If Free-Will were a Heuristic…
by rsbakker
Ecological eliminativism provides, I think, an elegant way to understand the free-will debate as a socio-cognitive ‘crash space,’ a circumstance where ecological variance causes the systematic breakdown of some heuristic cognitive system. What follows is a diagnostic account, and as such will seem to beg the question to pretty much everyone it diagnoses. The challenge it sets, however, is abductive. In matters this abstruse, it will be the power to explain and synthesize that will carry the theoretical morning if not the empirical day.
As hairy as it is, the free-will debate, at least in its academic incarnation, has a trinary structure: you have libertarians arguing the reality of how decision feels, you have compatibilists arguing endless ways of resolving otherwise manifest conceptual and intuitive incompatibilities, and you have determinists arguing the illusory nature of how decision feels.
All three legs of this triumvirate can be explained, I think, given an understanding of heuristics and the kinds of neglect that fall out of them. Why does the feeling of free will feel so convincing? Why are the conceptualities of causality and choice incompatible? Why do our attempts to overcome this incompatibility devolve into endless disputation?
In other words, why is there a free-will debate at all? As of 10:33 AM December 17th, 2019, Googling “free will debate” returned 575,000,000 hits. Looking at the landscape of human cognition, the problem of free will looms large, a place where our intuitions, despite functioning so well in countless other contexts, systematically frustrate any chance of consensus.
This is itself scientifically significant. So far as pathology is the royal road to function, we should expect that spectacular breakdowns such as these will hold deep lessons regarding the nature of human cognition.
As indeed they do.
So, let’s begin with a simple question: If free-will were a heuristic, a tool humans used to solve otherwise intractable problems, what would it’s breakdown look like?
But let’s take a step back for a second, and bite a very important, naturalistic bullet. Rather than consider ‘free-will’ as a heuristic, let’s consider something less overdetermined: ‘choice-talk.’ Choice-talk constitutes one of at least two ways for us humans to report selections between behaviours. The second, ‘source-talk,’ we generally use to report the cognition of high-dimensional (natural) precursors, whereas we generally use choice-talk to report cognition absent high-dimensional precursors.
As a cognitive mechanism, choice-talk is heuristic insofar as it turns a liability into an asset, allowing us to solve social problems low-dimensionally—which is to say, on the cheap. That liability is source insensitivity, our congenital neglect of our biological/ecological precursors. Human cognition is fundamentally structured by what might be called the ‘biocomplexity barrier,’ the brute fact that biology is too complicated to cognize itself high-dimensionally. The choice-talk toolset manages astronomically complicated biological systems—ourselves and other people—via an interactional system reliably correlated to the high-dimensional fact of those systems given certain socio-cognitive contexts. Choice-talk works given the cognitive ecological conditions required to maintain the felicitous correlation between the cues consumed and the systems linked to them. Undo that correlation and choice-talk, like any other heuristic mechanism, begins to break down.
Ancestrally, we had no means of discriminating our own cognitive constitution. The division of cognitive labour between source-sensitive and source-insensitive cognition is one that humans constitutively neglect: we have to be trained to discriminate it. Absent such discrimination, the efficacy of our applications turn on the continuity of our cognitive ecologies. Given biocomplexity, the application of source-sensitive cognition to intractable systems—and biological systems in particular—is not something evolution could have foreseen. Why should we possess the capacity to intuitively reconcile the joint application of two cognitive systems that, as far as evolution was concerned, would never meet?
As a source-insensitivity workaround, a way to cognize behaviour absent the ability to source that behaviour, we should expect choice-talk cognition to misfire when applied to behaviour that can be sourced. We should expect that discovering the natural causes of decisions will scuttle the intuition that those decisions were freely chosen. The manifest incompatibility between high-dimensional source-talk and low-dimensional choice-talk arises because the latter has been biologically filtered to function in contexts precluding the former. Intrusions of source-talk applicability, when someone suffers a head injury, say, could usefully trump choice-talk applicability.
