll just be in it. Having more time on my hands, I tend to mention to my daughter how that dinosaur the group just helped is a meat eater and would then go on to devour the other dinosaurs. I think I sucked in a lot of nest propaganda when young and am a victim of it – I kind of wonder if anyone expecting a crackedmoon has some kind of obligation to read more than six pages is also a nest propaganda victim as well.
I’d suggest voicing the fairly nasty implications and unseen sharp ends of the stick (where do the Octonauts get their funding) of the worlds these shows are while they are running, rather than turning off. This sort of sell is everywhere, so there’s no point turning it off when it’ll just come up somewhere else – but if her dads subtext floats to mind when the world makes it’s sell/indoctrination….
Or maybe I’m refering to it more seriously than you did – but what can I say – it was and is a burn.
Reblogged this on synthetic zero and commented:
brush-fire Bakker clearing the dead wood….
Nice to see a bunch of new names at TPB! Welcome, all! 🙂
This reminds me of when I took my son to a new primary school and we met the principle first. Afterward I said ‘Let’s go have some icecream!” and he said “You’re just doing that because you want me to feel good about this thing”. And in my brain I’m almost screaming the thought “YES! Would you just LET me??”
Whatever the hungering corporate zombie is now, perhaps, you know, Walt was trying to make life nicer to some degree? Maybe?
I dunno. The story I’m brewing is pretty bloody creepy.
It cannot be much creepier than the Vegimals. Even though I know you’re (at least) least half kidding above, the inclusion of the Vegimals genuinely bothers me for the precise reason you mentioned – they have NO creature report.
The saving grace of the show, to my mind, is that the end of each episode actually contrasts the cartoonish, anthropomorphized version of the animals against the depiction of the actual animals. The Creature Report serves to focus attention on true facts about the animals that drive the narrative (e.g., how an octopus uses camouflage), as well as the artificiality of the Octonauts themselves.
And then they throw in the fucking Vegimals, which themselves eat fucking fish crackers. It’s INSANE. Besides, you just know Tweak is going to break one day, and eat Barrot and Codish ALIVE.
By the way, I really like the concept of “cultural candy”. In fact, I think this notion is inextricably tied up with hard choices one must constantly make as a parent when presenting The World “as it is” to one’s child, since it is effectively impossible to convey the notion of an indifferent, stochastic universe to young children (and, frankly, most adults – I see you there, theists).
There even seems to be some interesting connections to BBT, or at least the notion of heuristics and the theory of mind more generally, since as a parent one is obligated to teach your child a set of lies THAT WORK. That is, given what we know about how most people organize their beliefs about themselves and the world they live in, teaching your child the aligned concepts is necessary because those beliefs have predictive validity when engaged socially with other people. Others we rely on because they are time-tested, and perhaps there’s a value in that. It reminds me the Pragma’s “mask of counterfeit rage” when teaching Kellhus. I wonder if one cannot raise a child, even a Dunyain child, without such a mask (when emotion is absent in the parental figure). Too much is in-built that expects and even demands it, maybe. Affection is milk to the very young.
I recognize that your central focus in this series of posts is to engage with philosophy and (adult) philosophers, but the angle that really caught my interest is the extent to which any of these ideas are “actionable” in the context of child-rearing.
Finally, I would also like to point out that Disney cartoons, particularly older ones, are strewn with emotional land mines. Sure, it’s cute in The Rescuers when two mice board a “plane” that’s really a sardine tin strapped to an albatross. That’s what I, as an adult, remember as salient, and, to my mind, “interesting and fun for children.” But the question The Rescuers raised – that I didn’t anticipate, but should have – is “Daddy, why do some babies not have Mommies and Daddies?” It’s a strange inversion of WYSIATI. My daughter cannot see so much of what I see that it’s hard to predict where her focus will land, so I blow it, and am left stammering.
And so I go on preparing her as best I can for the day when I can explain to her that much of what I’ve taught her is, and had to be, a lie.
