CAUSA SUIcide
Every so often the papers carry a horrific story of some family drowning sequentially. one member will get into trouble, prompting another member to jump in, prompting another member to jump in, and so on. it’s almost always the case that no one in the family knows how to swim, but still they jump in. every time i encounter a story like this i think of hume and his empirical aphorism about drowning, the futility of reason in the face of water. and i am reminded of philosophy more generally, how all the great figures line up, jumping in to save their predecessor, only to find themselves going under.
philosophy is where thinking goes to drown. always has been. always will.
and yet here we are, lining up…
this is why i have a hard time deciding whether philosophy is more tragic or more comical. funny because the stakes are so low, and tragic because the domain is so significant. like the drowning families, it’s one of those things you laugh about when telling your buddies at work, only to wince in remorse thinking about the survivors. i find philosophy hilarious in proportion to my distance to it. i write these witty and callow aphorisms that pose its presumptions like 19th century stills of the infamous dead. i don’t tell anecdotes. and then i find myself in funks like these, thinking about survivors… or should i say, the lack of them.
one thing’s for sure: no corner of human inquiry is more optimistic.
i take quentin meillassoux to be a wonderful case in point:
“By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call correlationism any current of thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every philosophy which disavows naive realism has become a variant of correlationism.”
the project of after finitude is essentially the one i attempted in my dissertation: how do we escape context?
meillassoux calls the problem ‘correlationism,’ a kind of master commitment to some kind of originary theoretical scene. i simply call it context.
what we’re trying to intellectually escape.
wittgenstein was big trouble. the pragmatists had been arguing this for years, but he crystallized the problem that normativity poses for all representational accounts of meaning. until PI, philosophers still had faith in the ability of language to logically relate us to the world. so long as language was transparent, this was no problem. then wittgenstein simply asked, what justifies your applications? he thematized normative contexts, in effect, and it all began to crumble. ‘truth conditions’ would no longer do.
now this is something that’s fascinated me for a long time. why does making something like ‘normativity’ explicit have the ‘inferential’ effects that it has? so long as normativity remained implicit, representationalists could think that the truth-function of language literally bound them to the world. as soon as normativity is disclosed the stakes are radically transformed. in a strange sense, all of creation is reinterpreted.
now how is that like, even fucking possible? reading heidegger was like this for me, a profound implicature that settled like fat snow over all of existence, suddenly snapping the world into a different focus. trippy shit.
let’s give this phenomenon a name, exhaustive philosophical reinterpretation (EPR).
kantian ‘correlation’ is an exhaustive interpreter. most all the great philosophical revolutions are. they somehow rewire something so conceptually paradigmatic that everything needs to be reinterpreted. what’s more, even if you disagree with them, there’s a sense in which their problems remain. philosophy is filled with troublemakers and peacekeepers; some philosophers, like wittgenstein, manage to be both. otherwise, they tend to come in twos.
the troublemaker kant hoped to pacify was hume. like wittgenstein, hume made explicit what had been an obvious but otherwise invisible feature of knowledge contexts: subjectivity understood in the modern sense. so long as subjectivity remained implicit, rationalists could think that reason alone could apprehend the world. as soon as it became explicit, the logical view from nowhere had to await kant and the retreat into the transcendental.
in both cases of making explicit, the normative and the subjective, the structure is almost precisely the same. some implicit (but otherwise obvious) feature of the context of knowledge is rendered explicit. you could say that this is all that ‘philosophical progress’ consists in, the making explicit of paradigmatic features. and this, somehow, seems to be what generates EPR.
so hume saddles us with what might be called the ‘subjectivity constraint,’ and wittgenstein saddles us with what might be called the ‘normativity constraint.’ when subjectivity is invisible it’s easy to think we see things as they are. when normativity is invisible it’s easy to think our claims are fixed by the way things are. both of these take an apparent ‘view from nowhere,’ a logical relation to the world, and situate it somewhere.
contextualize it.
so, for some reason, contextualizing knowledge has the effect of rendering it more contingent. whereas, decontextualizing knowledge has the theoretical effect of rendering it more necessary. the structure of natural languages actually seems to accommodate this with propositional attitudes, the way operators like ‘believes that,’ ‘hopes that,’ ‘denies that,’ have the effect of short-circuiting compositionality. these operators bracket their attendant propositions, exempt them from the surrounding semantic economy, by literally rendering them relative to some intentional activity. they become ‘opaque contexts.’
why does contextualization lead to contingency? because contexts seem to possess what might be called ‘determinativity’: as soon as the subject contextualizes knowledge, the subject seems to somehow determine knowledge. likewise, as soon as norms contextualize knowledge, norms seem to somehow determine knowledge. since the philosophical process of making explicit seems to be a cumulative one, the tendency has been toward ever increasing contingency.
where the former strands us with the veil of representations, the latter strands us with a veil of performances. the problem with both of these contextualizations of knowledge is that they seem to render it entirely contingent, nothing at all outside of given subjective or normative contexts…
but only so long as you attribute a certain kind of determinativity to either. just because contexts seem to possess determinativity doesn’t mean they do. meillassoux is careful to reference ‘naive realism’ in passing, because to pause would be to kick open the doors to an entirely different brand of ‘correlationism,’ the kind belonging to thinkers as penetrating as searle or brandom, say.
you could say he simply takes the failure of these philosophical outlooks to find their way beyond correlationism by thinking through correlation. but this simply begs the question of why these thinkers feel compelled to begin with correlationism. it certainly isn’t because they are unfamiliar with the subjective or normative turns–a neologism (‘correlation’) does not a profound ontological discovery make.
they begin with the ‘scene of correlationism’ because they cannot see their way past the subjectivity and normativity constraints. correlation isn’t some accident that philosophy just stumbled into: hume discloses the context of subjective incapacity that is a fact of human cognition, just as wittgenstein discloses the context of normative complicity. and there is quite simply no going back, short of answering the problems that these thinkers pose–problems that meillassoux all but ignores.
meillassoux wants to characterize philosophy in the decontextualized (dogmatic) sense, as the hunt for truth, where truth is understood in all or nothing terms. he wants to find a view from nowhere hidden in some attic dormer. but I see the situation far, far differently. philosophy, rather, is the hunt for the frame of frames, the one that will allow us explain knowledge, comprehend life, describe appearance… the magical context. how do you subtract the fact that meillassoux has a normative context? how do you subtract the fact that he shares the same cognitive incapacities we all suffer?
you can’t.
both of these disclosures command subsequent thought.
and this is displayed in meillassoux’s abject vulnerability to the most simplest, most honest of questions… how do you know?
‘so that’s your philosophical opinion, that we have spooky knowledge at a distance? i know for you it looks like a jail break, but from my standpoint, it has to look like hand-waving. why? well, there’s subjectivity. and there’s this thing about normative contexts.
there’s these difficulties we can’t simply bluff our way past anymore.
in truth and context i thought the problem lay in the partitioning of performance and content. since i take it to be the case that all claims are not equal, i thought that ontological innovation was the solution, the provision of some paradigmatic description that could account for knowledge while meeting these two challenges.
and for his attempt meillassoux simply generalizes the epistemological dilemma into ‘correlation,’ then offers up a counterexample. the Ancestral. this counterexample allows him to pose the subjective and normative contextual disclosures as the problematic constraints they are. Ancestral claims have contexts. then he poses his question:
“In one sense, yes, the correlationist will reply, because the scientific statements pointing to such an event are objective, in other words, inter-subjectively verifiable. But in another sense, no, he will go on, because the referent of such statements cannot have existed in the way in which it is naively described, i.e. as non-correlated with a consciousness.”
the trick is this. since the subjective and normative contexts are second-order dislosures, they have the effect of relativizing first-order disclosures. parmenides hinge… you’re looking at it. there’s this creak, and a view from nowhere becomes a view from there. what meillassoux is doing is basically arguing that correlation generates a theoretically ‘opaque context’ when it comes to Ancestral statements. the truth of the first-order claim doesn’t sum with the truth of the second-order…
hmm.
of course. i realize there are plenty of counter arguments that could be offered here, but the bottom-line is they needn’t be made. meillassoux’s trick lies in characterizing this problem as a choice. you see, he wants to convince you the correlationists murdered the absolute, that they freely chose to pull the trigger, when the whole time they have both hume and wittgenstein holding mk xix, .50 (action express) desert eagles to their heads. meillassoux’s trick, in other words, is to turn the challenge of philosophy after hume and wittgenstein into a kind of theoretical patsy.
to pretend that the guns aren’t also levelled at him.
you can give him his ‘past, only like, for real argument,’ or his ‘transcendental schmancendental argument.’ the more damage they do the better. these issues only serve to draw attention away from the obvious: 1) that the claim that hume and wittgenstein have rendered objectivity difficult to understand is about as trivial as any in philosophy (which just goes to show how effective philosophical rebranding can be). and 2) that the troubling facts of subjectivity and normativity still obtain.
this is just to say that the entire opening of after finitude is just a red herring.
correlation, my ass.
The magical context is the EPR triggering disclosure that does one of two things: either it reconciles truth and context in a manner that meets the constraints of subjectivity and normativity, or it renders the whole matter moot. it takes as given that the ‘movement of philosophy,’ insofar as it is ‘progressive’ at all, is the movement of making the implicit explicit. it also takes as given that this progression, thus far, has made truth progressively more difficult to understand.
we can draw at least two pessimistic inductions from this: first, that exercises in philosophical nostalgia like after finitude are as inevitable as yellow armpits; and second, the next great reinterpretation of the occluded frame will likely just make matters fucking worse.
as i mentioned at the beginning of this particular adventure, meillassoux’s project was essentially my own. unlike meillassoux, however, i made the magical context in the first sense–an EPR triggering disclosure that reconciles truth and context–my explicit goal. thanks to the arrogant idiocy of youth, i never paused to consider the trend of disclosure, the way making the implicit explicit seemed to make matters worse for truth. i literally thought i was solving a problem. what i found was disaster.
the brain.
looking back, our philosophical descendants will almost certainly dub this philosophical age the ‘neural turn.’ as with past turns of the philosophical screw, there’s a kind of ambient instability about the thing turned to, an appreciation and a respect, but absent any real sense of what it means. only people interested in the philosophy of mind tuned in when i mentioned the brain ten years ago. almost universally, my continental peers reflexively dismissed the talk as ‘reductive nonsense.’ not so now. it’s taken woefully, perhaps even comically, long, but intentional philosophy is at last realizing what scientists, futurists, and SF writers have been crying from hilltops for years: a new Enlightenment is upon us, one with philosophical consequences even more profound than the old.
buckle up, kids. the ride will get scary–perhaps even lethal.
meillassoux actually agrees with me, though he hasn’t realized it yet.
“… when we raise the question of the emergence of thinking bodies in time we are also raising the question of the temporality of the conditions of instantiation, and hence of the taking place of the transcendental as such. Objective bodies may not be a sufficient condition for the taking place of the transcendental, but they are certainly a necessary condition for it.”
this is the account i offered in my previous adventure: an empirical way to conceive the ‘taking place of the transcendental,’ or why it is our perspectives have the structure they do.
“We thereby discover that the time of science temporalizes and spatializes the emergence of living bodies; that is to say, the emergence of the conditions for the taking place of the transcendental. What effectively emerged with living bodies were the instantiations of the subject, its character as point-of-view-on-the-world.”
this is one of the things that I suspect led brassier to pose his problem in the manner he did: how can the irreflexive time of the world described by science gives rise to the reflexive time of the transcendental? this is the million dollar question, one which meillassoux simply glosses and moves on.
“The fact that subjects emerged here on this earth or existed elsewhere is a purely empirical matter. But the fact that subjects appeared – simply appeared – in time and space, instantiated by bodies, is a matter that pertains indissociably both to objective bodies and to transcendental subjects. And we realize that this problem simply cannot be thought from the transcendental viewpoint because it concerns the space-time in which transcendental subjects went from not-taking-place to taking-place – and hence concerns the space-time anterior to the spatio-temporal forms of representation. To think this ancestral space-time is thus to think the conditions of science and also to revoke the transcendental as essentially inadequate to this task.”
to assert the priority of the subjective/normative over the causal is to forget that subjectivity/normativity is a consequence of the causal. i’ve always been fascinated with the way certain forms seem to float like structured strands of intellectual protein through philosophy, fastening themselves in various guises in various autoreproductive contexts. if you think about it, meillassoux’s ‘problem of Ancestrality’ bears some resemblance to kripke’s skeptical paradox. the idea is to find some apparently simple question, such as, how do you know ‘plus’ isn’t ‘quus’? that traditional philosophical schemes seem incapable of answering, then to provide your own innovative solution. so where kripke posed the ‘problem of quus’ to forcefully disclose the fact of normativity, meillassoux poses the ‘problem of the Ancestral’ to… argue that normativity makes truth difficult.
what meillassoux is saying is trivial. but there is something forceful here, a disclosure every bit as radical and threatening as kripke’s skeptical paradox.
as bones would put it: “it’s in his brain, jim!”
brain. a word never mentioned in after finitude–to my recollection, at least.
in a sense, meillassoux has to avoid the brain, simply because of the theoretically fatal (for him) way it reframes what he calls ‘philosophies of access.’ information that does not reach the brain does not reach consciousness, plain and simple. spooky knowledge at a distance is one thing, but spooky information? or what about vacuum tube delivery system of the absolute, mathematics? what happens if mathematics is something that our brains do, leaving us to observe phenomenal shadows which, since they comprise the totality of our experience of mathematics, seem like everything? there can be little doubt that the brain horrifically complicates his argument. but if any project demands an accounting of the brain, surely it’s his. think about it: he’s posing the problem ‘ancestrality’ poses for the transcendental, and he entirely overlooks the one place where they are, as he puts it, ‘indissociable.’
hmm.
all I am is a phd drop-out who continues to dabble. i am not a scholar in any sense. so when i find myself this mystified by the reputation of a certain philosophical wonk and his work i really am inclined to think something is flying over my head, that i’ve gamed the ambiguities this way or that way or what have you. but i’m having a real difficult time seeing this particular book as anything other than a kind of philosophical melodrama, a theatre where the trivial is dressed as revelation, where really fucking hard philosophical problems are made up to resemble ‘errant philosophical choices.’
