Malabou, Continentalism, and New Age Philosophy
by rsbakker
Perhaps it’s an ex-smoker thing, the fact that I was a continentalist myself for so many years. Either way, I generally find continental philosophical forays into scientific environs little more than exercises in conceptual vanity (see “Reactionary Atheism: Hagglund, Derrida, and Nooconservatism“, “Zizek, Hollywood, and the Disenchantment of Continental Philosophy,” or “Life as Perpetual Motion Machine: Adrian Johnston and the Continental Credibility Crisis“). This is particularly true of Catherine Malabou, who, as far as I can tell, is primarily concerned with cherry-picking those findings that metaphorically resonate with certain canonical continental philosophical themes. For me, her accounts merely demonstrate the deepening conceptual poverty of the continental tradition, a poverty dressed up in increasingly hollow declarations of priority. This is true of “One Life Only: Biological Resistance, Political Resistance,” but with a crucial twist.
In this piece, she takes continentalism (or ‘philosophy,’ as she humbly terms it) as her target, charging it with a pervasive conceptual prejudice. She wants to show how recent developments in epigenetics and cloning reveal what she terms the “antibiological bias of philosophy.” This bias is old news, of course (especially in these quarters), but Malabou’s acknowledgement is heartening nonetheless, at least to those, such as myself, who think the continental penchant for conceptual experimentation is precisely what contemporary cognitive science requires.
“Contemporary philosophy,” she claims, “bears the marks of a primacy of symbolic life over biological life that has not been criticized, nor deconstructed.” Her predicate is certainly true—continentalism is wholly invested in theoretical primacy of intentionality—but her subsequent modifier simply exemplifies the way we humans are generally incapable of hearing criticisms outside our own. After all, it’s the quasi-religious insistence on the priority of the intentional, the idea that armchair speculation on the nature of the intentional trumps empirical findings in this or that way, that has rendered continentalism a laughing-stock in the sciences.
But outgroup criticisms are rarely heard. Whatever ‘othering the other’ consists in, it clearly involves not only their deracination, but their derationalization, the denial of any real critical insight. This is arguably what makes the standard continental shibboleths of ‘scientism,’ ‘positivism,’ and the like so rhetorically effective. By identifying an interlocutor as an outgroup competitor, you assure your confederates will be incapable of engaging him or her rationally. Continentalists generally hear ideology instead of cogent criticism. The only reason Malabou can claim that the ‘primacy of the symbolic over the biological’ has been ‘neither criticized nor deconstructed’ is simply that so very few within her ingroup have been able to hear the outgroup chorus, as thunderous as it has been.
But Malabou is a party member, and to her credit, she has done anything but avert her eyes from the scientifically mediated revolution sweeping the ground from beneath all our feet. One cannot dwell in foreign climes without suffering some kind of transformation of perspective. And at long last she has found her way to the crucial question, the one which threatens to overthrow her own discursive institution, the problem of what she terms the “unquestioned splitting of the concept of life.”
She takes care, however, to serve up the problem with various appeals to continental vanity—to hide the poison in some candy, you might say.
It must be said, the biologists are of little help with this problem. Not one has deemed it necessary to respond to the philosophers or to efface the assimilation of biology to biologism. It seems inconceivable that they do not know Foucault, that they have never encountered the word biopolitical. Fixated on the two poles of ethics and evolutionism, they do not think through the way in which the science of the living being could—and from this point on should—unsettle the equation between biological determination and political normalization. The ethical shield with which biological discourse is surrounded today does not suffice to define the space of a theoretical disobedience to accusations of complicity among the science of the living being, capitalism, and the technological manipulation of life.
I can remember finding ignorances like these ‘inconceiveable,’ thinking that if only scientists would ‘open their eyes’ (read so and so) they would ‘see’ (their conceptually derivative nature). But why should any biologist read Foucault, or any other continentalist for that matter? What distinguishes continental claims to the priority of their nebulous domain over the claims of say, astrology, particularly when the dialectical strategies deployed are identical? Consider what Manly P. Hall has to say in The Story of Astrology:
Materialism in the present century has perverted the application of knowledge from its legitimate ends, thus permitting so noble a science as astronomy to become a purely abstract and comparatively useless instrument which can contribute little more than tables of meaningless figures to a world bankrupt in spiritual, philosophical, and ethical values. The problem as to whether space is a straight or a curved extension may intrigue a small number of highly specialized minds, but the moral relationship between man and space and the place of the human soul in the harmony of the spheres is vastly more important to a world afflicted with every evil that the flesh is heir to. 8, Hall, Manly P. The Story of Astrology: The Belief in the Stars as a Factor in Human Progress. Cosimo, Inc., 2005.
Sound familiar? If you’ve read any amount of continental philosophy it should. One can dress up the relation between the domains differently, but the shape remains the same. Where astronomy is merely ontic or ideological or technical or what have you, astrology ministers to the intentional realities of lived life. The continentalist would cry foul, of course, but the question isn’t so much one of what they actually believe as one of how they appear. Insofar as they place various, chronically underdetermined speculative assertions before the institutional apparatuses of science, they sound like astrologers. Their claims of conceptual priority, not surprisingly, are met with incredulity and ridicule.