“You’re just doing that because you want me to feel good about this thing” that’s awesome!! double sunday? triple??
Scott, is it cool if I cite this in my in-process dissertation? I’m critiquing semiotics in chapter 3 on the grounds of historiographic flattening, and I think your assessment dovetails nicely with my own criticisms in the chapter.
Just let me know if you’d like me to cite this as something other than a blog post (for example, if this is a conference paper or something I’ll cite it as that if you prefer).
Most certainly, Neal. Cite it for what it is. She be frozen in time, now.
Some recent artwork! From Somnambulist, Fane the First Cishaurim: http://spiralhorizon.deviantart.com/art/64-365-518281134
From Quinthane, Bashrag: http://quintvc.deviantart.com/art/Bashragtime2-533471948
The most recent art added to second-apocalypse.com: http://www.second-apocalypse.com/index.php?topic=1040.msg21278#msg21278
Ochlo,
And so I go on preparing her as best I can for the day when I can explain to her that much of what I’ve taught her is, and had to be, a lie.
How is it a lie? Or are you refering to teaching it as if it stretches to the very horizon and is the circle that surrounds all, rather than being a model/game/circle (and a small one at that) within some other much vaster, unknown circle? The eclipsed, with the lie being it eclipses? Other than that, how is it a lie?
I remember a scene in a WWII movie (it might have been The Guns of Navaronne) in which an officer tells one of his men a plan different than the plan he is going to use, then sends him to contact another unit, expecting that he will be captured and tortured by the Nazis. Another of his men calls him a ruthless bastard upon learning of this brilliant disinformation trick. The best way to lie convincingly is to believe it yourself. To put it another way, the best way to lie is to have been lied to yourself.
And as adults we still believe the lies we were told as children, even after we learn they are not true.
What are some examples of such lies?
Apart from deep (pathological) denial, it doesn’t seem possible to call a lie true after discovering it’s falseness – only to approach the structure that permeated the information in a different way.
“I think I sucked in a lot of nest propaganda when young and am a victim of it.” Perhaps “believe” is not quite the right word. As i meant to point out via the link below, the experiences of infancy and childhood are built into the structure of the brain. A brutal, violent childhood wires a child’s brain for brutality and violence. The child grows into a brutal, violent adult and raises brutal, violent children of his own. In the same way, most of us have seen how people who were over-indulged as children expect the rest of the world to be as compliant as their parents were. If childhood experiences shape our brains one can argue that what we learn about the world and the people in it runs even deeper than belief.
And for that matter how do we learn racism or homophobia or antisemitism? Most bigots learn bigotry in childhood, and if your parents preached “nigger nigger nigger” to you all through your childhood it’s going to take a road to Damascus moment to change your mind.
Reminds me of a particular door to door religious guy I met once. See, change ones mind from what, in regard to N!N!N!? To the right belief? The guy at the door had that air about him – where he’d tried various spiritual journeys. And despite his faith – one that made him go talk with strangers like me – he had that air about him. The one where he knows instead of a ‘I have to’, he’d gone through a ‘I choose to’. And absolute conviction was denied to him, even as he craved it.
That’s probably the real road to Damascus to surmount. Saying ‘Oh, I was so ignorant!’ is far easier, as its simply exiting into another conviction.
But in either case they don’t see it that they could even be believing something that could possibly be lies.
What’s the difference between a sign and a meme?
signs exist…
What’s interesting is how you’ve made the jump to an actual Hegelian dialectical move by reversing the operator/procedure strategy in bringing to the fore the disclosure of semiotics in practice is itself the problematique for which it assumes it is the cure.
Postmodern theory always did has this false synch about it, as if the thing it wanted to describe was actually generated by the very theories it used. The objects of its discourse were fantasias of its on conceptual movement rather than gaining access to the underlying structure or objects. Instead it constructed these objects out of signs and portents then captured from this fantasmatic reality the truth of its own image. And, as you say, what’s import is not what it reveals, but rather what it subtracts and leave out: the neglected obstacles to its own interminable play of significations.