Choice-talk, in fact, possesses numerous useful limits, circumstances where we suspend its application to better solve social problems via other tools. As radically heuristic, choice-talk requires a vast amount of environmental stage-setting in order to function felicitously, an ecological ‘sweet spot’ that’s bound to be interrupted by any number of environmental contingencies. Some capacity to suspend its application was required. Intuitively, then, source-talk trumps choice-talk when applied to the same behaviour. Since the biocomplexity barrier assured that each mode would be cued the way it had always been cued since time immemorial, we could, ancestrally speaking, ignore our ignorance and generally trust our intuitions.
The problem is that source-talk is omni-applicable. With the rise of science, we realized that everything biological can be high-dimensionally sourced. We discovered that the once-useful incompatibility between source-talk and choice-talk can be scotched with a single question: If everything can be sourced, and if sources negate choices, then how could we be free? Incompatibility that was once-useful now powerfully suggests choice-talk has no genuinely cognitive applicability anywhere. If choice-talk were heuristic, in other words, you might expect the argument that ‘choices’ are illusions.
The dialectical problem, however, is that human deliberative metacognition, reflection, also suffers source-insensitivity and so also consists of low-dimensional heuristics. Deliberative metacognition, the same as choice-talk, systematically neglects the machinery of decision making: reflection consistently reports choices absent sources as a result. Lacking sensitivity to the fact of insensitivity, reflection also reports the sufficiency of this reporting. No machinery is required. The absence of proximal, high-dimensional sources is taken for something real, ontologized, becoming a property belonging to choices. Given metacognitive neglect, in other words, reflection reports choice-talk as expressing some kind of separate, low dimensional ontological order.
Given this blinkered report, everything depends on how one interprets that ontology and its relation to the high-dimensional order. Creativity is required to somehow rationalize these confounds, which, qua confounds, offer nothing decisive to adjudicate between rationalizations. If choice-talk were a heuristic, one could see individuals arguing, not simply that choices are ‘real,’ but the kind of reality they possess. Some would argue that choice possesses a reality distinct from biological reality, that choices are somehow made outside causal closure. Others would argue that choices belong to biological reality, but in a special way that explains their peculiarity.
If choice-talk were heuristic, in other words, you would expect that it would crash given the application of source-cognition to behaviours it attempts to explain. You would expect this crash to generate the intuition that choice-talk is an illusion (determinism). You would expect attempts to rescue choice would either take the form of insisting on its independent reality (libertarianism), or its secondary reality (compatibilism).
Two heuristic confounds are at work, the first a product of the naïve application of source-talk to human decision-making, cuing us to report the inapplicability of choice-talk tout court, the second the product of the naïve application of deliberative metacognition to human decision-making, cuing us to report the substantive and/or functional reality of ‘choice.’
If choice-talk were heuristic, in other words, you would expect something that closely resembles the contemporary free-will debate. You could even imagine philosophers cooking up cases to test, even spoof, the ways in which choice-talk and source-talk are cued. Since choices involve options, for instance, what happens when we apply source-talk to only one option, leaving the others to neglect?
If choice-talk were heuristic, in other words, you could imagine philosophers coming up things like ‘Frankfurt-style counterexamples.’ Say I want to buy a pet, but I can’t make up my mind whether to buy a cat or a dog. So, I decide to decide when I go the pet store on Friday. My wife is a neuroscientist who hates cats almost as much as she hates healthy communication. While I’m sleeping, she inserts a device at a strategic point in my brain that prevents me from choosing a cat and nothing else. None the wiser, I go to the pet store on Friday and decide to get a dog, but entirely of my own accord.
Did I choose freely?