The fact that biologists neglect Foucault is no more inconceivable than the fact that astronomers neglect Hall. In science, credibility is earned. Everybody but everybody thinks they’ve won the Magical Belief Lottery. The world abounds with fatuous, theoretical claims. Some claims enable endless dispute (and, for a lucky few, tenure), while others enable things like smartphones, designer babies, and the detonation of thermonuclear weapons. Since there’s no counting the former, the scientific obsession with the latter is all but inevitable. Speculation is cheap. Asserting the primacy of the symbolic over the natural on speculative grounds is precisely the reason why scientists find continentalism so bizarre.
Akin to astrology.
Now historically, at least, continentalists have consistently externalized the problem, blaming their lack of outgroup credibility on speculative goats like the ‘metaphysics of presence,’ ‘identity thinking,’ or some other combination of ideology and ontology. Malabou, to her credit, wants ‘philosophy’ to partially own the problem, to see the parsing of the living into symbolic and biological as something that must itself be argued. She offers her quasi-deconstructive observations on recent developments in epigenetics and cloning as a demonstration of that need, as examples of the ways the new science is blurring the boundaries between the intentional and the natural, the symbolic and the biological, and therefore outrunning philosophical critiques that rely upon their clear distinction.
This blurring is important because Malabou, like most all continentalists, fears for the future of the political. Reverse engineering biology amounts to placing biology within the purview of engineering, of rendering all nature plastic to human whim, human scruple, human desire. ‘Philosophy’ may come first, but (for reasons continentalists are careful to never clarify) only science seems capable of doing any heavy lifting with their theories. One need only trudge the outskirts of the vast swamp of neuroethics, for instance, to get a sense of the myriad conundrums that await us on the horizon.
And this leads Malabou to her penultimate statement, the one which I sincerely hope ignites soul-searching and debate within continental philosophy, lest the grand old institution become indistinguishable from astrology altogether.
And how might the return of these possibilities offer a power of resistance? The resistance of biology to biopolitics? It would take the development of a new materialism to answer these questions, a new materialism asserting the coincidence of the symbolic and the biological. There is but one life, one life only.
I entirely agree, but I find myself wondering what Malabou actually means by ‘new materialism.’ If she means, for instance, that the symbolic must be reduced to the natural, then she is referring to nothing less than the long-standing holy grail of contemporary cognitive science. Until we can understand the symbolic in terms continuous with our understanding of the natural world, it’s doomed to remain a perpetually underdetermined speculative domain—which is to say, one void of theoretical knowledge.
But as her various references to the paradoxical ‘gap’ between the symbolic and the biological suggest, she takes the irreducibility of the symbolic as axiomatic. The new materialism she’s advocating is one that unifies the symbolic and the biological, while somehow respecting the irreducibility of the symbolic. She wants a kind of ‘type-B materialism,’ one that asserts the ontological continuity of the symbolic and the biological, while acknowledging their epistemic disparity or conceptual distinction. David Chalmers, who coined the term, characterizes the problem faced by such materialisms as follows:
I was attracted to type-B materialism for many years myself, until I came to the conclusion that it simply cannot work. The basic reason for this is simple. Physical theories are ultimately specified in terms of structure and dynamics: they are cast in terms of basic physical structures, and principles specifying how these structures change over time. Structure and dynamics at a low level can combine in all sort of interesting ways to explain the structure and function of high-level systems; but still, structure and function only ever adds up to more structure and function. In most domains, this is quite enough, as we have seen, as structure and function are all that need to be explained. But when it comes to consciousness, something other than structure and function needs to be accounted for. To get there, an explanation needs a further ingredient. “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness.”
Substitute ‘symbolic’ for ‘consciousness’ in this passage, and Malabou’s challenge becomes clear: science, even in the cases of epigenetics and cloning, deals with structure and dynamics—mechanisms. As it stands we lack any consensus commanding way of explaining the symbolic in mechanistic terms. So long as the symbolic remains ‘irreducible,’ or mechanistically inexplicable, assertions of ontological continuity amount to no more than that, bald assertions. Short some plausible account of that epistemic difference in ontologically continuous terms, type-B materialisms amount to little more than wishing upon traditional stars.
It’s here where we can see Malabou’s institutional vanity most clearly. Her readings of epigenetics and cloning focus on the apparently symbolic features of the new biology—on the ways in which organisms resemble texts. “The living being does not simply perform a program,” she writes. “If the structure of the living being is an intersection between a given and a construction, it becomes difficult to establish a strict border between natural necessity and self-invention.”
Now the first, most obvious criticisms of her reading is that she is the proverbial woman with the hammer, pouring through the science, seeing symbolic nails at every turn. Are epigenetics and cloning intrinsically symbolic? Do they constitute a bona fide example of a science beyond structure and dynamics?
Certainly not. Science can reverse engineer our genetic nature precisely because our genetic nature is a feat of evolutionary engineering. This kind of theoretical cognition is so politically explosive precisely because it is mechanical, as opposed to ‘symbolic.’ Researchers now know how some of these little machines work, and as result they can manipulate conditions in ways that illuminate the function of other little machines. And the more they learn, the more mechanical interventions they can make, the more plastic (to crib one of Malabou’s favourite terms) human nature becomes. The reason these researchers hold so much of our political future in their hands is precisely because their domain (unlike Malabou’s) is mechanical.