“those correlationists, tsk-tsk-tsk…”
“um, dude? hume and wittgenstein are like, holding guns.”
My bid for the magical context consisted of kicking a pillow into hume’s face while cartwheeling to the fireplace. if i could keep moving laterally fast enough to avoid getting tagged, i could grab the poker, hurl it like a javelin right at wittgenstein’s face, then…
did i mention i was gunned down?
just not by hume or wittgenstein.
it’s taking philosophy time. in the absence of any efficacious epistemic constraints, philosophy wanders where it will, speciating and convoluting until some disclosure like subjectivity or normativity forces a drastic change in game plans. theoretical incompetence (TI) assures that the individual philosopher almost always ‘discovers’ what they need to make their rationalizations stick, even as it assures that those rationalizations will fail to command any kind of meaningful consensus. what distinguishes subjectivity and normativity was that they made explicit something undeniable, something as plain as plain can be, as well as encompassing, something pertaining to the sum of human activity. as disclosures they were at once obvious and totalizing.
‘legalists’ like meillassoux are literally a dime a dozen, lawyers who toil in the archives looking for some kind of loophole. the problem, however, is that he wants to be a framer, to emulate those who have rewritten the philosophical constitution. so he does what framers do, diagnosing and isolating some systematic dysfunction in the existing constitution. but because he really has no new, game-changing disclosure to make, he offers us yet another legalistic loophole, a ‘context escape clause’ that does little more than raise more question than answers. but since it is his escape clause, he pretends that it’s truly a new constitution. and thus the absurd disjunct between what his discourse presumes and what it accomplishes. the perpetual comedy and tragedy of philosophy.
and me? prior to my dissertation, i was every bit the clown meillassoux is. everything i’ve written (and continue to write) reeks of the will to frame. root through the documents on three pound brain and you will find diagnosis after totalizing diagnosis, culminating in what I sincerely believed was the next great disclosure, the magical context.
i called it the occluded frame. what had yet to be disclosed, i thought, was contextuality itself, the principles that explained the disclosures of other framers. once we understood the contextual logic that makes kant, hegel, nietzsche, wittgenstein, heidegger, and so on possible, i thought, we could get to the business of designing a new constitution, one that allowed us to make sense of truth and context, while explaining the implicit assumptions that led all those past framers astray.
so i developed a theory of ‘vantages,’ one self-consciously designed to side-step the subjectivity and normativity constraints–an account of context that made room for truth. this meant running the theory through all the traditional skeptical arguments–the ones that meillassoux largely if not entirely ignores. and this meant dealing with the argument from illusion.
i had dispatched with ‘representationalism.’ since a perspective is always a perspective on something that transcends it, positing things that stand between us and the world, representations, literally makes ‘perspective’ incomprehensible–or so i thought. the problem, of course, was the simple, incontrovertible fact that we dream, we lie, we hallucinate, we tell stories, and so on. how could these things be explained absent representational intermediaries? i redescribed all these things as ‘vicarities,’ idiosyncratic angles on the world from special kinds of positions within the world. dreams were perspectives on the world from the standpoint of dreaming in the world.
i painted a picture where everything was cognitive in some respect, only not equally so. i formalized the language of positionality that we seem to instinctively reach for whenever comparing views. i explained how some ‘standpoints’ could encompass others, while other ‘positions’ left us ‘in the dark.’ i described the necessary angularity of human truth, the illusory nature of the ‘view from nowhere,’ and the way the logical function of language nevertheless exploits it. on and on i went, drunk with afferentially constrained innovation, seeing hermeneutic opportunities everywhere i turned, convinced that i had found the magical context, the EPR triggering disclosure that could reconcile context and truth.
i was going to be the next wittgenstein, the next heidegger…
but… i was a clown.
odd, isn’t it? the way we are so prone to disguise the social dimension of our philosophical writing, how everything is a pitch to the other, yet pretends to be wholly invested in its subject matter. odd, isn’t it? that out of all the second-order considerations we drag into our work, that this one would be the most assiduously avoided? the most reliably punished? out of all the clownish things about philosophy, the systematic suppression of motive–be it prestige, employment, or immortality–is the most clownish of all. when you think about it, it’s remarkable we had to wait so long for nietzsche and his great disclosure (before we could willfully ignore it).
Of course I wasn’t the next wittgenstein–I wasn’t even the next meillassoux! i was another grad student smoking from the bong of conceptual possibility. the significance of my ‘disclosure’–my account of the contextuality of context–depended on my normative context…
wittgenstein, fuck!
because my particular normative context was having none of it. i had placed all my professors in a curious double-bind, one that put their fetishization of ‘originality’ in direct conflict with the expediencies of conceptual standardization. i was a clown, and i could feel it. decades in dusty libraries were required to make the claims I was making. i was out of my depth: how could i not drown?
i had always been fascinated by so-called ‘unexplained explainers,’ those concepts that must simply be ‘given’ in some way to get any philosophical theory off the ground. ask a wittgensteinian about use and he or she will say you have to look at the contexts in which it is used. the premonition of shame and social humiliation turned my eye to my great unexplained explainer, the occluded frame.
the argument from illusion already had me thinking about brains. even a brain in a vat had a vat. i saw in this a pregnant connection between what i was saying about vantages and their empirical substrate: they were both impossible to understand absent their environment. even more, i had been playing poker with an avowed nihilist, and losing faith in the preemptive presumption of so much continental philsophy.
so what was it about the brain that could explain occluded frames?
something did not so much puncture as punch through me, a disproportion of relative velocities so great that I remained motionless around the portion of me that was torn away. an occluded heart.
i only heard the gunshot on the way down.
So long as intentionality remains cognitively closed, which is to say, a family of conceptual and intuitive unexplained explainers, we need only keep a wary eye on cognitive neuroscience as we philosophize. traditional philosophical discourse retains its autonomy. both pre-subjective and pre-normative philosophy, i think, provide excellent analogues for the ‘pre-neural’ situation that obtains today. until the neural problematic is disclosed in some undeniable manner, established normative economies will continue conserving their ‘constitution,’ and legalism will rule the day. consider the curious case of meillassoux: despite the theatrics of his exposition, the way characterizing correlation as a figure makes it seem contingent, he nonetheless remains constrained. he still has to cast about in search of a loophole. he remains, despite his remonstrations otherwise, a post-subjective, post-normative, pre-neural philosopher. his book literally should have been titled, gaming finitude.
philosophical constitutions are hardy beasts. short of some decisive formulation, only the gradual accumulation of interpretative background noise precipitates their collapse. as the activity of meillassoux and so many other intentional philosophers demonstrates, neurality still awaits the disclosure that will render it undeniable. intentionality has yet to be explained in a manner that forces philosophy’s collective hand.
for my part, however, neurality has arrived. for some ten years now the insight that ruined my dissertation, the ‘blind brain theory,’ has slipped through the various pockets of my life, a hard marble that burns the fingers for being so cold. i quite literally refuse to believe it, and yet, nevertheless, i find it undeniable. it is the context i cannot seem to escape.
the blind brain theory (BBT), assumes substantial informatic asymmetry, radical quantitative and structural disparities between the information the brain processes and the information the brain processes of that processing. the analogy is that of the brain peering back at itself through a peephole, and as such profoundly incapable of grasping itself for what it is.
the problem of consciousness has something to do with intentionality. intentionality is unique because of the way it ontologically monopolizes consciousness, and so encompasses all our activity. but it is also unique in an even more extraordinary way: where other phenomena simply ‘resist’ explanation, intentional phenomena seem to be intrinsically antagonistic to explanation. like a card trick, one cannot explain it without explaining it away. BBT simply takes this ‘magical analogy’ at its word: it presumes that intentionality as well as other ‘inexplicables’ of consciousness like presence, unity, and personal identity, are kinds of ‘magic tricks,’ artifacts of the way the conscious is a prisoner of a greater, unconscious, magician brain.
all magic tricks turn on information horizons: the magician literally leverages her illusions by manipulating what information you can and cannot access. the spectator is encapsulated, which is to say, stranded with information that appears sufficient. the sense of magic arises from the disjunct between this apparent sufficiency and what actually happens. if recursive neural processing simply is consciousness, then we can presume encapsulation, which is to say, we can presume, not only that the conscious brain is fenced with information horizons, but that the information accessed has to appear sufficient, simply because it possesses no information that could generate the ‘appearance of insufficiency.’[*]
consciousness can be characterized as a queer camera obscura, a finite ‘informatic region’ where things appear medially. To ‘appear medially’ simply means to appear ‘from nowhere.’ (and because to be from nowhere (nowhen) means to go nowhere (nowhen), we never go anywhere, and so always find ourselves here (now)). think of rules, the way they form an invisible water-slide, something that constrains us implicitly. given BBT, the ‘normativity’ we abstract from rules is an artifact of informatic asymmetry. the features we ascribe to normativity are the result of local, and therefore fractional, access to global processes of behaviour and behavioural feedback. they only apply to how we experience these systems. since the information is so local, we can’t make any global assumptions regarding the actual processes involved. but since local is all the system has, it becomes global. we presume to know what normativity is, so much so we often presume to inflict that knowledge upon others.
constraints on access structure consciousness: this is the heart of the BBT. as strange as it sounds, what the system looks like depends on what the system sees. those constraints, insofar as they constitute information exterior to the system, must remain invisible to the system. as a product of access, the conscious system must be saturated, which is to say, whole, finite, and unbounded. experience is the expression of limits that cannot be seen as limits. access to ancient environmental subsystems simply ‘becomes’ the world. access to all other systems becomes everything that accompanies the ‘appearance of a world’: the medial, the sourceless and maximally proximal. everything else is missing.
phenomenologically speaking, you’re presently experiencing a collection of multiply sourced points of access to your greater, unconscious brain. it’s all contingent. imagine a tangled mass of cables knotted into a single field of possible recursive access, one that blots all sight of the cables or anything else, that seamlessly sutures over all the etiological chasms between, simply because they are not accessible. over that field ranges another dynamic field of ongoing recursive integration. the invisible, medial arrow of intention, the you, is a kind of misapprehension, not in metzinger’s sense of self as simulation, but in every sense. you hang as volition, desire, intellect, pain, shame, bliss because your frame cannot differentiate you from yourself. time runs out the same as vision, and so you… just… hang. the manifold channels of recursive access are you, scattered like a british empire through the brain, bound by a communal inability to imagine, let alone perceive, the dividing sea.
to appreciate the radicality of this approach one need only consider the alternatives. all speculation on consciousness (that i’ve encountered at least) suffers from what–from the standpoint of BBT–might be called the ‘accomplishment fallacy.’ the accomplishment fallacy takes consciousness as experienced to be a kind of multi-modal achievement, the product of various brain functions–the famed ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCCs). so consider the classic philosophical problem of the ‘unity of consciousness,’ which showed the light of dualism to descartes. In being no one (already the classic statement of neurality), metzinger claims that ‘our conscious experience of reality is held together internally by a principle or mechanism which itself is consciously inaccessible.’ the presumption here is eminently intuitive: if consciousness is unified, and if consciousness is a product of the brain, then something in the brain must be responsible for unifying consciousness. this presumption is so intuitive, in fact, that he ends up positing ‘phenomenal aspects’ and ‘hidden mechanisms’ for pretty much every reportable feature of consciousness.
BBT simply turns the question around the way einstein turned newton’s theory of gravity around. where newton looked at gravity as a discrete force acting on objects with inertial dispositions, which is to say, something to be achieved, einstein transformed gravity into a feature of space-time, which is to say, an expression of structure. BBT performs an analogous figure-field switch with respect to the unity of consciousness. where the philosophical tradition looks at unity as an achievement of some discrete neural complex, BBT transforms it into an expression of what consciousness is, which is just to say, recursive neural information integration (of the kind required, perhaps, to code brain information for linguistic transmission). the unity of consciousness, as much as qualia or objects or affects, is an expression of information access. why is consciousness unified? simply because it has no access to information pertaining to its disunity.
i understand how peculiar this must sound, but consider the peculiarity of the accomplishment perspective, [*] now that you have an alternative as a basis for comparison: why are NCC’s required to produce the inability of consciousness to discriminate its own modularity? Because this, in the end, is what we are trying to explain: the holistic unity we experience, not the super-complicated multiplicity we are.