These examples evidence the mischief falling out of heuristic neglect in a stark way. My wife’s device only interferes with decision-making processes to prevent one undesirable output. If the output is desirable, it plays no role, suggesting that the hacked subject chose that output ‘freely,’ despite the inability to do otherwise. On the one hand, surgical intervention prevents the application of choice-talk to cat buying. Source-talk, after all, trumps choice-talk. But since surgical intervention only pertains to cat buying, dog buying seems, to some at least, to remain a valid subject of choice-talk. Source neglect remains unproblematic. The machinery of decision-making, in other words, can be ignored the way it’s always ignored in decision-making contexts. It remains irrelevant. Choice-talk machinery seems to remain applicable to this one fork, despite crashing when both forks are taken together.
For some philosophers, this suggests that choice isn’t a matter of being able to do otherwise, but of arising out of the proper process—a question of appropriate ‘sourcing.’ They presume that choice-talk and the corresponding intuitions still apply. If the capacity to do otherwise isn’t definitive of choice, then provenance must be: choice is entirely compatible with precursors, they argue, so long as those precursors are the proper ones. Crash. Down another interpretative rabbit-hole they go. Short any inkling of the limits imposed by the heuristic tools at their disposal—blind to their own cognitive capacities—all they can do is pursue the intuitions falling out of the misapplications of those tools. They remain trapped, in effect, downstream the heuristic confounds described above.
Here we can see the way philosophical parsing lets us map the boundaries of reliable choice-talk application. Frankfurt-style counterexamples, on this account, are best seen as cognitive versions of visual illusions, instances where we trip over the ecological limits of our cognitive capacities.
As with visual illusions, they reveal the fractionate, heuristic nature of the capacities employed. Unlike visual illusions, however, they are too low-dimensional to be readily identified as such. To make matters worse, the breakdown is socio-cognitive: perpetual disputation between individuals is the breakdown. This means that its status as a crash space is only visible by taking an ecological perspective. For interpretative partisans, however, the breakdown always belongs to the ‘other guy.’ Understanding the ecology of the breakdown becomes impossible.
The stark lesson here is that ‘free-will’ is a deliberative confound, what you get when you ponder the nature of choice-talk without accounting for heuristic neglect. Choice-talk itself is very real. With the interactional system it belongs to—intentional cognition more generally—it facilitates cooperative miracles on the communicative back of less than fifteen bit-per-second. Impressive. Gobsmacking, actually. We would be fools not to trust our socio-cognitive reflexes where they are applicable, which is to say, where neglecting sources solves more problems than it causes.
So, yah, sure, we make choices all the bloody time. At the same time, though, ‘What is the nature of choice?’ is a question that can only be answered ecologically, which is to say, via source-sensitive cognition. The nature of choice involves the systematic neglect of systems that must be manipulated nevertheless. Cues and correlations are compulsory. The nature of choice, in other words, obliterates our intellectual and phenomenological intuitions regarding choice. There’s just no such thing.
And this, I think it’s fair to say, is as disastrous as a natural fact can be. But should we be surprised? The thing to appreciate, I think, is the degree to which we should expect to find ourselves in precisely such a dilemma. The hard fact is that biocomplexity forced us to evolve source-insensitive ways to troubleshoot all organisms, ourselves included. The progressive nature of science, however, insures that biocomplexity will eventually succumb to source-sensitive cognition. So, what are the chances that two drastically different, evolutionarily segregated cognitive modes would be easily harmonized?
Perhaps this is a growing pain every intelligent, interstellar species suffers, the point where their ancestral socio-cognitive toolset begins to fail them. Maybe science strips exceptionalism from every advanced civilization in roughly the same way: first our exceptional position, then our exceptional origin, and lastly, our exceptional being.
Perhaps choice dies with the same inevitability as suns, choking on knowledge instead of iron.
heh i didn’t see the alien bit coming, only a space alien can save us!