For them, Malabou’s reading of their fields would be obviously metaphoric. Malabou’s assumption that she is seeing the truth of epigenetics and cloning, that they have to be textual in some way rather than lending themselves to certain textual (deconstructive) metaphors, would strike them as comically presumptuous. The blurring that she declares ontological, they would see as epistemic. To them, she’s just another humanities scholar scrounging for symbolic ammunition, for confirmation of her institution’s importance in a time of crisis. Malabou, like Manly P. Hall, can rationalize this dismissal in any number of ways–this goes without saying. Her problem, like Hall’s, is that only her confederates will agree with her. She has no real way of prosecuting her theoretical case across ingroup boundaries, and so no way of recouping any kind of transgroup cognitive legitimacy–no way of reversing the slow drift of ‘philosophy’ to the New Age section of the bookstore.
The fact is Malabou begins by presuming the answer to the very question she claims to be tackling: What is the nature of the symbolic? To acknowledge that continental philosophy is a speculative enterprise is to acknowledge that continental philosophy has solved nothing. The nature of the symbolic, accordingly, remains an eminently open question (not to mention an increasingly empirical one). The ‘irreducibility’ of the symbolic order is no more axiomatic than the existence of God.
If the symbolic were, say, ecological, the product of evolved capacities, then we can safely presume that the symbolic is heuristic, part of some regime for solving problems on the cheap. If this were the case, then Malabou is doing nothing more than identifying the way different patterns in epigenetics and cloning readily cue a specialized form of symbolic cognition. The fact that symbolic cognition is cued does not mean that epigenetics and cloning are ‘intrinsically symbolic,’ only that they readily cue symbolic cognition. Given the vast amounts of information neglected by symbolic cognition, we can presume its parochialism, its dependence on countless ecological invariants, namely, the causal structure of the systems involved. Given that causal information is the very thing symbolic cognition has adapted to neglect, we can presume that its application to nature would prove problematic. This raises the likelihood that Malabou is simply anthropomorphizing epigenetics and cloning in an institutionally gratifying way.
So is the symbolic heuristic? It certainly appears to be. At every turn, cognition makes due with ‘black boxes,’ relying on differentially reliable cues to leverage solutions. We need ways to think outcomes without antecedents, to cognize consequences absent any causal factors, simply because the complexities of our environments (be they natural, social, or recursive) radically outrun our capacity to intuit. The bald fact is that the machinery of things is simply too complicated to cognize on the evolutionary cheap. Luckily, nature requires nothing as extravagant as mechanical knowledge of environmental systems to solve those systems in various, reproductively decisive ways. You don’t need to know the mechanical details of your environments to engineer them. So long as those details remain relatively fixed, you can predict/explain/manipulate them via those correlated systematicities you can access.
We genuinely need things like symbolic cognition, regimes of ecologically specific tools, for the same reason we need scientific enterprises like biology: because the machinery of most everything is either too obscure or too complex. The information we access provides us cues, and since we neglect all information pertaining to what those cues relate us to, we’re convinced that cues are all that is the case. And since causal cognition cannot duplicate the cognitive shorthand of the heuristics involved, they appear to comprise an autonomous order, to be something supernatural, or to use the prophylactic jargon of intentionalism, ‘irreducible.’ And since the complexities of biology render these heuristic systems indispensable to the understanding of biology, they appear to be necessary, to be ‘conditions of possibility’ of any cognition whatsoever. We are natural in such a way that we cannot cognize ourselves as natural, and so cognize ourselves otherwise. Since this cognitive incapacity extends to our second-order attempts to cognize our cognizing, we double down, metacognize this ‘otherwise’ in otherwise terms. Far from any fractionate assembly of specialized heuristic tools, symbolic cognition seems to stand not simply outside, but prior the natural order.
Thus the insoluble conundrums and interminable disputations of Malabou’s ‘philosophy.’
Heuristics and metacognitive neglect provide a way to conceive symbolic cognition in wholly natural terms. Blind Brain Theory, in other words, is precisely the ‘new materialism’ that Malabou seeks. The problem is that it seems to answer Malabou’s question regarding political in the negative, to suggest that even the concept of ‘resistance’ belongs to a bygone and benighted age. To understand the coincidence of the symbolic and biological, the intentional and the natural, one must understand the biology of philosophical reflection, and the way we were evolutionarily doomed to think ourselves something quite distinct from what we in fact are (see “Alien Philosophy,” part one and two). One must turn away from the old ways, the old ideas, and dare to look hard at the prospect of a post-intentional future. The horrific prospect.
Odds are we were wrong folks. The assumption that science, the great killer of traditional cognitive traditions, will make an exception for us, somehow redeem our traditional understanding of ourselves is becoming increasingly tendentious. We simply do not have the luxury of taking our cherished, traditional conceits for granted—at least not anymore. The longer continental philosophy pretends to be somehow immune, or even worse, to somehow come first, the more it will come to resemble those traditional discourses that, like astrology, refuse to relinquish their ancient faith in abject speculation.
Reblogged this on synthetic zero.
I should add that this piece, like so many others, is entirely the fault of Synthetic Zero. I’m not sure what I would do without you guys!
that’s me spur in the side…
I’m a continental biologist, and have only very little understanding what this interesting discussion is about. We get some ethics, but I’ve never heard of biopolitics. Biology marches on to whatever it feels is urgent in its own point of view. What many biologists in the field of environmental sciences are concerned about, for example, is the future of non-human life. The problems and ethics surrounding marketization and commodification of species, of “ecosystem services”. There is urgency.