Been reading Dehaene’s work of late and found it to be fresh. As he suggest we’re like primitives doing throwing stones and bits of data at our understanding of the brain’s processes, not realizing that all our models are primitive scratches on the blank wall of the abyss:
Although my lab’s computer simulations reproduce some features of conscious access, they are a long way from mimicking the actual brain— the simulation is far from being conscious. In principle, however, I do not doubt that a computer program could capture the details of a conscious state. A more appropriate simulation would have billions of differentiated neuronal states. Instead of merely propagating activation around, it would perform useful statistical inferences on its inputs— for instance, by computing the likelihood that a specific face is present or the probability that a motor gesture will successfully reach its target.
Dehaene, Stanislas (2014-01-30). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts (Kindle Locations 3339-3343). Penguin Group US. Kindle Edition.
“…it is effectively impossible to convey the notion of an indifferent, stochastic universe to young children…”
Of course it is. Just don’t love them and don’t nurture them. They’ll figure it out. I think that’s what happened to these children:
Looking past the ethics of that test for now…what’s with the female monkeys in it? Even the article writer says they are surprised at the result? Getting their Yatwer on or something?
I meant something like “of course it’s possible.” I could be wrong, but I think what those children (and Rhesus monkeys) are experiencing is the existential dread Ben Cain talks about in Rants. Of course children who have not been loved or nurtured do not acquire language, so they can’t say. One thing that “techno-science” to use one of Ben’s phrases, and Disney (and religion, and most heroic fantasy) have in common is a desire to create a universe that loves us.
This struck me as obvious, but many of the comments seem to have been written by parents who love their children, so the idea of being as indifferent to their children as the universe is to the living organisms that are its ‘children’ didn’t occur to them.
I want to nerd rage about how a rock is being compared to the workings of a computer on concious entities and being taken seriously as such! How anyone thinks it at all performs any functions a semi conductor/transistor (or a relay – or even a freakin’ valve!) does!! Why did we invent transistors if a bloody rock does the same thing!? They literally want to take transistors and make a big ass pile of them to ‘interpret’ the rocks inner molecular vibrations. But the vibrations are random – christ, the whole thing almost mirrors academic philosphers and the technological society around them that’s supposed to interpret them…farrrrrrrrrrrrrk!
correction: put ‘supposed to’ in scare brackets.
Well this concerns what is the relation between computer programs qua formal automata described by mathematical theory and real implementation of computer programs on actual digital machines. The short of it like all philosophy is no one knows. But usually the identification that open systems “implement every formal automata” (putnam) is just part of an argumentative strategy that rejects computational isn’t views of the mind
I don’t even think it’s that mysterious. A program is only what we call a bunch of magnetic states on a hard drive or pot holes in a CD. Then there are parts which react to magnetic states and pot holes. At the very least trying to say a rock does anything like that to dismiss any idea of intelligent computation is really missinformed (of course I really mean ignorant, but don’t tell anyone I said that!)
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All interesting points, but i can’t help but think of this through a Sarteist or Gibsonian lense.
If one examines Sartreist absurdity, one is faced with a choice: either reject subcultural situationism or conclude that culture serves to reinforce the status quo. The premise of the dialectic paradigm of consensus holds that narrativity is intrinsically used in the service of class divisions.
Concerning Gibson, The main theme of his works is that the common ground between class and truth are irreconcilable and that any number of discourses concerning the genre, eventually leads the observer/reader/interpreter to the
defining characteristic of the presocietal condition. A predominant concept is the concept of textual culture that would denote the role of the reader as artist. If the precultural paradigm of narrative holds, we have to choose between subdialectic theory and textual deappropriation.
Having said that there is also the structuralist mind-set that would disrupt all above….