Well, there’s Fermi’s paradox
ha yeah we are as capable of being bewitched by maths as by grammar, somehow a kind of deus ex machina always slips in…
This all seems compatible with compatibilism, unless I misunderstand either it or you
One way of looking at what’s happening is as a gradual swapping of deep information ecologies for shallow ones. Choice-talk is only going to become more unreliable. Redefinition a la Dennett, forcing the terms to refer, is a hopelessly underdetermined exercise, and obscures the importance of naivete, the fact that neglecting sources is required for choice-talk to function reliably.
Thus the need to think these things through post-intentionally, clear away the old jargon to make room for something sensitive to sources. If our ancestral human cognitive ecology is suffering some kind of fatal crash, it behooves us to ponder what lies on the far side.
it may not behoove us but it’s certainly interesting to ponder
It’s still a great song:
What would a society without morality be like? For example our legal systems are based on morality and the idea that human beings are able to choose between good and evil. How would that system be replaced? What do elections mean now that the outcomes can be manipulated by software. If election results are not the rational choices of a free people what are they? How binding are the outcomes of those elections? Is democracy as we currently understand it still possible given that elections are a kind of choice talk?
I just went through a big Rush kick, actually. Neil Peart is a libertarian libertarian, no joke. There is trouble in the forest…
The reason I think the answers to your questions are so easy is that the loss-rate of ancestral invariants is only going to increase. More and more marbles are being dumped on the floor. We’re bipedal. Ergo…
Given Ayn Rand’s taste in heroes I wonder how Neil feels about Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg and the rest of the internet’s robber barons. I wonder how he feels about Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and the modern authoritarian technocrats of that ilk. I wonder on my own behalf if our plutocrats and their technocrats might not be converging on a kind of post-ideological totalitarianism from different directions. If “everything that is not forbidden is compulsory” we no longer need concern ourselves with free will in its academic or political incarnations.
I’m crying.
David Hume came to the conclusion of a bundle theory of mind, maybe learned from Buddhist ideas brought back by missionaries.
In introspection, he simply found there was no there there, just lots of thoughts and sensations. The experience of a singular, coherent self is a superficial lens through which we interpret what is in our awareness. In that context, the entire free will debate dissolves into nothingness, which is to say it’s a non-debate. It’s not really about free will but about identity and consciousness.
A much more profound insight into this mystery is that of Julian Jaynes who explores the narratizing mind. And ultimately that is what is being debated, the stories told and the characters enacted. These stories are neither right or wrong, can’t be formulated as falsifiable hypotheses. They are heuristics that give meaning without really explaining anything.
I don’t even find thoughts and sensations.
There’s countless ways to moot the debate–so many that a lot of philosophers think engaging it signals a lack of sophistication. The challenge here is to explain the debate, show why it possesses the structure it does, and what it teaches us about cognition more generally.
“I don’t even find thoughts and sensations.” I might get why you say that. I’d say that “thoughts and sensations” is a loose, ambiguous descriptor.
“There’s countless ways to moot the debate.” That is undoubtedly true. It’s hard to even know what the debate is about or even if it is a single debate… or debates all the way down.
“The challenge here is to explain the debate.” That is why I brought up Jaynes. And I know you’ve mentioned him in passing before in your blog.
““I don’t even find thoughts and sensations.” I might get why you say that. I’d say that “thoughts and sensations” is a loose, ambiguous descriptor.”
A big reason consciousness is so difficult to understand has to do with the heuristic inapplicability of aboutness to inner experience. Do we find things or make them?
What Hume is doing in the Treatise is demonstrating just how underdetermined our phenomenological musings turn out to be, how easily interpretations can be wrenched this way and that. He’s showing us the heuristic limits of human metacognition.
“Do we find things or make them?