Which is why institutional insularity of continental philosophy is my primary target here. You’re right: I think I could have given her argument a VERY rough ride on the subject of political/social criticism and debate in the bio sciences. The real issue is that the debate is not her debate, and so all ‘ideologically compromised,’ all playing out within the confines of ‘biologism.’ With hundreds of CRISPR start-ups out there, it’s not simply about urgency, it’s about biting bullets in the name of reaching out. Stomping your feet outside the door does not make one relevant! If she thinks you need to read Foucault, then she needs to give up making ingroup cases, and approach biologists on their terms, even if only to transform them.
http://www.philpercs.com/2015/12/theres-no-such-thing-as-continental-philosophy-but-its-rational-for-you-to-think-there-is.html#comment-6a00d83451aec269e201b8d17e1ab1970c
This is a terrifically useful and much-needed interrogation, Scott. I don’t quite know where Malabou is going with that closing oracle: “There is but one life, one life only.” The call for a new materialism here does suggest a dialectically uneasy cocktail of anti-reductionism and its contrary. It’s as if the question of life and embodiment is being framed only to be pre-emptively closed by deferring to a future theory that no one has a clue about. That said, there seems to be a useful point of exposure to the outer dark of posthuman possibility space here.
Even if one can make a case for a kind of Derridean textual ontology of life, that doesn’t buy us continuity. It buys us something like a condition of possibility claim – i.e. living things have the structure of the iterable mark in virtue of the functional indeterminacy of their component mechanisms. But even if some functional indeterminacy is a condition for contentfulness (As Dennett argues in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea) it isn’t the same. And it doesn’t tell us whether or not the amplification of functional indeterminacy won’t efface meaning altogether, which is why the transcendental model is misleading and why Malabou’s closing remarks are so in need of their own deconstruction.
Well, in a sense all speculative claims have their messianic interpretative regress-ender, so it’s kind of unfair of me, I think, to fault her for swinging for bleachers in the fog. For me, it’s the ingroupishness that’s the real problem. They need to take some genuine social responsibility for their claims, see themselves as they are seen sans all the face-saving bullshit. If they don’t, they are doomed.
Where would I find that argument in DDI, David? Could you clarify your case for the Derridean textual ontology of life? For me, all machines have ‘slop’ (as Wimsatt would say), and in the case of bio-machinery, evolution has found ways to leverage reproductive advantages out of that slop. And this is all she’s really talking about in her readings of epigenetics and cloning. Given the radically heuristic nature of ‘content,’ all that slop is neglected with the rest of the machinery, which is the only thing that renders the ‘promiscuity of content’ a phenomenological surprise. ‘Graceful degradation,’ or functional robustness, is a direct consequence of our inability to derive ‘pure’ iterations–as is evolution itself.
Here’s the quote I was thinkin on:
“Unless there were ‘meaningless’ or ‘indeterminate’ variation in the triggering conditions of the various frogs’ eyes, there could be no raw material (blind variation) for selection for a new purpose to act upon. The indeterminacy that Fodor (and others) see as a flaw in Darwinian accounts of the evolution of meaning is actually a precondition for any such evolution . . . Meaning, like function, on which it so directly depends, is not something determinate at its birth. It arises not by saltation or special creation, but by a (typically gradual) shift of circumstances (p. 408 i the 1995 Penguin edition).”
Otherwise put, Fodor’s disjunction problem highlights the fact that a symbol that had an absolutely determinate meaning, really wouldn’t be all that symbolic. Generalising, a biological system whose tokens could only be used for one thing or in one context wouldn’t furnish the variation for opportunistic re-use in evolutionary or cultural contexts. I’m just noting the obvious analogy with Derrida’s iterability argument. Here’s Sam Wheeler rocking it in Indeterminacy of French Translation:
“Because of iterability, the possibility of other meaningful occurrences of the linguistic item with different meanings, something beyond the linguistic item must be brought in to complete meaning, if meaning is to be completed. The completion can only be a context that itself includes language-like items that themselves require interpretation in context. And so on. At every point where clarification by context would be required, some language-like phenomena require interpretation, again by context. a still other context.
The possibility of occurrence with other meaning is part of the essence of what it is to be a linguistic item. That is, unless it were possible for this very sentence to be taken as, for instance, non-serious, it would not have significance. The meaning of the sentence itself, in virtue of the iterability described above, is not tied to the particular personal intention that produced it. On an occasion of utterance of course, the intention would clarify the meaning of the utterance. The only difficulty is that the intention is itself something language-like, and so subject to interpretation in diverse ways. Only a kind of meaningful entity or state that could not be misinterpreted would finally and unambiguously fix meaning. The denial of the possibility of such a magic language of thought is the conclusion of Derrida’s critique of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena.”]
No magic language. No magic functions, either. This is probably all the textual ontology we need.
I see. Same thing, then. No slop, no variation, no evolution.
That’s a great quote. You might think it odd but I actually would divide the issue between Fodor and Dennett, insofar as the apparent determinacy of meaning is something that itself requires explanation. There’s a reason (aside from the lack of a graduate program at Tufts) that Fodor’s account was far and away the more popular in philosophy of mind circles. Without some natural account of determinacy, its hard to understand evaluability/correctness, and thus actually explain cognition. So long as the eliminativist (or quasi-eliminativist in Dennett’s case) fails to explain/explain-away the apparent determinacy of meaning, then his or her account remains drastically incomplete. And also, I think Dennett has far too much faith in the capacity of intentional cognition to theoretically solve for cognition more generally. Meaning always distorts theoretical contexts, simply because it’s a low-dimensional fragment adapted to the resolution of practical interpretative concerns. (There’s a reason why Brandom finds Dennett so amenable to his thoroughly supernatural system of philosophy!) There’s just no such as ‘meaning’ outside various practical, problem-solving contexts (what Wittgenstein misdiagnoses as ‘language games’). So I always get itchy when he deploys intentional idioms in theoretical contexts. The fact is, he really only has an intentional story (the stance story) to give when asked to explain what he’s doing.