BBT assumes that the informatic asymmetry that characterizes all conscious phenomena relative to their empirical counterparts is no coincidence. it assumes, in other words, that consciousness really is a kind of ‘trick’–and that, given encapsulation, it could be no other way. it asks of every so-called ‘phenomenal aspect’ it encounters, first, ‘what information is this missing?’ and then, ‘why is it missing this information?’
you are your thalamocortical system (TCS), but in such a way that you cannot recognize yourself as such. given the first proposition, the second becomes a platitude. the ‘explananda of consciousness,’ in other words, are informatic asymmetric ‘misapprehensions’–they have to be, not only because of the kinds of structural and developmental constraints that presumably pertain to neurorecursivity, but because of the mad complexities revealed by neuroscience. you are a brain incapable of seeing itself as a brain–what could be more obvious?
according to the BBT, all the so-called ‘puzzles of consciousness’ fall out of this–in some cases* with dreadful ease and stupefying consequences. oblivious to the privative dimension of conscious experience, the neural accomplishment perspective ‘naturally’ interprets the various phenomenal consequences of informatic asymmetry as a positive, as something that some mechanism had to achieve. BBT, on the other hand, simply sees them as structural consequences of what consciousness is: the brain’s dubious informatic grasp on itself.
a chasm lies between consciousness as possessed and consciousness as experienced. we quite literally do not have the consciousness we think we experience. as much as theorists like metzinger and dennett insist (in various guises) on this very same point, the accomplishment fallacy leads them (in various guises) to mistake our misapprehension for the thing. there is no such thing as the now. there is no such thing as personal identity. there is no such thing as intentionality. it’s not that we’re stranded with these ‘imperfect yet useful tools,’ we quite simply don’t have the tools–only misapprehensions.
the intractibility of the qualia debate is something BBT actually predicts, the one side simply regarding experience, dumbfounded that anyone could disbelieve, the other side accumulating more and more evidence of actual discrepancies. recursive systems may ‘look like’ what ‘they see,’ but what they are is an entirely different matter. we can’t just say we are what we look like without first explaining away the fact that we’re not. we do not hang nowhere; there is no such thing as now; there is no such thing as personal identity: all phenomenology is the phenomenology of misapprehension. but at the same time, we can’t simply assert we’re not what we look like without explaining why what we look like seems to exhaust what we are. we still have a phenomenology.
in the intentional terms forced upon us by consciousness, consciousness can only be a ‘misapprehension’ because whole dimensions of information have been sheered away. you need only ask what your hundred billion or so brain cells are doing this very moment (running you, among other things) to appreciate the staggering asymmetry between you and what you really are.
brain cells… you don’t want to see that shit on your carpet.
but to say we are this impoverishment is to suggest we have no other recourse. the question, ‘what is it like?’ actually bears the imprimatur of encapsulation: experience can only resort to experience to explicate experience. the ‘given,’ its content and modes of givenness, can only be hashed out in terms of the ‘given.’ phenomenology not only seems to be the ‘natural mode’ of experiential description, it seems to be the only mode. once you refuse to consider the given in isolation from the source, however, you realize that reflection upon the ‘givenness of the given’ can only compound experiential poverty. in a sense, you could say phenomenology is in the business of scalping decapitations, then claiming that the world is braided out of hair.
the very thing that suggests phenomenology is the only way, encapsulation, is the very thing that renders phenomenology impossible. encapsulation does not stand still. it’s like we’re plucking gears out of an occluded transmission only to be dumbfounded by the mangled, twisted bits in our palm. what we initially ‘see without seeing’–which is to say, what is initially given–is a ‘part of the machine’; it is given as originally sourced, or implicitly given. as soon as we turn our attention and make it explicit, it is given as secondarily sourced, which is to say, as something even more informatically impoverished, a penury that encapsulation presents as riches.
when you extract the ‘Cartesian conceit’ from this scene, realize that everything is given, and on the back of profound etiological agnosia no less, the dismal state of ‘conscious introspection,’ no matter how regimented, is revealed.[*] an (unsourced) ‘redness’ and an (unsourced) ‘apprehension’ are given together with an (unsourced) ‘interval’ that distinguishes them. siamese triplets: the first is bound, the second is crowned, and the third is forgotten whenever we undertake to ‘reflect’ on the ‘givenness of the given.’ to subject experience to experience, to attribute quiddity to quality, is to sacrifice a sourceless, radically impoverished whole in the name of a sourceless, radically impoverished fraction.
again, encapsulation means saturation, the utter occlusion of poverty and parochialism, no matter how extreme. BBT, in other words, provides a means of explaining why qualia seem the most certain thing even though they are nothing at all. in doing so, it offers a rather parsimonious solution the hard problem. in a sense, every time the brain reaches to grasp itself, consciousness chops off its fingers and cries, ‘see!’ as a product of recursive information processing, consciousness is the product of severe informatic constraint. our consciousness of consciousness can only be explained away because functional explanation is etiologically informative: it provides the very information our experience of consciousness lacks, and so seems to explain something entirely ‘other,’ something a zombie could have.
it’s the parsimony of BBT relative to its explanatory scope that troubles me the most. think of metzinger’s compendious head: the bean in being no one is filled with models and simulations and levels of description–it’s a place where brain function is discursively wired to resemble the things in our experience. the head of BBT is remarkably empty in comparison. in place of the baroque complexity of the PSM, you simply have this ‘occluded clearing,’ possessing presence, unity, and self-identity by virtue of structure. one that directly follows from the identity of consciousness and neural recursion viewed in an orthogonal light.
BBT is a theory possessing almost unthinkable consequences. far from rendering the disclosure of neurality undeniable, it seems to promise the opposite. and perhaps this will be the case. perhaps empirical verification is the only thing that will transform neurality (as disclosed here) into the successor of subjectivity and normativity.
and maybe this isn’t such a bad thing. my own inclination is to think the radical theoretical consequences of BBT amount to a reductio of some kind, that the sheer absurdity of its conclusions warrant holding out for a ‘messianic moment.’ but ‘absurd’ here is only absurd from the standpoint of the human. in general terms, science has a long track record of disappointing our aspirations. the fact is, the kinds of ‘absurdities’ that fall out of BBT are precisely the kinds of absurdities we should expect given the neurostructural and evolutionary constraints placed on human consciousness. there is good reason to presume that profound etiological agnosia is something that any biological recursive information system would suffer. BBT literally predicts that intelligent extraterrestrial life will have there own versions of our philosophical dilemmas.
but this suggests a different strategy one might take to the disclosure of neurality. if the radicality of BBT renders it too controversial to become undeniable in the way subjectivity and normativity became undeniable, then perhaps there is a way to render it unavoidable.
since BBT presumes that intentionality is an artifact of informatic asymmetry, and since intentional concepts are ubiquitous throughout philosophy, it should be possible to critique any given instance of philosophy in terms of the informatic asymmetries that underwrite their grounding assumptions. in other words, it should be possible to deploy particular instances of what might be called a ‘general information asymmetry argument.’
the general information asymmetry argument (GIAA) aims at nothing less than the total de-legitimization of pre-neural inquisitive philosophy. in other words, it aims to establish neurality as an unavoidable disclosure. it assumes:
1) every philosophical problem involves the expression of informatic asymmetry.
2) every philosophical problem should admit interpretation in BBT terms.
3) each of those interpretations will, ideally, constitute an empirical hypothesis (or failing that, lay the groundwork for one).
4) the warrant of the corresponding intentional interpretations is diminished as a result.
this, although it fails to make neurality undeniable, does highlight the reliance of traditional philosophy on unexplained intentional explainers, and as such theoretically incomplete in comparison to BBT.
so, for instance, you could reinterpret kripke’s skeptical paradox as a reductio of normativity, where the paralyzing demand that the dispositionalist account for the normativity of claims could be met by explaining away normativity in information asymmetric terms. you could argue that derrida’s differance simply is an intentional (and therefore deceptive) instance of informatic asymmetry, or that heidegger’s concept of facticity intentionalizes the effects of etiological agnosia, or how hegel simply takes encapsulation, the way the invisibility of information horizons generates the illusion of self-sufficiency, at its word.
GIAA, in other words, enables the work of EPR, a reinterpretation unlike any ever carried out in the history of philosophy. the one that delivers the great guardian of philosophy’s autonomy, the ‘philosophical problem,’ to the work of empirical speculation. the one that no longer believes. the one that diagnoses philosophy as the brain’s long and arduous pilgrimage to itself.
Once we latched onto the occluded frame, we did not let go. this is why the soul was disclosed. this is why humanity was disclosed. this is why subjectivity was disclosed. this is why normativity was disclosed. each of these disclosures made truth that much more difficult to comprehend. neurality is the disclosure that will kill truth altogether, insofar as it kills all intentionality.
the way you are reading now is about to go extinct. in the future, all reading will be bent–between the intuitive immediacy of meaning, and knowledge of the agnosiac distortion implicit in ‘intuitive,’ ‘immediacy,’and ‘meaning.’
there will be no end to the apologies. i can feel them bubbling in me, confabulatory bids to disown these very thoughts. the great gift of TI–aside from delaying the disclosure of neurality–is the ability to rationalize what you cherish or cannot relinquish. but, for the first time such philosophy will stand directly opposed to scientific discovery, the only institutional prosthesis that can correct, however imperfectly, for TI. the constructivist of the future can be told why their reasoning blinds them with apparent insight. so they will retreat, perhaps form a sophisticated, academic rind about new age thinking.
meaning will shriek its defiance–like all cornered animals.
Even as you read this, individuals across the world are theorizing the myriad, specific ways in which unconscious mechanisms deliver information to consciousness. my only innovation is to run this speculation backward, to interrogate consciousness in terms of what cannot be delivered. not so long ago, this would have been transcendental speculation, yet another philosophical attempt to disclose the occluded frame. now it’s empirical speculation.
neurality, as much as subjectivity or normativity, is encompassing, something that pertains to the sum of human activity. if it becomes as undeniable as hume made subjectivity or wittgenstein made normativity, then any nontendentious philosophy must answer to it. the blackboards will have been wiped clean.
and make no mistake, it very well could be a form of suicide. nothing abhors a vacuum more than the philosophical imagination (whatever the fuck that turns out to be). opportunities abound. names will be made. but it really could mean the end of philosophy as an institutionally independent form of human inquiry. this isn’t to say that further disclosures won’t be made–the occlusion of the implicit is always fooling us into thinking nothing remains to be made explicit–only that philosophers likely won’t be the ones to make them. this could be the point where the lake runs out of philosophical family to drown. this disclosure at last delivers inquisitive philosophy, philosophy that cares (or pretends to care) for nothing save truth, to the cold hands of science. if something resembling BBT is verified, it means that intentionality is a fundamental misapprehension as a matter of empirical fact. inquisitive philosophy will boil down into a speculative halo about the sciences, leaving only a self-conscious or tendentious philosophy of untruth in its wake, an apologetic philosophy, that seeks to organize our collective misapprehension from within, even as it rationalizes its falsity from without.
BBT is a curious conceptual tool–anything that allows for the translation of fundamental philosophical problematics across the transcendental/empirical divide has to be. consider mathematics, meillassoux’s oracular loophole. what is numerical ideality?
what is thought at all?
according to BBT, default identity obtains wherever information access precludes differentiation. in this sense, you can see ideality as a kind of informatic flattening (the result of having fewer channels/modalities engaged perhaps). subtract temporal resolution, distinction (meaning is fuzzy), medial variability (you can’t distance or walk around a meaning) and lateral variability (meanings bleed rather than bump into each other), and what you seem to be left with is the appearance of some kind of abiding differential field. neural complexes that are multi-dimensional and plastic are combed of all their complexity, flattened and blurred and detemporalized, and meaning appears to be holistic. we seem to be referencing a ‘different realm.’
ideality is just reality stripped to the bone. and in this sense, meillassoux is ‘right,’ mathematicians are paleontologists, the deluded interface where the proximal real reaches for the distal real. a place to watch the bones be put together–and with a sense of ‘willing’ stapled to it, no less. one only need ask this question: how much do mathematicians know about what’s happening–as a matter of empirical fact–in their beans as they count?
bang.
information is lost. and that loss is abject ignorance, near total etiological agnosia. the ideal never possesses more information than the real. if anything, ideality is proportional to information loss, an informatic lack which perhaps allows the brain to mimic turing’s universal machine, the spiral incarnation of the mathematical circle. meillassoux’s dilemma, that is, the dilemma of ‘correlation’ more generally, is the result of a misapprehension of a misapprehension according to the BBT. the question isn’t will meillassoux escape thought with mathematics, its, what the hell is he talking about? thought? he knows what thought is? like fuck he does.
it literally could be the case that no sciences are so unconscious as the abstract. such a claim must sound anathema to the specialist: how could the engine of the ‘information revolution’ be so ‘information poor’? because it only needs admit to consciousness what evolution demands and structure allows. no more, no less. we now know enough to know that what the subject ‘feels’ need not be indicative of anything. neuropathology reveals boggling dissociations of capacities and sensations (in precisely the fashion BBT predicts). the fact is, we have to await a more mature neuroscience to definitively answer these questions.
either way transcendence has been explained away.