What Hume is doing in the Treatise is demonstrating just how underdetermined our phenomenological musings turn out to be, how easily interpretations can be wrenched this way and that. He’s showing us the heuristic limits of human metacognition.”
indeed, did you see:
http://www.ensoseminars.com/presentations/past22/
?
ps also
https://www.academia.edu/39326657/M._Anderson_and_A._Chemero_The_world_well_found_in_M._Colombo_L._Irvine_and_M._Stapleton_eds._Andy_Clark_and_his_Critics_Oxford_University_Press_161-173
Great little read. The overarching problem, I think, lies in the lack of any theory of metacognitive ecology: all theorists run afoul misapplications of intentional cognition as result, allowing them to torpedo one another while damning the torpedoes in their own case.
glad you like it, they are chipping away which is pretty striking in itself I can’t tell you how long I’ve waited for some cracks in the old certainties
Chemero in particular. He was far more forgiving just a few years ago.
dmf – I went to your two links. The second particularly interested me, but I only skimmed it. The focus on swaying is more complex than it at first appears. But I wondered if there might sometimes be simple explanations. Maybe swaying is a secondary effect of some primary trait that was evolved for entirely other advantages at some point in evolution.
The swaying itself could be incidental as part of embodied existence, an expression rather than a cause of some deeper motivation. Perhaps humans simply enjoy the sensation of swaying as an indicator of embodiment that is tied up with a basic sense of self in the world. As our eyes constantly move, it could just feel more comfortable to be in a state of movement.
To put it simply, maybe swaying feels good, is pleasurable. It doesn’t have to serve any pragmatic function. As long as it isn’t a direct detriment to survival and procreation, evolution doesn’t necessarily offer any deterrence of pleasure that serves no clear purpose. Why do we assume something like swaying should serve a purpose? And even if we come up some plausible hypothesis, it still might be yet another just-so story we like to tell ourselves.
Swaying and other forms of movement might be the default of our evolutionary lineage. It simply is something we inherited, maybe for no particular reason. It’s the default, unless some evolutionary pressure selects for something else. We sway. It’s just what we do. Why not? If humans didn’t sway, that might be the peculiar behavior that needed explaining.
Why assume that it doesn’t, Ben? In-principle arguments like this miss the point, I think. Their account explains certain systematicities evident in the way we sway. That’s what recommends it as a possibility over other possible explanations. The possibility of other possibilities goes without saying, by and large.
I wasn’t assuming it doesn’t. I merely offered the suggestion that neither is there a reason to assume it does. I was being ‘agnostic’ on the matter. I guess I find myself skeptical, as when dealing with the just-so stories of human biodiversity advocates. Skepticism is my natural inclination, not to claim that makes me right, as I wasn’t really arguing for any particular strong position. I’m simply exploring the assumptions we make. As far as I can tell in dealing with most people, the possibility of other possibilities most certainly does not go without saying. But I understand that you and others commenting here aren’t typical. i was just offering a thought experiment, I suppose, and not trying to prove anything.
But they provide several reasons. That’s the point. One can be skeptical and still acknowledge the merits of a case vis a vis alternatives, no?
I agree. My thoughts were simply step back from the narratizing mind. But I didn’t mean to dismiss any given narrative as a plausible theory. It’s simply thinking about what is happening in our consciousness when we tell these stories. And considering narratizing as fundamental to consciousness, it makes one wonder what kind of mind the Piraha have in being disinclined to tell explanatory stories, mythological or scientific. I’m thinking about this in more social science terms than as philosophy or neurocognitive science.
I didn’t have a clear thought in my original comment about the theories on human swaying. But maybe it was coming down to that storytelling aspect. We could speak of which stories are most true, most strongly correlated to the evidence with the greatest explanatory power with hypothesized causal mechanisms. And we could differentiate that from false stories or at least false according to science. Still, what fascinates me is this desire to tell stories and why it appears to form out of a specific kind of mentality. Our debate here is not a universal to humanity but only found within specific cultures with specific ways of thinking. The debate of such topics is only possible at all because we’ve developed Jaynsian consciousness. That fascinates me, what underlies the debate itself.