So how do I see it? The fact is nothing needs to be brought in ‘to complete meaning,’ because there’s nothing to complete. We are environmentally engaged systems always, even when dreaming. What philosophers call ‘context’ is best seen as a metacognitive kluge, a way to reference the neglect suffered by philosophical reflection on meaning and cognition. The kind of temporalization of the relation between context and meaning you find in Derrida is best seen as a reductio of context and meaning. Once you distinguish between communication as it is, as opposed to communication as it appears to reflection, you can safely set all this aside. The latter is informed by the serial trickle of information selected for conscious broadcast: and people are perennially surprised we simply cannot get our heads around ‘meaning’! On a flat, materialist account, everything is irreflexive, always. The miraculous thing about human communicative cognition is reflexivity, or synthesis, which BBT explains via neglect, the fact that the absence of difference making differences generates various judgements of identity (such as only-game-in-town effects like ‘transcendental signifieds’). In this sense, what Derrida’s doing is showing up the illusory nature of reflexivity in the specialized idiom of reflexivity. He takes the reflective illusion of the semantic as his starting point, confusing the limits of metacognition for something ontological (text), then endlessly calls attention to consequences of neglect, the way reflection fools us into thinking that communication is something other than an endlessly variable, ecologically specific, environmental relation. On my account, context is a way to characterize that neglect without understanding it.
The best way to understand a nonbinary position like mine is to watch children, who know what they know, mean what they mean, without the least inkling of our theoretical imbroglios. That’s what we want to explain, not the heaps of second-order speculation we’ve heaped upon it.
[…] December 2, 2015, in Uncategorized, by enemyin1 Scott Bakker has written a fascinating and extremely timely interrogation of a recent article by Catherine Malabou on the implications of recent biology for biopolitics in […]
‘One life only’ is nothing but spiritualism. I think it was Philip K Dicks obsession too. How could lives which shared a common origin have catabolic and conflictual relations with respect to one another. If only we could see the real truth of universe of living information or some shit, life could magically accord with the harmonious ideas of life bequeathed to us by pretheoretical intentionalist cosmogeny!
I suppose you could come up with some kind of ‘leash account,’ where naivete functions to police the application of intentional idioms to those ecologies that are adaptive. But it’s kind of humbling to think your father’s estimation of that ‘philosophy bullshit’ was likely the truest thing anyone has ever told you about it!
On a somewhat related note, claiming chronological priority by reframing cultural triage as old hat is an interesting strategy I haven’t seen that much.
What a dick. They guy, like, never once referenced Neuropath, man. Otherwise, I’m not sure what you mean Frank.
I’m pretty sure I originally misread it. When he talks about the neuronovel replicating and systematizing the earlier insights of the psychological novel I had taken him to mean replicating without recontextualizing, which made it sound like he was dismissing the intrusion of neuroscience upon novel writing as a non challenge that’s already been more skillfully addressed long ago, but that’s not really what he’s getting at.
Now I’m not really sure what he’s getting at to be honest.
I think he’s just trying to say a bunch of clever things both neuro and literary, is all.
John Cleese lays out Blind Brain Theory in a short clip: https://youtu.be/-M-vnmejwXo
As the stars would have it, Cleese also happens to be narrating a new film based on the cultural history (and astrologer) Richard Tarnas’ work: http://changingofthegods.com/
Awesome. But what do you think, Matthew? Why should we presume science won’t level the traditional domain of the human when it’s levelled all others? Certainly you have arguments. Lay them on us.
As I’ve said before, I agree with you about intentionality. Phenomenological philosophers need to get with the program and recognize that the causal (in my terms, the “prehensional”) is prior to the intentional. Where we disagree is on how to characterize the causal/prehensional. I don’t see how causation can be coherently conceptualized in non-prehensional terms. I think you dismiss the process-relational alternative to Continentalism too quickly. Don’t forget that Whitehead was right there with Russell as a founder of the analytic school. He initiated developments in math and logic that purified these “languages” of all semantic and intuitive content. And even more so than Russell, he was one of the few mathematical physicists to really grasp the implications of relativity and quantum theories in the 1910s and 20s. So if you are looking for a philosophical school of thought that not only takes natural science seriously, but that actually emerged out of the sciences, why not consider Whitehead?
As far as science “leveling the traditional domain of the human,” if this was going to happen it would have happened 150 years ago. The “semantic apocalypse” you are predicting has been heralded by scientistic types for quite a long time already. It hasn’t materialized. Despite the myth of the Enlightenment, religious and spiritual perspectives are gaining more ground today than ever before (for better and for worse). What really frightens me is the unholy mixture unknowing religiosity and technology known as Transhumanism. It’s just re-heated Christian providentialism.
“I don’t see how causation can be coherently conceptualized in non-prehensional terms.”
If the whole of science has been able to tick along quite nicely without worrying about this irresolvable debate, why bother worrying about it now? What does it add aside from perpetually underdetermined controversy? Why not just shrug at “conditions of possibility” and the endless interpretative wars they give rise to?
If you haven’t noticed, we seem to be running out of time!