BANG!
you’re dead. you, dude. dwindling in a pool of blood and meaning.
maybe this is what Nietzsche meant. maybe I can convince the relevant module to affirm…
nope.
certainly this is a glimpse into what will be a ghoulish philosophical future. every domain it inherits, science seizes what is readily comprehensible and saturates it with human indifference and intentional antithesis. now it stands ready to reveal anthropos as the greatest anthropomorphism of all. more and more blindnesses will be catalogued. we will be mapped by our agnosias. inquiry into the brain will be divided, as was inquiry into the body, into organs, and functions will be argued and explored. the contradictions will be cloistered the same way that allowed deathcamp guards to make love to their wives.
public institutions will be gradually medicalized. there is no separation of science and state.
philosophy will become something you can pin on boards. before the lunacy of the post-human, we will have to endure the degradation of the subhuman, an epoch of correlation and functional description.
neurality. this is the magical context, the one where the curtain closes on the coin trick of consciousness. the most exhaustive interpreter of all. the next will be the Technological Reformation, when the neurospecialists, seeking to maximize fitness indicators, begin to augment the subhuman. a sweaty bulb on a corporate stalk. and these scribblings will be just that, scribblings, something our ancestors affix with magnets to the refrigerator door.
‘such a darling dear…’
some drownings are sequential.
“the general information asymmetry argument (GIAA) aims at nothing less than the total de-legitimization of pre-neural inquisitive philosophy.”
Including, of course, moral philosophy.
I feel no pain, because there is no ‘I’ and there is no ‘pain’. There is so much your occluded frame is HIDING from you Jorge!
I need to do some thinking about your claim that BBT might give us an inroad into breaking the Hard Problem for once. After all, you’re claiming that we can assault philosophical problems empirically and the Hard Problem is perhaps most defined by its seeming imperviousness to empirical assault. My brain (naturally!) rejects this.
Speaking of feeling no pain.
Fantastic link. Now we’re cooking.
OK, I know first hand of pain without painfulness, but the reverse… painfulness without pain is very alien to me. The section where he talks about the guy who feels a ‘clearly unpleasant’ feeling he wants to avoid without being able to attach ‘burning’ or ‘piercing’ type adjectives to the feeling clearly shows that “pain qualia” REALLY ARE some kind of myopic perception of a multitude of inputs that the brain doesn’t track. The “asymbolia” is fascinating.
The question becomes: is Scott right that this myopia follows from a structural limitation in information processing, or should we instead prefer the Metzinger and co. explanation and instead see it as an ACHIEVEMENT of sensory integration?
This pot is cracked, but the stew smells good.
Information pertaining to the multiple sourcing of pain is inaccessible to recursive integration, so pain is just pain for experience, and we are dumbfounded when this or that sourcing strand is snipped. What other answer could there be? What BBT does is simply turn this platitude into an explanatory principle. It really is that parsimonious.
The question isn’t one of how recursion ‘binds’ multiple sources, since identity is the informatic default, but how recursion distinguishes pain from other affects: where does THIS information come from?
The link made me think of a couple of things…
1. The documenatry “A Life Without Pain” – I watched part of this documentary when I was on a selection jury for a film festival. The film profiles three children who suffer from congenital analgesia. The extremes gone through in order to help protect these kids were fascinating (and a bit disturbing). In the part I saw, a little girl had to have her teeth removed so she wouldn’t chew her tongue up and also had to have her eyes sewn shut to prevent injury. Very difficult to watch.
2. Phantom limbs and phatom limb pain. The idea that people can experience pain or sensation from a limb that has been amputated has always made me go “huh?”. I was reading Jan Westerhoff’s “Twelve Example of Illusion” and in one of the chapters (a chapter on reflections) he mentions:
“The neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran, one of the best known researchers into phantom limbs, tells the story of his patient whom he asked to lift a cup with his phantom hand. Just as he is about to reach out with the stump of his arm Ramachandran pulls the cup away. The patient cries out in pain.”
Mr. Westerhoff then explains that Ramachandran believed that the source of phantom limb sensation had complex cognitive causes and was not due to inflamed nerve endings (as was generally thought). Ramachandran argument was, essentialy, tthat that phatom limb pain was caused by the brain trying to move a limb but not getting any feedback from the limb. This lack of feedback results in the brain learning that the limb is paralyzed. As Westerhoff puts it, “this fiction of the brain, the illusory paralyzed limb, was the cause of the pain the patient experienced.” Ramachandran believed that if the brain could be convinced that the missing limb was still there then it might unlearn this assumption of a paralyzed limb. This led to the development of the mirror box which he believed could be used to somehow convince the brain that the missing limb could still be moved. (see http://cbc.ucsd.edu/pdf/Synsth_Phant_Lmb_P_Roy_Soc.pdf – “Synesthesia in Phantom Limbs Induced With Mirrors”)
I’ve been following Ramachandran’s stuff on phantom limbs for years. It shows, I think, the way the brain’s modularity leads to a multitude of encapsulations, blindnesses that only various extreme circumstances can lay bare.
This is madness, I admit (it’s one among many things that are preventing me from committing). It has to be. But again, there’s the bottleneck thesis: this isn’t simply empirically possible madness, it’s likely probable! Given that consciousness is the result of the brain’s auto-tracking, and given the sheer complexity of the brain (the most complex thing we know of), given structural constraints on recursive processing (the way, for instance, the brain is a magician that we are wired to), and given evolutionary constraints, we should presume that the brain would have a very dicey informatic grip on itself.
From the BBT standpoint, the best way to understand ‘what’ you seem to be is as a structural effect of informatic impoverishment. This is your baseline – an encapsulated information economy – because this is in fact what you are. But there’s no way you can seem to be this for the very same reason: any explanation that imports non-encapsulated information simply has to seem to ‘miss the point.’ Why? Because what you seem to be is literally the result of your utter blindness to this information.
You are a kind of continuous ‘magic trick’ that the brain plays on itself. The same way etiological explanations of the trick ‘fail’ to explain the ‘magic’ they also ‘fail’ to explain consciousness. It’s the same reason ‘dissociations’ strike us as so bizzarre as to seem impossible. They literally ‘interfere with the show’ by providing a glimpse of the ‘multiple sourcing’ that is a fact of the information accessed by consciousness, that in no way can be accessed by consciousness. Recursive discriminations need not match up with first-order discriminations.
Trust me, I wish this didn’t have the hold on me that it did. The whole thing seems to turn on seeing DISCRIMINATION as the ‘accomplishment,’ as the indication of information accessed. It’s as simple as that. As soon as you do this and go through the ‘mysteries of consciousness,’ they suddenly seem a whole lot less mysterious, even inevitable in certain instances. How is consciousness as it appears unified? Well, let’s look at the kinds of structural constraints on neural recursion. An ‘accomplishment’ theorists asks: how is unity achieved? A BBT theorist asks: how is disunity achieved? The fact that pain can be dissociated in bizarre ways simply follows from BBT: the real question is one of how pain is distinguished from pleasure, boredom, redness, and so on. Why? Because that’s where informational palette of consciousness is complicated.
“…the real question is one of how pain is distinguished from pleasure, boredom, redness, and so on. Why?”
How: I think distinctions made by biological systems are built on the same mechanism that allows an amoeba to distinguish gradations in nutrient density. Presumably differences in nutrient density trigger chemical events in the organism that trigger various behaviors within the organisms repertoire of evolved behaviors. If this is so then distinctions/differences are separated out of the background environment in this way whether the medium is light, pressure, air waves, passing molecules (taste and smell), or internal sensations. In humans chemical reactions stimulated by some environmental medium trigger neural activity which in turn stimulate the release of chemicals in the body which provoke behavioral responses that have evolved to be appropriate to the stimuli. Also, in humans there is another level of processing required to compute the relative urgency of the many stimulus/response chains that are instantiated simultaneously but the fundamental stimulus/response mechanisms involved are, taken individually, fairly simple mechanisms.
Why: Survival. It seems to me that it’s always possible to explain biological states in terms of their importance to survival. We can distinguish pleasure, pain, boredom, and redness because being able to do so serves the persistence of our species and, incidentally, our individual biological systems.
You wear me out sometimes Bakker. You have to be the most pessimistic dude, like, ever (Schopenhauer notwithstanding). Isn’t mania supposed to make you feel *good*?
Actually, I happen to have some experience with this. Allow me to quote Wikipedia: “Other elements of mania may include delusions (of grandeur, potential, or otherwise), hypersensitivity, hypersexuality, hyper-religiosity, hyperactivity, impulsiveness, talkativeness, an internal pressure to keep talking (over-explanation) or rapid speech, grandiose ideas and plans, and decreased need for sleep (e.g. feeling rested after 3 or 4 hours of sleep).”
You had me until you started predicting the future. =)
Schopenhauer… What a pollyanna. It is a depressing theory – which is why I seem caught in this crazy ‘Yes-no-yes-no!’ space. My mania doesn’t seem to fit those criteria, aside from the ‘grandiosity.’ I cycle between loving and hating my work, the way I think most writers do. What makes this different is the sense of sudden cognitive transformation. I’ve been following cognitive neuroscience off and on for more than 10 years now, and it always seemed a chaotic jungle of inscrutable problems and theoretical incompatibilities, and suddenly this nihilistic exahalation passes through it, and the problems open up, and all the theories are indexed according to the way they get things wrong. It really is crazy – too crazy to trust actually.
The future predictions are probably the only robust thing in this paper!
Given your pessimistic induction of philosophy’s historical development, and given that our three pounds of mushy stuff have hard wired limitations to its abilities, do you foresee a stage where newer EPR operations that recontextualize all the old would necessarily be so complex that even the brightest among us simply won’t be able to carry out any further iterations without becoming hopelessly confused? Setting aside a neuroscience induced semantic apocalypse messing with our cognitive baselines and turning us all into enclaves of crazies, could there be a point where further meta-framing by our brains as is simply becomes impossible?
Since I don’t have any trouble prematurely assuming agreement to my leading questions, I’ll keep going and say this suggests to me that philosophy’s more-contextualized-than-thou endeavors to think up the next big EPR is going to hit a brick wall even without running into the lab forged screws of a neurological turn. At some point we’ll going to be too dumb to dazzle ourselves any more impressively than we already have. The self deception that the latest “context escape clause” really is the next big thing will be brought about as much by professional egoism as by the comforting, comprehensible limits of the legalist perspective.
What does this say about BBT itself as exhaustive reinterpretation? I haven’t thought this through.
As a complete aside, a few years ago I made the mistake of going to my then favorite stand up comic’s show twice in a row. By then I already knew that comics often used the same material over long stretches of time. Still, I expected this guy to be different. Seeing him as a working comic and not just some guy who told jokes was the least fun I’ve ever had at a comedy club, even if the jokes themselves were still hilarious.
I find you to be a fiercely brilliant thinker, often deserving of the capital T even if you’re too humble to admit it, and I keep returning to your writings precisely because I like your focus and your style. But then I notice a perfectly innocuous pet phrase of yours like “curious double-bind,” “all the way down,” or “pessimistic induction” reappear for probably only the third or fourth time, and the experience is consistently if bizarrely disillusioning. “He’s just an author with a style!” it seems to say, yet I don’t even know why that should bother me. More support for BBT perhaps. I really have no idea where the rest of my brain is going with this.
Technological Reformation: when we really begin integrating our brains with our technology. At that point we smash into the information horizon called the ‘Singularity.’
Again, the Technological Reformation makes it impossible to say. BBT now makes me think that we are more likely to be the AI that gulps the planet.
As you should! I am just another flakey numbnut. That’s actually the point of the bombastic style, to call attention to the context of expression and to avoid the droning ‘tone from nowhere,’ which I see as the real rhetorical trick.
Now that’s some new unpleasantness about the singularity I haven’t considered. If we really are faced with an information horizon then just about anything could pop out the other side. The neural turn might force most of us to come to terms with the alien truths of the cruel stranger, it might make crackpots out of an entire institution, but it could also give those who really dig their heals the means to pat themselves on the back with more arms that before. The technologies of the future could enable the philosophers of old to create even bigger melodramas and more elaborate tracts of dazzling bullshit the likes of which we can scarcely imagine.
I agree with you so much I want to simply paste and copy what you said into the piece! The crazy thing is, if we live to be old men, we’ll actually see this happening…
I predict there will be a ‘new Heidegger,’ a champion of intentionality that people rally around out of the collective instinct to create the semblance of consensus.
Also, were you drunk when you wrote this? Just curious.
Not at all. The bombast is intentional – a way to contextualize my voice, speak from somewhere rather than nowhere. I realized doing would likely alienate many people, but then I thought, FUCK THEM. I want to write philosophy the way people talk philosophy in the bar – outside the institution.
Is the lack of consistent capitlization is also intentional? 🙂
nOTHING eSCAPES tHE wEB oF mY iNTENTION
Another hero worshipping myth shattered! Color me disappointed.
Drunk… talk philosophy in the bar…
It took me 4 days to realise this! What the hell, man?
Sounds like quite the bender…
Speaking of identity. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1331769/Doctors-stunned-conjoined-twins-share-brain-thoughts.html
I remember this. Very creepy, and strangely beautiful too. I hope the parents are able to keep the lab coat brigade away from them.
We’re not all like the heartless NASA scientists from ET.
Just 95% of us.
“We’re not all like the heartless NASA scientists from ET.
Just 95% of us.”