To my mind, this brings us into interesting territory. Think about this anthropologically and linguistically (Daniel Everett is a linguistic and his son, Caleb, has written a book on linguistic relativity).
The Piraha don’t only lack a storytelling tradition or even much interest in speaking in narrative form. They also lack recursion, numerical terms, and color terms.
They speak concretely and personally. In making a truth claim, they reference direct experience or else the direct experience of someone they know. Their language requires this of them, as there is no way to speak of abstract generalizations.
The Piraha would never debate “free will” or what it feels like to see “red” or if “God” exists. It’s simply not within their linguistic and cultural framework. This would influence not only their mentality in experiencing the world but their way of thinking about their own minds.
I don’t know if or how this might be relevant to your own thoughts. It’s just wonder about how we talk about things and how difficult it is for us to think outside of our way of using language or the way language uses us.
I’ve been thinking about the Piraha quite abit lately. I read a couple of Dan’s books earlier this year as well as Caleb’s (also excellent) book on numbers–research for The Lollipop Factory. Dan’s reading a draft of the novel now in fact!
No one does a better job laying out the mad ecological complexity of human communication. The fact that we squeeze it into such a sparse signal means that neglect is bound to confound our inquiries. I’m trying to convince him that neglect provides a way to articulate and explore what he calls ‘dark matter.’
I’m glad to hear that you’ve been researching into this and that it is informing your other writing. That sounds exciting. I’ve never read your fiction and, in fact, I was oblivious of your other writing when I came across your blog.
I should dive into one of your novels because I must admit that sometimes your blog posts go over my head in that there is plenty you talk about that I’m not familiar with. My own reading often takes me in other directions.
What book do you think would make the best introduction to your work? Maybe I’ll wait for your new book to come out and get a copy of it. When is it planned to be available?
I tell people to start with Neuropath. The relationship to the theory is easier to see than in the fantasy works. And the level of violence and sexual perversion in Neuropath is a sort of test to see if he is your type of author.
Thanks for the recommendation. I’m going to see if my local public library has any of his books.
If we were all in a relatively empathetic society, would choice die or just be severely humbled?
It’s doomed regardless, I think.
What form does that doom take? I mean to me humans at default don’t take on huge philosophical thinking – they live and they do things well prior to any concept of ‘free will’ getting into their heads. Ignoring corporate manipulation for a moment, what is doomed here? A kind of academic religion?
I mean I can feel a kind of upsetness even in myself just glibly treating ‘free will’ as a passing religion. But what was the idea there for? Was it there for the people, or were the people there for the sake of the idea (with the latter definitely being religion)?
Nice seeing posts from you btw. Hope your christmas was a nice one for you and your family.
Post-ideological totalitarianism, Callan. You don’t need communism or national socialism, but you need a politics that’s built from the ground up to work without free will. As I said above, I think our internet robber barons and their authoritarian technocrats might be converging on the same unfreedom from different directions.
So long as there’s some kind of competition, there’s noise. This is why tribalism, identification, is so crucial at this juncture: notional competitors allow mass signallers to eliminate actual competition. Dere’s gold in dem der anxieties.
Khellhus, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Big Brother from 1984, Pol Pot, Hitler all want to condition the ground of your existence and come before your ‘choices.’ The ways in which Amazon and Facebook condition the ground and come before your choices are different, in that different carrot/stick ratios are preferred, but the goals are the same.
And transferable.
Have you seen “Tell Me Who I Am” on Netflix? Horrifying and revealing.
No Netflix, I fear.
You’re probably better off, but the documentary is about identical twin brothers and what happens when one of them loses his memory in a motorcycle crash. The other brother reshapes, then, his brother’s memory, but leaves out horrible, but critical, details in order to spare his brother and create better false memories for himself. Anyway, apart from the appalling revelation, it provides a good account of what happens when our heuristics are damaged.
And you blogging again is my favorite Christmas present this year. Thanks.
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