On a factual note, religiosity continues to decline, even in America.
If “science” means knowledge, then I worry about it not having any coherent conceptual basis for causality. If “science” just means useful technique, then yeah, who cares. Let’s just get on with the blind will to power.
As a philosopher, I can’t help but ask these questions. Alas, reason is saddled with questions it cannot answer but that it also cannot avoid asking, as Kant told us long ago. Philosophy is an infinite task and so should not be held to the same standard as “normal science” (in Kuhn’s sense), as though it should just solve clearly defined puzzles with definitive answers. I don’t deny that philosophy, mostly due to its lack of contribution to GDP, is going extinct. But I don’t have to like it.
And unlike Kant, I don’t believe the purpose of philosophy is to deduce conditions of possible experience. It is rather to uncover the genetic conditions of actual experience (which is another way of talking about your project, is it not?). Again, we share many of the same critiques of phenomenologism, we just have differing metaphysical interpretations of the ontological status of scientific objects. You will deny that you’re perspective relies on any speculative basis, I’m sure. But it seems to me that when you refer to “causal” explanations of how things in themselves operate below the level of consciousness, you’re not showing your work. “Causation” remains an unexplained explainer. But maybe you’re saying science isn’t in the business of “explaining” but only of “transforming” (i.e., not knowledge, but power)?
You gotta admit, the line between ‘Philosophy is an infinite task’ and ‘Philosophy is an interminable parlour game’ is an awfully fine one.
For me, philosophy is about figuring out how things work in ways that do work. Anything can be argued, which is why we require ways to sort between arguments. My position is theoretical, speculative, but it is also hypothetical, pending further stories regarding how things work. It can and will be sorted. In this sense, our positions are profoundly different. Blind Brain Theory will either be confirmed, or discounted. There’s endless ways to interpret it’s ‘ultimate foundations’ and absolutely no way to arbitrate between them, so why bother?
So yeah, sure, causation remains as much an theoretical unknown on my account as it does on yours… because the fact is, you have no way of knowing whether your metaphysical account is the one-in-a-million true one or not. You may feel as if you’re doing ’cause’ a favour, but it seems pretty clear all you’re really doing is tethering it to endless controversy. Why should anyone prefer your stab-in-the-dark explainer over my skeptical one? The threat with all infinite tasks is that they are ultimately futile. Why should anyone think endlessly disputing issues that make no practical difference is anything but futile?
Hi Matthew,
I’ve read a little secondary literature on Whitehead, but haven’t really dived into his writings. It’s my loss I’m sure, for all sorts of reasons. have you any suggested readings for novices ? (your work looks deeply impressive btw)
I think there’s a case for arguing that the semantic apocalypse (whatever form it takes) would be a technological or technoscientific event rather than a purely intellectual one. That is, it will be a case of instrumental eliminativism rather than the more familiar theoretical kind.
This could be so if meaning falls out of social practices in some way. There are various technological scenarios that we might consider for the instrumental elimination of propositional attitudes. For example, if being a language user is necessary for being a “true believer” then a technological device that superseded language – a la Churchland’s commisure – would lead the practical demise of the attitudes. Likewise I’ve argued here ( http://philpapers.org/rec/RODD-2 ) that if something like anti-reductionist materialism is true with regard to the attitudes, then extremely self-modifying (hyperplastic) agents would have no use for them. Thus as we approach the limit of hyperplasticity, we approach the volcano’s lip, so to speak. I think Scott’s already sketched out this scenario vividly in Neuropath.
David, I appreciate your distinction between instrumental and theoretical realization of BBT. I see the former as perhaps inevitable given the amount of funding from DARPA and other sources for this type of research. I find the latter implausible for several reasons, the most glaring of which is the performative contradiction of offering a theory about human brains that denies the theoretical capacity of human brains.
I wonder if you are familiar with Whitehead’s theory of propositional feelings? Following from his prehensional interpretation of causality (causation as the inheritance of feeling), propositions are no longer simply human linguistic phenomena but intrinsic to natural processes all the way down, serving as an explanation for how novel potentialities become ingredient in physical actuality.
“I find the latter implausible for several reasons, the most glaring of which is the performative contradiction of offering a theory about human brains that denies the theoretical capacity of human brains.”
Straw. BBT simply points out that our ability to cognize is a function of information access and computational resources (which is to say, ecological). This puts limits on our ability to reliably theorize.
But otherwise, I’m even more confused as to how BBT could be instrumentally ‘inevitable’ and yet theoretically ‘incoherent’!
I sometimes think what science will look like a hundred years from now. Philosophy like the other humanities (i.e., art, history, literature, etc.) will vanish a museum piece in a dead and dying western civ. twilight. Science welded as it is to the living system of capitalism will continue because of its alliance with profit and innovation. I’m sure as you’ve suggested philosophers may still wander around among us but they will in essence be living fossils that no longer hold sway in the actual culture of that era. With advances in our current gaming systems into holographic and advanced displays combined with the emerging AI and Mediatainment empires both the University and Library as institutions will vanish while new forms of learning and mentation will become tied to empirically driven tools that merge with our everyday lives. Humans will no longer use reflection, memory, and the hard won knowledge systems we accumulated during the Humanistic age of Books. In fact with advances in artificial intelligence I’ll assume our machines which have become our externalized brains will do most of the advanced thinking for us, and for the most part make the viable decisions for us as well.