ET is the first movie to cause me to have nightmares, thanks in no small part to those scientists. They scarred the hell out of me.
Fascinating. Thanks for posting.
I wonder if the brains are relatively discreet? And can simply detect through surface contact. I’m thinking that. It’s how I’m starting to think the brain detects itself – through a gross physical extension somewhere. This link (I think Jorge gave originally) seems to refer to folds in the structure of the brain. Part of the brain folding over to detect, like a finger curling over to feel the palm from which it extends.
They seem cheerful little things (I guess maybe you would, if your eternally hugging someone else) – hopefully neck pain isn’t an issue.
Not sure I grasp this much on my first read through, but
A: It seems to use a technique that is pinched clear of origin? Like we look at this like its not associated with the origins of the universe and such? I’m not saying the origins of the universe will bring some happy joy joy to it all, or even be found at all. It’s just the technique seems a bit short sighted – even though it probably covers several million years, in a way.
B: This makes me think I’m really not grasping it, but this basically seemed to be outlined in TDTCB and follow books? Primarily through the example of Kellhus and, atleast to me, his being dismantled as a human being (I ceased to really a charater standing in those sandals. Cnair points out a comparison with a whirlwind at one point). Maybe your getting something more now. Will attempt a second read at some point.
“public institutions will be gradually medicalized. there is no separation of science and state.”
in canada perhaps:
http://2012.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/12/santorum-science-should-get-out-of-politics.php?ref=fpb
This is where I genuinely empathize with the religious mindset, believe it or not. Science discloses fact – there’s no doubt about that. But at what point does the unlivability of those facts overwhelm their social utility?
I was away a couple of days, and found myself too buried to weigh in on your dialogue with Mitsu, Ohlo. But I am curious as to what you think of BBT as exposited here. It seems to me there should be a way to mathematically model what I’m talking about. Any statisticians in neck of the neuro woods?
“But at what point does the unlivability of those facts overwhelm their social utility?”
it’s an excellent question – i think that point has already been reached for a substantial minority of american citizens. particularly for economics, but that’s another rant.
“But I am curious as to what you think of BBT as exposited here.”
a bit confused, honestly. if i understand you correctly, then we substantially agree, and had already agreed more than i had thought.
in fact, this seems to me like the argument, couched in philosophical language, that parallels the assertion i was making in the prior thread on the subject.
however, i think part of the problem – in terms of mutual understanding – is that many neuroscientists take BBT as given. we work on the far side of “neurality” as you call it. that prevented me from seeing the radical implications in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind as particularly radical.
(side note: with respect to the prediction that aliens will have philosophical dilemmas, i would recommend bruce sterling’s short story, “swarm” for a fun take on it).
“you are a brain incapable of seeing itself as a brain–what could be more obvious?”
well, yeah.
to make this concrete, consider inserting an electrode into the brain, or even poking the brain with a finger. now, the subject might experience flashes of light, or clicks, or a brush on the hand, depending on the piece of brain you poke, but what they most certainly won’t experience is “hey, someone just poked me in the brain.” there are nerves, but not nerve endings of the requisite sort. thus, the disjunction between what we are and what we feel ourselves to be is fairly workaday for those of us on the microdrive side of the electrodes. of course the brain doesn’t know it’s a brain – there are no nerve endings for proprioception, touch, etc. in it.
this in part is what motivated my questions about retinal eccentricity and the visual field in the prior thread – as i see it, those are questions that help define the “contours” of encapsulation, let’s say. that’s why they seemed relevant to me. if such considerations are entirely irrelevant, as was argued, then i guess i still miss the point.
to take another example, just yesterday i came across a paper from a neurosurgeon in my group who has been working on tinnitus. tinnitus is a perceptual “phantom” with very real implications for those who suffer from it. in a nutshell, my argument has simply been that discussing “qualia” will never help people with tinnitus the way deep brain stimulation in area LC of the caudate nucleus may. to quote the abstract: “Results from this study indicate that perceptual awareness of auditory phantoms is contingent on satisfying a permission condition controlled by the dorsal striatum.” these kinds of problems are not intractable IF we take a few things on “faith” (i.e., that people feel what they claim, and aren’t lying about it).
i continue to assert that if we want to intervene, we should focus on the brain as “thing”, and less on questions like “what kind of a thing is the mind?” what we call “me” is just the visible part of the iceberg that we all are (and as you explore in your fiction, most of the important collisions between us take place underwater).
here’s another paper i came across yesterday – Cerf et al. (2010) published in Nature that humans can control the firing rates of specific neurons in their brains. subjects look at a superposition of two images, while recording from two sets of neurons. when a set of neurons fires at a higher rate, one of the images increases in contrast because the experimenters are decoding the firing rates in real time. by concentrating on an image, the subjects regulated the relative firing rates of neurons in the medial temporal lobe.
why do i mention this? well, one, because it’s fucking awesome.
second, because it tempts questions like: does that mean we have “free will” then? that we control our own thoughts?
that, right there, is what i see as the Philosopher’s Error. always the Big Questions and Hard Problems. can we have free will in a deterministic universe? really? we have to have a theory of the ENTIRE fucking universe first?
how about we just ask an insomniac about it? or do an experiment – here are some scalp electrodes. if you can achieve REM sleep in 30 seconds, i’ll give you a million dollars. or better, if you don’t, i’m going to shoot you. where’s your “free will” now?
so, do we have “free will”? do we truly “control our own thoughts”? it’s a bullshit approach. those are bad questions, since we can’t test them, and the “thought experiments” endemic to philosophy of mind quite often beg the question. “which mental processes are most accessible to voluntary control?” is a slightly better one, but perhaps only slightly.
if i understand the general thrust of your argument, then my criticisms are quite similar to the idea that our ability to define our terms in inquisitive philosophy is subject to the GIAA. i just tend to emphasize the fact that because we have physical brains which we can observe, we can learn useful things about them, including about our own perceptual experience, provided we have the “brain as thing” as an epistemological anchor.
let’s say that the empirical measurement – of the behavioral performance on a psychophysical task, of the firing rate in the neuron, etc. – is the ‘inutteral’ string that fixes meaning, and makes science ‘sorcery’. absent that, it’s just a bunch of shouting.
“it’s not that we’re stranded with these ‘imperfect yet useful tools,’ we quite simply don’t have the tools–only misapprehensions.”
tools for what? here, i was somewhat unsure what was intended. tools for understanding the nature of our own consciousness? i thought the notion was that consciousness was the tool. it is typically assumed that attention is a limited resource, and a range of studies support this. it takes us time to shift the focus of attention, too. things “capture” our attention. i remember reading the idea that we did not evolve to reason out the truth, but instead we evolved to win arguments in competition with other humans/hominids (always assuming we are right, then, is a kind of “fitness” antithetical to Pure Reason, then). so, tool for what? i’m not arguing, i’m asking. i didn’t quite get this.
i did find your treatment of the question concerning the “unity of consciousness” as an “accomplishment” quite useful. psychologists spend lots of time demonstrating that the limits of perceptual awareness of quite distinct from the limits of perceptual processing. for example, percepts that never achieve perceptual awareness are still registered and behaviorally relevant (e.g. ‘priming’ effects in psychology). the idea that we are blind to the “failures” seems perfectly natural and sensible (e.g., change blindness, AKA “what gorilla?”). again, i think some of the confusion arose from the fact that i’m already in the choir, wondering why you are preaching to me. i forget that your sermon is intended to the heretics down the road.
now, in a sense, i would quibble in that the brain clearly does seem to TRY to unify percepts across sensory modalities (i suspect you won’t disagree, either). here’s another fun example from yesterday’s literature search – if you have people repeat a syllable (‘ooh ooh ooh ooh’), but amplitude modulate their auditory feedback with headphones, people report a throbbing sensation on their lips and larynx. that is, they perceive what would have explained what they heard themselves saying.
it’s funny that the term “correlationism” was wasted, because many perceptual illlusions and many of our cognitive limitations have to do with the fact that our brain is creating a “maximum likelihood’ model of the world. our brains seem biased to see and seek correlations (the “original sin” of confirmation bias, perhaps…).
here’s a nice example of the neuroscience of “qualia-lite” from Kondo et al (2011) in Cerebral Cortex:
It is unclear what neural processes induce individual differences in perceptual organization in different modalities. To examine this issue, the present study used different forms of bistable perception: auditory streaming, verbal transformations, visual plaids, and reversible figures. We performed factor analyses on the number of perceptual switches in the tasks. A 3-factor model provided a better fit to the data than the other possible models. These factors, namely the “auditory,” “shape,” and “motion” factors, were separable but correlated with each other. We compared the number of perceptual switches among genotype groups to identify the effects of neurotransmitter functions on the factors. We focused on polymorphisms of catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) Val(158)Met and serotonin 2A receptor (HTR2A) -1438G/A genes, which are involved in the modulation of dopamine and serotonin, respectively. The number of perceptual switches in auditory streaming and verbal transformations differed among COMT genotype groups, whereas that in reversible figures differed among HTR2A genotype groups. The results indicate that the auditory and shape factors reflect the functions of the dopamine and serotonin systems, respectively. Our findings suggest that the formation and selection of percepts involve neural processes in cortical and subcortical areas.
yeah, the genetic basis of the rate of perceptual switching for bistable percepts, referenced to specific neurotransmitter systems.
did shit just get real? more seriously, though, i include these examples because they illustrate, quite concretely, what i consider interesting approaches to similar questions. it’s always possible to quibble about interpretation in the Discussion, but a good experiment should at least give one a sense that “they did this, that happened” (for the bad ones, you quibble about Methods undermining Results). clearly, we rely on subjective reports, but the conclusions require intersubjective validation and statistical support.
i appreciate your point that the brain will fail in recognizing it’s own failure with respect to the disunity of consciousness. how could it not? this is kind of what i meant by “i’m not surprised that i can’t see the back of my own head” in the prior BBT thread.
the process of science – this chipping away, nibbling at the edges of the Big Problem, is useful because i think many Big Problems (“free will”) are phantoms created by the structure and limits of language, and the peculiar structure of our consciousness. i appreciate the fact that BBT as expressed here provides a model for thinking about why the Clear Light of Reason so often fails us. the philosophers’ model of truth is such that given their “totalizing” goal (the unitary “hinge” or “frame”), they are playing a game only one of them can “win.”
scientists, by contrast, think of themselves as digging in the same dirt, excavating a series of tiny truths. i think Darwin blazed a great deal of this particular trail. we fall for various perceptual illusions and live our cognitive biases because our brains were built for feeding, fighting, fucking, and, in the case of humans, talking trash about one another in service of the first 3.
philosophers seem to me not to take seriously the fact that we are animals (i think it’s interesting that primatologists are encroaching on the study of ethics, now that it’s been amply demonstrated that our nonhuman primate cousins exhibit strikingly similar proclivities like striking over unjust “wages”, etc.).
our cognition is goal-oriented, not truth-oriented. even though there are more photons streaming off the words of a book in sunlight than there are coming from the white of the page when read inside, we call one black and the other white. is that being “massively deceived”? (i should note that we while are certainly aware of overall brightness levels, contrast, not luminance, dominates visual perception). good enough is good enough. the “quick and dirty” solutions are literally bred into us.
“thought? he knows what thought is? like fuck he does.”
this made me want to clap.
ironically, it strikes me that we take very different paths to a similar perspective – i asserted that philosophers of mind are best ignored. my argument was about methodology, and empirical in nature: “let’s compare neuroscientists and philosophers record making progress on these issues.” i think neuroscientists have made genuine progress (join us on the dark side – we have cookies, two-photon imaging, and monkeys!)
based on this essay, i guess you’ve decided to nuke the whole goddamn mess from orbit. it is, as they say, the only way to be sure.
“It seems to me there should be a way to mathematically model what I’m talking about. Any statisticians in neck of the neuro woods?”
this is quite a long piece – what in particular did you want to model? something about the requirements in a recursive or reentrant system of “second-order” monitoring of the processing taking place in the “first-order” system?
(have you read about the Human Connectome Project? i suspect that the “orders” in the sense above will be analogous to concepts like “fractal dimension”)
if so, i would insist that whatever architecture you dream up, you must assume that you eventually have to push a moderately reduced form of it through a woman’s vaginal canal.
“certainly this is a glimpse into what will be a ghoulish philosophical future. every domain it inherits, science seizes what is readily comprehensible and saturates it with human indifference and intentional antithesis.”
so?
if the alternative is letting people with Alzheimer’s wither and die while we bicker over whether their disease reflects a “diminishment of qualia in intensity or clarity” or some other horseshit, count me out.
we don’t need to let ourselves be haunted by philosophical phantoms. if you find yourself unconvinced that god exists, is your next thought, “well, not reason that it shouldn’t be killing and raping from here on out, then”? if grief is an illusion, why not play softball with your daughter’s severed head tonight?
we are things, and we do things because it’s what we are, and the doing of things means something to us because that too is part of what we are. there’s solace in that, no?
i for one enjoy my “consciousness horizon”, and am glad that i don’t bear the conscious burden of my physical totality. when i was a kid, sometimes i’d become conscious of my own breathing, then take it over, consciously, thinking that if i didn’t i’d stop breathing. who wants that?
sorry for the long rambling post. i recognize that i will have failed to engage some of the issues “head-on.” that’s inevitable, though.
i also recognize that my essential point has been made far more concisely elsewhere: http://xkcd.com/54/
I had a sense I was mistaking you that first post – it’s easy to forgot how absurd all this looks from the outside. This is a seriously awesome jag, ohlo. “we are things, and we do things because it’s what we are, and the doing of things means something to us because that too is part of what we are. there’s solace in that, no?” is going to have me thinking hard a long time. The big thing is the possibility of philosophy, which you had already counted among the dead. I imagine it’s like weeping over a stranger’s tombstone to you.
The stuff about science I entirely agree. The therapeutics are definitely going to be the drivers – and I can’t help but mourn the absence of ‘good’ or ‘will’ in any of the people involved. Doesn’t that give you pause?
With the math I was thinking all these ‘the way it’s gotta be’ inferences from the standpoint of the system should be susceptible to some kind of mathematical analysis, wouldn’t you think?
I think like with Mitsu’s thunderbolt from Thor analogy and how the thunderbolt still exists even if an involved external agency ceases to, a ‘good’ that was thought to be attached to an external agency still exists as something even once that external agency is removed.
I know there are protestations to that, but it reminds me of an example Richard Dawkins gave that when a police strike occured, the most religious suburbs were the ones which rioted and looted most. So to get all finger wagging moralising, I’m not sure how much anyone wanted to be ‘good’ if, once the external agency umblical cord is severed, the physical principles of ‘good’ are worthless to them.
The thunderbolt no longer exists. You can’t pick and choose between intentional phenomena with BBT.
Dawkins is presuming that the rioting and looting is a symptom of amorality, rather than moral outrage. Some people who steal are convinced they are redressing a greater theft.
The ecology of ‘good’ – lets outline a simple one. I share some food with you often, then a tree falls on my house latter and you help fix it. There’s an accounting system of give and then return there. Feelings of ‘obligation’ drive this ecology, as one example. I could write it up as a boardgame, various currencies banked, then returned on moments of random ill fate. I mean, you can hit me up that boardgames don’t exist, but what is it when two people configure their actions within the structure of chess? Even your nihilist poker player followed the rules, despite him what, thinking there are no rules?
Are ecologies intentional?
On the Dawkins thing, if someone, severed from their external leash, suddenly invents that they are stolen from, then it does come from amorality. Or alternatively, where did this sense of redressing a greater theft come from? Was it always part of the structure of principles they followed, or did it just get invented during the cop strike? Is it the latter, but seems the former? If it’s really the former, why don’t they ever discuss that it’s part of their principles to riot and loot? I’ll provide some brief discussion for myself – I think if my situation was bad enough, I’d do so, but it’s really at the worse ends of the spectrum that I’m not going to consider as ‘this was my righteous hour!’ or anything. Or I could well have missed where they casually discuss that they’d riot and loot at X condition.
Moral ones are.
We evolved to have communal dispositions. This is the thing you have to keep in mind: this very communication now, how it looks, feels, accesses just the merest haze of the actual transaction.
“Are lightning bolts intentional?”
“Thor’s ones are.”
I lack the descriptive, but I’m reminded of Valente’s “The bread we eat in dreams” where the protagonist dared enjoy a moment without the great intent maker in mind. I guess I could be put in the same basket as ochlocrat with his ‘solace’ question.
This is the thing you have to keep in mind: this very communication now, how it looks, feels, accesses just the merest haze of the actual transaction.
It’d be interesting if, under modified conditions, that was adjustable.
“I imagine it’s like weeping over a stranger’s tombstone to you.”
or that of a former companion i left a while back on the road, when i hitched a ride with a passing car, and he insisted on walking. i can’t say i’m surprised he never caught up.
“and I can’t help but mourn the absence of ‘good’ or ‘will’ in any of the people involved. Doesn’t that give you pause?”
not in the least. i give no more than 3 but perhaps less than 6 flying fucks about the ontological status of “good/will” vis a vis “intentionality.” that’s what i was trying to convey above.
if you really want to go around telling people their dog doesn’t and can’t ‘really’ ‘love’ them, go ahead. tell me how that goes.
the bleak conclusions strike me as the “slightly hysterical style of university talk”:
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/of-hume-and-bondage/?nl=opinion&emc=tya1
“With the math I was thinking all these ‘the way it’s gotta be’ inferences from the standpoint of the system should be susceptible to some kind of mathematical analysis, wouldn’t you think?”
not really. i referenced the Human Connectome project to indicate the complexities involved. a model is a model of something – i think we don’t know enough about the relevant something here to derive a useful model in this case. there’s an asymmetry in modeling with respect to simplification – if you can demonstrate that a reduced model can perform some discrimination task, great. if you show that a reduced model fails, you can’t conclude that the model’s object must also fail. it strikes me that the relevant predictions here are predictions OF failure, which is even worse with respect to the utility of models, which are necessarily reduced relative to their objects.
as for the inferences, if you mean things like “profound etiological agnosia”, then i think your notion of what mathematical models can accomplish is…wildly optimistic. of course, i may be missing the referent here.
i still don’t see many of the purported implications much beyond academic philosophy and it’s utility (beyond pedagogy – philosophy is CHEAP – no computers, no reagents, etc. when you’ve honed your critical thinking skills enough to say, “hey, this is all bullshit!” you’re done!).
the fact that we have reflexes doesn’t mean we can’t control our limbs under most circumstances. it certainly doesn’t mean that after grasping the “profound” implication that our bodies will sometimes move based solely on a consultation with the spinal cord, we should collapse into a boneless heap. not stepping on tacks or burning ourselves is GOOD. that’s all the “free will” experiment in scanner-predicted button pressing means to me.
maybe consciousness is a “user illusion.” but, as our greatest philosophers (i.e.,Guns ‘N Roses) teach us, you must nevertheless USE your illusion as you pursue daily life. i think BBT requires that you act AS IF you have intentionality – there’s no way out of that, either, no more than you can hear a dogwhistle or see ultraviolet light through sheer ‘force of will’.
losing “The Mind” isn’t something worth losing your mind over – unless you don’t have a brain.
(side note: i heartily recommend dan ariely’s “upside of irrationality” by the way. our irrational emotions are a part of what make us “good” in the standard sense in many ways).
I’m not sure I trust that scanner predicted button pressing. I suspect given the time allowed for choosing (seems like over 10 seconds?) what the individual is using is like a random dice roller/random number generator in their head. This is like monitoring the brain of a martial artist having a punch thrown at him – yes, the utility function fires and acts before the concious brain really grasps the punch is coming.
Have they done anything like pick a colour – then at the last second go against it? What have they done to try and disconfirm the conclusions made about the scanner prediction? And how much have I googled this myself – not really at all, cause I’m lazy, I’d pay that…
Why so? (That was a great article by the way).
Are you taking a pragmatist position like Blackburn?
as far as the “slightly hysterical” part, it was kind of an excuse for the segue to the link (which i figured you might like – accurately, it seems).
i’m not sure what i would be committing to with respect to blackburn’s “pragmatism”, but i like to think that much of what i’ve argued thus far could be called “pragmatic” in the plain language sense of the term.
i did think that blackburn has an excellent writing style, and one that so reeks of stodgy reasonableness that i found myself wanting to agree with him, for what that’s worth.
let’s see….
Click to access blackburn.pdf
well, i read as far as the rebuttal of Davidson, and so, yeah, i’m down.
but let’s not call it pragamatism. let’s call it “imma egg ya’ HOUSE, bitches!” let’s call “when you gunna clean it up?” an “external question.”
having skimmed the article in full now, i find it’s general excellence manifest.
he had me at “…especially modern art galleries, is little more than autological.”
then again, how much of the substance is style?
one more thing, in defense of A.J. Ayers:
http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/~swb24/reviews/Ayer.htm
the incident with mike tyson, at a minimum, demands respect.
The only objection I have to this is that “the less we know”, the more can be outside our frame. So while the theory is nihilistic, who knows what’s outside? It’s as if more than giving “answers” it definitely proves that those answers can’t be achieved at the present time. We essentially prove wrong all theoretical frames we built, but without denying that an undiscovered theoretical frame exists out there. We’re merely underdeveloped.
A bit like philosophy. It’s not like philosophy ceases to exist following this scenario, it’s that it’s “too soon” for it to pretend doing what it pretends to do.
I guess that the core of the idea didn’t change much, and what you got here is more like a rationalization and demonstration through the structure of philosophy. Not much as in developing the theory, but demonstrating it to others and narrow it to a more precise shape.
The “revelatory” parts, I think, were already in what you wrote along the way. How I understood it: consciousness is merely an illusion produced by how it works. Without distinctions it sees itself everywhere. But in “truth” conscience is only one of the functions of the brain, contained in a larger unconscious/hidden structure. Similarly the data that consciousness accesses is only a selection of all data available to the greater brain.
…But it doesn’t work. The future is about what we achieve. An house we build is something we achieve. The singularity, if it happens, will be something we achieve.
Who’s doing all this? Surely not the unconscious brain. It’s the consciousness that leads down that path. Voluntarily or compelled, but it’s still either an intentional act, or a “natural” one, doing evolution’s blind work.
I mean, let’s say that we now have already knowledge to open some more the keyhole. It seems to me that our consciousness will “direct” what we’ll achieve afterwards. The consciousness, even when proved as whimsical and fallacious, is still “in control”, and will likely always fight to preserve itself. Fake or not.
If we are a small part of the brain, then I don’t think it will surrender easily its position. And to whom goes the throne anyway?
And I still completely fail to see the implications on the personal level, beside teaching some humility.
You’re entirely right on the first point, which is why I hold out in my faith in intentional realism. I feel like a flake saying this, but the quantum picture of reality is just so strange, that who the fuck knows?
But, given what we do seem to know, the BBT is radically destructive of intentionality – all of it. The sum of your experience is simply informatic smoke – the worst kind of eliminativist epiphenomenalism you could possibly imagine. And the Bottleneck Thesis effectively kneecaps any of the standard arguments against either eliminativism or epiphenomenalism. The problem, at least it seems to me, is the way it offloads the burden of proof: Consciousness is radically informatically impoverished as a matter of fact. Why should any of your intuitions trump the empirical probability that we are massively deceived?
I think ‘the consciousness’ has a kind of budget. An amount the subconcious ( patterns of survival wrought over millenia) will humour behaviour divergent from those patterns. Probably an easy example of the latter retaking control is throwing up – gah, I hate that take over! Anyway, the softer your conditions the more budget you get – thus allowing for potentially more civilised behaviour. However, your infra structure falls down, so too will your budget…
Abalieno, your argument can be refuted simply by thinking of consciousness as a spandrel: something that comes along with the higher cognitive UNCONSCIOUS processes that allow culture, technology, philosophy, etc to be possible but actually has no executive function.
While this hasn’t been decisively demonstrated empirically yet, there are many tantalizing experiments that suggest this is the case. For starters, the experiments that show that our conscious experience of ‘making a decision’ actually occurs AFTER the decision has been made.
Of course, Nietzsche would slap his forehead and be all like “duh!”
And regarding quantum stuff… yes, it does make you sound like a flake thanks to the countless New Age idiots that latch onto ‘quantum weirdness’ as some kind of spiritual escape clause in an era of materialistic reductionism.
My answer to that is to ask why consciousness exists then. If it makes no decision and it is mechanical, then why we have it?
It seems to me that consciousness actually is responsible for many stupid decisions that aren’t automatically coded. A suicide would be then a simple mechanical function. Why even worry about it?
But I guess the theory is built so it admits no reply. It’s like a black curtain that descends and there’s nothing after it.
This is my problem with this theory: it’s kind of pointless. In the sense that it’s not an “EPR”. It’s just the surrender of everything.
How we even decide if it’s good or not? A good theory should be proved useful, lead to some sort of change. But this one, once accepted, is so subversive that leaves things exactly the same.
This is what I do: I agree. Now what? I’m still the fictional illusion of someone else’s dream. The true reality is “over there”, but mine is here. I still have to relate to stuff around me and on my level.
It’s like being in a dream. You are still forced to behave as if you’re believing it as reality.
Recursive neural processing serves many, many functions, not the least of which is letting brains communicate with other brains. If my brain sees a lion, then it pays for your brain to know. Add to this all the complexities of social interaction, thus the payoff for one brain communicating ownership of a given behavioural output, and so on.
It just so happens that recursive neural processing constitutes an encapsulated information economy, that it only catches the merest whiff of the informatic complexities that make it possible, whiffs that it systematically mistakes for bouquets. This is why the functions it subserves are all but invisible to you. It integrates multiply sourced information streams, formulates behavioural responses, but because it can only access what it accesses, it is utterly blind to its actual functional role. ‘Deciding’ is something that happens to you. ‘Owning your decision’ is something that happens to you. Consciousness as it is (recursive neural integration) performs any number of functions. Consciousness as it is experienced is simply a side effect of information horizons, saddled with ‘actions,’ which is to say, misapprehensions of its actual functions.
I’m not sure what you mean about the BBT being so subversive that it leaves things unchanged. It drastically reinterprets everything. You are the functional misapprehension of something else’s activity. The functional misapprehension is forced upon you, yes, but your discursive relationship to it has been utterly revolutionized. You are now living a misapprehension you know to be a misapprehension.