What will these humans become? For the most part they will become obsolete and slowly be upgraded into either merging with robotics or virtual civilizations; either losing our minds for physical bodies of robotic assemblages to advance into those inhuman zones of space we as humans had little chance of ever moving into; and, exiting into virtual conclaves where our holographic assemblages will allow for strange and inventive paradises based on creative art and imagination.
Either way as you’ve pointed out if science reduces our thought to Being (naturalism) we will in essence return to Parmenides original fiction of the merger of thought and environment in a unified distribution of intelligence into its environmental complex. Humans in essence will disappear into their environments, and not even realize this is what their doing having transformed and externalized their minds through technological singularity long before.
If “beauty” can be an appropriate term here, Steven, that’s a beautifully turned response and a kind of ethical provocation in so many ways…
Of course I’ll add ironically that if we ever do eliminate the gap between the symbolic and the natural, thought and Being; erase the reflective organ of the brain, consciousness we will in deed and fact commit if not literal then figural suicide of the human, and once again enter the natural order of animals without reflection. Is this really a step forward? Once we resolve the void between thought and its object, eliminate the lack that drives reflection will we not forget thought altogether? Will we not become completely blind to thought and Being? Without that Narcissistic scar of which consciousness as Freud fictionalized ages ago spoke, will we not renter the mirror, become the mirror reflecting nothing more that what we see without the ability to reflect on that reflection? Second order reflection having vanished into this eliminative move? What do we gain thereby?
And if there’s never been any ‘gap’ outside the baffles of philosophical reflection, what then? A stroke is a stroke, no matter what one claims about materialism. The meat has always made the decisions, and its only now that it’s coming to realize as much. We evolved to make due in shallow information environments, to understand things in the absence of anything but the most granular mechanical knowledge of our environments. So now we find ourselves confronted with the growing obsolescence of our ancestral tools, and the problem we face is that these tools are wired in, that we cannot but cognize ourselves and others save by using them.
Yea, I agree – the metaphor of the ‘gap’ is just a bad way of thinking, one that we use because like God we have no way of recognizing what we don’t know, so we continue to fill our ignorance with poetry… rhetoric, words, symbols for the unknown… trying to fool ourselves that we know what we’re talking about, when we know very well we have no utter clue.
Lovely description. One way to see this process is in terms of ‘noise reduction’ (or ‘rationalization’ in the most profound sense), where our systematic relation to our environments becomes ever more intricate and robust, until it really makes no sense to consider ‘individuals’ over and against environments any more. Augmentation leads to Integration leads to Choir.
Yes, I do agree we seem to be becoming more Borg-like day by day: a collective being in which solitude and the atomic self-reflecting solitaire will become an icon of an Emersonian fiction, the vestiges of Romantic Ideology that has been slain along with its Victorian Age democracy… the atomized individual is what we’re eliminating for a more robust and communicative global communication wherein mind and machinic (AI, robotics, etc.) are in unison. Our environment and us both becoming more and more artificial in which the natural/artificial divide is itself eliminated.
Technological Buddhism.
Buddhism is a form of realism: the acceptance that all life is sorrowful (dukka). Not sure if there could be a technological Buddhism: unless machines will suffer? haha!
I’m no expert on Buddhism. Wikipedia states:
Within Buddhism, samsara is defined as the continual repetitive cycle of birth and death that arises from ordinary beings’ grasping and fixating on a self and experiences. Specifically, samsara refers to the process of cycling through one rebirth after another within the six realms of existence, where each realm can be understood as physical realm or a psychological state characterized by a particular type of suffering. Samsara arises out of avidya (ignorance) and is characterized by dukkha (suffering, anxiety, dissatisfaction). In the Buddhist view, liberation from samsara is possible by following the Buddhist path.
To the extent that technology destroys the sense of individual selfhood it should destroy the individual capacity for suffering. To the extent that individuals merge into “a collective being in which solitude and the atomic self-reflecting solitaire will become an icon of an Emersonian fiction” the will lose their capacity for individual suffering. Machinehood is a sort of Nirvana.
Michael/Steven, have either of you checked out IEET’s Cyborg Buddha Project? I don’t know anything about it, I only discovered it today when reading these comments inspired me to do a Google search on Buddhism and transhumanism.
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/cyborgbuddha
Can’t say I really agree with it – seems to come from middle income thinking, where material goods just kind of turn up – somehow the process of them turning up is greased. That’d be the preferable situation, really – when resource aquisition is greased, just as much a kick to the left buttock or the right buttock sends the greased person in a different angle than before.
I mean dealing with this involves identifying the reward structures involved and contemplating rebuilds. But we never did that in the past as nature was the thing we were up against and couldn’t be rebuilt (back then) – so the inclination is to just look at the behavioural decline of the peeps involved. That’s what this looks like.
TL;DR: Don’t agree, it didn’t follow the money (and lack thereof) enough.
Reblogged this on dark ecologies and commented:
A good discussion on Malabou on R. Scott Bakker’s site. I want add too much to the discussion other than a quick note.
Awesome stuff.
This is the second time I’ve heard a call for a “new materialism” in the last few days. Dale Peck’s flaming molotov of a book against the excesses and insularity of contemporary literary fiction ended with a plea for the same. Some coincidence.
Is that promising? Considering his sympathetic views of and forays into genre fiction, maybe. Then again, a decade after he swore off ever writing another such negative review, I picked up a brand new copy of his book off amazon for 1 cent, so maybe not.