That’s why you’re balking (or at least that’s why I balk): it seems to transform a difficult life into an impossible one. Like I said to Frank, there’s a point at which the unlivability of a certain fact seems to count against its utility.
It seems to me like you are describing an “alien” world. So in a way that it can’t be relevant, as it’s completely out of reach. Non-human.
Or a kind of spiritual Kabbalistic world, but with the rule that we can’t go there. We can only listen to tales about it (that don’t make sense as they have no relation with the material world).
I say nothing changes because it’s like multiplying everything for zero. Whatever you feed it, it’s still zero.
Then the are two aspects that leave me dubious. The first is the (optimistic) possibility that we are intended to be this way. Our illusion is not something to go against, but because what is relevant is on this side. (though I share the automatic impulse to go against the barrier if one exists. and I guess is a natural reaction) Being blind executors of a process (that someone could call God), our “duty” is to stick to what is “related-able” to us: trust the master if you realize you’re blind (otherwise, go die in hell, as you don’t have any chance).
Then the aspect of what we observe. Saying that non conscious brains have ideally “more control” is too fancy to feel believable. We build far more with our brain. A form of communication with other brains is not exclusive of human beings. So the point is to isolate what is exclusive of human beings.
It can’t be a simple limit because of “what we do”. Including scientific progress. And we can’t be an “involution” because of other observations that would be hell to justify. And consciousness can’t be a “side-effect”, because it seems powerful on its own. So I’d say consciousness should be explained as an “enabler” of useful functions. Something “achieved” by a system.
The world described by science is actually the most relevant world in many respects, which is why the corporate world seems to piling into neuroscience. The degree to which that world caters to our ‘intuitions’ is what strikes me as irrelevant. Very little of what science has shown has been friendly to our cherished assumptions: why should this be any different?
‘Trust the master’ is one of the potential reactions that troubles me the most: the world of capital will embrace all this for the very reason it embraces science period – it works. Trusting your misapprehension will be tantamount to trusting them.
“Saying that non conscious brains have ideally “more control” is too fancy to feel believable.” Even if this was what I was saying I’m not sure what ‘too fancy to be believable’ means. Consciousness ‘seeming powerful’ has no logical bite so long as the account can explain why it seems so, which BBT can do (its one the signature distinctions between it and other accounts). Otherwise, I think consciousness should be explained in terms of what it actually is – which is what BBT does.
Consciousness AS EXPERIENCED very well could, as a matter of empirical fact, be a kind of ‘side-effect.’ Given this, you can’t rule out theories like BBT on principle. Also, remember that the assertion that consciousness is deceptive is simply an empirical fact: the question isn’t if, it’s how much. BBT says, ‘Very much,’ which is what makes it such a difficult pill to swallow.
Nope, I don’t understand.
The moment you deny religion because there’s no intentionality is the moment you also deny the “world of capital”, since that’s an emergent world of non-intentionality too.
So the moment you deny a “good” will, you also deny a “bad” will. And obviously even having a discussion is kind of pointless, since it also is “driven” on its artificial rail.
The point is your theory isn’t giving “awareness”, so it isn’t giving a motive for change (there can’t be change if there’s not intentionality).
So you either:
– Trust the master (because you have no choice)
– Trust the master (because you decide he knows better)
Consciousness AS EXPERIENCED very well could, as a matter of empirical fact, be a kind of ‘side-effect.’
A side-effect like every other casual-directed evolution. But I still think that it was selected, not a mere side-effect due to the selection of something else that “triggers” consciousness.
I think it’s “consciousness” itself that was selected, as it is probably what differentiates a human being from other animal species and makes us a dominant one.
Actually, now you are starting to understand. The arguments you’re groping toward is the performative contradiction on the one hand and the reductio on the other. In other words, that BBT has to presume the very intentionality that it explains away, and so performatively contradicts itself, and that the conclusion of BBT is so absurd (leading to contradictions such as the previous) that it has to possess false premises.
Once again, the problem is that BBT suggests massive neural self-deception is not only empirically possible, but actually likely. Given the metabolic cost of the human brain, you would expect evolution to take every shortcut possible. Given the overwhelming complexity of the brain, you would expect it’s ability to track itself to be drastically limited. And so on.
So neither of these arguments tell against it. You need something different.
I use intentional discourse because I have to. That doesn’t mean I have to believe in it. It only means I have very little faith in its ability to disclose anything reliable, as I think, the history of philosophy amply demonstrates. You’re perfectly welcome to throw as much philosophy as you can muster against it in the meantime (just remember Bergson!). Meanwhile, the BBT stands as an empirical possibility that science will either verify or reject in the course of time, one that is parsimonious, has enormous explanatory scope, and seems to demystify all the major ‘problems of consciousness.’
Trust me, Ab, if you could find even a remotely plausible way out of this, I would leap at it. As it stands, all I can do is stamp my foot and say, “No!”
Yes, but I merely do not understand and you repeating things won’t help.
I don’t understand why you have to “worry” when the worry itself is a product of a misconception. The removal of intentionality removes everything. Including everything we consider “bad”. As I said you are describing an alien dimension that has no “effect” on us. Because it has so much effect that the “us” we relate to simply doesn’t exist. These two worlds do not touch (again because of intentionality).
Secondly, I don’t understand what the brain should be doing beside running the involuntary functions. Because psychology has also been explored, and despite the unconscious, people are still able to figure out, at least in a broad way, what they have done and why. Their decisions.
If there’s this HUGE disproportion between what we control and what the brain does outside our consciousness, then I wonder what it is about. Because usually we realize how stupid we are, and it’s wholly within our control.
It seems to me that whatever bigger brain is out there is still quite stupid on its own. In fact I’d say it’s an animal brain (the brain minus consciousness), and it’s not this greater intelligence.
So, again, the difference between a human being and the rest of animals is that the human being has consciousness. And that consciousness, as limited as you want, is still what made us dominant. In the pattern of evolution consciousness has a positive value.
Sorry, Ab. I don’t know how to respond to your repetition of the performative contradiction charge short of repeating the empirical possibility that nature would strand us in this bind. That’s the claim you need to undermine to make your charge stick. Until then, you’re just foot-stomping with this particular tack.
In point of fact, we usually don’t realize how stupid we are: check out Tetlock’s or Gardner’s book on expert forecasting for some entertaining round-ups. How often do you come across instances of people ‘underestimating’ their intelligence? To take another of your examples, there’s actually quite a bit of evidence suggesting that we regularly confabulate ‘motivations,’ that we literally cook up rationalizations that we instantly take as true – something which probably explains why various psychological therapeutic approaches tend to be equally effective no matter what narrative they come up with. ‘Having a story’ seems to be the important thing, not the ‘truth.’ And the list goes on and on. One of the strengths of BBT is that it explains the systematic nature of cognitive shortcomings like these, and why they tend to be invisible to us.
As for ‘control,’ ask yourself what these researchers will be discovering in 20 years time.
Otherwise, most researchers actually think animals have consciousness – but I take you mean linguistic self-consciousness. Without a doubt it is a big reason why we’ve dominated the planet – something which you attribute ‘positive value’ to, but has no ‘objective value’ in and of itself. I just don’t see what this has to do with BBT. As I’ve already said a couple of times, BBT fully acknowledges the important function of recursive neural information integration. It just implies that our experience of that function is ‘hallucinatory’ in a number of crucial respects.
Which happens to be consistent with the trend of cognitive psychological/neuroscientific research for decades now.
You really don’t like this theory very much! I can’t say blame you (I guarantee I hate it more), but I’m not sure you’re all that clear on it.
BBT fully acknowledges the important function of recursive neural information integration.
Well, that’s something. It already says that we are in the course of evolution and not some oddball anomaly. Meaning that, like the arrow of time (since I was fiddling with cosmological ideas these days) or entropy, even the evolution of life follows its pattern and has a direction. We are being driven on a scheme, whether mechanical or willed somehow. This course of life is as “ordered” as the course of nature and all its laws.
You seem to deny even the discussion of this evil intent of the “world of capital”. You can bring it up, but I can’t.
I wasn’t here trying to find a weak spot in your theory and prove it wrong. I was trying to understand its practical consequences. That’s why I said it leaves things unchanged. Not because the theory isn’t working, but because what it reveals “can’t be used” (I explained this above).
This is not me trying philosophy, it’s me simply not understanding what are the possible consequences AFTER we agree that this theory is valid.
And that’s why I was then shifting the context. If we are on a “course”, of evolution, set by a master we can’t relate to (whether some unknown god or simply mechanical drift of a system of rules), then our “opinion” or awareness of this is irrelevant. As it sits outside our perception and will.
Let’s say that you took some drug that let you see the TRUTH of the real world. But this drug had just one use and can’t be remade. And whatever truth you discovered can only be used practically if you are able to cross over again. The result is that you could write an interesting book about it, but for the rest it is irrelevant as it pertains to a domain that will continue to be sealed away.
If “reality” is a point of view, then your theory is describing something fictional. Because the “truth” here is kind of irrelevant. The truth is here and now, for us. What you describe is non-us. We can’t relate to it even if we are merely the shadow of what happens on the other side. In Kabbalistic terms (and this idea of the consciousness being a mere shadow of something happening elsewhere is a Kabbalistic image) there’s a barrier that you can’t go through, and “knowing” about it is the most irrelevant thing. The “human condition” says you live in a sealed world. You don’t know and will never know what happens beyond this barrier. So whatever happens beyond the barrier, even if it influences you at 100%, is still irrelevant.
At least as long scientific progress hasn’t done that breakthrough, and only after it specifically knows ways to enlarge the keyhole. At THAT point we could begin to relate to it, as we begun relate to whatever new scientific discovery that changed the world.
Whatever that “step” grants us is irrelevant right now. And if anything we should HOPE it happens as soon as possible, because the horrible condition is what we are right now. Whatever comes after, considering the implications of the theory, is “better” and “legitimate”. As it is part of the course of evolution.
What I’m asking you is to show me where these thoughts I’m having are fallacious, or not admissible consequences of the theories you described.
(and consider I use religious ideas not because I have a religious belief. But simply because those images are for me intuitive to explain some ideas effectively)
Remember Gould’s point about evolution only apparently having a ‘complexity arrow.’ The eukaryotes comprise a minority of life on the planet. I’ve been thinking about BBT w/ reference to entropy myself lately, simply because conceptual parallel between entropy in physics and information theory. There’s a strange ‘information in a bottle’ aspect to BBT – perhaps a theoretically lethal one (let us hope).
I’ll give you one thing, wrestling with this monster these past weeks has made me a lot less critical about the singularity! But the standpoint you’re taking simply (from the BBT standpoint) reifies your misapprehension. If you want to use the concept ‘perspective,’ the more accurate formulation would be that you are simply experiencing reality darkly, not anything ‘other’ than reality. There’s literally no way out of the ‘real’ with BBT – that’s the tragic anchor.
The intuitive move from ‘intentionality doesn’t exist in the world’ to, ‘therefore I must be experiencing a different world’ just doesn’t work (all this is laid out in the qualia section of the piece). There’s no autonomous domain, just blinkered access to the real. One of the consequences of that myopia is to snip what are moments of impoverished access and inflate them into self-sufficient wholes: in other words, introspective reflection is a kind of compound myopia, where you take a snip of a snip – the illusion of some kind of practical or ontological autonomy simply falls out of this.
BBT actually explains why reflection on consciousness runs into the difficulties it does. Regardless, we literally are our informatic contact with the outside world, only in such a way that it is impossible to intuit ourselves as such. Everything we know, is knowledge of the real, only darkly.
Well, I guess we speak different languages because I don’t understand why my reasoning is not acceptable.
If you want to use the concept ‘perspective,’ the more accurate formulation would be that you are simply experiencing reality darkly, not anything ‘other’ than reality.
Accurate or not the consequence is the same. Shadow or reality darkly, you can use or adjust the examples, but the message doesn’t change.
The intuitive move from ‘intentionality doesn’t exist in the world’ to, ‘therefore I must be experiencing a different world’ just doesn’t work
It’s not “different”, they are linked. But this link exists outside the “us” that speaks and is conscious. We are passive.
You theory has pragmatic value the moment it allows to acquire a greater awareness (and so choice), and, accordingly to its own rules, this is only possible IF you can reach and manipulate those links. Otherwise these two “worlds”, even if they are two sides of the same coin, remain “unattainable”.
Things you can’t attain remain irrelevant to you. I never said this occluded realm is “autonomous”. What I said is that our perceived existence is. And you can’t escape that.
So, as “voice” of that autonomous existence I continue to say that you are forced to deal with what you have. Here and now. And here and now your theory is without powers (as long you can’t go and USE those links).
It’s the same discussion we had about science vs religion. You stated that the first won merely because it “worked”. Your theory, the way it is formulated, works entirely as religion (as it denies everything on the assumption there’s a greater world hidden from us, which is inherently religious language, if you notice).
So I draw the line.
BEFORE: right now. Your theory has no consequence as it describes something that, while it defines everything here, can’t be reached, can’t be described, can’t be used. So it’s alien and irrelevant.
AFTER: whenever we are able to “transcend” our limits. Accordingly to your theory we can’t define ANY moral right now. As our present condition forces us to take everything without being directly involved (passivity). Whenever we see more of the hidden world then we could begin to interpret it.
So your theory is essentially a probable prediction of a speculative event. But right now it has no consequence.
The question is whether the science will bear it out or something like it. All this stuff about it being ‘out of reach’ and ‘irrelevant’ is just factually wrong. A great deal of the thousands of messages that bombard you daily turn in some respect on theories, techniques, and technologies that presume your island of self-sufficient relevance to be largely fictive. We got our fingers all over the strings. Soon ‘consumer neuroscience’ will drive everything that you see – not just the ads – we pass through the fingers of this. Why? Because it can tell us what we like better than we can. The blind brain is totally within reach, which is what this is all about, really. The ‘black box of the organism’ as that linked paper puts it, has been cracked open.
I don’t get this. The difference between seeing two things and seeing one thing in two different ways is as about as huge as they come in debates like these. The consequences are nothing short of drastic.
I’m thinking I’ve misunderstood you when you said you started feeling less critical about the singularity.
Maybe it’s not because the lack of intentionality follows its due course “legitimately”, as I said. But because the “horror” that you describe is “right now”, the present condition. And the singularity may instead end up as a form of possible liberation from it.
I think I’ve figured out for the most part the rest you’re saying. The BBT theory is relevant right now because it is being used already: by not treating human beings like human beings and instead treating them as simple systems that can be easily manipulated once you figure out how they function outside all illusions and misconceptions.
I wonder what’s your stance on “art” and entertainment. Dance, music. These are once again results of the emergent consciousness as they also define us from the rest of life. And it’s a too large realm to be considered a side-effect. Way too much energy has been wasted on this.
My last post anticipates your question, I think.
With something like crocodiles, their patterns of behaviour are probably much the same as they were when the dinosaurs were around.
Further, what is the evolutionary use of a B which completely sees A? Okay, B sees A in its entirety and…it sees A in entirely and sees it in its entirety. And so on. Which is pretty redundant.
What is evolutionarily useful (potentially) is change. The gap in seeing, that disjunct, creates…lets say hallucinations. Dreams at night are a strong example. Some hallucinations are more evolutionarily useful.
I don’t really agree with Jorge on executive function. Go hold your hand above a lit candle – sure, you’ll pull your hand away eventually, but go get a chimp to hold their hand over, or other animal its paw. I estimate you will hold it there for longer. For no real practical/evolutionary benefit (unless hot chicks are watching). You have a certain amount of overide over your subconcious system. However, some hallucinations – well, result in the butchery of fellow men, or enslavement. Using that same override of potentially a more peaceful animal subconcious. You can kind of see that in executions where the target is dehumanised before being murdered. That process isn’t to affect the target, but to affect the subconcious level of the executioner – I estimate, anyway. To overide certain behaviours that’d lead to a more peaceful animal. So don’t think this whole conciousness thing is just dandy. If you take my theory here to be any indicator, conciousness can be worse than animal.
BBT actually seems to imply that humans are actually more unconscious now that we are conscious. If you grow a secondary brain to track the original (which seems to be the case with humans) what tracks that brain? In other words, in quantative terms, the unaccessed processing load of the conscious human brain is actually greater than that of the preconscious prehuman brain. Like I was asking, ohlo, it seems to me there has to be a mathematical way to get at this.
I’d pay that an overload of processes might swamp actual self monitoring – this perhaps leading to things like out of body experiences (Cordelia Fine describes a stressful situation like that – good book, btw, thanks for the recommend!). Though I’d note it gets a bit like “What about all these footprints around these here parts? Have a walk around, you’ll see ’em!”, in that the question posed provokes the content of the question posed.
Otherwise in comparison mathematically, a system with zero self monitoring* and 100 unconcious processes and a system with 1 self monitoring and 10000 unconcious processes is not more unconcious than the first.
I’m not sure I’d buy a continual, complete swamping process (as I think it results in the out of body stuff). Are you proposing a lower level of continual swamping, where the amount of processes somewhat overides what self detection there is?
In fear of the charitable reading stick, I’m trying here!
* To satisfy Mitsu’s homunculus complaint, ‘self monitoring’ is used here to mean obtaining an input from inside the synaptic structure, rather than obtaining an input from an external sensor like skin or eyes, etc. Otherwise the input feeds back into the synaptic structure as much as an external input does.
I wonder if you realized how close this is to religion, if not in the difference that you replace god with a question mark…
I’m not sure the term ‘religion’ makes sense in the absence of intentionality, so I don’t know what you mean.
“Trust the master’ is one of the potential reactions that troubles me the most: the world of capital will embrace all this for the very reason it embraces science period – it works. Trusting your misapprehension will be tantamount to trusting them.”
I’d like you to say more on this. Do you think there’s a way that BBT has liberatory potential with regard to “not trusting the master” or does it imply, essentially,
“resistance is futile”?
The problem is that it will, for the vast majority of people, constitute an unlivable fact, if it or something like it is verified. This means the strange divorce between cultural self-conception and managerial institutions that you see today, between the you ‘that deserves a break today’ and the you as a consumer data set will likely become phantasmagorically extreme.
To me, anyway, BBT seems to suggest that the sciences of animal husbandry will likely prove to have the best models of our political future.
I fell behind in this discussion but I HAVE to answer one thing.
Abalieno said:
“If it makes no decision and it is mechanical, then why we have it?”
Look up “spandrel”.
It’s something that just comes along with everything else that evolution demanded. Like bellybuttons and nipples on dudes. (I’m a Dawkins man, but sometimes Gouldian terms are very useful)
Make no mistake: I’m not claiming that this is the solution to the Hard Problem, or that I UNDERSTAND (ha!) it, but it seems increasingly likely to me that consciousness is simply a side-effect.
Maybe.
Anyhow, I’m going to read this whole discussion in a while but I have to work first.
So much for working.
I don’t really have much more to add, but this was tantalizing:
“the unaccessed processing load of the conscious human brain is actually greater than that of the preconscious prehuman brain”
You have two, pre-hominid apes competing on the African savannah… one has a slightly larger neocortex due to a mutation in a developmental genes. This puts that ape at a disadvantage: higher metabolic cost, morel likely to have birth problems, etc. BUT, now he has a cortex that can construct a reasonable model of the other apes smaller brain! He’s better at trickery!
Side-effect: this ape also tricks HIMSELF, all the goddamn time.
Much latter, this ape glorifies himself, builds a Cathedral and tricks himself into believing that the entire universe is run by a Giant Invisible Monkey in the Sky.
I LOVE IT!
Probably part that. Probably that the tricking loses the deciet in its passing on to fellow members of the specie. I mean, who told you you were ever concious to begin with? Can you name names?
I remember becoming very scared of death at about the age of 6 or 7. I wondered what sleeping and never waking would be like (my religious indoctrination had not begun yet… see you gotta get ’em early or they start questioning everything…). So, I was at least conscious of my ‘being’ although there wasn’t much introspection about the implications of that fact until about the age of 15.
I started thinking about it deeply when I decided that a materialistic, scientific world-view was best. I remember struggling a lot to reconcile that with my need for some kind of existence after the termination of my biological life. I was a Catholic until about age 17-18.
Lest you think I take myself too seriously, a lot of this thinking was done while sitting on the john taking a shit.
Lest you think I take myself too seriously, a lot of this thinking was done while sitting on the john taking a shit.
I think that’s the design of Scott’s church within a church within a church, isn’t it? Each consecutive church accessed through the holy porcelain portal of the prior…the darkness that flushed before…
Heh, I don’t have any real content to add that I can graps/think of in responce, but couldn’t resist writing that!
Verily. May the darkness flush you, my brother.
For a second there I thought you were communicating from beyond the grave!
Language can be ambiguous sometimes, or so I hear.
This might be a strawman I’m pitching at, but in terms of morality, surely it comes down to physical actions in the end? It’s not enough that children starving is felt to be ‘bad’ – you need the physical actions of sourcing food and relaying it to them. So what happens when ‘bad’ is an illusion, but the physical actions of the children being fed does occur? Or what happens in a universe where ‘bad’ is a real thing, but the physical actions of feeding children do not occur? Is the latter preferable? Is the existance of morality more important than those physical enactments of it? In giving the latter example, it occurs to me that that sounds alot like Earwa.
I’m not sure I follow but let me try to repeat and extrapolate.
1. In some hypothetical worlds, there is no absolute morality, but people act AS IF there were. (Earth)
2. In some hypothetical worlds, there IS absolute Morality, and sometimes people act immorally. (Earwa)
You think some people prefer the latter world, even if there are many people in the latter world that behave badly.
I can see that, and (personally) I disagree. I would rather live in a world where there is no final moral judge that can throw me in an eternal hellfire, and most good is done out of whim (evolved instinct) or machination for long-term economic gain rather than live in a world where The Evil Are Punished and the Righteous Rewarded for all eternity.
From my perspective this is particularly true since causality-violating free will seems an impossibility in any conceivable world*. This means that in world with Absolute Morality, people are born and destined to sin, only to be cast into an eternal fire.
*It’s surprising to me how something I once thought of as axiomatic now seems logically impossible.
Then, again, it’s not clear we’re talking about anything ‘meaningful’ at all when we talk in these terms at this level of abstraction. There’s a kind of meta-Pyrrhonian implication in all this. The truth could be that it’s all a kind of religion, all the way down. A compulsion to faith in the face of utter abjection. That not all that much separates the intentional spookiness of ‘free-will’ from the intentional spookiness of ‘conceiveability.’
For fun and deliberately heading towards the condition desired, perhaps with the hypothesized intensely hot and integral dot that preceeded the universe, the big bang came from a movement within that dot that broke the rules of its structure, detonating it/unraveling it. And in destroying all the rules of the old in this movement, it was an act of causality violating free will? Sure, the new universe follows causal rules, but all of it is in the wake of this one causality free movement, an echo of it.
Just a fun story idea, feel free to say I’m off topic.
The major issue I see here is that the premise for this pondering. Because there is the assumption of said event occurring it necessitates the need for time as we perceive it. An alternative way of viewing this whole situation changes the implications quite a bit.
So now assume that in fact the big bang did not in fact occur, that only this present configuration of stimuli be they hallucinated or external, exists. This moment is the only valid experience that you can operate from, and that all of the so called ‘past events’ are in fact a way that we unconsciously create a reason for things to be as they are. The future would simply be a mental projection of where things ‘ought to go’ based on what we know now.
Basically the past and future are both a series of stories that we tell ourselves because we need to assign an answer for why things exist as we currently experience them, that they are both mental fabrications used to create an illusory consistency.
From this perspective the issue of the ‘echo of a causality free action’ is far less relevant as the causality itself is a part of the hallucination. That any specific action that occurs in this universe will appear to be due to causality simply because we create the framework around each action with the perception of time.
So if it were a dream for example, and you did something, like ate an egg, you may or may not question this action. If you did however you would likely come up with some form of causality to justify it, such as “I was hungry” or “so and so made it for me” or “it smelled delicious” or whatever other plethora of reasons you might imagine. Within the framework of that dream it would appear to be due to some form of causality however, and yet the dream doesn’t have context outside of itself, it is not synched up with this reality in any perfect way.
To sum up the ‘big bang causality free action’ is simply causality free because there was ‘nothing’ before it, we have nothing around it in the flow of ‘time’ or our imagination there of to fabricate into it’s cause. Being the ‘first’ thing to occur it must therefore be free of cause and would appear that each subsequent occurrence has in fact been caused by it.
[…] problem I have with Bakker theory is that I cannot fully grasp it in its entirety. It’s kind of elusive and frustrating. […]
Hi Scott,
Thanks for your recent email. My google mail account was sequestrated by some bot or
hacker. I’ve reasserted control, but my response fell understandably fell foul of your spam filters.
Anyway, be assured that I’m not destitute on the Streets of
Barcelona and generally in pretty good shape after a difficult and
emotional month. Many thanks for the link to the article. I’ve downloaded
onto my mac desktop, which means it should be gone over at some point soon!
Best wishes,
David
Glad to see you’re kicking! Did you receive “The Last Magic Show” then? I only ask because you mention, ‘link’.
Ah , is that an attachment? If so, you better re-send. The attack trashed my entire inbox. I’m restoring but some items may have been lost.
D
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[…] CAUSA SUIcide […]
“Consciousness AS EXPERIENCED very well could, as a matter of empirical fact, be a kind of ‘side-effect.”
The term “side-effect” reminds me of the way the Indian Charvaka school of the sixth century BCE compared consciousness to a state of intoxication. In an argument titled ‘bhuta-caitanya-vada’ the Charvaka argued that soul or consciousness is just a concoction of the physical elements of the body and put forward the analogy of intoxication produced by the liquor . They said liquor is produced by combination of various ingredients, each of which, by itself, does not possess the property of inducing intoxication. It is only when all those ingredients together come in contact with the body that it produces feelings of happiness, delusion or intoxication. Thus, consciousness, pleasure pain, etc., are mere a set of feelings and not part of body as such.
Also, a person might experience a dream in which he was a tiger. On waking up he says, “I had a dream”; but, he does not continue to behave as if he were a tiger. The Charvakas argued that the person owns the dream, but not the dream-body (tiger). If the dream were a property of the body, then, one should be tiger also after the dream. Consciousness, therefore, is just like the dream created by the body and may be related with the body-function but not part of the body.
[…] CAUSA SUIcide […]