As for your critique of Malabou and continental philosophy in general, something about it has been seriously bothering me. The scientific argument to the cudgel is an argument of power. It’s won and lost on the basis that falling rocks can cudgel us in Real ways that mere armchair theorizing about rocks can’t, and so if you science your way into fling rocks better than the next guy, then regardless of how you did it, the rest of the world better watch out. But as you noted, we are natural in such a way that we cannot cognize ourselves as natural. That implies the more we uncover the heuristically neglected underlying mechanisms of our own cognition, the less intuitively convincing they’ll end up appearing to us. Which means ironically, if we are nevertheless trained by an ever expanding array of past demonstrations of efficacy into the habit of attributing “cudgel power” to such emerging scientific discoveries, the more likely we’ll also become at misattributing this efficacy towards anything that bears the mere resemblance to scientific discovery to our perennially biased and judgment challenged selves.
From people in the 1920s drinking radium water, that miracle cure-all of atomic science, to dating sites nowadays boasting of fancy algorithms matching couples based on a hundred separate criteria, people are liable as ever to hear a handful of personal testimonials and truthy handwaves of so-called fact and go “Wow! Sign me up!.”
Precisely because I buy into BBT, I think the threat of scientism is very real and only going to get worse. The scientific understanding of sexual attraction and pair bonding may have truly advanced to the point of allowing companies to match people up to historically unprecedented levels of success, but the flip side of such advances outpacing our evolved heuristics actually make us increasingly less equipped to separate all the brilliance from the bullshit. If at a time when truths still mostly fit our intuitions, skillfully hacking the cheat spaces of misapplied heuristics could already elicit belief responses regardless of the “truth” of the matter, then our judgment is going to have even less to fall back on when scientific truths start to look increasingly like Cthulhu nightmares.
So I think there is a point to being wary of unwarranted scientism. Due to their insularity, continental philosophers may not always be the most qualified to make such accusations about science, but at the same time a large focus of their profession consists of studying those very same cheat space hacks and crash space insanities that are increasingly dominating our lives. Rhetoric, argumentation, ideology! Isn’t that the bread and butter of heuristic cheat space hacking?
Thus I believe to merely outline the rhetorical strategy of “scientism” as continental philosophy’s derationalization of outgroup competitors is, on the one hand insightful and important to note, but on the other hand also dangerously incomplete as a critique. They may be laughably bad at addressing scientific topics they don’t sufficiently understand, but they’re not necessarily wrong to fret about people’s reactions.
Might want to use another term than ‘New Materialism’ though. What purports to new materialism these days is the brain child of Deleuze’s follower, Michael DeLanda and his epigones Rosy Braidotti, Karan Barad, Jane Bennett, and others who seem to be combining a form of new vitalism with an ethical flavor.
In some ways if one could combine the subtractive (eliminative) ontology of Badiou’s Being and Even, Logic of Worlds base on Set Theoretic with BBT one might actually have an interesting go. But that’s another ball of wax, and I’m sure Scott would see it as just one more bargain with the devil of intentionality. But worth a look.
I agree pretty much all the way down the line. What I would add, though, is that buying into the myriad theoretical rationalizations of meaning (the stories of meaning philosophers like to tell) makes it very, very difficult to diagnose breakdowns in practical meaning (the ecological degradation of our socio-cognitive heuristics), to the point where it becomes tempting to see groups like continentals doing anything much more than aiding and abetting the very processes they claim to be ‘resisting.’
It’s a tightrope… as you say.
Maybe only a fallen philosopher who’s studied the metaphysics of presence in depth could be crazy enough to spend this much persistent effort writing about BBT. 🙂
that all came to the surface when the branch derrideans went after Rorty for his deflationary readings of Derrida (we are always already manipulating being my favorite twist) , the irony is seeing folks like Malabou and all now making the move (limited as they are) towards something much more neo-pragmatist.
To S.C Hickman,
Of course I’ll add ironically that if we ever do eliminate the gap between the symbolic and the natural, thought and Being; erase the reflective organ of the brain, consciousness we will in deed and fact commit if not literal then figural suicide of the human, and once again enter the natural order of animals without reflection.
Uh, why is that? Are you sure it’s entering once again? Maybe it’s just not moving at all, where we are and always were and just figuring that out now?
How does that ‘erase the reflective organ of the brain’?
Or are you talking some kind of actual surgery?
Well, if you’ve read Scott’s Neuropath there are many ways this might come about: surgery, genetic manipulation, the singularity into either robotic or virtual existence – which might entail other forms of alterity, modes of being and consciousness. Either way the human mode of being and reflection would no longer exist as it does now. Whether our philosophical speculations about consciousness change or not is just another fallacy of the heuristic universe. For me consciousness is just one more metaphor to describe in natural language something we in face – as Scott keeps telling us, have no clue about and probably neglect the information we need to ever truly understand it, being both blind to those processes, as well as being limited to a small range of information (meta-neglect) onto that system. So in fact and deed if we alter into something else, the human species as it exists will exist no more; ergo, suicide or erasure (i.e., another mask for humans no longer being part of the rational universe of humanism).
Oh – you mean with surgery as part of the cognitive process itself? When I heard ‘elimate the gap between the symbolic and the natural’, I just didn’t think of surgery or anything – call me old hat!
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/15/tech/electronic-skin/
Like the aliens in ‘Blindsight’
http://www.rifters.com/real/Blindsight.htm
but Scott’s right. If you get past the first 20 pages or so and like it you might as well buy it.
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